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ABSTRACT 
Doreen Thierauf: Spectacularly Conceived: Sexual Violence and Burdened Motherhood             
in Nineteenth-Century British Literature 
(Under the direction of Beverly Taylor and Ruth Salvaggio) 
 
This dissertation responds to the traditional scholarly assumption that near universal 
censorship prevented discussion of sexual assault and pregnancy in nineteenth-century British 
literature. I argue that these issues are not only at the heart of Mary Prince’s slave narrative The 
History of Mary Prince (1831), Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s verse novel Aurora Leigh (1856) 
and her slave poems, as well as George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1871) and Daniel Deronda (1876), 
but that women’s reproduction is represented in remarkably similar ways in each of these texts. 
Elite women writers staged abused, suffering, or pregnant bodies in spectacular and often 
exploitative ways, utilizing a mode of representation that derived from sentimental genres of the 
late eighteenth century. Reading these women-authored texts in the context of abolitionist, 
medical, and legal literature, I show that the creation of female writers’ authority in the Victorian 
literary marketplace was intimately tied to the rise of professional discourses, and that both 
processes depended on the prurient display of non-elite women’s bodies in distress. I conclude 
that female Victorian novelists and poets, echoing male professionals, accepted the notion that 
the public display of women’s sexuality threatened the institutional stability of marriage, 
procreative norms, and cultural reproduction. Spectacular displays of women’s sexuality were 
strongly associated with working-class femininity, and writers’ depiction of women’s 
reproductive troubles supported a fundamentally conservative political message. My argument 
thus complicates previous scholars’ understanding of nominally progressive nineteenth-century 
 iv 
writings. I demonstrate that rhetorical strategies marked by sentimental appeal, professional 
detachment, and half-concealed eroticism allowed elite women writers to position themselves as 
major spokespersons for cultural reform. These strategies ultimately helped cement the 
economically dependent status quo of female working-class and colonial subjects in Victorian 
Britain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Sentimental Beginnings and “Rouzing” Sexual Spectacles 
The project’s title, “Spectacularly Conceived,” conveys my overall concern with 
nineteenth-century authors’ tendency to invite readers to witness someone else’s pain, 
particularly pain experienced by socially inferior women, in order to educate audiences in 
sympathy and politico-moral citizenship. Throughout this work, my use of the word “spectacle” 
refers broadly to the literary staging or exhibition of a person or object to generate pleasure in the 
reader, or to entertain, fascinate, and satisfy curiosity (see Mallipeddi 27). Throughout the 
nineteenth century, the dramatic literary staging of a woman’s anguished affect and the shameful 
exposure of her body (or of individual body parts) communicated her sexual availability. A raped 
woman’s lament of her loss of purity or, say, a narrator’s multi-page study of a transgressive 
heroine’s facial features served as sexual “vignettes, staged and managed for the consumption of 
a viewer” (Jarvis ix), and could be expected to evoke titillation among Victorian readers. As I 
will show, much of British abolitionism’s political force rested on the spectacular staging of 
female slaves’ involuntary participation in sexually suggestive scenes because anti-slavery 
writers realized that non-visceral descriptions failed to convince readers of slavery’s immorality. 
Later, Elizabeth Barrett Browning exploited that same representational logic to cement her 
unusually powerful presence within the transatlantic literary marketplace and to direct readers’ 
emotions into reformist channels. Even a famously “cerebral” writer like George Eliot, 
 2 
publishing in the 1870s, was not immune to putting her coquettes up for public consumption to 
make a point about the decline of middle-class culture—a decline occasioned by girls’ moral 
miseducation and resulting in their mercenary summons of the public’s prurient gaze.  
Nineteenth-century authors, with their penchant for showcasing female bodies on display, 
were indebted to David Hume’s paradox of tragic pleasure. At the beginning of his essay “Of 
Tragedy” (1757), Hume ponders the 
unaccountable pleasure, which the spectators of a well-written tragedy receive from 
sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions, that are in themselves disagreeable and 
uneasy. The more they are touched and affected, the more are they delighted with the 
spectacle; and as soon as the uneasy passions cease to operate, the piece is at an end. … 
The whole art of the poet is employed, in rouzing and supporting the compassion and 
indignation, the anxiety and resentment of his audience. They are pleased in proportion as 
they are afflicted, and never are so happy as when they employ tears, sobs, and cries to 
give vent to their sorrow, and relieve their heart, swoln with the tenderest sympathy and 
compassion. (185-6) 
 
The problem of the “unaccountable pleasure” readers derived from uneasy spectacles constitutes 
one of this dissertation’s central themes. Most obviously, the derivation of pleasure from 
observing someone else’s pain poses an ethical dilemma.1 Borrowing from Aristotle, Hume 
theorized that audiences’ store of negative emotion would be purged in moments of tragic 
catharsis. After releasing pent-up anger or melancholy, spectators’ spirits would soar. Others 
would derive satisfaction from having their emotions aroused towards morally worthy and 
interesting new objects, or from observing their own heightened sensitivity and responsiveness to 
someone else’s pain. Edmund Burke, writing in the same year as Hume, proposed that 
sympathetic observation of distress would create a certain pre-cognitive, emotional, and 
instinctive “delight,” especially when art represented anguish effectively. Burke reasoned that 
spectators would feel immense relief upon the realization that they were not the ones subjected to 
                                                 
1 See Oliver, for recent investigations into ethical recognition. 
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pain. To counteract the selfishly voyeuristic dimension his analysis affords, Burke further 
posited—without reference to specific scripture—that God had created humans to “be united by 
the bond of sympathy.”2 The delight of the spectacular experience would be infused with a 
productive sort of pain prompting the observer to relieve suffering. Where pleasure “hinders us 
from shunning scenes of misery,” Burke mused, “the pain we feel prompts us to relieve 
ourselves in relieving those who suffer” (43). Humanity’s bonds, therefore, were thought to be 
forged from the mutually exclusive impulses of selfishness and altruism, and relied on human 
beings’ universal (and universally identical) ability to experience and witness pain. Aesthetic 
form would aid spectators’ apprehension by converting the consumption of a public body into 
pleasurable aesthetic experience. The degree of the audience’s distress or passion would depend 
on the work’s artistic excellence because positive aesthetic appreciation could enhance the force 
of negative feelings. Finally, equality of affectability suggested equality of status, an idea further 
developed by philosophers, political orators, and, later, novelists, radicals, and socialists over the 
course of the nineteenth century.3 
Neither Hume, Burke, nor the authors following them ever sampled the range of readers’ 
affective responses to tragic scenes, although, as I argue, writers attempted to harness tragedy’s 
pleasures to produce political affects with particular political effects. For example, readers of 
abolitionist materials clearly showed themselves to be drawn to the forbidden exhilarations of the 
violent spectacle, and British anti-slavery agitators explicitly exploited the spectacle’s attractions 
                                                 
2 Burke 42; see Carey 29-30. 
3 Dadlez 215-23; see Carey 30, 38; Sánchez-Eppler 100. Hume writes that this “very eloquence, with which the 
melancholy scene is represented … diffuse[s] the highest satisfaction on the audience” (190-1; see Dadlez 217). 
Hume further: “The impulse or vehemence, arising from sorrow, compassion, indignation, receives a new direction 
from the sentiments of beauty. ... And the soul, being, at the same time, rouzed by passion, and charmed by 
eloquence, feels on the whole a strong movement, which is altogether delightful” (191-2). 
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in the service of emancipation. This project not only suspects4 that some audiences enjoyed 
opening themselves up to the titillating spectacle rather than honing their capacity for 
compassion or purging negative emotion (processes that in themselves problematically 
instrumentalize someone else’s exposure to the public gaze), but also that authors consciously 
attempted to regulate, even institutionalize, flows of sympathetic and prurient affects. At stake is 
the consideration that Hume’s “swoln” spectators—wittingly or not—reinforced and perpetuated 
the violence that the literary representation brought to their supposedly sympathetic attention.  
My analysis begins with an examination of The History of Mary Prince, a mostly non-
fictional account of a slave woman’s life in the British colonies of Bermuda and Antigua. Ultra-
personal testimonies like Prince’s, consisting of a sequence of scenes in which the slave, “an 
aggrieved, melancholy, and sentimental witness” (Mallipeddi 2), first observes and then 
experiences extreme victimization, formed the bedrock of the British abolitionist publishing 
circuit and showcased reformers’ belief in the power of narrated personal experience to effect 
policy changes. To justify my choice to begin with the History, I take my cue from Tricia 
Lootens who has argued that Victorian literary criticism, despite the powerful presence of 
postcolonial and Empire studies, still “echoe[s] and elaborate[s] most late Victorians’ own 
ambivalent, haunted evasions of the heritage of transatlantic slavery.”5 One can easily forget that 
Mary Prince’s History (1831) and Eliot’s Daniel Deronda (1876) appeared within a time span of 
                                                 
4 Although this mode of suspicious reading might have become somewhat unfashionable, I would wager that the 
quasi-pornographic representation of sexual violence in Victorian literature constitutes a test case for the ethical 
limits of ‘mere’ surface reading. Rather than taking a “triumphalist cast” in excavating half-buried emplotments 
(Felski 230), my study’s overall ethos is one of mourning in light of the army of ghosts still awaiting scholarly 
reckoning. See Burton 66, on “continuous suspicion and radical doubt” with which feminists should confront the 
historical objects of empire, and Armstrong 1995, 417, on paranoia as “an essential phase in the reading process” 
because “only a closeness to a text’s terrors keeps one sane.” 
5 Lootens 2006, 494; see Lootens 2017, 16, 34. 
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forty-five years because the cultural and political worlds they invoke seem completely detached 
from one another. The chapter sequence of this dissertation intends to linger on some of slavery’s 
“haunted evasions” as they reach into the second half of the century, particularly in their relation 
to the spectacular (non)representation of reproductive anguish and sexual violence. As Angela 
Davis states, “slavery, like [black women’s] sexuality, lies continually at the periphery of our 
consciousness; eluding representation, it hovers over us [and] disrupts our lives with 
unpredictable eruptions” (104). Slavery not only stole black women’s sexuality and reproductive 
functions “for white pleasure and profit” (A. Davis 104), its legacy continued—and continues—
to burden descendants of enslaved people socially and economically. One of the mechanisms 
regulating that continued burdening is the pornographic gaze, the historical Western visual and 
literary convention that, as some critics have argued, first arose to “explain” black women’s 
sexuality to Europeans and that, in the twentieth century, contributed to the rise of the porn 
industry. At the core of the pornographic gaze—wielded by men and women alike—is the 
unbroken history of “racial and sexual fetishism obsessed with the fascinations and horrors of 
black women’s difference.” 6 Its purpose is the elision of women’s status as political subjects. 
The Victorian age incompletely processed slavery, culturally speaking, because the 
sentimental literary tradition that emerged alongside abolitionism in the second half of the 
eighteenth century was so successful in producing politically explosive affect that it was never 
obliged to query the inherent ethical contradictions of its form, particularly its purposefully 
imperfect concealment of slavery’s atrocities. The abolitionist movement in Great Britain had 
expanded rapidly in the 1780s, mass-producing fiction and non-fiction that contributed to the 
                                                 
6 Miller-Young 28. The pornographic structure of representation on which I will elaborate below is unaffected by 
the implied gender of the narrative’s voice or point of view. The explicitly female ‘subjectivity’ of Mary Prince’s 
narrator as well as Barrett Browning’s poetic speaker both deploy the pornographic gaze (see Kappeler 90). 
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consolidation of a Christian, often specifically Evangelical Christian, culture at home (Gould 
11). Abolitionist literature appealed to female readers of the middle and upper classes, as activist 
publishers and authors expected that women would inculcate anti-slavery convictions in their 
(male) children who would grow up to become abolitionist lawmakers. Because women, the 
cultural guardians of morality, were seen to be less susceptible to temptations of economic gain 
and political power, abolitionist texts invoked women’s ‘innate’ compassion and posited an 
imagined, and highly fraught, alliance between anti-slavery’s goals and the emerging cultural 
regime of metropolitan domesticity. Consequently, public approval of black women’s slave 
narratives (reflected in high sales numbers), was most easily won if stories successfully 
conveyed the fantasy that formerly enslaved women’s virtue would survive slavery more or less 
intact and that they were ready to serve the ends of white English domesticity.7 Harnessing 
domestic ideology to rectify the evils of slavery not only educated white readers in the moral and 
emotional standards at home, but perpetuated structures of authority that themselves were at the 
heart of slavery. 
Abolition mobilized elaborate conventions of sentimental discourse designed to politicize 
readers and, through popular consent, effect the end of British slavery. Crucially, the sentimental 
mode, with its appeals to readers’ tears, was constitutionally “leaky.” It portrayed slavery’s 
                                                 
7 See Sánchez-Eppler 109. White metropolitan morality on both sides of the Atlantic deemed rape an essentially 
nonpublic crime—yet one with catastrophic public ramifications—and did not easily sanction written accounts that 
openly suggested it to be a public and virtually omnipresent practice under slavery. The metropolitan understanding 
of female virtue equated chastity with silence. Consequently, “it [was] impossible for an unchaste woman to be 
raped” (Hartman 105). Since rape was seen to erase the victim’s already scant claims to liberal subjectivity, a black 
woman narrating her own rape was doubly dubious to a white audience already skeptical about black people’s 
suitedness for ‘civilization’ (Santamarina 232; see Altink 67; Woodard 133). Despite abolitionist texts’ focus on 
individual physical torture and subjection under slavery, they registered women’s sexual trauma as highly codifed 
circumlocution—easy to be recognized if one knew what to look for. In what follows I suggest that the knowing 
allusion to a socially inferior woman’s rape is, in fact, the necessary ingredient for post-abolition liberal British 
subjectivity. 
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atrocities as romantic family tragedy and sensationally divulged the open secret of systematic 
miscegenation between white men and black or mixed-race women in the colonies. Confronted 
with accusations of sexual exploitation on a massive scale, proslavery authors, in turn, asserted 
that women of color were by nature precocious and promiscuous.8 In aggregate, these discursive 
battles, with their standardized exposure of black bodies in pain, perpetuated rather than 
confronted slavery’s commodifications, equally subjecting colonial bodies to their respective 
labor disciplines and market regimes (see Mallipeddi 3-4). I suggest that the convention of not-
quite-unspeakable horrors—those ghostly hoverings and hauntings9 towards which Lootens and 
Davis point when they address slavery’s unfinished legacies—continued to shape the British 
cultural imaginary, and the novel tradition in particular, after Emancipation in 1834. The result 
was a long-standing tradition of a public language that failed to document sexual crimes, denied 
poor women the ability to articulate sexual identities, and maintained pornographic registers 
wielded by cultural elites to stabilize pre-Emancipation social and labor hierarchies. 
One of the most prominent long-term consequences of ‘leaky’ sentimental story-telling 
this project considers is the form of “enforced narratives of the self” (Steedman 55, 48). These 
are moments in which women (half-)confess to having been raped10 or abused, or in which their 
                                                 
8 See Miller-Young 33. British and colonial law usually disregarded rape or attempted rape of slaves at the hands of 
white men. Since colonial law did not (fully) recognize slaves’ subjectivity, sexual exploitation was automated as 
the legitimate use of forever willing property. Henrice Altink shows that some colonies imposed laws to reduce the 
occurrence of interracial sex. In 1826, Jamaica established the death sentence for white planters who had raped a 
slave, a singularly strict prohibition which did not occasion any convictions as it required slave women to procure 
complex evidence documenting the crime. Altink interprets the law as a strategy to assuage abolitionist voices in the 
British government (76). Nevertheless, some lingering doubt about black women’s humanity and interiority was 
regularly rephrased as the myth of black women’s seduction of white masters, expunging and romanticizing colonial 
sexual violence (Hartman 80-7; see Beckles 133). 
9 For contending with Victorian ghosts, see Roach 2-3 and passim, and Freedgood 45-7. 
10 While it might seem obvious to define rape as sexual intercourse between two (or more) partners without the 
consent of (at least) one of the partners, the concept remains notoriously difficult to define. Requiring ever-changing 
evidence for successful prosecution, rape’s legal status is contingent on historically shifting assumptions about 
ownership of women’s bodies and its impact on social relationships. For the purposes of this project, rape will be 
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transgressive actions are divulged for public consumption. Regardless of their fictional content, 
such narratives usually take the shape of autobiography, complete with birth place, names of 
parents and lovers, and rueful conversion to bourgeois domesticity. Moreover, they are mediated 
by middle-class or elite amanuenses. This socially superior interlocutory agent assumes the 
rights of a “magistrate,” in Jacques Derrida’s terms, a narrator whose authority sometimes 
overlaps or competes with the author’s. The magistrate occasions the confessional narrative, 
controls its plot, possesses the social power to demand a statement, institutes the victim-expert 
dyad, interprets what is said, measures the testimony against existing moral law, finds the 
speaker sufficiently virtuous, and vouches that the story is safe for public perusal. In the finished 
narrative, the magistrate’s leading questions are edited out, consolidating the genre as self-
evident and natural. The magistrate’s domicile—whether Thomas Pringle’s house in Claremont 
Square, Barrett Browning’s Florentine refuge11, or George Eliot’s vast medical library—becomes 
the birthplace of sexuality’s “official documents,” silencing alternative cultural possibilities of 
                                                 
broadly defined in accordance to an Elizabethan statute that guided nineteenth-century British law, according to 
which rape is “‘the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will’” (qtd. in Conley 520). 
Contemporary Western law tends to privilege concerns about the deliberate violent and devastating intrusion into the 
victim’s most intimate bodily and psychological space, and measures the severity of the crime against the human-
rights ideal that a person’s dignity and physical integrity are indefeasible (Horvath and Brown 3). Unlike earlier 
legal systems that prosecuted rape as a property crime that entitled fathers, husbands, or employers to restitution, 
nineteenth-century British law acknowledged the existence of women’s independent will. Yet, the courts based their 
adjudication on inferences about the accuser’s moral character, and most of the investigation hinged on assessing the 
degree of the accuser’s physical resistance. Carelessness, flirtatious behavior, or less than violent struggle damaged 
the accuser’s credibility and led to a verdict that blamed her for the loss of her reputation. Throughout the nineteenth 
century (and until today) judges were less likely to rule in favor of the accuser if she was of low social status. Judges 
considered male sexual aggression a laudable and inevitable feature of virile masculinity, although, as I will show in 
the first and third parts of this dissertation, high-status men were expected to shield violent impulses from public 
scrutiny. Sexual assaults were rhetorically minimized—and often forgiven—as unfortunate temporary 
transgressions, while rape accusations publically announced a woman’s loss of virtue and invited ridicule or 
incredulity (Conley 524-32). Under slavery, the systematic rape of enslaved women was a technology of 
domination, repression, and terror, employed to disable resistance, humiliate women and men, and thus disintegrate 
slave cultures (A. Davis 116). 
11 In accordance with scholarly convention, I will henceforth abbreviate the poet’s name as “EBB.”  
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speaking about sex.12 I argue that women writers specifically assumed the guise of the magistrate 
(usually imagined as sentimental or benevolent sisterhood) to claim authority and authorship 
within a literary market hostile towards female authors, winning status as regulators and 
institutionalizers of other women’s bodies. This guise suspended historical or fictional subjects 
in a state of “domiciliation”—put them under “house arrest” (Derrida 1995, 10, 12)—to ensure 
that women writers’ own lineage, literary or biological, would survive into the future. Black and 
poor women’s sexual labor was thus harnessed by literary representations to help define the 
terms of citizenship, liberal selfhood, and cultural belonging (see Miller-Young 35).  
 Although there has been a recent uptick in interest in sentimentality, many critics 
approach it dismissively.13 Particularly scholars of nineteenth-century literature appear to find 
sentimentalism’s grab for readers’ viscera distastefully self-indulgent. Lootens has remarked that 
scholars seem more at ease with the rhetorical violences of Victorian political satire than with 
sentimental literature’s ability to “jerk” one’s “corporeal chain.”14 Resisting the lure of today’s 
hostility towards “tear-jerking,” I would like to respond to Lootens’s and Marjorie Stone’s 
repeated calls for further explorations of the relationship between representations of anguish, 
ethics, and literary aesthetics.15 Sentimentality, along with its related and parallel tradition, 
                                                 
12 Derrida 1995, 9; see Steedman 67. 
13 See Mallipeddi 4; Sánchez-Eppler 100. 
14 Lootens 2006, 495; see Lootens 2017, 2, 16. 
15 The current critical aversion towards sentimentalism has to do with its starkly feminized, universally appealing 
‘gushing.’ It is a rhetorical mode addressing everyone in possession of a body and a ‘heart,’ regardless of age, 
political affinity, or intellectual preparation. Its historical association with maternalist philanthropy and with literary 
genres such as romance and melodrama renders the “tear-jerker” akin to the call of an imagined universal mother—a 
call that academics, navigating traditionally masculinist professional hierarchies, are loathe to heed. Sentimental 
literature written by and for women, however, “exercise[ed] unprecedented (and, perhaps, since unequalled) 
pragmatic public power” in the first half of the nineteenth century and therefore warrant renewed interest (Lootens 
2017, 39, see 16; Stone 2002, 150). 
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gothic melodrama, is defined by its preoccupation with feelings and changing emotional states, 
and consists of distinct and portable rhetorical strategies that emphasize representations of 
human emotional and physical anguish. By default, its spectacular scenes stage suffering as 
world-historically exceptional to win the reader’s sympathy and mobilize stereotype to support 
readers’ quick apprehension of the sufferer’s moral worth.16 As I will show in the first half of 
this project, antislavery authors invented an unstable black female body immediately 
recognizable as both rebelliously heroic and loyally servile. Translating political scandals into 
sexual ones, abolitionism’s sentimental spectacles imagined non-elite bodies (and souls) as 
deformed by circumstance, thereby soliciting and authorizing the well-meaning intervention of 
institutional establishments.17 The early Victorian liberal state, emerging after Emancipation in 
1834, rests on a historical legacy of intense political feeling and complexly imbricated 
spectatorship, and its coherence benefited from the cultural superimposition of sexual language 
over that of the centuries-long struggle for participatory democracy (see Levy 29-30). 
The spectacle as an event designed to foment political affect arose during a period of 
relative political stability and economic prosperity in late eighteenth-century Britain. For the first 
time, increasingly literate and wealthy readers were at sufficient leisure to take an interest in the 
suffering of others, less likely to encounter suffering in their daily lives than their ancestors, and 
able to provide private financial redress.18 Nineteenth-century philanthropic and social 
movements, erected on depictions of pain, can be considered cultural reactions to the vanishing 
                                                 
16 See Jarvis 14 and passim, for “scenic-ness” as underlying and subverting the novel’s realism; see Lootens 2017, 
17, for the “click of the cliché” on which sentimental writing thrives. 
17 See Levy 36; Sánchez-Eppler 101. 
18 Carey 18-9; Sánchez-Eppler 100. 
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of overt physical violence from everyday life and indicate that, by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, a significant portion of the population found the infliction and experience of 
violence intolerable (Carey 19-20). The ability to sympathize with anguished virtue and 
innocence (as opposed to guilty or unruly people) indicated one’s self-conscious participation in 
benevolent, non-violent civilization. With its focus on the human body’s capacity to feel pain, 
the spectacle invited the European reader to identify with people of vastly different backgrounds, 
cementing the spectator’s own distinctive identity in the process. It also reframed the imperial 
conquests of the past as literary, philanthropic, and commercial activity in the present. The 
spectacle confronted British readers with the historical outcomes of exploitative practices abroad 
and at home (be it rapacious masculinity, economic marginalization, or the slave trade), and 
conveyed arguments for political change by representing suffering as an occasion for pity and 
generous giving—all the while allowing the sentimental, politically responsible bourgeois self to 
stabilize itself into the future.19 
The spectacle of pain linked the concerns of abolitionists with that of mid-century 
feminists, the latter’s self-image propped up by the mythologized memory of the successful anti-
slavery campaigns.20 The later parts of the dissertation take liberal feminists’ problematic 
equation of marriage with slavery and prostitution, stock motifs in Victorian writing, as one of 
their central themes. Under the legal fiction of coverture, Victorian wives effectively ‘enjoyed’ 
the status of physical and economic property to their husbands. Cultural campaigns against 
mercenary marriage and for companionate unions employed rhetoric reminding philanthropic 
                                                 
19 Mallipeddi 7; see Levy 24. 
20 See Sánchez-Eppler 100; Lootens 2017, 31. Lootens further suggests that late-Victorian writers struggled to 
maintain faith in the moral promise established by Emancipation as the liberatory project of Empire appeared to be 
collapsing (2017, 34). 
 12 
women, many of them previously involved in the abolition of slavery, that they themselves were 
sexual slaves. As part of such rhetorical maneuvers, white Victorian women writers tended to 
appropriate and erase colonial subjects’ difference to align slaves’ narratives more closely with 
their own. Women writers recognized that their non-conformity with the norm of white maleness 
blocked them from attaining liberal personhood and political inclusion. Since reproduction and 
marriage were understood to stymy and replace women’s political speech, the British legacy of 
slavery helped women articulate the conditions of their own disenfranchisement by rhetorically 
equating bourgeois women and slaves in search of liberal subjectivity and self-ownership, 
absorbing the latter within the domestic narrative of the former.21 
 
Methodological Considerations 
This project is interested in registers of representation and traces the conscious inability 
of nineteenth-century British literature to articulate that to which it eagerly and powerfully 
alludes.22 At the heart of that inability is a fundamental “conflict between a structural or material 
and an emotional or moral conception of social reality” (Sánchez-Eppler 112). Reformist women 
                                                 
21 See Brown 1995, 124-6; Lootens 2017, 40-1; Sánchez-Eppler 93-4. 
22 Jean-François Lyotard’s concept of the differend has been used to describe Marian’s inability to narrate her own 
rape in Barrett Browning’s Aurora Leigh (Lawson and Shakinovsky 116-7), and holds true for all examples of 
sexual violence in this project. Lyotard defines the differend as a linguistic situation between two opposing parties, 
in which “the ‘regulation’ of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the 
wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom” (Lyotard 9). This deprives the accusing party of the means 
to prove that they have been wronged and the moment of speaking yields silence, maintaining the status quo (10): 
The differend is the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be able to be put 
into phrases cannot yet be. … This is when the human beings who thought they could use language as an 
instrument of communication learn through the feeling of pain which accompanies silence … that they are 
summoned by language, ... to recognize that what remains to be phrased exceeds what they can presently 
phrase, and that they must be allowed to institute idioms which do not yet exist” (Lyotard 13). 
Sexual violence and women’s reproductive self-reflection is not yet part of official discourse, but each of the texts I 
investigate works towards developing the public language without which this dissertation could not have been 
written. 
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writers’ lack of exposure to material realities of slavery, working-class poverty, or (in many 
cases) sexual violence made it impossible for them to separate the ideals of bourgeois 
domesticity from the interconnected systems of capitalist patriarchal authority that occasioned 
the oppressions against which they agitated. Their mode of appeal compensated for the absence 
of material realism via ‘real’ stimulation of readers’ affective and bodily apparatus with the help 
of spectacular scenes of suffering, spiritual appeals, and recourse to authorized professional 
registers. The political efficacy and economic success of their works relied on writers’ ability to 
“rearrang[e] the real,” replacing documentary evidence from inaccessible places in the colonies 
or the slums with that of readers’ immediate feeling (Sánchez-Eppler 100). Bodily indicators of 
sympathy (or at least fascination) are thus the preferred vehicle of communication, while, 
throughout the texts I study, professional epistemologies delimit what can be known and 
articulated about the subject at hand.23 
Additionally, my project faces the strange fact that many Victorians feared words more 
than actions. In what follows, I ponder certain phrases and expressions at length because 
Victorians placed “an awful stress on the power … of individual words”—they considered each 
public utterance a potential “moral act[]” (Marsh 224, 223). By the mid-nineteenth century, 
obscenity had become established as a secular crime (rather than spiritual sin), and language, 
particularly that of polite literature, was seen as an immensely culturally influential moral 
mechanism that could produce fatal debasement or vital elevation in the reader. Victorians’ trust 
“in the quasi-magical correspondence between words and the things they represent,” in the 
                                                 
23 This does not mean that strategies of documentary realism would solve the problem of the voyeuristic 
representation of anguish. Realism and conventions of documentation and interpretation (especially forensic ones) 
are historically tied to cultural and political institutions that benefit from and encourage women’s exploitation. 
Realism in itself is neither hegemonic nor liberating (see Hesford 195-7). 
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“divine autonomy” of words, gave rise to a culture of euphemism, indirection, and narratological 
anxiety, particularly with regards to sexual matters (Marsh 258, 227). The fear that language 
enacted moral change in the reader also influenced nineteenth-century negotiations of the 
boundary between private and public information. Once knowledge became common or 
commonly shared (like the prostitute’s body), it turned vulgar. For example, melodrama, that 
most universally appealing form, came to be seen as a “promiscuous genre” catering to a 
“debased imagination” unfit for ladies (Marsh 208). 
Language, as an institution of moral policing, counteracted the radical individualism that 
had emerged in service of the unregulated capitalist marketplace and worked towards the 
consolidation of a national culture. Yet, sexual censorship also supported capitalism’s 
beneficiary class because unregulated sexuality, rhetorical and material, risked neutralizing 
property and inheritance laws (Marsh 208). Owing to these contradictory cultural pressures, the 
Victorian literary market instituted silence on sexual matters “as the ultimate penitential 
euphemism,” while nurturing a culture of “shared knowingness” that refused public 
acknowledgment of independent and private sexual thoughts (Marsh 230, 220). As I show in 
chapter 9, when Eliot’s narrator resorts to medicalized gothic fantasy to articulate the trauma of 
marital rape, she is writing against, yet assiduously within, the legal limits of literary 
representation. Although both Middlemarch’s and Daniel Deronda’s plots revolve around the 
question of sex within marriage, Eliot was obliged to uphold the novel form’s respectable status 
by alluding to reproductive problems via euphemistic metaphor, gothic registers, and medical 
concepts.24 The 1880s, the decade after Eliot’s death, saw the height of Victorian taboo-driven 
                                                 
24 Scientific terminology had begun infiltrating Victorian literature after 1850 and was seen to open new and more 
precise ways for describing the material world. 
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legislation of publically circulated sexual utterances, a trend that had begun more than three 
decades earlier and culminated in the fin de siècle’s full-blown crises of morality and 
representation. Both crises were prefigured in Eliot’s novels. 
Due to these historical conventions of indirection, most of the sources cited in this project 
do not actually concern women’s bodies, sexual violence, or motherhood. The primary texts I 
engage—novels, verse, newspaper articles, abolitionist pamphlets, medical tracts, legal works, 
advice literature, surviving correspondence—were created at a time when written accounts of 
women’s intimate physical experiences were not systematically collected. Even educated and 
wealthy women’s private intimate recollections are absent from nineteenth-century archives, 
deemed unworthy of preservation. Jacques Derrida, in “Archive Fever,” famously calls this 
historical structure of selection the “topology of privilege” (1995, 10).
 
In the meantime, however, 
archives’ historical mandate has changed. Where they formed the backbone of a national social 
history, served institutional and state power, and deprived some groups of legal and documentary 
visibility, over the past five decades, archives have become “collective, memory-based 
structure[s]” (Ridener 111). Twenty-first century archives—stored on servers or in cardboard 
boxes all over the world—are dispersed in institutional and informal locations, and are seen to 
create a place of memory for the present. Yet even the contents of our rapidly expanding digital 
archives depend on historical selection strategies that failed to anticipate the critical desires of 
twenty-first century scholars. While theorists now view the archive as a symbolic and utopian 
space from which to address “human knowledge, memory, power, and justice,” decisions made a 
few centuries ago still determine what can (and cannot) be found there.25 
 
                                                 
25 Ridener 127; see Derrida 1995, 17; Velody 7. Although one should not “be shocked at its exclusions, its 
emptinesses, at what is not catalogued, … nor that it tells of the gentry and not of the poor stockinger,” the archive is 
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Rape, two hundred years ago as much as today, functions as a “material and discursive 
site of struggle for cultural power” (Hesford 197). Because historical archives keep disappointing 
and because rape continues to be an essential point of inquiry for feminist critics, my project 
pulls together generically disunited statements and fragmented evidence about women’s sexual 
lives—some of them traumatically painful lives—for its evidentiary basis. Piecing together 
sources, understanding their complex mediation, and acknowledging their indisputable partiality 
allows me to work “against the grain of the overbearing power relations” that occasioned their 
production (D’Cruze 1992, 378). This approach is informed by Derrida’s insight that the 
priorities of historical documentation conceal certain forms of knowledge in order to authorize 
others. Archives, despite their past service to national institutionalization, tend to rear up against 
their official meanings. They divulge information that one was not supposed to see and that, after 
all this time, still pretends it is not there; they contain telling references, unexpected symbolisms, 
lexical echoes, sly allusions, hastily patched-over elisions, panicked redactions, surreptitious 
emplotments, self-defeating identifications, embarrassed silences, details buried in subordinate 
clauses, out-of-rhythm intervals, and weighty spaces that disrupt their institutional 
designations.26 Often reading strategically (be it with or against the ideological grain), this 
project collects discontinuous “stories caught half way through” from which to construct 
previously submerged histories and which may (or may not) indicate the presence of nineteenth-
century sexual knowledge and related fictionalized socio-biological processes.27 
                                                 
a frustrating place. It is the “neatest demonstration of how state power has operated, through ledgers and lists and 
indictments, and through what is missing from them” (Steedman 68). 
26 See Derrida 1974, 158; Steedman 40. 
27 Steedman 10, 83; see Foucault 1969, 8. This is also true for my engagement with subsequent scholarship. 
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By studying the “material effects of the rhetoricization of the body” (Hesford 197), by 
taking seriously cultural materialism’s interest in social power and political incentives, I also 
articulate how feminist scholars of nineteenth-century British literature, writing in an age of mass 
digitization, can try to remember the past.28 As such, this dissertation, a literary history of 
burdened reproduction, functions as a politically invested “technology of memory” that 
recognizes the process of writing literary history as an endeavor responding to urgent alignments 
in the present and hoping to “propel[] a new future.”29 It is important to keep in mind that the 
present moment of writing does not constitute the linear and inevitable endpoint of the formally 
progressive literary texts under discussion. Rather, most elite nineteenth-century writers expected 
that the future would gradually yield legal improvements, while fundamental hierarchies—those 
between the sexes, between rich and poor, between masters and servants—were thought to be 
universal, God-given, and indefinitely persistent. As such, it is important not only to study what 
these authors say and which knowledges they mobilize, but also to trace their political “modes of 
address” and the cultural milieu, social networks, material positions, and horizons of 
intelligibility from which their articulations occur—as well as that which remains unsaid (and 
possibly unthought).30 By considering these historical texts with a non-progressive, non-
teleological, non-liberationalist lens, I hope to assemble archives of the past that help virtualize 
possible ways of making sense of social hierarchy for the future. 
Relatedly, I avoid ahistorical projection of the somewhat exhausted rubrics ‘sexual 
                                                 
28 See Foucault 1969, 8, 147; Armstrong 1995, 402. 
29 Grosz 16; see Steedman 66-7. 
30 Grosz 13. Unarticulated possibilities include alternative ways of sociality, profoundly competing with bourgeois 
liberal selfhood, such as unrefined comportment, communal instead of individual priorities in ordering society, 
gregariousness instead of seriousness (see Barret-Ducrocq 19; Levy 25). 
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agency,’ ‘voice,’ and ‘autonomy’ onto mostly fictional nineteenth-century texts. Not only do such 
readings apply traditional Western feminist values to a historical period in which these concepts 
did not enjoy much currency, but they invite a form of revisionism that measures historical 
crimes with the yardstick of human rights activism.31 Although I ultimately participate in such 
discourses, I also want to emphasize that nineteenth-century Anglophone texts hardly grant non-
elite women even the most rudimentary narrative forms of interiority and almost never make 
room for such women’s own words. I use terms such as ‘victim’ and ‘agent’ sparingly 
throughout, because rape not only already sufficiently institutes women’s violability but also 
because both terms are “equally fictitious” (Grosz 14). I do not dispense with the terms 
‘subjectivity’ and ‘identity’ (which, in their liberal origins, imagine a mysterious inner force 
propelling people into action), but I would follow Elizabeth Grosz who invites critics to consider 
subjects as operating from “their strategic placement within power networks; that is, in terms of 
what they are able to do, more than in terms of who they are.”32 Therefore, I consider agency, 
particularly women’s sexual and political agency, as an embodied interaction with and material 
negotiation of cultural codes, moral imperatives, and economic incentives (see Hesford 197). 
Agency, just like the progressive projects past and present, can be complicit, impacted, and 
ethically impure. 
I primarily consider the works I discuss here as evidence of middle-class and elite 
women’s hard-fought access to the literary and activist publishing circuit, access which seemed 
                                                 
31 Although human rights discourses today function as instruments of Western power and economic hegemony, both 
of which were historically responsible for the slave trade, I salvage from this historically contaminated concept the 
notion that each human being has the inalienable right to physical autonomy and integrity (Cheah 153). 
32 Grosz 14. According to Grosz, people interact “in terms of forces, agencies (in the plural), operative vectors, 
points of intensity, lines of movement, resistance, or complacency” (14), a model of subjectivity that allows for 
more agile historical investigations than the well-honed (and still indispensable) race, class, and gender trifecta of 
identity politics. 
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to necessitate and was facilitated by the instrumentalization of laboring, black, or otherwise 
unruly women’s sexual experiences to gain the ability to make specific political points. Writers’ 
appropriation of rape as a social problem, that is, their participation in the “economies of flesh” 
that offer oppressed bodies up for the purposes of entertaining, querying medical knowledge, 
participating in politics, and raising money, yields simultaneous valences of subversion and 
complicity which interact and reinforce each other (see Miller-Young 33). Rape in this context 
provides a material and rhetorical site on which cultural contestations of intersecting hierarchies 
are ritually enacted with mostly predetermined outcomes. Rape functions as a rhetorical 
technology capable of activating liberal selfhood for white women writers. In turn, the subjected 
women’s own precarious self-proprietorship, her “character,” coalesces around her ability to 
imitate acceptable behaviors—servility, eagerness to please, productivity. As will become 
apparent, particularly in the first and second parts of this project, race and class as critical 
concepts may possess less historically interpretative force in this context than highly visible 
subservient or physical labor and the simultaneous erasure of reproductive labor. 
Most of the historical texts I analyze are fictional and form part of a larger discursive 
practice of writing, circulation, and reading. Nevertheless, these representations spawned and 
amplified cultural narratives of reproduction, interpellating readers into subjects, conventions 
into institutions, and differences into hierarchies. Rhetoric is a material practice and the 
consequences of cultural representations of embodied experiences can transport pain forward 
through time when they give rise to repeated articulations of sexual, economic, and racial 
mastery. The socio-biological phenomena under discussion are historically real insofar as they 
created material legacies (see Burton 70). Moreover, nineteenth-century texts, both literary and 
professional, reflect how past institutions wanted to identify and remember themselves. They 
 20 
project a “unity of an ideal configuration” during the moment of collection, just as scholarship 
does afterwards.33 Achille Mbembe argues that all historical scholarship depends on “pieces of 
time to be assembled, fragments of life to be placed in order … in an attempt to formulate a story 
that acquits its coherence through the ability to craft links between the beginning and the end … 
creat[ing] an illusion of totality and continuity.”34 The “totality” of this dissertation responds to a 
given generic pre-configuration, just as the works I criticize. I recognize that the conventional 
constraints of scholarship itself, with its mandate of dispassionate distance and invocation of 
discrete authorship, equally risk voyeurism, co-optation, commodification, and the conscious 
perpetuation of spectacular exploitation. Subject to the “critical nervousness” many scholars 
experience when writing about rape (Hesford 194), I have not been able to solve the crisis of 
representation that accompanies writing about sexual violence and trauma since I am obliged to 
reproduce scenes of anguish in order to present primary evidence for my argument. Yet, to 
analyze these scenes carefully, to balance “empathetic impulse … and the need for historical 
specificity,” and to consider subjects as operating within historically specific fields of constraint 
and possibility, appear to produce the best methodological compromise, one that is both 
“enabling in the present and pay[s] respect to the past.”35 The simultaneous posture of mourning 
and utopian possibility I assume throughout reaches towards the embattled promise of pluralistic 
                                                 
33 Derrida 1995, 10; see Steedman 1. 
34 Mbembe 21; see Burton 66; Foucault 1969, 15; Steedman 70. 
35 D’Cruze 1992, 378; see Hesford 193-4; Yaeger 226-7. Although trauma studies suggest that the retelling of abuse 
might help facilitate recovery, I am not very optimistic about literature’s ability to “cure” rape culture when it 
utilizes sexual violence as an occasion for the titillating spectacle (see Hesford 195-6). I am also very aware of my 
own “loudspeaker of privilege” that enables me to speak about black exploitation, race relations, and questions of 
ethnicity with unearned authority. As Lootens cautions Victorian scholars, most of whom are currently “writing 
white”: “any white person who speaks of racial oppression should know enough to expect some level of ... 
historically justified irritation … And through that loudspeaker, the ‘right’ thing—the thing, that is, that could be 
spoken without negatively ‘taking’ the ‘parts’ of people of color ... —simply cannot be said” (2017, 179). 
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democracy.36 
Personal experiences of non-elite women are mostly lost to scholarship today, and literary 
scholarship has only slowly come around to investigating the complex historical mediation of 
extant accounts of sexual violence. For reasons that this project identifies, even texts that were 
advertised as spoken by freed slaves or liberated working women were constrained by the 
generic parameters of sentimentality to such an extent that attempts to recover the ‘true’ or 
‘authentic’ experience of sexual oppression are bound to fail. Particularly in the case of 
abolitionist prose and verse, we are often looking at “white fantasies of black lives and suffering” 
(M. Wood 2002, 21). Nevertheless, to reckon with the experiences of disenfranchised 
constituencies and to translate them into a present-day system of meaning remain urgent critical 
goals. Since the biological and psychological ramifications of mass sexual exploitation only four 
or five generations removed from the present keep haunting scholars of Victorian literature, past 
injustice must be made legible—particularly when our favorite women writers are its agents (see 
Levy 35). 
 
Chapter Outlines 
The first part of this dissertation, “Slavery’s Legacies: Mary Prince, Pornography, and the 
Missing Child,” focuses on the politics of editorial mediation in Mary Prince’s The History of 
Mary Prince: A West Indian Slave, Related by Herself (1831). Building on scholarship that 
understands the History to invoke a set of carefully delimited generic requirements, particularly 
concerning its representation of enslaved women’s sexual and reproductive experiences, I argue 
that the incomplete elision of rape, pregnancy, and childbirth in the History purposefully gestures 
                                                 
36 Burton 67; see Grosz 17. 
 22 
towards the previously neglected representational economy of plantation pornography. The 
History’s white metropolitan editors, Susannah Strickland Moodie and Thomas Pringle, silenced 
the reality of systematic rape under British slavery while capitalizing on its luridness to boost 
sales of their pamphlet. The titillating representation of the slave woman’s non-reproductive, but 
obviously sexually abused, body served to ensure that economic, sexual, and racial hierarchies 
would remain stable even after the 1834 abolition of slavery. This becomes vividly apparent 
when reading the few archival fragments that constitute Mary Prince’s legacy against Pringle’s 
ambitions as South African colonizer and spectator of ‘Hottentot’ women, and Moodie’s later 
career as colonial wife, mother, and novelist. Although I do not understand Mary Prince to 
embody pure spectacle, incapable of articulating her own needs, pleasures, and ambitions, I 
remain overall pessimistic that critical concepts of ‘agency’ or ‘resistance’ are productive in light 
of the History’s oppressively pornographic registers. 
The second part, “Motherhood’s Burden: Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Rape, and the 
Pleasures of the Spectacle,” outlines EBB’s liberal feminist intervention in debates of sexual 
violence and female sexual desire. In addition to investigating the complicated politics of 
spectatorship in her slave poems, this part of the dissertation focuses on the representation of 
poor single mothers whose children are the product of rape in “The Runaway Slave at Pilgrim’s 
Point” and Aurora Leigh. Analogous to Prince’s History, EBB’s works derive their political 
force from the mutually reinforcing aesthetic registers of the philanthropic writer’s professional 
discursivity and her deliberate evocation of erotic prurience. These representational modes 
allowed EBB to invent herself as an influential maternalist voice advocating for cultural reform 
while preserving the economically dependent status quo of working-class and colonial subjects. 
Although EBB meant to articulate a viable model for cross-class solidarity between elite and 
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working women, her philanthropic verse spectacularly fails to imagine strategies that would 
reach beyond individual salvation. 
The final part, “Eliot’s Coquettes: Aborted Reproduction in Middlemarch and Daniel 
Deronda,” re-interprets the actions of the two novels’ most socially ambitious female characters, 
Rosamond Vincy and Gwendolen Harleth, in light of Victorian medical discourses surrounding 
miscarriage, female hysteria, and marital rape. My examination of Eliot’s coquettes concludes 
this project and ponders Victorian representational possibilities when unruly women’s “house 
arrest” is fully institutionalized. In Middlemarch, Eliot blurs the distinction between abortion and 
miscarriage to facilitate a critique of misplaced female ambition. In the latter novel, the 
autoerotic desires of the novel’s heroine, Gwendolen Harleth, are “treated” by means of marital 
rape. In both works, Eliot’s conservative narrator strains against the conventional limits of 
sexuality’s articulation and systematically turns to gothic registers that interrupt her default 
realism. She further avails herself of mid-nineteenth-century medical writings to stage 
transgressive women in statuesque attitudes and to produce sexual tableaux vivants for the 
reader’s arousal. As in the project as a whole, I conclude here that spectacular displays of female 
sexuality are associated with “common” women without claim to cultural citizenship, and that 
the elite woman writer’s depiction of heroines’ reproductive troubles supports a reactionary 
political message that is meant to endure.  
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PART ONE 
SLAVERY’S LEGACIES: MARY PRINCE, PORNOGRAPHY,  
AND THE MISSING CHILD 
 
Introduction 
Mary Prince, born into slavery on Bermuda in 1788, accompanied her owners to London 
in the summer of 1828 where she was, according to British law, a free woman. Overworked and 
ill, she escaped from the Wood family, members of St. John’s proslavery merchant elite on 
Antigua. After months of irregular employment during which she lodged with the Woods’ 
substitute laundress, Prince called at the Anti-Slavery Society’s office in Aldermanbury in 
November 1828. There, she met Thomas Pringle, the Anti-Slavery Society’s Secretary, who took 
an interest in her case and eventually hired her as his domestic servant at Claremont Square in 
June 1829. At this time, the campaign to abolish slavery throughout the Empire was at its peak.37 
The Anti-Slavery Society unsuccessfully appealed to the Woods to manumit Prince and 
petitioned Parliament on her behalf. In turn, the Woods presented evidence damaging Prince’s 
credibility which stalled presentation of the petition until the House of Commons’ session ended 
in late November 1829. The Woods returned to Antigua without their longtime housekeeper and 
Prince found herself compelled to stay in England because, by law, she would have been a slave 
                                                 
37 The slave trade had been ruled illegal in the British Empire by 1807; slavery as an institution was abolished in 
1834 in all British dominions. 
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again upon setting foot on Antiguan soil. Now a member of Pringle’s household, Mary Prince—
allegedly on her own initiative—told her story for the purpose of generating abolitionist 
materials and income to support her, hoping eventually to return to her Antiguan husband, Daniel 
James, as a free woman. 
Susanna Strickland, the future Mrs. Moodie who would achieve fame for her 
observations of Canadian frontier life, was part of Thomas Pringle’s literary circle and recorded, 
transcribed, and perhaps helped edit Prince’s oral account in late 1830 or early 1831. The 
finished piece, The History of Mary Prince, A West Indian Slave; Related by Herself, was 
published as a slim pamphlet in late January 1831 in London and Edinburgh, and was met with 
such enormous public interest that it went through three editions within a few months. Slave 
women were crucial to the “war of representation” waged between pro-slavery and abolitionist 
media campaigns, each claiming that their respective depictions reflected the true circumstances 
of British Caribbean slavery (Hall 107). Pringle’s prefatory remarks to the History, dated January 
25, 1831, indicate that this media “war” was fully responsive to, and contingent on, metropolitan 
discourses. Pringle states that Prince’s testimony was initially 
written out fully, with all the narrator’s repetitions and prolixities, and afterwards pruned 
into its present shape; retaining, as far as was practicable, Mary’s exact expressions and 
peculiar phraseology. No fact of importance has been omitted, and not a single 
circumstance or sentiment has been added. It is essentially her own, without any material 
alteration farther than was requisite to exclude redundancies and gross grammatical 
errors, so as to render it clearly intelligible. (MP 55) 
 
Pringle assures readers thrice that alterations to Prince’s words were guided only by 
considerations to practicality, relevance, and correctness. Critics have taken this to mean that any 
information the editors found to deviate from their target audience’s cultural comprehension was 
excised. The pamphlet was to foster readers’ sympathy with an enslaved woman who, 
insufficiently empowered to achieve her own liberation, conveyed her experiences via a morally 
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reliable first-person narrator (Sharpe 2002, 120). Readers’ willingness to read, much less accept, 
Prince’s testimony depended on her adherence to bourgeois sexual moral codes, even if her 
cultural heritage and the circumstances of her enslavement prevented her from adopting such 
norms. As later legal documents prove, Pringle and Strickland filtered certain “redundancies,” 
many of them pertaining to Prince’s complex sexual history. As scholarship of the past two 
decades has argued, it is very likely that Pringle and Strickland morally purified and selectively 
re-plotted aspects of Prince’s testimony for maximal rhetorical effectiveness and marketability, 
and thereby weakened the narrative’s claim to historical authenticity.38 The extant pamphlet 
enfolds Prince’s memories in a semantic web of Christian moral principle and preserves her 
account only “as far as was practicable” for the Society’s purposes (MP 55). 
By circulating ideologically palatable representations of slaves’ suffering, the Anti-
Slavery Society’s main publishing outlet, the Anti-Slavery Reporter, had won much attention 
among mostly female evangelical readers. Its accounts of slavery employed coded, yet for 
publishers and audiences’ tastes maximally frank, language that imagined slavery in terms of 
saintly martyrdom undergone by chaste women of color. Sexual experiences under slavery—
whether consensual or enforced—were censored because “Christian purity, for those 
abolitionists, overrode regard for truth,” as one of the History’s more recent editors, Moira 
Ferguson, puts it (MP 4). Despite an obvious willingness to display female slaves’ bodies in 
states of extreme agony, the explicit representation of morally degrading experiences, including 
rape, was taboo.39 
                                                 
38 MP 55; see Peterman 46-7; Schroeder 272-3; Whitlock 1995, 252; Woodard 144. “Pruning” was a current 
euphemism for bowdlerization, itself a euphemistic term for the desexualizing of language that had become 
mandatory by the late eighteenth century (Marsh 218). 
39 Sharpe 2002, 121; see Fisch 2-3. 
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Over the course of the next three chapters, I consider Mary Prince’s narrative as a 
discursive tool in a political power struggle over the limits of the representable in which the slave 
woman’s body functions as the primary site of ideological contention. Focusing on the complex 
relationship between historical evidence, editorial intervention, and the representation of sexually 
suggestive acts in Mary Prince’s History, I argue that ‘authenticity’ as a category of analysis is of 
very limited usefulness for scholars of British slavery. Rather, it forecloses other readings that 
help make visible the History’s proximity to plantation pornography, a genre usually excluded 
from considerations of the text. The History’s generic affinity with early nineteenth-century 
discourses of spectacular violence is supposed to rouse—and arouse—its readers by eroticizing 
slavery’s unspeakable acts. I will begin my analysis with a review of the many previous 
approaches to Prince’s History. 
 
Criticism’s Ontological Battles: Voice, Authenticity, and Mediation 
Mary Prince’s History has been appropriated as a paradigmatic text in the service of 
various academic and political projects as well as for inclusion in several colonial, black, or 
autobiographical canons. Scholars almost universally acknowledge the History’s strict adherence 
to the nineteenth-century British slave narrative. This faithfulness to genre delimits the History’s 
plot, ideological scope, and representation of embodied experience. However, critics have 
focused less on the important tension between Pringle and Strickland’s (and scholars’) impulse 
to reify the History’s speaker as a historical person and political agent in her own right, and the 
History’s literariness, including its indebtedness to conventions of sentimentality, Christian 
conversion narrative, abolitionist propaganda, racial science, and emerging genres of 
pornography. Despite a general awareness that the History’s production and the archive of 
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knowledge about slavery it creates seem overdetermined by genre, editorial mediation, a 
profusion of supplementary materials and intruding footnotes, as well as by the avalanche of 
legal documents in the wake of its publication, many scholars writing after Moira Ferguson’s 
first scholarly edition of 1987 ascribed certain, if not all of the politically important rhetorical 
interventions performed by the History to its agential first author, ‘Mary Prince.’ Subsequent 
critical responses, particularly of the early 1990s, understood the History’s imputed author to be 
a self-identical, culturally aware, politically empowered, and protesting subject, and henceforth 
celebrated her as an authoritative figurehead of black resistance and affective solidarity, cross-
racial feminist sisterhood, and founder of racial, national, literary, or postcolonial traditions.40 
The History allegedly showcases ‘Mary Prince’’s “independent spirit,” “resistance,” and 
“warriorhood”—formulations which seem to prove that some scholars participate in the 
sentimental epic staged by the History.41 
The earliest, and most prominent, examples of such scholarship are Moira Ferguson’s 
Subject to Others (1992) and Sandra Pouchet Paquet’s essay, “The Heartbeat of a West Indian 
Slave” (1992). Neither engages seriously the History’s complicated and at times contradictory 
textual assemblage, but rather argues for (and inaugurates) its inclusion in black canons by virtue 
of its author’s essential West Indian identity. Overstating the History’s radicality, Ferguson 
falsely calls Prince “the first black British woman to escape from slavery.”42 Although Ferguson 
                                                 
40 Woodard 135, 144, 145; Paquet 2002, 31, 49; Midgley 88; Salih “Black Subject,” 123. 
41 L. James 1999, 22; Paquet 2002, 45, 15; see Baumgartner 255. The inverted commas here suggest that ‘Mary 
Prince,’ the History’s narrator and object of its many intertexts, is an editorial, critical, and, above all, literary 
construct. Although I will discontinue the use of inverted commas from now on, it is important to keep in mind that 
this designation functions a placeholder, and does not necessarily denote the historical person, unless otherwise 
indicated by reference to historical context (see Salih “Black Subject,” 124). 
42 MP 1; also see M’Baye 178. Female manumission in the West Indies was rare, but far from exceptional 
(Morrissey 72). Prince’s story is remarkably similar to the case of Grace Jones who, like Prince an Antiguan slave, 
arrived in England in 1822 with her owner, Mrs. Allen. She was legally free during her stay and returned to the West 
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gestures towards the text’s mediatedness, she claims that Prince never gave up narrative 
authority to Pringle or Strickland; rather, Prince has created an “inviolable textual frontier for 
herself” as well as an “autonomous domain of her own” (Ferguson 1992, 298). Ferguson hears 
Prince’s “sparring voice [that is] audible only to initiates,” a “mimicking and deadpan” tone, and 
a resistant “double-voiced discourse” (1992, 284). In Ferguson’s reading, Prince refuses to 
remain a silent, inscribed-upon object of abolitionist discourse. This critical desire results in 
Ferguson’s detection of a “power reversal” vis-à-vis Strickland whose role it becomes to earn 
money and take Prince’s orders.43 In the same year, Pouchet Paquet, reading for Prince’s 
“heartbeat,” that is, essential selfhood expressed by a unique voice, approaches the History as if 
Prince wrote her own autobiography. Similar to Ferguson, Pouchet Paquet registers Prince’s 
alleged Caribbean speech patterns and discursive idiosyncrasies bubbling below the text’s 
linguistically normalized surface.44 Further, Pouchet Paquet ascribes artistic cunning to Prince, 
alleging Prince’s vernacular to result from lyricism and artistic craftsmanship, and resulting in an 
“all-inclusive ancestral voice” that communicates “the essential tropes of return and self-parody 
in images shot through with the dialogic overtones of a community fashioning self out of 
resistance.”45 This idea, likewise found in Ferguson, ahistorically assumes that Prince’s intended 
                                                 
Indies, and slavery, a year later. Lord Stowell, in the High Court of Admiralty, ruled in 1827 that, while Jones had 
been free in England, her renewed presence in Antigua fell under the jurisdiction of colonial law—like Prince, she 
was technically, but not legally, free (Midgley 86; see Cooper 197). 
43 Ferguson 1992, 292; see Whitlock 1995, 252; and Rauwerda 407. 
44 For the same focus on ‘voice,’ see Aljoe 74-9; Bohls 176; Haynes 18-22; Rice 21; Schroeder 277-9; also see Aljoe 
59, and Todorova 285, for an interrogation of ‘voice’ as linked to the slave’s body and therefore providing 
authenticity. ‘Voice’ was brought to prominence by the work of William Andrews and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. Sue 
Thomas still mobilizes ‘voice’ as analytical category in 2014 (165). 
45 2002, 34, 49; see M’Baye 192, and Woodard 133-6, for similar claims regarding Prince’s artistry and specifically 
Caribbean expressions. Pouchet Paquet’s own intellectual location and ideological motives within African American 
liberationist contexts become apparent with her piece’s last sentence: “Mary Prince’s heart is the caged bird that 
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audience was a nineteenth-century Anglophone black community (Salih “Black Subject,” 129). 
The History becomes therefore “a triumphant narrative of emergent West Indian subjectivity,” 
single-handedly inaugurating a literary tradition and “mak[ing] permanent the foundations of a 
roots-derived national self-consciousness in West Indian autobiography.”46  
Inspired by such early framings, scholars of the 1990s and early 2000s read the History 
through various generic or political lenses. None of the proliferating categories applied to 
Prince’s story—autobiography, slave testimony, British abolitionist, African American, Anglo-
African, Black Atlantic, black-authored, African womanist, Pan-Africanist, trickster narrative—
are adequate or sufficient, while the abundance of taxonomic registers itself has become mind-
boggling und unwieldy.47 More recent investigations acknowledge the instability of the History’s 
narrating subject and pay ample attention to the History’s many intra- and intertexts, thereby 
contextualizing and historicizing the text’s production (Salih “Black Subject,” 124). Jenny 
Sharpe, Gillian Whitlock, Antje Rauwerda, and Sara Salih, by highlighting the History’s editorial 
mediation, challenge Ferguson and Pouchet Paquet’s investment in Prince’s Caribbean 
expressions or artistic daring, and call for “relinquishing the comforting illusion of a single black 
subject who protested against the evils of slavery in a self-authored, mono-vocal, mono-cultural 
text.”48 Assuming that the History’s framing documents—those newspaper articles, essays, and 
letters penned by whites, many of them part of the pro-slavery lobby, for intra-British perusal—
                                                 
sings the definitive song of freedom to let her people go” (Paquet 1992, 143; see “Black Subject,” 128-9). This 
sentence was cut from the 2002 version. 
46 Pouchet Paquet 2002, 33, 36; see Salih “Black Subject,” 129, for a critique of “roots” as critical concept applied to 
the History. 
47 Whitlock 2000, 20; Ferguson 1992, 298; M’Baye 178-9; Pouchet Paquet 2002, 40; Rice 22. 
48 Salih “Black Subject,” 134; see Rauwerda 399. 
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are necessary extensions of the narrative, these scholars resist the History’s insertion into black 
canons while yet defending its importance for understanding black self-narration. As a 
consequence, critics increasingly concede that ‘voice’ and embodied experience are not only 
irrecoverable, but that white-authored texts about slavery have taken “great care” to widen the 
reader’s distance to this history (M. Wood 2002, 21). According to an emerging consensus, 
English cultural memory of slavery ought not to be conflated with slaves’ own recollections. 
Despite their attention to the History’s intertexts, recent work on Prince still inaccurately 
tends to interpellate the former slave woman as the first female slave-turned-abolitionist, aided 
by her “writing team” in an egalitarian and collaborative exercise aimed at outlawing slavery 
once and for all.49 Scholarship that ignores the context of the History’s historical articulation—
and that articulation’s contingencies—invites “the dual dangers of presentism and essentialism,” 
as Sara Salih cautions (“Black Subject,” 125). In what follows, I want to keep in mind Carolyn 
Steedman’s warning that “the resurrectionist historian creates the past that he purports to restore” 
(38), and generate an alternative, and perhaps less encouraging, past that sees Prince’s 
abolitionist agency as fully circumscribed, and often eclipsed, by powerful interests not 
necessarily allied with those scholars ascribe to her. Critics are wary that reading Mary Prince’s 
story as at least partly confabulated and shaped by early nineteenth-century literary conventions 
would do a disservice to the formerly living, breathing Mary Prince and her legacy. However, to 
interrogate and destabilize the History’s subject does not erase the validity of black history as a 
political project. 
                                                 
49 Aljoe 20; see also Baumgartner 268; Bohls 167; Maddison-MacFadyen 2014, 3, 20; Whitlock 2000, 21. Pouchet 
Paquet was the first who described the History as “collaborative venture” between Prince and “well-intentioned 
supporters” (2002, 28-9, 31, 37). 
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A concern with whether or not scrutiny of the History’s literariness reduces its facticity (I 
do not believe it does) should not prevent scholars from interrogating ‘fancy’ as a constitutive 
part of the work ascribed to Prince. The circumstances of its publication preclude the text from 
adhering to certain standards of authenticity that critics ascribe to other slave memoirs or to the 
genre of autobiography itself (see Whitlock 2000, 15). Undoubtedly, Prince played a significant 
role in the composition of the narrative. As far as scholars have been able to determine, her story 
is perfectly ‘true’ and ‘factual’ with regards to the people and places she mentions and allows for 
the sequential reconstruction of Mary Prince’s life.50 Her memory for names, places, and times 
was in fact reliable and acute. It bears keeping in mind that in their ongoing endeavors to verify 
crucial parts of Prince’s story, critics implicitly continue to anticipate and counter historical 
charges that the History is a forgery and that its statements regarding slavery are exaggerated. 
Such charges have circulated since the first edition of the History appeared in 1831.51 All 
subsequent production of text about Prince (including the present chapters), no matter how well 
                                                 
50 See Appendix for my update of Sara Salih’s rough timeline of Mary Prince’s life in the History’s Penguin edition. 
While I am aware that this timeline perpetuates the Enlightenment impulse to contain individual biography within a 
(perhaps false) teleology, my attempt at chronological “order” is a reaction to the widespread inattention to detail in 
much Mary Prince scholarship which has led scholars to make claims about the historical Mary Prince’s experiences 
that are contradicted by statements made in the History or in its intertexts, or for which there is no evidence. Bacabar 
M’Baye, for instance, writes that Prince died shortly after Strickland wrote down her testimony (185). Reliable 
information is meager, barely running over two pages. 
51 Although Salih writes that “‘truth’ may not be a goal for contemporary readers,” continued verifications do take 
place and yield spectacular results (Salih “Black Subject,”124). The continued proliferation of verifying materials 
draws attention to their a priori inability to guarantee authenticity and editors’ persisting fears that today’s readers 
will encounter the History skeptically or, in the worst case, dismissively (see Whitlock 2000, 21). Margot Maddison-
MacFadyen, in her impressive recent work, explicitly anticipates charges of fictionalization and provides the 
remaining, previously unknown, names of Mary Prince’s owners. She also supplies much additional information 
about the five related families who owned Prince and traded her among themselves in Bermuda, Turk’s Island, and 
Antigua—Myners [Miners], Williams, Ingham, Darrell [Darrel], and Wood (2014, 3). Also see Bernard 240-2, for 
the Bermudan ancestors of John Wood, Robert Darrell, and other wealthy merchants. Horace Wood of Pembroke 
Parish, for example, owned the largest single group of slaves in Bermuda, 38 people, in 1773 (Bernhard 236, 265-7). 
Clearly, the fact that the details about Mary Prince’s life, as provided in the History (and to which neither Pringle 
nor Strickland would have had easy access), have proven to be “true” confirms Prince’s lasting acquiescence to the 
genre’s, her interlocuters’, and scholars’ fetishization of facticity and their assumption that black testimonies require 
intensive custodianship. 
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intentioned, unwrites her history (Rauwerda 397). This is Mary Prince’s paradox: she is 
unavailable as ‘authentic’ eyewitness, but that does not render the experiences recorded in the 
History inauthentic or useless to scholars today. That academic readers themselves shape 
available evidence to suit their individual projects is clear. 
My reading the History as a text shaped by literary conventions, including predictable 
emplotment, use of metaphoric language, and the presence of finely calibrated limits to the 
articulation of ideological messages, does not reduce the wished-for political effects of creating a 
scholarly ‘home’ for Mary Prince’s legacy. Rather, such a reading, along with extensive cross-
reading between the History and its many available intertexts, allows for the identification of 
previously obscure semantic possibilities that, in turn, enable a wider contextualization of and 
more precise reckoning with the monumental violence visited upon the victims of Euro-
American slavery in general, and upon the body of the historical figure who, in the absence of 
better options, we continue to call Mary Prince. 
 
Authenticating and Falsifying, Pruning and Adding 
As John Thurston writes, “[t]he shaping of Mary Prince into an intelligible, linear, 
grammatically correct narrative has taken this text away from Mary. It is a corporate text—Mary, 
Susanna, Pringle—that finally only the Anti-Slavery Society could be said to author” (61). 
Rather than constituting a collaborative endeavor, the History was a business venture and most 
of its production occurred outside of Prince’s sphere of influence. Some older scholarship has 
overstated the degree to which Prince directed the production process, even if it acknowledges 
the culturally and linguistically mediated nature of the work.52 Prince was disadvantaged by her 
                                                 
52 Pochet Paquet 2002, 33. 
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illiteracy, likely total ignorance of the British abolitionist literary circuit, and inability to make 
contact with black abolitionists in London (see Midgley 90). 
What is more, scholars tend to ignore or make light of Prince’s material dependence on 
Pringle which influenced the History’s gestation.53 Gillian Whitlock, for instance, writes that 
Prince “took refuge as a maid” in Pringle’s home (1995, 251). Michael Peterman assumes Prince 
worked at the Pringles’ “at least nominally” (46). While it appears that Prince was incapable of 
arduous physical labor by 1830, she was obliged to carry out domestic tasks in Pringle’s home, 
such as caring for Pringle’s ailing wife, and her continued residence was contingent on her 
ability to work. Prince left the Pringles’ service in June 1832, perhaps because her rheumatism 
and worsening eyesight left her unable to labor, or because the allowance of ten or twelve 
shillings per week she received from Pringle at that time was sufficient to maintain her.54 
Pringle’s offering of “refuge” at Claremont Square was subject to termination and depended on 
his continued goodwill.55 
                                                 
53 Antje Rauwerda acknowledges this question but does not investigate it further (400). Janice Schroeder’s 2004 
essay acknowledges the importance of Prince’s domestic work in Pringle’s home for abolitionist struggle (273). 
54 MP 29; see Thomas 2014, 121, and Christian Advocate, March 4, 1833, 68. The Times report on Wood v. Pringle 
incorrectly states that Prince had received a weekly allowance of £10 or £12 for the eight months leading up to the 
trial (6; see Thomas 2005, 131n11). Pringle’s postscript, dated March 22, 1831, mentions her oncoming blindness 
(MP 129). 
55 Using the name ‘Mary Prince,’ she applied to London’s Fetter Lane Moravian church in July 1832, a month after 
she left the Pringles, and asked to be admitted to the congregation. Her request was denied due to her past “immoral 
conduct” (Thomas 2011, 83). Sue Thomas maintains that Prince’s application is evidence that “Moravianism 
satisfied some of her spiritual and personal needs” (2014, 121; see 2011, 82-3). I consider it just as likely that the 
Pringles encouraged her application because they wished her to continue her religious education (which was 
“indistinct” and “very limited,” according to Pringle), find an alternative source of material support, or because she 
wished to contact her Antiguan friends with the help of the London congregation (MP 116). The Hatton Garden 
Moravian mission in London had already helped her materially when she was “destitute” in 1828 (MP 89). The 
vocabulary used by Prince to describe Antiguan Moravian teachings is “doctrinally precise and allusive,” according 
to Thomas (2014, 125). 
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While the first edition sold well, its veracity was questioned and its editor personally 
vilified by pro-slavery outlets. The loudest voice belonged to James Macqueen, former plantation 
manager, editor of the ultra-conservative Glasgow Courier, and staunch defender of colonial 
slavery (Thomas 2005, 115-6). In November 1831, Blackwood’s, Caribbean planters’ “political 
text book,” ran Macqueen’s twenty-page slander in which he accused Pringle of having 
fabricated Prince’s story. Macqueen insinuated that Prince, Anti-Slavery Society’s “despicable 
tool,” was Pringle’s prostitute.56 While Macqueen’s lewd shrillness is a good indicator of the 
History’s power in strengthening public support for abolition, Pringle was pressured to 
authenticate those details of Prince’s story that Macqueen and others had diligently cast into 
doubt (Vigne 2012, 218). As a result, subsequent editions’ page count swelled as Pringle inserted 
long footnotes into the main text and appended supplementary letters, legal documents, quasi-
forensic statements, eyewitness accounts, and two unrelated slave testimonies to prove that the 
                                                 
56 Thomas 2005, 117; “Colonial Empire,” 750-1. It is one of Pringle’s life’s ironies that he himself had helped found 
Blackwood’s in 1817 (Vigne 2012, 201). John Bull, a periodical as stridently pro-slavery as Blackwood’s, circulated 
the same rumor when publishing a letter to the editor in December 1831: “as is also well known, [he] keeps in his 
house a black—hush! offend not the classic ear of MR. PRINGLE, by giving utterance to a word of undoubted import” 
(‘Expositor’ 415; see Vigne 2012, 219). Randolph Vigne is certainly correct when he states that the History “cost 
[Pringle] dear, and not just financially” (Vigne 2012, 218). Pringle wrote to his friend John Fairbairn on December 
31, 1831, 
Do you see how MacQueen is abusing me in Blackwood? I will ere long reply to his misrepresentations 
(not his abuse) in a fourth edition of “The History of Mary Prince”. Meanwhile I am prosecuting him for 
libel. Abuse is what we must all expect—and in truth it is a distinction to be calumniated in such a case. (qt. 
in Vigne 2012, 219). 
The fourth edition of the History never appeared, but the libel suit Pringle v. Cadell was heard on February 21, 1833. 
Thomas Cadell was the London publisher of Blackwood’s—Macqueen resided in Scotland, outside the Court of 
Common Pleas’ jurisdiction. Pringle won the suit but was awarded only £5 (and £435 in costs), rather than the 
£2,000 he had demanded (Vigne 2012, 219). Wood v. Pringle was heard before the Court of King’s Bench six days 
later, on February 27, 1833. Wood had sued Pringle early in 1832 for libel over Pringle’s accusing the Woods of 
cruelty towards Prince. Wood won by default because Pringle failed to assemble witnesses that could corroborate 
the story of Prince’s abuse. Six witnesses spoke in Wood’s favor, among them his own daughter, Mary Caroline 
Bennett, and Robert Briggs, himself indicted for cruelty towards slaves two years earlier (see Thomas 2014, 162; see 
Rauwerda 408). Wood was awarded £25 and costs, both of which Pringle had to pay himself, although Macqueen 
initially believed Pringle was backed by the Anti-Slavery Society. Trial transcripts have not survived, if they were 
made in the first place. The Times printed a 4,500-word summary of Wood v. Pringle, a trial that lasted seventeen 
hours without interruption; Prince’s statement takes up 1,400 words, perhaps suggesting that she was cross-
examined for several hours on the witness stand. While it reveals information omitted by the History’s editors, the 
summary is itself tendentiously edited and contains errors (Thomas 2014, 136-7). 
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History’s representation of Prince’s experience was accurate.57 The result is the present 
“concatenation of mutually validating and interlinked documents” not attributable to a single 
author (Salih “Black Subject,” 132). Many of the added materials and footnotes (including the 
original Preface and Supplement) assert Prince’s authorship, initiative, and control over the text’s 
production, and place her in the tradition of well-known formerly enslaved autobiographers, such 
as Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, Oloudah Equiano, or Ottobah Cuguano. It bears repeating that this 
strategy has been extremely successful since the identity created by the History’s narrator is 
sufficiently compelling to have occasioned hundreds of creative and scholarly responses over the 
past two centuries. 
I would nevertheless maintain that Prince’s appeals to her British readership are 
mediated, if not effected, by the Anti-Slavery Society’s objectives (see Whitlock 1995, 252). 
Pringle’s prefatory disclaimers that the History was unaffiliated with the Anti-Slavery Society 
and that its proceeds would go to Mary Prince alone are a case in point (MP 56). Such posturing 
was meant to defuse the ideological explosiveness of Prince’s narrative. Pringle expected that 
readers would be weary of abolitionism and, by extension, nonconformist religion. Audiences 
might have been deterred from purchasing the book had it fashioned itself as a product of the 
loudest organ of British anti-slavery propaganda. Assuring readers that a pamphlet had no 
connection to the Anti-Slavery Society was an effective and long-standing recruitment strategy 
to the abolitionist cause. Carefully dosed and politically resonant appeals to the “good people in 
                                                 
57 Woodard 144; Aljoe 98-9. See Salih “Black Subject,” on the individual provenance of individual additions to the 
History’s supplementary corpus. The first edition contained supplementary materials of equal length to the main 
text; the imbalance between the actual narrative, original supplementary materials, and critical introductions, 
annotations, and expanded appendixes is even greater in recent editions. Just like Prince’s editors, scholars continue 
to be concerned with appropriately controlling readers’ responses to the narrative by adding framing materials. This 
authenticating “gesture … perpetuates one of the generic features of slave narratives” (130). For further commentary 
on the supplementary materials, see Aljoe 69; Baumgartner 261; Whitlock 2000, 13; Woodard 145. 
 37 
England” are interspersed throughout the History and, along with the abundance of stylistic and 
plot devices that characterize first-person slave narratives, testify to its abolitionist leanings (MP 
55). The History’s political commitments as well as its cultural intentions complicate any notions 
of Mary Prince’s ‘authentic voice’ or her status as primary autobiographical subject. Her 
authority is contingent on her ability to represent and vouch for the experience of all slaves at a 
moment when abolitionist campaigning had reached maximum public penetration.58 This ability, 
in turn, rests on the implicit assurance that her experiences are commonplace and unremarkable. 
On the other hand, in best Bildungsroman tradition, the History accentuates the peculiarities of 
Prince’s life and celebrates her coming of age within slavery and her heroic spunk to facilitate 
the reader’s identification with this unique and pitiable individual. The resulting tension between 
heroism and ordinariness complicates any notions of a stable ‘I’ in the History.59 
Gillian Whitlock notes that “an overwhelming sense of readership, of audience, pervades 
the History” (1995, 252) because the particular formal and cultural constraints of the slave 
narrative delimit descriptions of slave women’s embodied female experience. The conventional 
“script for writing the self as a colonized subject” is not only “omnipresent,” as Whitlock 
suggests (2000, 38), it enables the invention of the colonial subject in abolitionist literature. In 
fact, the first-person subject produced by the History is wholly bourgeois. As Laura Ann Stoler 
writes, “discourses of sexuality do more than define the distinction of the bourgeois self; in 
identifying marginal members of the body politic, they have mapped the moral parameters of 
                                                 
58 Thus Prince: “I know what slaves feel—I can tell by myself what other slaves feel” (MP 94). 
59 See Salih “Black Subject,” 130-1. Ferguson, Pouchet Paquet, and Woodard appear to take the History’s novelistic 
emplotment as tale of liberatory heroism at face value. This plot is itself indebted to eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century literary conventions which continue to shape humanistic epistemologies of the present. 
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European nations.”60 By endlessly casting Mary Prince’s sexual experiences under slavery as 
marginally representable, by pretending to excise all references to sexuality, the History, with its 
massive public response and subsequent proliferation of authenticating-yet-obfuscating 
appendices and footnotes, create ‘Mary Prince’ as black-and-poor-and-hypersexual subject and, 
in ever finer detail, calibrate that subject’s ability to demand public recognition, self-ownership, 
“property rights, citizenship, and public relief” (Stoler 1995, 8). 
In the end, ‘Prince’s’ disappearance from the archive after 1834 confirms that this subject 
has been eliminated after and due to abolition. Nationhood, whiteness, and middle-class morality 
are the History’s, and abolition’s, true offspring. In this reading, the editors’ invention of Prince 
as a literary subject without claims to a biological or archival afterlife is the necessary underside 
of abolition’s victory, even when allowing for the possibility that Prince successfully attempted 
“to evade the archive and its strategies of surveillance, to elude the threat of capture and 
classification that official archives represent” (Baderoon 73). Prince, like so many working-class 
women before her, “disappears from the records leaving behind fragments of a story made for 
her by the legal system.”61 Having had her story taken down, she did not have the last word. 
Before turning to the History’s text itself, the first portion of my analysis pays close attention to 
Susanna Strickland and Thomas Pringle’s editorial ambitions and likely textual interventions in 
the service of creating the slave woman as British subject.  
                                                 
60 1995, 7; see A. Davis 107; Gates 12; Hartman 62. See also Elspeth Probyn’s reminder that the self “represents the 
process of being gendered and the project of putting that process into discourse. … The self is not simply put 
forward, but rather it is reworked in its enunciation” (2). 
61 Steedman 54, 57; see Aljoe 28, 70-1. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
HOW TO GET A CHARACTER: WHITE FANTASIES OF ABOLITION 
 
The Problem with the Amanuensis: Susanna’s Plots 
Scholars spend little time studying Susanna Strickland’s or Thomas Pringle’s personal 
investments in Mary Prince’s History, although both Strickland’s and Pringle’s archival estates 
prove them to be prolific and visible colonial and literary agents in their own right. In my effort 
to tease apart the densely textured processes of mediation that converge in the production context 
of Mary Prince’s History, I first highlight Susanna Strickland’s role as Prince’s amanuensis. In 
contrast to previous assessments of Prince and Strickland’s “writing scene” as collaborative and 
the text’s “moral fabric” as “shared,” my focus is on the power differentials—in terms of class 
affiliation, race, sexual history, and, perhaps most importantly, cultural belonging—that existed 
between the two women at the moment of Strickland’s recording of Prince’s testimony. I then 
suggest how Strickland’s perception of these differences might have crucially shaped the 
History.62 When attending to Strickland’s long-standing aspirations to authorship and her 
attempts to gain access to London’s bluestocking intelligentsia in the face of her family’s 
precipitous economic decline, Strickland’s role begins to look somewhat less politically 
                                                 
62 Whitlock 2000, 13; Thurston 61; Paquet 2002, 31; Aljoe 90. This is in contrast to Gillian Whitlock’s attention to 
the History as an autobiographical occasion wherein “intersection and interdependence of identities and 
identifications between European and colonial women become apparent” (2000, 16). Whereas Whitlock’s analysis 
relies on intersubjectivity and transculturation, I imagine the History from Strickland’s perspective and as produced 
largely on Strickland’s, rather than Prince’s, terms. 
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unproblematic than some critics make it out to be. I argue here that the “writing scene” is not the 
site of Strickland’s unequivocally selfless and supportive midwifery of Prince’s text. Rather, it 
manifests the limits of white genteel femininity’s ability to hear and record stories from beyond 
the cultural and economic pale. Further, although Strickland, in retrospective, did not ascribe 
much importance to her work on the History, I suggest that “the writing scene” between herself 
and Prince is precondition for her later contribution to the “mythology of the founding mother of 
Canada” (Atwood and Beaulieu 49). Strickland’s white motherhood of babies, texts, and nations 
actually depends on the erasure of Prince’s maternity (see Spillers 80). Rather than being “barely 
visible” (Baumgartner 265), Strickland’s presence determines what we know about Prince. 
Strickland, born in 1803, was twenty-eight years old when receiving Mary Prince’s 
testimony, having spent most of her adult life in the pursuit of building a literary career for 
herself. Her late father, Thomas Strickland, of North Lancashire yeoman ancestry, had advanced 
to manager of London’s Greenland Docks and attempted to cement his financial success by 
aligning himself with the landed gentry. In 1808, he purchased Reydon Hall, Suffolk, and settled 
there with his increasing family.63 However, the ascension into the gentry was short-lived and 
incomplete: Strickland’s prospects deteriorated and, after a business failure precipitated his death 
in 1818, Mrs. Strickland and her eight children—six daughters among them—clung to leisured 
country life under reduced circumstances.64 Susanna Strickland and four of her five sisters began 
earning their money as professional writers because any other economic pursuit would have 
threatened the women’s precarious hold on gentility. After her father’s death, Susanna 
                                                 
63 E. Lee 48; Thurston 12. 
64 Thurston 19; see Peterman 24. 
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Strickland’s existence was defined by her mother’s struggle to “keep up appearances” and by her 
own efforts to make a living and gain recognition as an author (Peterman 24). 
By the late 1820s, Strickland had published a number of children’s books, and regularly 
contributed poems and sketches to journals that catered to the upwardly mobile segments of the 
middle-class, such as ladies’ gift-book annuals and periodicals like La Belle Assembleé, or, 
Bell’s Court and Fashionable Magazine. Strickland’s early writings satisfied the literary tastes of 
the cultural establishment: adventure and historical fiction undergirded by Anglican moral 
principle and patriarchal authoritarianism were in high demand. Already in 1822, Strickland had 
published Spartacus: A Roman Story, “an overwritten and naïve celebration of Spartacus’s 
nobility and sensibility,” along with other “poetry and tragedy in the mode of ‘gloom and 
grandeur,’” that is, melodramatic in tone and archaic in setting.65 Strickland’s literary output was 
safely and romantically removed from the social discontents of the period leading up to the 1832 
Reform Act and to abolition in 1834. Strickland’s writing of that time, particularly her verse, is 
conventional, sentimental, and clichéd, and follows a culturally and religiously conservative 
blueprint that ascribes political unrest to the individual’s inability to curtail his or her passion 
(Thurston 29). In Strickland’s literary imagination, excessive affect ought to be mastered to 
achieve social and psychological equilibrium, while untenable social or ideological 
contradictions, such as poverty or immoral sexual conduct, are resolved through providential 
salvation in the hereafter. Fairness comes to those who act according to moral principle and are 
eager to improve themselves through education. 
As one of Strickland’s recent biographers, Michael Peterman, points out, her cultural 
position as firmly tethered to the gentry ideologically yet tenuously connected to it in terms of 
                                                 
65 Peterman 30, 29; see Thurston 28. 
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wealth, occasioned her adherence to a standard plot which “required, within the dictates … of an 
aristocratic, class-conscious, and materialistic society, the recognition of her protagonist’s—and 
her own—value as an individual fully deserving of elevation and reward within the social order 
in which he or she had been misplaced” (Peterman 33). Strickland’s sympathy for social 
underdogs, such as Spartacus, the archetypical rebellious slave, was based on these figures’ 
availability for heroic elevation and attenuated by her trust in “benevolent and noble 
paternalism,” often personified by well-meaning father figures who would step in and rectify the 
material disadvantages of her virtuous, deserving protagonists (Peterman 33). Strickland’s 
socially privileged readers were thus assured that their charitable support of the virtuous poor 
testified to their own moral goodness (Thurston 28, 37). It is my contention that The History of 
Mary Prince is crucially enframed by these ideological paradigms. This is not to say that 
Strickland’s initial role as mouthpiece for the elite disqualified her from appreciating Mary 
Prince’s situation later on. However, the History’s plotting is affected—and perhaps effected—
by Strickland’s spending most of the 1820s in an attempt to write herself out of poverty. Over the 
course of the decade she was immersed within an elite literary marketplace that pressured her to 
disavow her own reduced means (Thurston 21). Strickland’s writings of that period maintain and 
celebrate sharp class distinctions; her protagonists display the “proper diffidence [that] ought to 
be paid to those of superior rank” because moral worth, in Strickland’s tales, is truly grand only 
when accompanied by rank and wealth (qtd. in Peterman 34). Hence, Strickland’s acculturation 
within Regency class codes likely conditioned her grasp on and representation of Prince’s life, 
despite the ideological ruptures Strickland experienced in the late 1820s. 
 43 
In April 1830, a religiously disaffected Susanna Strickland joined a nonconformist chapel 
of Congregationalists, a conversion that offended her Anglican mother and older siblings.66 Her 
religious commitments of this time were fervent and restless. Although she found an “intense 
faith in Christianity,” her intellectual engagement with doctrine was ever-evolving and shifting.67 
She favored the dissenters for their “more personal and passionate” religious teachings over self-
congratulatory and stultifying Anglican ritual (Peterman 39). At the same time, the teachings of 
the Congregationalist Church demanded that she extricate herself from authorial ambition and 
focus on her and her readers’ moral improvement. As a result, Strickland’s romantic religious 
enthusiasm and hunger for public recognition of her literary genius remained at odds. Even as 
she imagined herself piously retreating from the secular world of publishing, she continued to 
seek contact with famous literati (Peterman 41, 44). Nevertheless, Strickland’s—and two of her 
sisters’—affiliation with a dissenting Puritan sect that had a long-established base among urban 
traders as well as the rural yeomanry inverted her father’s social ascension and indicates that she 
had become disaffected with her family’s social aspirations and religious observance (Thurston 
20). By 1830, Strickland had acknowledged her reduced circumstances and, with the dissenters’ 
help, explored alternative meanings of her coming down in the world. 
As a result of her waning allegiance to establishment ideology, Strickland changed 
friends and professional contacts, moving among intellectuals, celebrities, and nonconformists of 
the London literary scene. She had met Thomas Pringle in 1828 and, although he was only 
fourteen years her senior, she soon considered him her “dear adopted father,” and he took to 
                                                 
66 Thurston 16; see Peterman 38. 
67 Thurston 54; see Peterman 41. 
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calling himself her “loving papa.”68 He introduced her to the London intelligentsia and invited 
her to stay with his family several times between the summer of 1830 and her marriage in April 
1831.69 While residing with the Pringles, she worked on her ambitious verse collection, 
Enthusiasm, and Other Poems (1831), which deals with “disappointed love, captivity, madness, 
and poverty” (Thurston 57). Just as in her Spartacus, slavery and indigence are imagined to 
result from an unknowable divine will. The collection’s titular long poem reflects upon the 
expansion of the poet’s imagination—and her agency to speak politically—through divine 
inspiration (Peterman 41). Strickland also took up writing reviews for the intellectual avant-
garde journal Athenaeum, for which Pringle served as editor until late 1830, as well as for the 
Anti-Slavery Society (Thurston 59). While in Pringle’s care, Strickland wrote in realistic and 
romantic genres. However, Marian Fowler remarks that Strickland had a “Romantic preference 
for fancy rather than fact, the ideal rather than the real.”70 Even her realistic writing was 
structured by desire for moral sublimity. 
Pringle had connections to the Clapham Sect, the early nineteenth-century network of 
social reformers whose activism would strongly influence Victorian middle-class morality. After 
gaining access to Pringle’s inner circle, Strickland embraced their outlook on slavery and morals, 
and adopted the pursuits of genteel literary philanthropy, safely located within the bounds of 
                                                 
68 Moodie 1985, 50; see Thurston 191n35. 
69 Peterman 45-6. Strickland was married in the Anglican Church because marriage in other churches was forbidden 
until 1836 when the civil register was introduced. Her husband, Captain John Dunbar Moodie, was a Scottish 
Presbyterian, and had been acquainted with Pringle since 1813 (Thurston 17). The fact that Mary Prince and 
Susanna Strickland were unable to obtain legally sanctioned marriages within their own respective churches perhaps 
strengthened their personal bond. Strickland had recourse to marriage within Anglicanism, of course, while Mary 
Prince’s legal situation as an enslaved person in Antigua had prevented her from marrying in the English Church. 
The Anglican Church held the monopoly to wed couples on Antigua until 1844 (Lazarus-Black 62). 
70 Peterman 45; see Fowler 95. 
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domestic propriety.71 Moreover, by casting Pringle as her adopted father, Strickland understood 
her changing political and religious outlook to result from emerging ties of affective kinship. The 
emotional bond with the Pringles eventually allowed her to resolve the contradiction between the 
reality of her social position and the ideology she had promulgated in the 1820s. With Pringle’s 
help, she decided that she would reinvent herself as a writer serving the divine, improving public 
morality, and liberating slaves (Thurston 59). 
 
Strickland, Blackness, and the Invitation to Speak 
 In late 1830, Strickland wrote a short poem, “An Appeal to the Free,” for the Athenaeum 
in which she highlighted the detrimental effects of slavery on the British public, declaring that 
the unreformed minds of slavery’s bystanders were themselves in shackles. Perhaps overshooting 
the mark, she portrays those who “suffer a brother in bondage to pine” as being themselves 
enslaved by their inhumanity.72 The “Appeal” confirms John Thurston’s suspicion that 
Strickland’s “sympathy for slaves had been overdetermined by her experience of the chains of 
class and gender and her adoption of evangelical morality.”73 Although she was well read, 
                                                 
71 By the 1820s, evangelical women’s drawing-room philanthropy had emerged as a pursuit compatible with 
domestic ideology, although many female abolitionists feared for their respectability, especially when the 
conversation shifted from the religious register to the political one. Male political leaders, especially from 
conservative evangelical factions, strongly disapproved of female abolitionism. Women abolitionists countered that 
their activity naturally followed from other feminine religious occupations, such as missionary or Sunday School 
work. Female-led abolitionism was thus framed as charity rather than policy-making (Midgley 93-4; see Ferguson 
1992, 294; Kidd 69-70). 
72 Strickland 1830, 728. Pringle’s line of reasoning is similar: “Slavery is an institution which, wherever it exists, 
must produce misery and degradation to all concerned in it; to the master as well as to the slave”; slavery “vitiates, 
by a terrible re-action, the heart and character of the oppressor” (Pringle 1828, 289, 292). This is a standard 
abolitionist trope, of course. Southey’s “The Sailor who had Served in the Slave Trade” (1789) serves as an 
important predecessor. Strickland and Pringle rework the trope by embedding it within evangelical rhetoric (Voss 
74-5). 
73 Thurston 59. Two further publications by Strickland from this period warrant mentioning. “The Vanquished Lion” 
(1832) relies on sentimental tropes and is in line with the Anti-Slavery Society’s ideology and phrasing. It carefully 
refutes contemporary pro-slavery arguments and encourages readers to “rightly consider[] the subject” (Moodie 
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Strickland had little insight into, and virtually no expertise in, slavery’s economic scope or its 
impact on daily existence in the West Indies before meeting Prince—and benefitting from 
Prince’s domestic service—at Pringle’s home. While scholars identify her encounter with Prince 
as primarily shaped by racial difference and the negotiation of that difference74, I would refine 
this estimation and argue that, in light of Strickland’s other writings, she probably comprehended 
Prince as culturally uncouth and economically downtrodden. Prince’s phenotypical difference 
likely contributed to the social distance Strickland perceived to exist between herself and the 
destitute slave-turned-servant. However, racial difference, for Strickland, primarily signified 
abject class status. I also expect that she considered Prince’s virtue to be besmirched, perhaps 
irrecoverably so, as she conspicuously avoids referring to Prince as a friend later. 
It is likely that Strickland did not reflect on the circumstance that she, as the penniless 
spawn of a white family with genteel aspirations, was entitled to reside in Pringle’s family as a 
                                                 
1985, 37). Strickland’s speaker enumerates the shared experiences of enslaved people, a list that uncannily 
resembles the plot of Mary Prince’s History and that illustrates abolitionism’s focus on a limited repertoire of scenes 
and concerns:  
To be torn from their country—to be exposed in the public market-place—to be sold like beasts of 
burden—to be separated from fathers, and mothers, and brothers, and sisters, and husbands, and wives, and 
children—to be worked beyond their strength—to have no settled home—to receive no wages for their 
labour—to be inhumanly punished with a cart-whip for the least offence, and often for no offence at all—to 
have no one to comfort them when sad, to nurse them when sick, or to feel the least pity for such 
aggravated sufferings—to pass a childhood, a youth, and a manhood of toil, and an old age of disease and 
neglect— this … is to be a slave. (Moodie 1985, 37) 
Further, the overall tone of the story is “condescending and overweeningly literary,” as Rauwerda observes. This 
short sample will suffice: “The eyes of the black glistened with joy as he pressed the fair youth to his dark bosom. 
‘Dear young massa, think no ill of the black man—look no dark upon him. Black man have a large heart—black 
man love all that treat him well’” (Thurston 39). Second, the late sketch “Washing the Black-A-Moor White” 
(1871), a supposedly humorous anecdote about a former slave boy scratching black paint off a plaster cast of his 
own head, illustrates Strickland’s conscious use of color binaries to mark cultural, social, and racial difference. It 
also repeats racist stereotypes about African-born persons’ physical and intellectual inferiority that had 
crystallized—and worsened—by the second half of the nineteenth century, in addition to showcasing the Strickland 
sisters’ indebtedness to phrenology as a racial discourse (see Peterman 40; see Wheeler 2000, 235). The sketch’s 
egregious language almost lets one doubt that Strickland had actually interacted with former slaves forty years 
earlier (Moodie 1991, 253-6). 
74 See Baumgartner 266; Bohls 167; Haynes 30; Whitlock 1995, 253; Whitlock 2000, 40; Woodard 133; for 
Strickland’s replication of monogenecist thought, see Cooper 206. 
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guest—presumably without financial contribution to her maintenance—while Prince, the 
penniless former slave, had to earn her keep in Pringle’s employ, notwithstanding her physical 
debility (see Thurston 60). If her earlier stories are any indication as to how Strickland perceived 
Mary Prince, it seems safe to say that, as long as Prince’s conduct towards Strickland evinced the 
necessary degree of humility and gratitude, Strickland would count Prince as one of the 
deserving poor in need of temporary guardianship and tutelage (Moodie 1985, 60). She was not 
always as generous. After witnessing a procession led by radical reformer Henry Hunt (whose 
politics would have a profound effect on the later emergence of Chartism) towards Islington in 
late January 1831, Strickland, in a letter to her friends James and Emma Bird, denounces the 
mostly male crowd of working-class demonstrators as an “incomparable blacking mass,” “dirty 
blacking boys,” and “motley band of rag tag notoriety” spouting “teeth jarring jargon.”75 Their 
refusal to disperse leads Strickland to believe they lacked the money to pay the road toll. She 
dismisses revolutionary agitation from below with reference to the self-defeating spectacle of the 
mob’s poverty, with black dirt and uncouth shrillness signifying uninvited sights and sounds. 
Class (dirt), race (black appearance), and gender (unruly, possibly sexually threatening, boys) 
appear to converge in Strickland’s memory of the Islington procession; no voice from below is 
worth hearing unless Strickland herself encourages such speech. This episode suggests that, 
despite Strickland’s well-meaning benevolence, her abolitionist zeal co-exists with her collusion 
in working-class disenfranchisement, a stance widely cultivated among female anti-slavery 
writers.76 
                                                 
75 Moodie 1985, 56-7. James Bird was a minor poet as well as stationer and bookseller in Yoxford, Suffolk, near 
Reydon Hall (Vigne 2011, 16n75).  
76 Whitlock 1995, 250; see Thurston 60, and Midgley 93. As Jennifer DeVere Brody notes, abolitionists often 
“analogized class and race” and employed dark-skinned women as stand-ins for more immediately pressing national 
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Whereas the first part of her letter to the Birds expresses Strickland’s disdain for men 
whose racialized poverty illegitimately claims her attention, her beneficence towards a poor 
black woman determines the second half. The letter moves seamlessly from castigating working-
class difference as black/dirty/male to detailing Strickland’s occupation as Prince’s ostensible 
secretary in the following paragraph. Both passages are structured by Strickland’s arrogance 
towards, and conscious self-distancing from, the sight of blackness, and neutralize the force of 
Prince’s own political resistance.77 
I have been writing Mr. Pringle’s black Mary’s life from her own dictation and for her 
benefit adhering to her own simple story and language without deviating to the paths of 
flourish or romance. It is a pathetic little history and is now printing in the form of a 
pamphlet to be laid before the Houses of Parliament. Of course my name does not appear. 
Mr. Pringle has added a very interesting appendix and I hope the work will do much good 
… (Moodie 1985, 57) 
 
The slippage of race/class performed in the letter’s earlier section also shapes Strickland’s 
description of her own contribution to the History. Here, “black” is the major attribute of 
abolitionism’s grateful recipient, Mary, herself in possessive grammatical and material 
relationship to Strickland’s father figure Pringle.78 As the History details, Prince had worked as 
                                                 
concerns of white women’s or working-class disenfranchisement. The situation of working-class whites in England 
was regularly compared to that of black slaves (Brody 80)—a connection that was clearly not on Strickland’s mind. 
77 For Strickland’s habit to conflate linguistic codes of race and class, see “Black Jenny” (1832) which, despite the 
title, is about an impoverished blacksmith, his sick wife, and five children who are rescued by a gentry 
philanthropist. The titular “Black Jenny” is a foal, symbolizing a youthful free spirit shackled by poverty (Thurston 
37). 
78 See Ferguson 1992, 296; Paquet 2002, 36; Rauwerda 397-401; Todorova 292; Whitlock 1995, 255-6; and 
Whitlock 2000, 19 for extensive scholarly commentary on the many names of the History’s narrator—Mary Prince, 
Mary Princess, Mary Princess of Wales, Mary James, Black Mary, and Molly Wood. Each name instantiates a 
different owner’s or editor’s desire, “construct[ing] Prince in ideologically and politically loaded ways” (Rauwerda 
397). “Prince” is her father’s (given) name (MP 57), preferred by Pringle whose footnote is invested in creating the 
illusion of a Christian-patrilineal line of recognition that reverses slavery’s erasure of descent (Rauwerda 400). 
“Mary, Princess of Wales” is the likely derogatory name the Anglican Reverend Curtin wrote into Prince’s spelling 
book (Thomas 2014, 135). Obviously, “Prince” is an equally derogatory name for a slave or servant, something that 
Pringle fails to note in his preference of the metaphorically rich “Mary Prince.” That Pringle does not opt for “Mary 
James” (although Prince’s temporary employer, Mrs. Forsyth, calls her thus) might indicate that he, similar to John 
Wood, doubted the indissolubility of slave marriages or that he was loath to compete with Daniel James for 
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charwoman for Mrs. Forsyth in the summer of 1829 before joining Pringle’s household staff (MP 
92, 114). Twice blackened, Prince’s race and occupation mark the social gap between the former 
slave and her amanuensis. For Strickland, who elsewhere participated in the convention of 
sentimentally portraying working-class people as enslaved, recognition of non-elite experience 
can only occur in response to Pringle’s paternalistic encouragement and depends on the 
conflation of racial and class oppression (see Thurston 192n39). It appears that Strickland 
remained true to her old plots. Thus, “Papa Pringle,” Prince’s proprietor and Strickland’s 
paternal guide, authorizes his servant’s “simple” and “pathetic little” tale as worthy of 
Strickland’s recording, while assuring readers of Prince’s “place in a patrilineal order” (Whitlock 
2000, 19). Strickland, meanwhile, doubly announces her charitable condescension while assuring 
her correspondents that, although not written as a sentimental novel, the History still contains 
sufficient pathos to be enjoyed as entertaining.79 
Strickland’s phrasing suggests that she found it unusual to write a story unadorned by 
“flourish and romance” and that she might have been tempted to enliven—or generically and 
socially elevate—Prince’s words by adding features that characterized Strickland’s own literary 
works.80 Drawing attention to the fact that her name will not be printed (amanuenses 
                                                 
authority over the former slave woman who was now under his protection. The Anti-Slavery Society’s 1829 petition 
on Prince’s behalf actually called her “Mary Princess or James, commonly called Molly Wood,” a fact that most 
scholars and editors overlook. “Molly,” Wood’s name for her, is slang for housekeeper or prostitute (Rauwerda 
402). This is all to say that the designation “Prince” is very unstable, and there might have been other, unrecorded 
names. It is unknown which name she would have claimed for herself.  
79 Moodie 1985, 41; see Cooper 199, and Whitlock 2000, 27. 
80 Heightened sentiment and romance were generic conventions firmly associated with pre-Victorian genteel 
femininity. When Strickland emphasizes the absence of flourish in the History, she indirectly also limits its 
speaker’s pretense to rank (see Whitlock 2000, 18). In fact, readers of the fashionable literary annuals in which 
Strickland published her work during the 1820s equated simplicity and directness with vulgarity. Helena Woodard 
reads the History with Strickland’s comment in mind and claims that “the grammatical roughness of the narrative 
flaunted the bareness of Prince’s literary skills” (Woodard 144). There is no evidence attesting to the strength to 
Prince’s “literary skills”—the formulation appears strange in light of Prince’s illiteracy. The spelling book in 
Prince’s possession and referenced by Pringle teaches one-syllable words (MP 84n; Thomas 2014, 135). Yet, for all 
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conventionally remained invisible), Strickland, ironically modest, seems to deplore that she 
cannot be credited with authorship for her endeavor (see Whitlock 1995, 251). However, in a 
letter she sends to the Birds three months later (see below), she refers to herself as Mary Prince’s 
“Biographer.” She thus reinserts her name into the History’s production process, despite the 
story’s many allusions to sexual transgression and violence from which she was required to 
disassociate herself.81  
 How would Strickland remember her interactions with Prince? Antje Rauwerda helpfully 
points to Strickland’s predilection to “fictionalize[] and render[] literary almost all details, even 
those of her own life” in her later autobiographical sketches (405). For instance, Strickland’s 
series of autobiographical sketches entitled “Rachel Wilde, or, Trifles from the Burthen of a 
Life” (1851) tends to poeticize affective states and descriptions of everyday occurrences, and 
celebrates the heroine’s heroic mastery of hardship despite ‘Rachel’s’ “fragile, gentle, and 
romantic nature” (Rauwerda 405). “Rachel Wilde” refers to Strickland’s transcription of Prince’s 
History when the protagonist is addressed by Mrs. Dalton, the embodiment of pro-slavery’s 
willful ignorance: 
“Who cared for a slave? One would think,” she said, “That you belonged to the 
Anti-Slavery Society. By the by, have you read a canting tract by that pious fraternity 
called ‘The History of Mary P—.’ It is set forth to be an authentic narrative, while I know 
it to be a tissue of falsehoods from beginning to end.” 
“Did you know Mary P—?” 
“Pshaw!—who does? It is an imaginary tale, got up for party purposes.” 
“But I do know Mary P—, and I know that narrative to be strictly true, for I took 
it down myself from the woman’s own lips.”  
“You?”—and Mrs. Dalton started from the ground, as though she had been bitten 
                                                 
we know, Prince might have been a gifted storyteller. She likely spoke a form of Caribbean patois (i.e. slaves’ 
creolized language, a combination of English, French, Spanish, and West African languages), associated in the 
metropolis with low intelligence and black contamination of (elite) Standard English (Aljoe 78-9; see Sharpe 2002, 
129). 
81 Moodie 1985, 60; see Whitlock 2000, 27. 
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by a serpent. 
“Yes, me.” 
“You belong to that odious society.” 
“I have many dear friends who are among its staunch supporters, whose motives 
are purely benevolent, who have nothing to gain by the freedom of the slave, beyond the 
restoration of a large portion of the human family to their rights as men.” 
“Mere cant—the vanity of making a noise in the world. One of the refined 
hypocricies of life. Good night, Mrs. M.—I don’t want to know any more of the writer of 
Mary P—.” (Moodie 1991, 228-9) 
 
In light of the avalanche of negative commentary after the History’s publication and the 
extensive proslavery suspicion about its authenticity, Strickland might have felt compelled to 
affirm its veracity and her own adherence to ‘fact’ two decades later. The scene between Rachel 
and Mrs. Dalton indicates that Strickland might have been personally attacked for confabulating 
Prince’s story, and she uses her novel to stage a rebuttal. Although the women mention Mary 
Prince, the scene is frustrating for Prince scholars because it focuses entirely on abolitionism’s 
persistent difficulty to overcome British readers’ skepticism, although Strickland, when writing 
“Rachel Wilde,” was perhaps aware of Mary Prince’s fate after Emancipation. The scene 
showcases Strickland’s ambivalence about anti-slavery’s raison d’être, not only because Rachel 
denies her official affiliation with the Anti-Slavery Society, leaving membership to her “many 
dear friends.” In fact, the censoring of Prince’s name distances Strickland from her work on the 
History, perhaps because Strickland feared association with the politically and erotically risqué 
details of Pringle’s libel cases and desired not to be mistaken for her alter ego ‘Rachel.’ She 
might have also preferred the initials’ quasi-fictional vagueness. As Rauwerda notes, 
Rachel/Strickland asserts the validity of the narrative based on the existence of the 
amanuensis rather than on that of Prince. The narrative is true because “I took it down,” 
not because it really happened. The “tissue of falsehoods” is not parted to reveal Prince, 
but rather to reveal Strickland. The incident serves only to reinforce Prince’s absence 
from what is ostensibly her own text. (406) 
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Strickland discusses slavery in “Rachel Wilde” not for Prince’s sake, but for the purpose of 
highlighting the number of her professional connections and her contribution to a widely 
published and notorious text. “Rachel Wilde’s” treatment of Strickland’s work on the History 
suggests that Strickland considered her task as amanuensis an augmentation of her literary 
standing (see Aljoe 74). She did not consider herself obliged to count Prince as one of her 
important literary contacts—rather, if they shared a personal bond, it is disavowed in “Rachel 
Wilde,” and Prince’s ghostly, redacted presence serves as a means to an end. 
 Although Rachel Wilde does not reference Strickland’s work on another pamphlet 
produced in 1831, this second slave testimony, Negro Slavery Described by a Negro: Being the 
Narrative of Ashton Warner, a Native of St. Vincent’s, deepens the impression that Strickland 
considered her contribution to the Anti-Slavery Society’s print media campaign a vehicle to 
establish herself as a woman of letters with her newly-acquired evangelical moral and political 
affinities.82 Published a few weeks after Mary Prince’s History, Ashton Warner recognizes the 
amanuensis on the imprint page; her name appears as “S. Strickland.” Her introduction to Negro 
Slavery traces her own political conversion, brought about by her encounters with slaves: 
The entire change in my own ideas, in regard to slavery, was chiefly effected by the 
frequent opportunities which Providence recently and unexpectedly threw in my way of 
conversing with several negroes, both male and female, who had been British colonial 
slaves, and who had borne in their own persons the marks of the brand and the whip … 
(Strickland 1831, 10-1) 
 
Conversation aids conversion, yet, as is so often the case, the visual proof of abuse is what 
convinces Strickland to listen.83 Warner was twenty-four years old and severely ill when he told 
                                                 
82 She learned only later that Pringle had to absorb losses of £15-20 on Warner’s narrative (Vigne 2012, 205). 
Clearly, it did not sell as well as Prince’s pamphlet, perhaps due to its less risqué content. 
83 See Peterman 47; Thomas 2014, 113. 
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his story to Strickland, and a note added before the pamphlet went into print, dated March 1, 
1831, announced Warner’s death and promised that proceeds would go towards the manumission 
of his family in St. Vincent.84 As is the case in Prince’s History, the editor anticipates readers’ 
initial dismissal of the project’s validity. Strickland safely shrouds Warner’s textual legacy in the 
progress narrative of anti-slavery’s evangelical imperialism and her own culture’s supremacy: 
“His amiable disposition and natural intelligence are striking proofs of what the African is 
capable, were his mental powers suffered to expand under the genial influences of civilization 
and Christianity.”85 These are the terms on which Strickland envisions slaves’ deliverance and 
elevation. 
Despite her recent defection from Establishment culture, Strickland continued to write 
within the parameters of socially conservative popular fiction in which “her long-suffering, 
mistreated, but noble protagonists” see their burdens lifted in ideological agreement with, and to 
the self-congratulating satisfaction of, British Christianity (Peterman 34-5). Resulting from 
Strickland’s realization that she was, “until a few months ago, one of the apathetical and deluded 
class I am now animadverting upon,” Ashton Warner and Mary Prince’s History are the 
products, and trace the recent process, of Strickland’s enthusiastic and romantic conversion to 
female middle-class philanthropy, echoing Pringle’s “awakening” from apathy ten years 
earlier.86 Strickland’s training in femininity disqualified her from considering the effects of 
                                                 
84 The introduction is dated February 19, 1831. 
85 Strickland 1831, 12; Midgley 93, 98, 103. Improving men’s behavior towards women was an important aspect of 
women’s enthusiasm for spreading civilization abroad and at home. Strickland’s words suggest that Warner behaved 
properly during the interview. See Whitlock 2000, 54, for the added complexities of Strickland’s relationship to 
“civilization” after her own emigration to Canada and her self-reconfiguration into colonial agent. 
86 Strickland 1831, 6; Midgley 94. The passage continues with a jab at James Macqueen and suggests that the pro-
slavery lobby and Blackwood’s audiences are one and the same: “The truth is, I had drawn the little knowledge I 
then possessed on this subject chiefly from literary periodicals on the side of the planters, such as the Quarterly 
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social, political, and economic pressures on individual and cultural identity, as these domains 
were inaccessible to her (see Midgley 93-4). Hence she ascribes “Africans’” failure to thrive 
within the precepts of “civilization” to slavery’s moral failings which implicate both enslaved 
and enslaver. With good self-governance, such obstacles will be overcome, she assures readers. 
 
White Virgin and Black Prostitute 
When scholars discuss the History’s silence about significant details of Prince’s life, most 
of which have to do with Prince’s sexuality (for instance, her serial cohabitation with men before 
her marriage), they tend to ignore Susanna Strickland’s own limited ability to speak explicitly 
about—or even to acknowledge the existence of—sexual matters. As an unmarried evangelical 
woman, Strickland, at least ‘officially,’ had no access to the culturally sanctioned circulation of 
erotic knowledge. Still, Prince’s testimony as well as Strickland’s perusal of abolitionist 
literature likely acquainted the amanuensis with the “uncomfortable conjunction of eros and 
enslavement” in abolitionist literature. Its presence increased in prohibited pornographic texts 
during the first half of the nineteenth century (Thurston 61). 
Just as she was living with the Pringles, Strickland—in her late twenties, moderately 
successful as an author, recently converted, unmarried, yet eager to settle down—appeared to try 
out different identities and life plans, repeatedly changing her mind over the course of only a few 
days or weeks. For instance, in a letter to James Bird dated October 9, 1830, Strickland playfully 
counts herself as one of the “bluestocking fraternity composing sublime odes” consisting of 
herself and her sisters; her next letter to Bird on the 19th announces her engagement to Captain 
                                                 
Review, Blackwood’s Magazine, and other publications of the same class; works certainly but little calculated to 
excite the feelings or alarm the conscience on this momentous question” (Strickland 1831, 6). 
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Moodie.87 When she returned to the Pringles at Claremont Square between December 1830 and 
January 1831, she was encouraged by positive responses to her recent publications, and, 
concerned about Moodie’s intentions to emigrate owing to his penury, she decided to break off 
the engagement (Moodie 1985, 54-5). It was back on soon: a week after inspecting the scars on 
Mary Prince’s back in Pringle’s home, Strickland married Moodie on April 4, 1831. In her letter 
to James Bird from the 9th, the new Mrs. Moodie writes, 
I was on the 4th instant at St. Pancras Church made the happiest girl on earth … Mr 
Pringle “gave me” away, and Black Mary, who had treated herself with a complete new 
suit upon the occasion, went on the coach box, to see her dear Missie and Biographer 
wed. I assure you, that instead of feeling the least regret at the step I was taking, if a tear 
trembled in my eyes, it was one of joy, and I pronounced the fatal obey, with a firm 
determination to keep it. My blue stockings, since became a wife, have turned so pale that 
I think they will soon be quite white … I send you twenty copies of Mary’s History, and 
2 of Ashton Warner. If you can in the way of trade dispose of them, I should feel obliged. 
I have begun the pudding and dumpling discussions, and now find, that the noble art of 
housewifery is more to be desired than all the accomplishments, which are to be retailed 
by the literary and fashionable damsels who frequent these envied circles. (Moodie 1985, 
60-1) 
 
This passage highlights Strickland’s self-conscious and rapid transformation from ambitious 
writer to wife. While Mrs. Moodie’s biography as pioneer settler woman-cum-author in Canada 
commences on her wedding day, archival traces of Prince’s life in the 1830s are nearly exhausted 
at this point. The image of “Black Mary” in her new clothes, sitting with the driver, is one of the 
last recorded glimpses we have of Prince. Despite the letter’s careful attention to the 
maintenance of class boundaries (one wonders whether Prince had owned any formal holiday 
clothes since her arrival in England), Susanna Strickland Moodie’s reference to herself as 
Prince’s “dear Missie and Biographer” presents her relationship with Prince as affectionate. As 
this letter showcases Strickland’s intense awareness of her own changing identity position, her 
                                                 
87 Moodie 1985, 52; see Thurston 61. 
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ties to Prince are likely subject to the same intense scrutiny and re-evaluation. Whether that 
friendly feeling actually existed or, if so, whether it was mutual, is impossible to tell.88 Yet, 
Gillian Whitlock’s reminder that “Missie” also occurs in the History as Prince’s appellation for 
Miss Betsey Darrell, to whom Prince was given as her “pet,” is sobering because it highlights the 
possessive quality inherent in female relationships across class and race, regardless of the white 
woman’s abolitionist sentiment.89 “Black Mary,” in fact, helps constitute “Mrs. Moodie.” 
In the above passage, “Black Mary” and “Missie” appear in the context of other, now 
stabilized, designations for Strickland. The somewhat flippant negation of intellectual ambition 
and Strickland’s (in hindsight specious) announcement that her literary endeavors have come to 
an end jarringly compete with Prince’s ostensibly glad spectatorship of the wedding and the 
former slave’s financial dependence on Mr. Bird’s ability to sell the pamphlets bearing the name 
she was given by Pringle. Moreover, “Black Mary” exists in uncomfortable opposition to 
Strickland’s ever whitening, increasingly purified stockings. The image, reshuffling the 
connections between women’s (un)married sexuality, erotic innuendo, and female 
intellectualism, suggests that once Strickland’s mental transition into wifehood has been 
accomplished, she will turn to domestic “discussions” rather than improper ones about slaves and 
undergarments (Whitlock 1995, 255). The former slave and her tangled moral baggage will be 
jettisoned in favor of white female passionlessness. Conversely, Prince, in her permanent 
blackness, does not possess such claim to privacy, which becomes obvious again in February 
                                                 
88 Peterman interprets Strickland’s naming of Prince as “Black Mary” to signify fondness, rather than a boundary 
marker (46). 
89 Whitlock 2000, 27; see MP 57; Midgley 91. Sue Thomas interprets the name ‘Missie’ to refer to the “honey bee 
… a colloquial term for something sweet or admired.” Thomas reminds readers that, while the bee makes honey, it 
can also sting (2014, 147). In their assessments of Strickland and Prince’s “collaboration” scholars usually do not 
attend to the possibility that Strickland/Moodie’s discourse of affinity towards Prince is not necessarily benign.  
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1833, when she is required to disclose her sexual history before the libel court for several 
hours.90 Such details within Strickland’s report of her wedding day, alongside Prince’s purported 
attachment to the bride (but not vice versa), implicitly assure the Birds that “Black Mary” is, at 
the very least, not on reciprocally friendly footing with the bride. Rather, Mary Prince, as 
Moodie’s foil, helps sustain Moodie’s white femininity and contributes to the “racialization of 
sex and the sexualization of race” at work here (Altink 90). 
It is surprising that scholars take the History’s assertion regarding Prince’s unproblematic 
alliance with Strickland at face value. The often-quoted passage, “I will say the truth to English 
people who may read this history that my good friend, Miss S—, is now writing down for me,” is 
seen to symbolize a utopian convergence of anti-racist struggle, with the black woman 
expressing her gratitude to and political allegiance with the white scribe.91 However, I contend 
that the speaker’s declaration of gratitude towards Strickland, the friendly amanuensis, is 
indispensable to the History’s rhetorical performance of authenticity. As has been noted, 
Strickland functions as the as innocent, maidenly, genteel conduit for Prince’s testimony. As 
such, white femininity filters explicit language and—just as marriage whitens Mrs. Moodie’s 
blue stockings—bleaches Prince’s ideologically inconvenient sexual experiences into silence and 
respectability.92 Within the logic of domestic ideology, it is precisely Strickland’s virginity, 
                                                 
90 The Times report of Wood v. Pringle records three instances of the court’s boisterous laughter during Prince’s 
examination, suggesting that the assembled middle-class audience perceived Prince’s reminiscences—she found 
another woman in her lover’s bed—as entertaining low-brow bawdy. As Sue Thomas puts it, Prince likely “made a 
spectacle of herself” (2005, 128; see Rauwerda 408). Throughout the article the reporter refers to Prince, at this 
point forty years old and debilitated, as “the girl.” In the History, middle-class editors (“Ed.” and “S—”) and 
Caribbean slaveholders (“Mr. D—” and “Capt. I—”) have equal rights to anonymity and privacy. Their names are 
redacted in deference to their reputation and assumed ability to litigate in libel suits. 
91 MP 94; see Whitlock 2000, 20. 
92 The court documents and Pringle’s own contextualizing materials suggest that the filter is not leak tight. Whitlock 
reads the narrative produced by Strickland and Prince as “a strictly policed first-person narration, with no sexually 
compromising material” (Whitlock 2000, 19; also see Ferguson’s introduction, MP 4). As my readings below 
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announced by reference to “Miss S—” on the very last page of Prince’s eyewitness account, that 
authorizes the slave woman’s voice to emerge and that, by concluding the tale, certifies the text’s 
inoffensiveness to polite women readers, while Pringle’s implicit paternal protection of the 
unmarried Strickland cloaks the “writing scene” in propriety.93 Strickland is required as Prince’s 
white double; if Pringle had been advertised as her interviewer, the narrative’s prurience would 
have been too strong for public taste.94 Simultaneously, it is obvious that the History’s decency is 
weakened by the many explicit references to Prince’s sexual transgressions in the supplementary 
materials Pringle penned for the third edition which explicitly name Strickland as amanuensis. 
Why, then, should scholars trust the History’s speaker’s claims to friendship (and, ostensibly, 
equality) with “Miss S—” when the text’s rhetorical structure is thus overdetermined by the 
sexual burdens of slavery?95 
All this is to say that scholarly celebrations of the “writing scene’s” political radicality 
and its successful overcoming of racial prejudice, while certainly opportune when considering 
                                                 
suggests, Strickland’s/Pringle’s incomplete censorship in fact risks compromising the unmarried Strickland. 
Likewise, Mary Caroline Bennett, John Wood’s married daughter (who had left Antigua in 1821) risks her 
reputation when testifying about Prince’s moral character under cross-examination. She contradicts her father when 
she says that she had “[n]ever heard of any charge of immorality against Mary Prince,” as her respectability depends 
on her public silence about sexual knowledge (Times March 1, 1833, 6; see Thomas 2014, 136-7). 
93 Pringle, in January 1831, shields Strickland’s anonymity in the first edition’s preface: “The narrative was taken 
down from Mary’s own lips by a lady who happened to be at the time residing in my family as a visitor” (MP 55; 
see Whitlock 1995, 251-2). 
94 Macqueen, writing in November 1831, ignores Strickland’s role entirely apart from casting doubt on her and Mrs. 
Pringle’s “delicacy and modesty,” and jumps directly to sexually compromising conclusions about Pringle and 
Prince. These are conditioned by Prince’s status as Pringle’s employee (Macqueen “Colonial Empire,” 745, 751; see 
Thomas 2005, 118). For Macqueen, “the figures of the black servants mark the presence of illicit sexual activity” 
(Gilman 209). 
95 I ask this question in opposition to Gillian Whitlock who considers the same passage proof of Prince’s self-
empowerment: “by way of thanking Strickland, Mary Prince affirms her own status as interlocutor, claiming her 
narrative before the very eyes of Pringle and her transcriber, her public mediators and guarantors as it were” (1995, 
252). 
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the atrocities Prince had to suffer, are exaggerated. Multi-pronged prejudice, for example 
Strickland’s with its particular race/class slippages, continued to affect Prince negatively after 
her arrival in London, even if that harm was much less vicious than the atrocities she 
experienced as a slave. Accounts that frame the History’s production as a monumental landmark 
in the history of anti-racist struggle risk ignoring that abolitionism itself was fully implicated in 
the perpetuation of racist, classist, and misogynistic power stuctures. 
 
Who Gets to Be a Mother? 
Women’s anti-slavery writings usually invoked permissible feminine traits, such as pity 
and empathy, as main catalysts of their activism, and, relatedly, conscripted themselves to the 
abolitionist cause as obvious preservers of the slave family and black motherhood. Convinced 
that their own experiences, particularly the imagined universals of pregnancy and childrearing, 
united them with slave women, ladies’ anti-slavery associations dedicated their work specifically 
to the improvement of female slaves’ plight. Obviously, their conception of liberated slave 
women’s future did not extend beyond their own proper sphere of action. Rather, female middle-
class abolitionists idealized their social position and offered it as a privilege to be enjoyed once 
their ‘enlightened’ imperialism, along with Christian civilization and British cultural and 
political laws, reached foreign shores. This idealization was often blind to British working-class 
women’s struggles and tended to exaggerate the ideological power of middle-class femininity. 
Female abolitionists like Susanna Strickland, then, focused their energy on drawing public 
attention to those aspects of slavery that violated domestic ideology, successfully reframing such 
aspects—female flogging, women’s field work, the separation of families, the slave woman’s 
impossible split of loyalty between her master and her husband, and the slave mother’s inability 
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to spend her pregnancy in seclusion and care properly for her children—as slavery’s essential 
crimes, without regard for slave women’s own cultural memory, everyday living conditions, 
future aspirations, and current strategies of survival.96 The formulaic representation of slave 
women “both verbally and visually as the ultimate passive victim” occurred because female 
abolitionists perceived them as incapable of self-assertion—and, in the ways of print culture, 
they were—and without male protection (Midgley 102). The brief glimpses of Mary Prince’s 
lived experience make the History so important to critics. Owing to Strickland and Pringle’s 
mediation, however, it is impossible to tease apart individual points of view. 
The greatest logical gap within the History, of course, is its silence about Mary Prince’s 
reproductive experience.97 The reasons for this elision might be ascertained when shifting one’s 
attention briefly to Strickland’s record as mother. After marriage, Strickland’s self-disciplining 
into proper gentlewoman and wife would be complete when she gave birth to her daughter 
Catharine less than a year after her wedding. Another year later, Mrs. Moodie was precariously 
settled in Upper Canada. Scholars have often noted that Moodie’s narratives of settlement are 
fundamentally shaped by her experience as a young mother, her “mother tongue” founding both 
a nation’s literary heritage and giving voice to the experiences of mothers surviving under dire 
conditions (Whitlock 2000, 250, 257). Motherhood, for Moodie, would “be constitutive, the most 
fundamental element in [her] articulation of self” (Whitlock 2000, 40). Prince’s “mother 
tongue,” that is, her patois as well as her possible maternity or pregnancy, on the other hand, is 
erased during the History’s production, because it is unintelligible outside domestic ideology, or 
                                                 
96 Midgley 94-103; see Altink 2; Beckles 38. 
97 According to Ferguson, the History “enciphers motherhood obliquely, [Prince’s] strange silence [being] an 
egregiously conspicuous omission in near-Victorian, family-conscious England” (Ferguson 1992, 289). 
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more accurately, because domestic ideology brands Prince’s experiences as those of a prostitute. 
My point is that Prince’s sexual life, as well as the History’s silence about it, are constitutive of 
that very same domestic ideology (see Stoler 1995, 109-11). Although Moodie’s genteel poverty 
and isolation in the Canadian wilderness strain the paradigm of domesticity to the utmost, the 
concurrence of whiteness, education, and Anglican marriage constitute motherhood as the core 
of Moodie’s identity. Her maternity is necessary for spreading Christian civilization and 
reproducing white bodies at Empire’s margins. Prince’s body, the experiential site of degradation 
and terror as recorded in the History, however, cannot be mobilized as pregnant or maternal. It is 
disqualified, ineligible. 
That only one of the two literary women gets to reproduce and have her lineage recorded 
illustrates the sharp disparity in scholars’ ability (and often willingness) to study Moodie’s and 
Prince’s interrelated literary and biological inheritance.98 Moodie’s children and Prince’s missing 
child(ren) are part of the very same, and increasingly anxious, inscription of motherhood as 
British women’s fundamental social role and primary reward during the nineteenth century (see 
Altink 11-2). If we understand the History as part of a longer tradition of ritualized inquest 
targeting unmarried mothers among the working poor to assess the allocation of welfare aid—
philanthropic organizations and governments “often demanded a [written] story in exchange for 
[their] dole” (Steedman 48)—the absence of Mary Prince’s child is neither a contradiction nor a 
coincidence. 
 
 
                                                 
98 For a recent exception, see Andrea Medovarski’s “Roughing it in Bermuda: Mary Prince, Susanna Strickland 
Moodie, Dionne Brand, and the Black Diaspora” (2014). 
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Susanna’s Plots, Cont’d 
Although academic studies of autobiography had initially focused on elite self-writing, 
personal life stories told by the poor vastly outnumber those of the socially privileged, 
particularly in Britain. As Carolyn Steedman notes, the rise of the bureaucratic state entailed the 
enforced narration of individual experience, character, and selfhood before a magistrate, 
beginning in the seventeenth century (46, 55). The repetition of the telling, usually with the 
judge’s questions and promptings edited out, encrusted oral autobiography into a conventional 
basic structure that eventually aided the formation of the modern literary subject. Both the 
Bildungsroman’s protagonist, the literary character, and servants’ official ‘character,’ a “mask 
that people were expected to don in the face of power,” are the result of the same interpellative 
apparatus (Steedman 55). The overwhelming majority of working-class testimonies given by 
women facing bastardy examinations tell the strictly sequenced story of work, seduction, and 
anguished conversion, made to appear self-evident by the removal of the interlocutor and the 
interlocutor’s implied loyalty to domestic ideology (Steedman 46-7). Such working-class 
narratives, written down by silent scribes, are reminiscent of early nineteenth-century stage 
melodrama in their reliance on social censure (i.e. articulation of shame and the meticulous 
recording cohabitations and fornications) as catalysts for conversion, despite their official 
function to determine the mother’s eligibility for welfare handouts. Often, the women were 
servants whose possession of their own person, labor, and stories was contested, and whose 
moral ‘character’ was constituted by this rhetorical process. 
I read Mary Prince’s History, with its pedantic attention to legal detail (date and place of 
birth, baptism, places of residence) and moral improvement (repentance and conversion), as a 
‘character’ statement “in which one employer described to another ... the habits and qualities of a 
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servant.”99 The aim of the History is to give Mary Prince ‘character’—to convert her from 
maximally degraded black slave to a plucky, semi-autonomous agent within slavery, and 
afterwards to a paid servant and respectable working-class recipient of philanthropic monies. 
Pringle, whose expertise is a function of his class status and resulting acculturation, vouches with 
his name for her conversion, assuring skeptical readers of “the watchful eye I kept upon her 
conduct” and his “closely observing her … for fourteen months.”100 Prince-as-subject arises from 
the text on Pringle’s terms—he is her moral doctor and social guidance counselor. Relatedly, 
Jenny Sharpe and others observe that each of Prince’s decisions described in the History feeds 
into, and aligns with, antislavery’s political mission.101 Prince’s being periodically sold away 
into increasingly harsh conditions amounts to a carefully plotted “descent into evil” against 
which the slave supposedly creates a bulwark of Christian morality and faith (Whitlock 2000, 11, 
20). The History, told in retrospective three years before Emancipation, stages a generic, if not 
archetypal, Odyssean plot of freedom for the almost-enlightened subject, catering to a 
teleogically/theogically-minded audience and defending England’s role as the origin of political 
change. Prince’s liberation from nightmarish hardship is not the primary concern, but the 
                                                 
99 Steedman 55; see Schroeder 265. 
100 MP 115. Pringle’s ‘character’ statement thus, edited for length: “We have found her perfectly honest and 
trustworthy in all respects; so that we have no hesitation in leaving every thing in the house at her disposal. … She is 
not, it is true, a very expert housemaid, nor capable of much hard work, (for her constitution appears to be a good 
deal broken,) but she is careful, industrious, and anxious to do her duty and to give satisfaction. She is capable of 
strong attachments, and feels deep, though unobtrusive, gratitude for real kindness shown her. She possesses 
considerable natural sense, and has much quickness of observation and discrimination of character. She is 
remarkable for decency and propriety of conduct—and her delicacy, even in trifling minutiæ, has been a trait of 
special remark by the females of my family. … Her chief faults, so far as we have discovered them, are, a somewhat 
violent and hasty temper, and a considerable share of natural pride and self-importance; but these defects have been 
but rarely and transiently manifested ... In short, we consider her on the whole as respectable and well-behaved a 
person in her station, as any domestic, white or black, (and we have had ample experience of both colours,) that we 
have ever had in our service” (MP 15-6). 
101 2002, 120, see 142; also see Cooper 200; Ferguson 1992, 378n37; Ferguson 1998, 51; Haynes 25-6; Todorova 
288-93. 
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establishment of global ‘civilization’ that will mass-produce enlightened black subjects as a 
result of benevolent English tutelage and religious conversion. Without conversion, successful 
(business) relations between Europeans and former slaves cannot be established.102 
Prince had received a bad ‘character’ from the Woods that reduced the likelihood of her 
finding work by stating she was lazy, dishonest, and licentious: “she would be a very 
troublesome character should she come [to Antigua] without any restraint.”103 According to the 
Woods, Prince’s continued enslavement served the public order and limited her ability to further 
degrade herself morally (see Thomas 2014, 162). The narrative attempts to reverse that earlier 
‘character’ although Pringle, as her employer, explicitly appends an estimation of Prince’s 
temperament that eerily sounds like Wood’s, and that partly uphold Wood’s honor and protects 
both men’s entitlement to imperial masculinity. Pringle censures Prince’s “somewhat violent and 
hasty temper, and [her] considerable share of natural pride and self-importance,” despite her 
“considerable natural sense” and “quickness of observation and discrimination of character” (MP 
115). Her failings—talking back and being difficult to manage—are those of an uneducated 
working-class woman, and she has proven herself worthy of freedom from slavery and of 
philanthropic attention. Pringle’s appreciation of Prince’s rationality is therefore, like that of 
colonial agents’ benevolence, contingent on her “ability to exceed his expectations” (Morgan 
28). The History of Mary Prince operates within—and admittedly struggles against—a long 
history of normalized low expectations for black female subjects. 
The generic particularities of the slave narrative add to this ‘character’ a marked attention 
to the spectacle of physical torture and pain as constitutive of the subject, something that 
                                                 
102 See Wood 2000, 191; see Sharpe 2002, 123. 
103 MP 100; see Midgley 88. 
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working-class autobiographies usually fail to register. I will explore their meaning for the 
History’s subject in the next chapter. Suffice it to say that Mary Prince’s violent subjection and 
the attendant physical burden—the whippings, the scars, the illnesses—figuratively (and perhaps 
biologically) obviate the possibility of motherhood and family formation, the constituents of 
imperial domestic ideology. Prince is locked into the staple role of “potentially virtuous slave 
woman,” even if her political benefactors call her sadly “uneducated,” hinting at her difficulties 
conforming to the lofty ideals set out by Christian womanhood.104  
If at all, the History frames Prince’s return to her husband and the future of her family as 
questions that remain to be resolved through divine grace: “I still live in the hope that God will 
find a way to give me my liberty, and give me back to my husband” (MP 93). The staging of the 
lovers’ separation was a staple in Strickland’s own poetry—Strickland actually always dissolves 
love thus—along with the occasional promise that heaven would bring the couple back together 
(Thurston 56). It is possible that we have inherited Strickland’s version of Mary Prince and 
Daniel James’s love story, to be resolved in the hereafter. Empire cannot accommodate the 
respectable black couple or nuclear family, even if it asserts black women’s capacity to submit 
within marriage.105 Prince’s reproductive capacity cannot be deployed in the Empire’s 
propaganda machine and remains strategically absent. 
If readers of the History hope that Strickland and Prince achieve quasi-feminist 
sisterhood on the basis of their sex, these differently situated women’s widely diverging claims 
to historical representation should make clear that “the female body” is discursively non-
continuous and widely unstable. Politics and social relationships produce women’s perceptions 
                                                 
104 Altink 67; Christian Advocate March 4, 1833, 68. 
105 See Spillers 67-8l; Altink 103. 
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of their own (and others’) embodiment beyond physiological adjacency of black and white 
female bodies. In contrast to Susanna Strickland Moodie’s maternity, Prince’s is connected to 
conditions of debasement, violence, and alienation (although other, unexpressed scenarios are 
possible as I show in the third chapter), and her body’s depiction in the History occurs in relation 
to nineteenth-century formulations of class (hard labor) and race (blackness), instead of gender 
(reproductive potential). Prince’s liberated body remains an exotic literary object to be marketed, 
sold, and “disposed of,” as Strickland so infelicitously puts it, after undergoing sentimental 
conscription and moral inspection. Once Mary Prince had transitioned from colonial to domestic 
capitalism, she is “taught to resign [herself] to Providence and look to the hereafter,” just like 
everyone else in the working class (Thurston 60). The History transforms Prince’s body from 
that of an abused black slave into that of a working-class pauper—a very common sight and 
unworthy of continued consideration. Not surprisingly, the Times’s court reporter describes 
Prince, during her first appearance at court and her penultimate appearance in “our” archive, as 
“a negress of very ordinary features” (“Pringle vs. Cadell” 4).  
 
The Problem with the Editor: The Congenial Colonizer 
Thomas Pringle, born in the Scottish town of Easterstead, Roxburghshire, in 1789, was 
the son of small tenant farmers and the third of seven children, six of whom would later settle in 
South Africa. Small farmers everywhere in the British Isles were affected by grand-scale 
agricultural restructuring and the economic crises of the Industrial Revolution’s early phases. 
The Pringles, at least five generations removed from local gentry, anticipated that their children’s 
struggles would increase over time. Thomas Pringle’s right leg had been injured in infancy, 
which left him with a lifelong limp. His mother died when he was six years old. The disability, 
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along with his father’s penury, predisposed Pringle to intellectual pursuits, encouraged by his 
surviving parent. At fourteen, Pringle was sent to Kelso Grammar School in Glasgow and joined 
Edinburgh University two years later in 1805. At university—only one tenth as costly as Oxford 
or Cambridge at the time—he was unable to decide on a profession. He began earning his living 
as a clerk in the General Register Office in February 1808 without having taken his degree.106 
While in Edinburgh, a city with a lively intellectual scene, Pringle gained access to 
literary and evangelical circles, immersed himself in the tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
and began writing romantic and epic poetry according to the literary fashion of the day. He 
befriended Walter Scott, in whose name he published a poem in 1816 (Vigne 2012, 16). 
Pringle’s first small collection, Autumnal Excursion, and other Poems, appeared in 1819. 
Encouraged by his connections, he resigned from his post at the General Register Office in 1817 
and assumed, along with John Cleghorn, joint editorship of the Edinburgh Monthly Magazine, 
owned by publisher William Blackwood and establishing itself as a serious scholarly periodical. 
However, the Tory Blackwood disliked Cleghorn and intended Pringle for sole editorship, 
despite the latter’s Whig affiliation and Presbyterianism. When Blackwood dismissed Cleghorn 
after six issues, Pringle followed Cleghorn out of loyalty (Vigne 2012, 31). The publication was 
subsequently re-named Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine and surviving correspondence 
suggests that its new editors deliberately set out to damage Pringle’s literary reputation.107 At the 
same time, Pringle also edited the Star Newspaper, one of very few liberal Scottish periodicals. 
In October of the same year, he became co-editor of Constable’s Edinburgh (or Scots) Magazine, 
                                                 
106 Vigne 2012, 4-17; see Meiring 2-7. 
107 Pringle’s first biographer in the twentieth century still writes that Pringle was simply overwhelmed with the task 
(Meiring 14). 
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a task that turned out to be too unprofitable to support his new family. He had married Margaret 
Brown, a farmer’s daughter from East Lothian nine years his senior, in July 1817. Facing 
financial hardship, he grudgingly returned to the General Register Office, transcribing records.108 
Still, he and his wife were too poor to live together after the wedding. Having no solid prospects 
to realize bourgeois ideology in their daily lives at home, although they were intellectually 
steeped in it, the Pringles looked abroad. 
Britain had annexed the Cape Colony in South Africa in 1806 and deployed troops 
against indigenous Xhosa tribes who had thus far been able to resist European colonization. The 
Dutch had already defeated and enslaved the San and Khoikhoi over the course of the eighteenth 
century, but the Xhosa were more numerous and better prepared for military confrontation. They 
lost the Frontier Wars of 1811-12 and 1818-19, however, and were driven from their homesteads 
and forced to resettle further east (Legassick and Ross 253, 268, 314). In Europe, meanwhile, the 
British government was concerned about riots of recently displaced and unemployed agricultural 
laborers, and encouraged emigration of “surplus” rural populations into the colonies. In response, 
the Cape Colony’s government, under Lord Charles Somerset, permitted limited British 
immigration of about 5,000 people to settle the former Xhosa lands of the Zuurveld as “rural 
buffer” against further Xhosa resistance (Legassick and Ross 269). Impoverished Scots farmers 
like the Pringles welcomed the chance to ascend to economically independent landowners, a 
prospect impossible to realize in Britain.109 Lured by the promise that they would create a new 
capitalist elite, transforming the local economy into a metropolitan one while reproducing 
middle-class British social relations, the Pringles, with a party of twenty-four settlers headed by 
                                                 
108 Vigne 2012, 36; see Meiring 17. 
109 The British Government received over 90,000 applications (Meiring 5). 
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Thomas Pringle, left from London in February 1820, arriving at the Cape in May and at their 
Baviaans River Settlement in June. They hoped that the new economic order would precede 
African Christianization, commercialization, and civilization.110 
Settlement was more difficult than expected. Bands of outlaw Xhosa and fugitive 
Khoisan remained in the hills, raiding the settlers’ cattle herds; drought and rust weakened the 
crops, and wild animals endangered everyone. Pringle’s limp and lack of capital prevented him 
from farming and, although the settlement prospered, Pringle, with the help of his tie to Walter 
Scott, secured a long-hoped-for position as under-librarian at the Public Library in Cape Town in 
September 1822 (Meiring 20, 65, 68). With his friend John Fairbairn, whom he had convinced to 
emigrate as well, he resumed editing periodicals, The South African Journal and the weekly 
newspaper The South African Commercial Advertiser, to support his family. He also started a 
school, the Classical and Commercial Academy, with Fairbairn in 1823, and hoped to take over 
editorship of the Government Gazette, a lucrative and prestigious position.111 Governor Sir 
Charles Somerset, Tory autocrat, however, refused to assign that post to a young and poor 
Scottish Whig. Pringle was disappointed and attacked Somerset for his refusal in the South 
African Journal. This was followed by Pringle’s exposure of government malfeasance in the 
eastern Cape colony Albany and his multi-year agitation for free press. Somerset unleashed a 
personal vendetta against Pringle and famously vilified him as an “arrant dissenter.”112 
Eventually, Pringle was forced to resign as librarian, close his academy, and suspend his 
                                                 
110 See Legassick and Ross 269; Meiring 19; Voss 73. Pringle kept a journal during his six years in South Africa on 
which his Narrative of a Residence in South Africa is based. The Narrative, along with his collection, Poems 
Illustrative of South Africa, was first published posthumously as African Sketches (1834). 
111 Vigne 2012, 87, 116-7, 124-5. 
112 Keegan 97; see Meiring 82-3, 85, 98, 103. 
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publications. He returned to England in July 1826 with his wife and sister-in-law, £1,000 in debt, 
hoping to be compensated for his financial losses by the Government and intending to return to 
South Africa before too long.113 
In 1821, Pringle had met Dr. John Philip, Superintendent of the London Missionary 
Society in South Africa and charismatic supporter of equal rights for the Khoisan and white 
colonizers. Philip’s philanthropy and moderate Christian liberalism, themselves the result of “an 
increasingly broad social and moral consensus at the heart of the British body politic about the 
responsibilities of Empire,” would greatly influence Pringle’s own views on slavery.114 The 
white South African ruling class would vilify these views, and Philip in particular, for more than 
a century. In June 1825, Pringle stayed with Philip for several weeks, accompanied by the 
missionaries William Wright, James Reade, and John Brownlee. During their conversations, 
Pringle was exposed to eyewitness reports detailing the atrocities of colonization and quasi-
enslavement of large parts of South Africa’s indigenous population after the end of the slave 
trade in 1807. Philip’s example had a direct and tangible effect on Pringle who felt “awakened” 
from his “lethargy by the edifying example [Philip] exhibits of indomitable pertinacity.”115 He 
planned to produce a pamphlet against enslavement in South Africa which not only risked the ire 
of the government elite but which was to determine much of Pringle’s future. The pamphlet was 
eventually entitled “Letter from South Africa. Slavery,” dated January 5, 1826, and written at the 
Cape. It appeared in the New Monthly Magazine in October 1826 was and reprinted in the Anti-
Slavery Monthly Reporter in January 1827 (Vigne 2012, 154-5). 
                                                 
113 Vigne 2012, 175; Meiring 109. 
114 Keegan 88; see Vigne 2012, 69-70, and Meiring 116-7. 
115 Quoted in Vigne 2012, 154; see Meiring 117. 
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Pringle’s professional connections in London had remained sufficiently strong during his 
absence for him to find commissioned work upon his return, and he helped edit fashionable 
annuals and political journals to stay afloat. In May 1827, Pringle was recruited by the Clapham 
Sect to the Anti-Slavery Society based on his South African “Letter,” and began a close 
professional relationship with Zachary Macauley, with whom he jointly edited the Monthly 
Reporter starting in 1828. The London Society for the Mitigation and Gradual Abolition of 
Slavery throughout the British Dominions, or simply, the Anti-Slavery Society, had been 
founded in 1823 as an association that, as the name suggests, promised a slow and steady, rather 
than a radical, end to slavery. Some of its members demanded immediate and complete abolition, 
although Pringle was probably not among them. When the public campaign for total and 
immediate abolition became increasingly noisy in 1829, and “almost frantic” in its challenge to 
the gradualists in the early 1830s, Pringle certainly approved.116 
Pringle took pride in his low paying, but, in his estimation, “highly respectable,” position 
and, while attending to the Society’s business in the morning, dedicated the rest of his time to his 
own literary pursuits and literarily agitating for his “great cause,” the emancipation of the 
Khoisan—which was won in July 1828.117 Although the Society focused the vast majority of its 
resources on campaigning against slavery in the West Indies, Pringle’s own contributions to the 
Monthly Reporter deal with exploitation of native tribes at the Cape and in Mauritius (Vigne 
2012, 203). In 1832, Pringle also assumed editorship of the Anti-Slavery Record, cheaply 
produced for a mass readership. By 1829, the Pringles, along with Margaret Pringle’s sister, 
                                                 
116 Vigne 2012, 205; see Pringle 1828, 170. 
117 Quoted in Vigne 2012, 202, 203; for the Khoisan emancipation and the passing of Ordinance 50, see Dooling 93, 
and Legassick and Ross 273. 
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Susan Brown, lived comfortably, if frugally, in Pentonville and were able to hire Mary Prince as 
a domestic servant. As Margaret Pringle was in poor health and their life burdened by financial 
struggle and debt, they received Susanna Strickland to enliven their home.118 
 
Civilization and Servitude 
As Pringle’s biographers have argued, Pringle’s anti-slavery philosophy resulted in large 
part from his South African settler experiences. Pringle’s self-conception, the result of his 
university training and solidified by his six years as colonizer, was undergirded by a fervent 
belief in ‘civilization’ as an enlightened state of existence which every Christian was obliged to 
encourage wherever he saw it wanting. This belief also presupposed that Pringle himself was in 
unproblematic possession of ‘civilization’s’ attributes. Considering his lifelong inability to 
ascend socially despite his deep intellectual commitment to the emerging moral bourgeois order 
and the more elevated social status of many of his friends, colleagues, and political allies, the 
promises of ‘civilization’ probably evaded him. In his South African poetry, Pringle explicitly 
identified as a Scottish settler, mobilizing Scottishness “for purposes of reverie and nostalgia”; 
yet, when face to face with South Africans—be they Dutch or indigenous—he identified as 
“Englishman” (Voss 74). Socioeconomic and cultural markers of identity are unstable in 
Pringle’s reminiscences and uneasily shift when pressured by encounters with people he 
perceived to be strongly incompatible with his own cultural standpoint. Therefore, although he 
                                                 
118 Vigne 2012, 182, 201-5. In a letter to Susanna Strickland Moodie, dated December 20, 1831, Pringle writes, “The 
health of Mrs P is just so so, as Mary says. My own is tolerable” (qt. in Vigne 2012, 205). This is a rare glimpse of 
Prince’s idiom and its (fond?) adoption in the Pringles’ household and intimate circle. Prince probably helped nurse 
Margaret Pringle at the time; however, Prince lost her position six months later, perhaps because her own health was 
failing or due to the media fallout and besmirching of Pringle’s name after the History’s publication. Pringle died in 
late 1834, possibly of tuberculosis. 
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doubtlessly acted with the best intentions, Pringle’s anti-slavery activism must be considered an 
integral part of a private project of political and cultural self-emancipation: if the Scottish 
abolitionist can speak for colonized subjects, he can speak—and be politically audible—to his 
English social superiors. Pringle’s writing as evangelical abolitionist is always also an act of self-
liberation from intra-British colonization and post-Revolution economic precariousness. 
In 1833, a year before his premature death, Pringle attempted in vain to secure the 
position of district magistrate of the as yet unnamed Kat River valley settlement. If appointed, he 
promised he would advance 
[t]he interests of humanity and civilization by the encouragement of general instruction, 
of infant schools, of religious missions, of temperance associations and other sound 
practical means, for gradually elevating long-degraded races of men in the moral and 
intellectual scale of being. (qt. in Vigne 2012, 242) 
 
‘Civilization,’ as Pringle understood it, while defending a “universalist concept of human 
nature,” regardless of phenotypical difference, encompassed in its practical application the goals 
of missionaries, government, and merchants (Legassick and Ross 271). Pringle, in true 
Enlightenment tradition, believed that each human being, having attained ‘civilization’s’ tenets, 
would be granted the right to individuality, which, in turn, would enable him or her to make 
progress both spiritually and materially. This would benefit society at large. Similar to Philip, 
Pringle had no scruples about colonial expansion under the British military. He disliked current 
military and governmental methods because they were inhumane, but did not question the 
beneficence of imperial expansion. Likewise, he sharply disapproved of the common settler 
stereotypes with regards to South African indigenous peoples—although some of his writings 
cultivate them as well—but still considered it in these peoples’ best interest that they should be 
delivered from “heathen darkness” (Pringle 1966, 16). Pringle’s hopes in this matter overlapped 
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with those of the landed and merchant elites: convert Africans into a proletariat ready to adopt 
current European labor relations. 
Owing to his yeoman background, he, perhaps too eagerly and intuitively, identified with 
South African slaves, indentured laborers, and native farmers, and celebrated with much 
nostalgia former slaves’ ability to ascend to the respectable artisanal and peasant classes—the 
same classes from which Pringle descended and that were in the process of being wiped out in 
Britain. Black South Africans appeared to him, if not enslaved, as universally bound in 
obligation—and servitude—to the agents of Europe’s civilizing mission that would ensure the 
continued existence of the African working class. In consequence, Pringle refers to the Khoi 
residing on his farm as “Hottentot vassals … our Mulatto auxiliaries … my Hottentot servants … 
my native assistants … our Mulatto tenantry” while he rises to “petty ‘border chief.’”119 
Observing those natives who were touched by civilization, Pringle generously deems them to be 
“respectful, faithful, and honest,” virtues ideally to be found among England’s upwardly oriented 
classes.120 To be fair, Pringle also warned of mistaking slaves in the colonies for working-class 
people at home, and of grouping both classes with cattle or property, since he believed that 
slaves’ and workers’ suffering would thereby be rendered invisible (1828, 168). 
Indentured laborers and peasants exist on a distinctly gradated scale of unfreedom in 
Pringle’s writing. Pringle’s poetry showcases slavery as an extreme form of servitude without the 
advantages of identity or speech, despite Pringle’s understanding of enslavement as a distinctly 
                                                 
119 Pringle 1966, 114, 115, 117, 168; see Voss 73. 
120 Pringle 1966, 45. He finds the Moravian mission at Genadendal “neat, orderly, and demure”—the Moravian 
“love of order” is realized “even to excess” (1966, 86). Elsewhere, he calls the Moravians “the true descendants of 
the primitive Christians,” an essential version of Christianity ideally suited to convert heathens (qt. in Meiring 11; 
see Thomas 2014, 125). For overlap in missionaries’ and abolitionist thought, see Qureshi 234-5.  
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economic, not essential, condition. As A. E. Voss suggests, this understanding is so acute that 
“African Sketches could be read as a tract on labour relations” (77). However, the freed black 
slave, owning only her body, automatically appears to Pringle not only as servant, but bound to 
him as his own servant. For Pringle, bodily self-possession and the ability to participate in 
capitalist relations, the mainstays of ‘civilization,’ through the transaction of one’s labor are the 
prerequisites of public speech, even if self-possession does not guarantee escape from poverty 
(see Holmes 49).  
The terms of Mary Prince’s employment in Thomas Pringle’s household and Pringle’s 
concomitant bequest of “voice” to her are thus usefully contextualized: The History’s speaker is 
audible and intelligible by virtue of her servitude to the editor. Over the course of the History, 
and as a result of its production, Prince is transformed from slave—a category associated with 
the spectacle of nakedness and moral depravity for Pringle, as I show below—to working-class 
servant. In order to fully appreciate the complexities of his gaze vis-à-vis Mary Prince, Pringle’s 
representation of enslaved bodies elsewhere must be taken into consideration as well. His South 
African and abolitionist writings provide ample material previously ignored by Mary Prince 
scholarship. 
 
Pringle’s African Landscapes and Bodies 
The uncivilized body in Pringle’s work tends to be naked and therefore immodest; social 
and economic bondage, due to the enslaved person’s inability to speak, is communicated through 
and as visibility of skin. Immediately after stepping off the boat in Cape Town, Pringle, 
overwhelmed by new sights and sounds, perceives that “[w]hips were smacking, bollocks 
bellowing, wagons creaking; and the half-naked Hottentots who led the … oxen, were running, 
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and hallooing, and waving their long lank swarthy arms … like so many mad dervishes” (1966, 
16). Here, upon Pringle’s arrival in Africa (the scene of Pringle’s first contact with black, 
indentured, and/or enslaved persons), animal and ‘Hottentot’ labor are conflated, and the bustle 
on Cape Town’s beach registers as “mad.” In his attempts to make sense of the South African 
landscape and the people inhabiting it, Pringle employs the naturalists’ gaze, noting “two elegant 
species of protea,” and switching into the mode of Romantic pastorialism in the next paragraph 
when he wanders into a ‘Hottentot’ village whose aspect from afar reminds him “of a Scottish 
glen” (1966, 14). Much of Pringle’s Narrative of a Residence in South Africa is dedicated to such 
ordering scientific observations of flora and fauna as well as ethnological descriptions of peoples 
and customs, both hallmarks of travel writing produced in the service of colonization. Mary 
Louise Pratt’s insights are pertinent here: 
The normalizing, generalizing voice that produces the ethnographic manners-and-
customs portraits is distinct from but complementary to, the landscape narrator. Both are 
authorized by the global project of natural history: one produces land and landscape as 
territory … the other produces the indigenous inhabitants as bodyscapes … Abstracted 
away from the landscape that is under contention, indigenous peoples are abstracted away 
from the history that is being made—a history into which European intend to reinsert 
them as an exploited labor pool. (63) 
 
Pringle’s interest in the colony’s material conditions indicates his awareness that they shape 
social existence and that they are subject to historical change. In fact, he perceives himself as the 
newly appointed agent of that change. Pringle’s romantically pastoral celebration of the South 
African “wilderness” does not contradict his naturalist descriptions of the exotic; writing Africa 
as Arcadian “Promised Land” allows him to imagine that this new territory was always meant to 
be his (1966, 14, 34). Both romantic reverie and scientific discourse are interdependent literary 
manifestations of Pringle’s acquisitive posture. Crucially, the foreign female body connects those 
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two modes and is mobilized as the spectacle that “explains” colonial social existence at its most 
fundamental. 
 Pringle’s romantic vision briefly collapses upon entering the village. He finds himself 
assaulted by sights and sounds of “woolly-haired, swarthy-complexioned natives … swarms of 
naked or half-naked children … the uncouth clucking sounds of the Hottentot language … and a 
hundred other traits of wild and foreign character” (1966, 14). He has not mentioned a single 
woman yet: Pringle, in fact, deliberately seems to avoid mentioning female natives in order to 
effectively stage the “Caffer woman,” a Xhosa refugee who embodies the unthreatening essence 
of persecuted indigenity. Her appearance re-stabilizes Pringle’s romantic and ethnographic gaze 
that reconciles the “wild and foreign” aspects of the people with the already-owned landscape: 
she stepped forward, drew up her figure to its full height, extended her right arm, and 
commenced a speech in her native tongue … Though I did not understand a single word 
she uttered, I have seldom been more struck with surprise and admiration. The language, 
to which she appeared to give full and forcible intonation, was highly musical and 
sonorous; her gestures were natural, graceful, and impressive, and her dark eyes and 
handsome bronze countenance were full of eloquent expression. Sometimes she pointed 
back towards her own country, and then to her children. Sometimes she raised her tones 
aloud, and shook her clenched hand, as if she denounced our injustice, and threatened us 
with the vengeance of her tribe. Then again she would melt into tears, as if imploring 
clemency, and mourning for her helpless little ones. … I was not a little struck by the 
scene, and could not help beginning to suspect that my European countrymen, who thus 
made captives of harmless women and children, were in reality greater barbarians than 
the savage natives of Caffraria. (1966, 16) 
 
Pringle, not having the least idea what the woman is saying, projects a sentimental tale upon this 
noble savage who appears to be in need of protection from whites, and accords value to her 
meaningless speech according to the bodily rules of dramatic stage performance. The positive 
impression thus gained is reinforced when Pringle attends the evening service nearby, largely 
attended by local women, assuring him again that this Christian place is already familiar: “their 
singing of the missionary hymns was singularly pleasing and harmonious” (1966, 16). Pringle 
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fondly witnesses the process of native emergence “from heathen darkness into the glorious light 
and liberty of the Gospel” (1966, 16). Noble savage females singing Christian hymns remind 
Pringle of his Scottish home, and inexplicable or incompatible cultural signifiers are absent from 
this optimistic report of cultural and economic progress.121 When the experience is repeated 
elsewhere, Pringle again celebrates the “mellow” sounds “where only a very few years ago no 
voice was heard, save the howling of wild beasts, or the yell of savage hordes” (1966, 88-9). 
Christianity allows for female African voices to become audible and comprehensible; otherwise, 
their mouths produce only “gibberish” or are conveniently muted or superseded by dramatic or 
“barbarous” corporeal signifiers (1966, 25, 168). 
In line with most male abolitionist writers of the 1820s, Pringle shows himself to be 
particularly worried about the morally degrading influence of South African slavery on 
colonizing men’s sexual morals. He complains about the frequency of “promiscuous intercourse” 
at the Cape, especially between slave women and white men, in lieu of slave marriages and 
baptisms.122 Further, he marvels that relations between non-African men and African slaves, the 
“objects of licentious traffic,” are “frequently even prescribed by their ‘Christian’ owners,” a 
formulation that transforms slave women’s inability to refuse sexual activity into neutral 
acquiescence and the traumas of rape (1827, 295). Although Pringle realizes that the spectacle of 
bodily suffering assists the production of sympathy among his readers, an enslaved woman’s 
                                                 
121 Pringle further: “There was, even amongst the rudest of the people, an aspect of civility and decent respect, of 
quietude and sober-mindedness, which evinced that they were habitually under the control of far other principles 
than those which regulate the movements of mere savage men. They appeared to be in general a respectable and 
religious native peasantry; as yet, indeed, but partially reclaimed from some of the indolent habits of nomadic life, 
but obviously progressing, and, in many instances, already farther advanced intellectually than externally” (1966, 
17). If it were not for the flicker of racist phenotypical stereotyping (which is rare in his work), Pringle could also be 
talking about an imaginary earlier stage in the Scottish peasantry’s development. 
122 1827, 295; also see Pringle 1828, 165, for the same phrasing. 
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physical torment caused by sexual abuse is unrepresentable. The slave woman’s interiority—her 
possible resistance to enforced prostitution or the psychological scars of abuse—cannot be 
rendered textually because she does not ‘have’ any interiority according to the logic of liberal 
self-ownership. She only has moral effects on others.123 Pringle, apparently forgetting that he just 
blamed European Christians for trafficking black women among themselves, puts the moral onus 
on the enslaved “prostitutes” who “frightful[ly]” besmirch “the morals of the white population” 
with “their depravity” (1827, 295). In British metropolitan culture, prostitution had come to 
signify moral degeneration at large, and Pringle rightfully expected his argument to be effective 
among readers (see Altink 80). 
Pringle’s ‘forgetting’ bespeaks the essential contradiction of evangelical abolitionist 
writing about the sexual crimes of slavery. Female slaves are fully morally accountable, although 
they are not subjects.124 They can have a “loose character,” while their thoughts cannot be 
intuited or represented (Pringle 1828, 165). They do not obviously self-reflect, but obviously 
affect—pull down to their state—the European male.125 If a free man happens to develop 
                                                 
123 See Pringle 1828, 161. As an important exception, Pringle acknowledges the interiority of slave women only 
insofar as they are mothers. He recounts the story of a slave who, shortly before her three children were to be 
transported to their new proprietor, threw herself off a cliff with them. She was rescued and later executed. Pringle is 
outraged that “much regret and sympathy were expressed—not, however, for the unhappy slave or her children” but 
for the owners who had lost valuable property (1828, 172). Motherhood and its motivations are intelligible within 
and as sentimental discourse, overriding Pringle’s potential concern for loss of property. He adds as an afterthought, 
“some slaves may be found possessed of good moral qualities,” yet assumes that slavery most likely leads to 
universal depravity (Pringle 1828, 168). 
124 See Altink 68. This contradiction extends also to the male slave: “A slave has, in fact, no character … his 
ambition has no scope beyond the gratification of his animal propensities, and he has few scruples about the means 
he employs to accomplish his object. From infancy, slaves are trained up to lie and steal; and, when they are 
detected, they feel no shame” (Pringle 1828, 168). Slavery as a system creates the toxic relationship between master 
and slave that mutually degrades the morals of both, Pringle argues. He cannot imagine enslaved subjectivity as non-
degraded because Pringle’s cause, his livelihood, as well as his identity as self-owning white subject, depend on the 
denial of slave ‘character.’ The slave cannot raise himself out of slavery. Pringle wrote these lines a year before 
Prince entered his house as a servant. 
125 “He sinks into a state of moral debasement, stands on a level with the slave” (Pringle 1828, 165). 
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affection for an enslaved woman or for the offspring resulting from their union, “he has the 
mortification to see these children slaves”; in fact, this emasculation, in Pringle’s understanding, 
is “more wretched and bitter than that of slavery” (1828, 166). Since masculine identity, within 
liberal ideology, depends on the simultaneous possession not only of one’s own independence 
but of full authority over one’s dependents126, Pringle can imagine nothing worse than the 
specter of white men losing control over what is rightfully theirs. Women, children, and black 
men, after all, are not entitled to independence even when they are not enslaved. The importance 
of white men’s control over wife and offspring overrides male and female slaves’ right to 
freedom. Such rights, for Pringle, are further mediated by ethnic and cultural belonging. 
 Although his moral discourse is draconian and sententious, Pringle evinces more 
tolerance towards African people’s cultures than other colonial writers of the period, especially 
with his habitual careful attention to differences between individual tribes, dialects, and cultural 
practices. Nevertheless, his assessment of ‘Hottentot’ or ‘Bushmen’ (i.e. Khoikhoi and San) 
women (regardless of their status as enslaved or free) is clearly indebted to hierarchical racial 
categorization of South African tribes as advanced by early nineteenth-century scientific 
discourse. When visiting a jail in the northern Karoo, Pringle deplores the absence of any traces 
of civilization’s progressive influence among some of the prisoners: 
There were wild Bushmen, too—with aspect, dress, and demeanour yet more barbarous 
and bizarre than the rudest of the colonial Hottentots. The whole raiment of the females, 
besides the caross, or sheep-skin mantle, consisted of a piece of leather cut into narrow 
thongs, and bound like an apron or small petticoat round the loins. (1966, 168)  
 
However, a ‘Caffer’ (Xhosa) woman sits nearby. Her “womanly modesty and decorum, pleasing 
to meet with amidst so much wretchedness and barbarism, and forming a favourable contrast to 
                                                 
126 See Altink 104; Whitlock 2000, 51. 
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the disgusting nudity of some of the other females around her” encapsulate the appropriately 
gendered traits of unobtrusiveness and covered skin, the minimum requirements for elevation 
into the state of noble barbarian.127 Pringle’s otherwise uncharacteristically harsh language 
directed at ‘Hottentot’ women continues throughout the Narrative, and his most scathing 
comments are directed at their traditional leather girdle which he calls “a wretched sort of 
leathern apron” and, a few pages later, “wretched apron of leathern thongs hung around the 
loins” (1966, 237, 246). Pringle’s hostility towards the ‘Hottentot’ woman’s apron announces his 
pious rejection, yet conscious perpetuation of, older discourses regarding the sexual spectacle of 
African womanhood. To understand the momentousness of this realization—and its importance 
for Mary Prince’s History—the following sections briefly address Saartjie Baartmann and the 
Western European fetishization of the visual markers of African women’s reproductive potential. 
The “history of surveillance and enforced visibility that mark ways of knowing in South Africa” 
(Baderoon 75), especially the visibility’s of African women’s genitalia, has immediate 
implications for Mary Prince’s History. 
 
Saartje Baartmann and the Burden of Non-Optional Visibility 
Owing to the notoriety of Saartjie Baartmann’s history, the massive “theoretical industry” 
that has sprung up around her (Baderoon 70), as well as its profound impact on the study of 
black corporeality, a brief summary will suffice.128 Baartmann, a member of the Khoikhoi ethnic 
                                                 
127 1966, 169; see Morgan 20, and Voss 77. Pringle further: “Her deportment was quiet and subdued; and her 
features, if not handsome to European eyes, were yet expressive of gentleness and simplicity of character.”  
128 For the politics of naming Baartmann, which are as complex and difficult as Prince’s, see Crais and Scully 9; 
McKoy 87; Qureshi 235. It is unclear whether Baartmann originally had a different Khoikhoi name—most scholars 
assume she did. 
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group, was born around 1790129 at the Eastern Cape in South Africa. She was the quasi-slave of a 
Dutch farmer, Peter Cezar, whose brother, Henrik, allegedly convinced her to travel with him to 
Europe in 1810. She was to exhibit herself as an exotic specimen in pseudo-ethnographic 
curiosity shows, and was promised a share of the revenue and safe return to her home country. 
Her London and Paris shows became (in)famous and highly politicized. Baartmann, oiled, face-
painted, adorned with South African tribal accessories, and wearing a tight, flesh-colored body 
stocking that accentuated her large behind, starred in a spectacle that Rachel Holmes has aptly 
termed “sexual tourism dressed up as education” (53). This spectacle, reminiscent of zoological 
displays at menageries, was orchestrated by Baartmann’s ‘keeper’ who exhibited her like an 
exotic animal (Qureshi 237). It also self-consciously “reiterated the performances of slaves as 
injured spectacles/commodities on the auction block” (Young 50, see 58). Audience members 
would grope and prod her, trying to ascertain that her bodily contours were real (Holmes 78). 
The spectacle of the “Hottentot Venus” was part of the large European freak show circuit in 
which white sexual fantasies about Africa materialized on the stage, in advertisements, and 
prints, consolidating white epistemological and political mastery within the capitalist matrix of 
slave ownership in the years after the 1807 ban of the slave trade.130  
Suspecting foul play, the African Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior 
of Africa, headed by abolitionist Zachary Macauley (Pringle’s later superior in the Anti-Slavery 
Society), sued Cezar in November 1810, accusing him of holding Baartmann in involuntary 
                                                 
129 Although Georges Cuvier wrote that Baartmann was 26 when she died in 1815 (suggesting her year of birth was 
1789), the museum case containing the plaster cast of her remains stated she was born in 1780 (Cuvier 262). In any 
case, she is Mary Prince’s contemporary. Both women were rare sights in London in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, as most persons of color in Europe were male (Fausto-Sterling 75, 77; Qureshi 240). Since the 
slave trade had only been outlawed in 1807, most white Britons during the 1810s likely expected dark-skinned 
people to be former slaves who now worked as servants (Qureshi 239). 
130 McKoy 86; see Wallace 150; Young 58. 
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servitude. The court then determined whether the illiterate Baartmann exhibited herself 
voluntarily or whether she had been forced to enter a contract she could not understand, and 
whether she had right to present her body—sell herself—in the first place.131 The question 
hinged on whether Baartmann was to be considered a prostitute or a slave forced into 
prostitution. The courts as well as Macauley’s connections among the Clapham Sect understood 
Baartmann to be the former. They “romanticized” her as having “fallen from a state of atavistic 
noble savagery to crude sexual, scientific exploitation in the modern factory of sin” (Holmes 69). 
The African Association concluded that the spectacle, a result of Baartmann’s own 
concupiscence, had sadly degraded her. In the months that followed, the Morning Chronicle and 
Morning Post published readers’ letters complaining about Baartmann’s risqué display, but no 
other legal or political action was taken. 
Baartmann traveled through Britain and France for four or five more years until a group 
of French zoologists and physiologists, among them Georges Cuvier, the founder of comparative 
anatomy, took an interest in her body, particularly in her buttocks and supposedly elongated 
genitalia. During a three-day visit at the Jardin des plantes in the spring of 1815, Baartmann 
refused to undress completely before the assembled professors and scientific illustrators, even 
when Cuvier’s competitors, Henri de Blainville, offered her money. The French naturalists had 
to wait until after her death to study her reproductive organs, producing a corpus of extremely 
detailed observations whose unambiguous voyeurism was protected by the socially acceptable 
guise of scientific inquiry.132 
                                                 
131 Young 50; see Magubane 829. 
132 Crais and Scully 2; see Fausto-Sterling 76, 90. The scientists’ chauvinism, invasion of Baartmann’s privacy, and 
pornographic gaze as well as Baartmann’s resistance to such forced exposure has occasioned much feminist 
criticism. For prominent examples, see Crais and Scully 133-5; Fausto-Sterling 67; Gordon-Chipembere 7; Guy-
Sheftall 18; Holmes 85-7; Miller-Young 34-5; Ndlovu 18; Young 59. Relatedly, see Baderoon 70; Gordon-
Chipembere 4-5; Kistner 186; McKoy 86-7, for critiques of some scholars’ tendency—among them, most 
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Baartmann died in December 1815, presumably of smallpox, and was immediately 
dissected by Cuvier who theorized that “Boschimannes” such as Baartmann were degraded 
humans, closer to apes than other human races and therefore situated on the lowest rung of the 
racial hierarchy (Qureshi 242). The Musée de l’homme in Paris exhibited a cast of her body as 
well as her preserved genitalia until the 1970s.133 Cuvier and de Blainville as well as other 
French, British, and German anatomists published detailed descriptions of Baartmann’s and 
other ‘Hottentot’ women’s genitalia (and later, brains), positing that the over-pronounced shape 
of African females’ sexual organs and posterior fat deposits served as a constant bodily 
incitement to procreation and suggested ‘Hottentot’ people’s polygenetic origin—legitimizing 
their inherent political inferiority towards Europeans.134 Most of this material reads like 
“scientific erotica” (Holmes 90) because the anatomists’ “desire-tinged hyperrealism … gave as 
its truth the uncontained sexuality of woman” (M. Nichols 118). Feminist scholars have held 
Cuvier, de Blainville, and their followers accountable for their scopic violations under the guise 
of racialist science, although many of the physiologists, including Cuvier, were nominally 
opposed to slavery.135 
                                                 
prominently, Sander Gilman—to criticize scientific racism while reproducing images of Baartmann’s body, thereby 
satisfying scholars’ own voyeuristic impulses. 
133 Cuvier alleged that her condition was exacerbated by the effects of alcohol abuse and a previous misdiagnosis of 
pleurisy (Fausto-Sterling 76; see Qureshi 242). Natasha Gordon-Chipembere considers critics’ repetition of Cuvier’s 
allegations a further confinement of Baartmann “to the space of victim, prostitute, and drunkard, labels that have 
now become synonymous with black womanhood” (4). For Cuvier’s and de Blainville’s reports of Baartmann’s 
physique, as well as her fraught exhibition history, see Cuvier; de Blainville; Fausto-Sterling 80-1, 85; Guy-Sheftall 
18; Qureshi 233. 
134 Crais and Scully 133; see Miller-Young 34; Moscucci 70; Schiebinger 395. 
135 For examples of such writing, see William Somerville’s “On the Structure of Hottentot Women” (1816 [1806]) as 
well as “Anatomical Description of the Organs of Generation in a Hottentot Female” (1833). Somerville states that a 
host of European travellers to the Cape have remarked upon the curious genitalia of female ‘Hottentots.’ He laments 
that he had trouble convincing women and very young girls—“maidens almost naked”—to expose their vaginas, 
even when he tried to persuade these women and girls with “high bribes” (236-40). He adds that ‘Hottentot’ women 
have strong libido, engage in sexual intercourse “with little restraint,” and give birth painlessly and easily (240). 
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 Much recent writing about Baartmann has countered Sander Gilman’s conceptualization 
of Baartmann as the epitome of pseudo-scientific sexual spectacle and African female 
corporeality in general in the early nineteenth century (see Gilman 206-16). Contextualizing 
Baartmann’s stage performance as the result of political, economic, and social colonial activity 
in South Africa as well as of “the acquisition of fresh territory just four years earlier,”136 
scholarship of the past decade has rethought the phenomenon of the “Hottentot Venus” as a 
metropolitan representation of imperial pursuits at the Cape. Rather than understanding the 
ethnographic spectacle as an inaugural moment of supposedly historically stable discourses 
about race and degeneracy, critics have paid close attention to the social relations underlying 
such discourses. Zine Magubane’s crucial essay shows that theories of degeneracy, as well as 
much racial science, were elite responses to post-Revolution political movements that threatened 
to blur traditional class and status boundaries (820).  
When people paid to watch the “Hottentot Venus,” then, they did not indulge in the 
fantasy that black female sexuality bespoke racial degeneration—Magubane reminds readers that 
degeneration was considered threatening because it could not be predicted by outer appearance 
                                                 
Somerville’s status as naturalist pornographer implicated in a project of masculinist colonialism is further 
heightened when considering that the Khoisan did not engage in genital manipulation whatsoever (Gordon-
Chipembere 8; see Miller-Young 33-4, for the claim that some African women possibly practiced genital 
manipulation for aesthetic purposes). De Blainville also marveled at Baartmann’s modesty (189). See Qureshi 243, 
for another disturbing example involving zoologist and explorer François Le Vaillant. Roxann Wheeler shows that 
British obsession with African women’s buttocks had made its first appearance in the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 
1797 (2000, 249). For European perceptions of ‘Hottentot’ women as simian prior to 1800, see Bush 14, and the first 
two chapters in Morgan. For early nineteenth-century medical displays of women’s reproductive organs (as wax 
objects or in print) serving as thinly veiled conveyors of pornographic fantasy, see M. Nichols 117. The centrality of 
the ‘Hottentot apron’ to medical science—and scientific men’s enduring fascination with it—is illustrated by the fact 
that William Flower, editor of the Journal of Anatomy and Physiology, included an essay on his dissection of a 
Hottentot woman in the journal’s very first volume in 1867, devoting the article’s final two pages to the description 
of the deceased’s genitalia (Flower 207-8). A few years later, overdeveloped labia became not only associated with 
black women, but with prostitutes in general, indicating their innate atavism (Moscucci 70). 
136 Qureshi 235; see Magubane 817. 
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alone. Scientific racial theories had solidified as inexorable cultural knowledge only by 1850 and 
were intimately tied to the growth of the British Empire after Emancipation in 1834 (Gates 3). 
What was contested, rather, were ideas of liberty, social hierarchy, property, and servitude 
(Magubane 827-8). Cuvier’s racialist writings, produced during the reconsolidation of elite 
power in the aftermath of the French Revolution, “scientifically” reject nascent political theories 
of liberty, political participation of the masses, and, ultimately, democracy. Baartmann’s 
mobilization as a popular and scientific spectacle is not the result of some automatic, scopically 
ignited racial or sexual alterity, unproblematically linked to the political goals of twenty-first-
century academic anti-racist struggle. Rather, the “Hottentot Venus” was a symptom of the 
intertwined ideologies of European imperialism and white African nationalism, providing much 
needed popular distraction as well as reassurance of colonial—and epistemological—superiority 
during times of European social unrest and industrial restructuring. The lurid display of 
Baartmann’s body, far from epitomizing fully-fledged British racism based on skin color, 
functioned as the most perceptually convenient “imaginative surface” for complex ideological 
contestation (Hartman 7). Baartmann’s jarred, labeled, and preserved genitals assured scientific 
elites that, as long as African women’s reproductive organs were fully understood and owned, 
their offspring could never demand social parity in the future.137 
Macauley’s legal intervention on behalf of Baartmann is later mirrored by Pringle’s 
investment in the liberation of the Khoisan, a cause ultimately about ownership of Khoisan labor 
and “‘voluntary’ commodification of the self,” as well as his advocacy for Mary Prince’s 
                                                 
137 McKoy 92; Wallace 150, 153; Wheeler 2000, 241. 
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manumission.138 Pringle’s colonial writings and the History of Mary Prince must therefore be 
understood as indebted to the interplay of colonial ideologies and popular spectacle. In my 
estimation, Pringle’s unusually disparaging comments about ‘Hottentot’ women’s leather aprons 
indicate that he was aware of—and probably uncomfortable with—the long tradition of the 
spectacularized European exploitation of black female bodies. He wished to rescue such women 
from their supposed self-degradation, not because he advocated for African women’s right to 
control their bodies’ representation in public, but as a reaction to ‘Hottentot’ women’s 
association with sexual impropriety. For Pringle and his fellow abolitionists, such impropriety, 
communicated via naked skin and leather aprons reminiscent of elongated labia, was equivalent 
to prostitution.139 Pringle’s sexual panic therefore criticizes, yet requires, the cultural currency of 
popular spectacles of African women’s bodies on display, and it is aimed at rendering that body 
invisible by turning it into that of a respectable servant.140 What Pringle’s ‘character’ of Mary 
Prince—his testifying to her work ethic and eagerness to please—proves is that the freed slave is 
converted from (sexual) property on public display into respectable self-owning worker whose 
abject living conditions and negligible political clout remain essentially unaltered. Scholarship 
on the History often ignores that self-possession does not guarantee political participation or 
automatic access to elite systems of knowledge formation. What working-class self-possession 
does bring about, though, is invisibility—or, depending on one’s perspective, privacy. 
  
                                                 
138 Magubane 829. I am unable to explore the many overlaps in Baartmann’s and Prince’s reproductive histories 
here. Baartmann was rumored to have given birth once or twice (Cuvier 262). De Blainville wrote that her child was 
dead by the time she came to Europe (183; see Fausto-Sterling 75). 
139 See Bush 96; Gilman 221. 
140 The trope had survived well into the 1820s. See Gilman 213, for the example of another “Hottentot Venus” being 
staged during a Parisian ball given by the Duchess Du Barry in 1829. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SLAVERY’S PORNOTOPIAS:  
MARY PRINCE AND THE NON-OPTIONAL VISIBILITY OF SCARS 
 
Slavery’s Pornotopias 
I have focused on Saartjie Baartmann’s legacy as prodded, painted, described, and 
dissected colonial body because her legacy of ritualized subjection uniquely exemplifies the 
eroticization of spectacular institutional power (colonial, legal, and scientific) at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. Slavery’s voyeuristic visual regime permitted British fantasies about 
black women’s enthusiastic participation in their own enslavement and objectification via “‘the 
gaze’ as an institutional micro-strategy” at the time when sexual continence became mandatory 
for middle and elite women.141 As some scholars have noted, usually in passing, in The History 
of Mary Prince, Saartje Baartmann’s ghostly afterimage continually hovers in the background.142 
Two highly influential, and seemingly unrelated, critical texts allow me to account for that 
‘hovering.’ I read the History as fundamentally indebted to pre-Victorian slave pornography, an 
association that most Prince scholarship appears to avoid.143  
                                                 
141 Wallace 150; see McKoy 88; Miller-Young 32; M. Nichols 109. 
142 See Cooper 201; Whitlock 2000, 25; Woodard 141. 
143 For instance, Ferguson writes that “Mary Prince … refuses a totalizing conception of black women as flogged, 
half-naked victims of slavery’s entourage” (1992, 298). I suggest that the narrative derives much of its rhetorical 
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First, Steven Marcus’s study on early Victorian pornographic fiction, The Other 
Victorians (1971), identifies ‘pornotopia’ as the fantasy space in which realism, denotative 
language, and linear temporality are suspended to produce in the (white, male) reader sensations 
of maximal sexual abandon and erotic transport; for Marcus, “language … is the prison from 
which [pornography] is continually trying to escape.”144 Language must be overcome to result in 
the dissolution of the self. Second, Hortense Spillers’s “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An 
American Grammar Book” (1987) introduces the term ‘pornotroping,’ which, for Spillers, 
comprises the ideological effects of slavery’s erasure of subjectivity and political authority on 
the body in shackles. The sovereign subject-as-beholder endows the slave body with eros, luring 
itself away from the bourgeois sexual order and linguistic representation.145 By virtue of the 
slave body’s association with sensuality rather than self-ownership, the body becomes an object, 
“a thing” or “flesh,” appearing prostrate, passive, and powerless even long after slavery’s 
abolition (Spillers 67). Both terms rely on an assumed male spectator who observes a scene of 
extra-linguistic excess from a private psychic and safe legal location within Enlightenment’s 
hegemonic sphere. Violent, racialized pornography emerged in support of “the formation of an 
autonomous, self-determining, ‘sovereign’ individual,” as Mary Favret argues (22). Both 
‘pornotopia’ and ‘pornotroping’ require the planned enactment of grotesque physical excess to 
                                                 
allure from representing slave women as “flogged, half-naked victims,” even if that depiction is not totalizing, as 
Ferguson notes. 
144 Marcus 279; also 268-9; see Scarry 35, on pain’s very similar effect of destroying language and the self. Eros and 
pain are closely intertwined throughout the scenes studied in this project. 
145 Effacing its own power to control discourse (along with its role in forming the institution of slavery itself), the 
subject pretends it has been seduced by the slave’s “‘otherness’” (Spillers 67; see Hartman 87). 
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shock, arouse, and educate audiences into erotico-political action, and both rely on “flesh,” the 
pre-cultural, non-conceptual materiality of the body, to produce this effect. 
I suggest that, taken together, these terms circumscribe the History’s staging of black 
female suffering and its desired effects on the reader.146 The modern subject—in this case, the 
‘proper’ English abolitionist reader (assumed male, but just as often female)—stabilizes itself by 
consuming the spectacle of violence in the slave colony, the imagined locus of quasi-aristocratic 
luxury, decadent sensuality, and excessive brutality, far removed from the European metropolis 
and modernity itself. Late eighteenth-century intellectual discourse had newly described the 
spectacle of pain as an aesthetic, if not sublime, event, producing in the spectator the relief of 
delightful vitality after facing an existential threat or witnessing the faithful representation of 
such a threat.147 Theories of sympathy linked individual sensibility to gentility, and implicitly 
required readers’ complicity in the spectacle to produce both aesthetic pleasure and social 
status.148 The extreme end of this “new erotics of cruelty” was voyeuristic Sadeian pornography 
which eroticized the spectator’s ability to discard sympathetic projection altogether.149 Empathy 
                                                 
146 Unlike early feminist theorists, I do not understand pornography necessarily as a sexual scene with coercive, 
degrading, or violent power dynamics producing a victim or a commodified body (see Steinem 37-8; Longino 44), 
or even as a representational regime strictly limited to the sexual (see Kipnis viii). Pornography appropriates 
political and cultural taboos to achieve maximum visibility of that taboo for a limited audience (see Miller-Young 
27; Williams 1989, 30). The genre’s modus operandi is culturally and historically contingent, although it usually has 
the explicit purpose to arouse readers or spectators sexually. The taboos at play in abolitionist writing with 
pornographic elements are precisely miscegenation and “the stripped, exposed and desired truth” of sexual 
exploitation of slaves through white slaveholding elites (Favret 19). For very recent work on the history of 
pornography, its connection to slavery, feminist approaches to pornography, and the rise of porn studies, see Marcus 
Wood’s Slavery, Empathy, Pornography (2002), Linda Williams’s collection, Porn Studies (2004), Jennifer Nash’s 
The Black Body in Ecstasy (2014), Mireille Miller-Young’s Black Sugar: Black Women in Pornography (2014), 
Helen Hester’s Beyond Explicit: Pornography and the Displacement of Sex (2014), as well as Lynn Comella and 
Shira Tarrant’s collection, New Views on Pornography (2015). 
147 Burke 55; see Wurth 27-9. 
148 Colligan 68; see Hartman 4. 
149 Colligan 68; see Wood 2002, 100. 
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is precarious, as Saidiya Hartman argues, as is the distinction between sympathetic witness and 
aroused spectator (4). 
Eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century slave narratives, with their focus on spectacular 
pain, take part in a broader tradition of educating European readers to become properly 
sympathetic readers, directing sexual desire “into a discourse of punishment” (Cooper 201). With 
its limited, yet complex and often contradictory, repertoire of graphic scenes of torture and 
victimization, abolitionist literature enabled the Christian subject-as-reader to imagine an 
authentic, shared humanity with the slave on the basis of the mutual capacity to feel pain, and 
then to claim to relieve that pain by liberating the oppressed.150 Scenes in which naked slaves 
were abused served as uncomfortable reminders of the body’s fragility, ultimate corporeal decay, 
and death, and were designed to evoke disgust and fear (see M. Nichols 105). The slave’s 
suffering functioned as an index of the liberal subject’s ability to “simulate empathetic suffering” 
(M. Wood 2002, 98-100). 
Announcing that they are merely invested in showing the slave body as human (as 
deserving of sympathy and rescue by the liberal state), abolitionist testimonies rested on 
pornotopia’s pleasures to assure readers that European imperial hegemony would remain intact 
even after the rescue. The purchase of voyeuristic abolitionist material constituted the reader’s 
reward for ending slavery, a reform effort that, for contemporaries, posed great risk to national 
wealth and identity. Rather than considering the production of “a sexual dimension that cannot 
be controlled by the forces that (re)produce it” as an incidental byproduct of abolitionism 
(Weheliye 71), I suggest that slave narratives, with their “obligatory scene[s] of gratuitous 
whipping, branding, boiling” (Weheliye 72), strategically utilized the potential for pornotroping. 
                                                 
150 See Hartman 18; Schroeder 262, 271; Weheliye 71. 
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The production of exploitative sexual titillation and the manifestation of punitive fantasies 
encouraged repeated and guilt-free consumption of the scene of terror, and assured readers that 
existing economic, social, cultural, ethnic, and material hierarchies would remain the same after 
Emancipation. When sentimental identification, sexual frisson, and “philanthropic patriotism”151 
merged into sexualized political urgency, the right to voyeuristic excitement is traded for the 
possibility of Emancipation. 
Historians suggest that a generic repertoire of titillating slave imagery, both literary and 
visual, flourished both clandestinely and publicly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as 
erotic high art, often depicting the torture and sexual abuse of men, women, and children, 
particularly in scenes of flogging.152 Punishment had been conceptualized as a public event since 
the seventeenth century, and abolitionism’s scrutiny of colonial cruelty was considered self-
evident penalty for slavery’s ethical transgressions.153 Representations of racialized sexual 
violence circulated in the explicit service of British and American anti-slavery agitation in 
pamphlets and periodicals, not only energizing a Western imaginary of slavery, but contributing 
to the formation of stable literary representations and abolitionist institutions. Doubtless, 
abolitionism was ideologically supported by humanitarian concerns and initiatives towards 
economic reorientation. But prurience also played a role as well, particularly during drawn-out 
parliamentary sessions when “sexualized looking … spliced legislative surveillance with the 
                                                 
151 Wood 2000, 44; see Colligan 70; Fisch 54-5; Miller-Young 27. Modern racist attitudes fully emerged in the three 
decades after 1834’s Emancipation (see Wood 2000, 190). 
152 Wood 2002, 89; see Colligan 67; Favret 19. 
153 Foucault 1979, 9; Morrissey 144-5; see Cooper 201. Slavery’s spectacles of torture and punishment are holdovers 
of eighteenth-century practices to enforce bodily discipline. They are obsolescent by the time of Emancipation; it is 
perhaps no coincidence that the gallows disappear from English public spaces by 1837 (see Foucault 1979, 7-9). At 
times, anti-slavery writers, highlighting their sensibility, expressly shunned graphic descriptions of abuse and stated 
that they had been forced to look away (see Altink 132). 
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often unconscious desires of voyeurism” (Favret 26-7). Imperfectly silencing their own erotic 
valences, abolitionist representations of the slave body in distress required readerly titillation—a 
repeated and expanding “English libidinal investment in the whip,” as Colligan writes (67)—to 
generate the intended affective response and necessary immersion in the text. The spectacle of 
bodily and individual disintegration likely produced an unfortunate “confusion of slavery with 
freedom” among some readers (Favret 21). 
As Marcus Wood points out, abolitionist texts have rarely ever been studied as 
pornographic although they present the slave body in remarkably graphic and eroticized terms 
and, anomalous in an age of rampant censorship and moral didacticism, hardly interrogate their 
own explicitness. The naturalization and neutralization of the exposed slave body—the fact that 
British and American slaveholding societies rendered the pornographic potential of plantation 
and slave literature invisible to themselves—seem to indicate that Western “definitional 
frameworks for the pornographic,” as Marcus Wood calls them (2002, 91), are themselves the 
result of power hierarchies dependent on the commodification of colonial bodies.154 Such 
societies are less likely to acknowledge the slave body as a site of erotic exploitation even as 
they attempt to dismantle slavery’s legal framework. Political economy and sadistic fantasy may 
mix to produce slavery as pornography, as a system of commodified sexuality, in literature (see 
Colligan 72). I argue that The History of Mary Prince is part of this larger corpus owing its 
creation to the “abolitionist strategy of political arousal” (Colligan 70). 
 
 
                                                 
154 As Michele Wallace puts it, “The entertainment values of the gaze in this … visual regime neutralized the 
capacity of the audience to perceive the military and economic violence the visual regime made possible” (153). 
Also see E. Kaplan 66; Miller-Young 17. 
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“Such Connexions Are So Common” 
The historical convergence of institutionalized colonialism and sexual fantasy determined 
public response following the publication of the History’s first edition. As the documents 
appended to the History reveal, the libel suit that John Adams Wood brought against Pringle and 
the ensuing public controversy in antislavery publications centered on the question of Prince’s 
moral character and sexual record, both unambiguously tied to her credibility as a witness of 
slavery as an inhumane system based on nonconsensual (re)production. Testimony given by 
Prince in court reveals that Susanna Strickland had neglected to include information about 
Prince’s extramarital relationships, one of them a longer and potentially commercial affair with a 
Captain Abbott, the other a period of cohabitation with a man called Oyskman who deceived 
Prince with a promise of freeing her. Furthermore, Prince was denied participation in the 
Moravian mission’s religious service when her relationship with Abbott became known, an 
injunction that was far from unusual (Lazarus-Black 92). Strickland also failed to include 
information about Prince’s whipping of a slave woman whom she “found … in bed with the 
Captain in her house,” an action for which she was presumably sentenced later to spend a night 
in “the Cage.”155 Macqueen’s article in Blackwood’s indulges in a lengthy description of the 
same event, with Martha Wilcox, the Woods’ free mulatta nursemaid, supplying information 
                                                 
155 Times March 1, 1833, 7. “She told all this to Miss Strickland when that lady took down her narrative,” writes the 
Times; however, “[t]hese statements were not in the narrative published by the defendant” (7). According to the 
report, Prince further conceded that Wood purchased her at her own request, and “[s]ome years afterwards, when 
[Wood] was about to sell her, she went on her knees and entreated Mrs. Wood to persuade him not to sell her. She 
did not mention that fact to Miss Strickland” (7). As Sara Salih writes, this “cross-examination … was evidently 
designed to discredit The History by drawing attention to the ways in which Strickland and Pringle—not to mention 
Prince—may have ‘compromised’ the truth” (“Black Subject,” 133). See Rauwerda 404; Thomas 2005, 128. 
Obviously, the Times and Blackwood’s articles are not more authentic than the History itself, but must be read as 
both complementary and productively contradictory to it. For the History’s “official” version of the incident, see MP 
80. Ironically, the conflict is rendered as concerning a pig, Captain William remaining unnamed. Prince actually 
appeared before Justice Dyett twice, once about the pig, and once because she had flogged Phibba. She was flogged 
herself and put in “the Cage” after the quarrel over the pig, suggesting that property struggles among slaves were 
considered more disruptive to the social order than those over prostitution. 
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designed to harm Prince’s credibility.156 Wilcox states that Prince continuously fought with the 
Woods because she was not permitted to leave the property at night or allow in strangers. One 
night she enlisted a boy to steal the key to the yard, allowing a certain Captain William to enter 
and spend the night. Wilcox’s report culminates by half-hiding the unspeakable: “She took in 
washing and made money by it. She also made money many, many other ways by her badness; I 
mean, by allowing men to visit her, and by selling ***** to worthless men” (Macqueen 
“Colonial Empire, 749). In the context of the History’s formulation of a respectable ‘character’ 
for Prince, her sexual experiences, intimate life, and possible complicity in the culture of colonial 
violence had to be hushed up. Prince could embody the victimized ex-slave and function as 
ventriloquized spokesperson for the abolitionist cause only as long as her life was narrated 
according to bourgeois norms of chaste womanhood, although colonial trading and plantation 
culture had never conceptualized African women thus.157 It was only logical that Wood would 
accuse Prince of illicit sexual behavior to reduce her ideological bargaining power after 
steadfastly refusing to release her between 1828 and 1833.  
If I am correct in my assumption that the History requires pornotroping for full political 
and marketing effect, the most important rhetorical skirmish for Prince’s authority as witness is 
actually staged in Pringle’s Supplement to the History’s first edition from early 1831. Pringle 
anticipates the nature of the representational battlefield and, precisely like the pro-slavery camp, 
normalizes the focus on Prince’s chastity as sole indicator of her authorial legitimacy although 
the History’s representation of Prince’s struggles appealed to other, more complex, cultural 
                                                 
156 Macqueen “Colonial Empire,” 749. Prince and Wilcox appear to have been at odds. In the History, the narrator 
refers to her as a “saucy woman, very saucy” (79). Also see Sharpe 2002, 148-9. 
157 See Beckles 24, 131; Midgley 90; Salih “Introduction,” ix; Woodard 135. 
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markers of virtuous Christian womanhood, such as piety, feeling, discipline, pride, and the will 
to self-improvement (Santamarina 234). The Supplement included a letter from the Antiguan 
abolitionist Joseph Phillips, a long-time acquaintance of the Woods and himself married to a 
black woman, who, after affirming Mary Prince’s general respectability in the community, 
vouched for the routineness of non-marital sexual relationships among Antiguan slave women 
and white men:  
Of the immoral conduct ascribed to Molly by Mr. Wood, I can say … that I have heard 
she had at a former period (previous to her marriage) a connexion with a white person, a 
Capt.—, which I have no doubt was broken off when she became seriously impressed 
with religion. But, at any rate, such connexions are so common, I might almost say 
universal, in our slave colonies, that except by the missionaries and a few serious 
persons, they are considered, if faults at all, so very venial as scarcely to deserve the 
name of immorality. Mr. Wood knows this colonial estimate of such connexions as well 
as I do; … when he ascribes to a negro slave, to whom legal marriage was denied, such 
great criminality for laxity of this sort, and professes to be so exceedingly shocked and 
amazed at the tale he himself relates, he must, I am confident, have … adapted it … for 
effect in England. The tale of the slave Molly’s immoralities, be assured, was not 
intended for Antigua so much as for Stoke Newington, and Peckham, and Aldermanbury. 
(MP 111) 
 
Pringle’s apparently counterintuitive choice to include both Wood’s and Phillip’s letters shifts 
attention from Prince’s broken down, rheumatic, and “done up” body to her body as 
contaminated by concubinage, unambiguously linking textual and sexual truth (MP 94). Both 
sides end up trafficking Prince’s body as evidence in their drawn-out legal battle, ostensibly to 
save her from different kinds of savagery. The attention shifts to Pringle and Wood’s struggle 
over the correct kind of English masculinity, with Prince functioning as the discursive occasion, 
or, less generously, as Pringle’s “despicable tool,” as Macqueen calls her. 
Several critics have wrestled with Pringle’s apparently contradictory decision to print 
Phillip’s frank remarks about Antiguan “connexions” when Pringle, not five pages earlier, had 
censored Wood’s description of Prince’s flogging the other slave woman, Phibba, over finding 
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Phibba in bed with Captain William “because it is too indecent to appear in a publication perused 
by females.”158 I suggest that there is no contradiction: Pringle’s suggestion that he censored the 
text is in line with Phillip’s comments in that they both imagine Antigua as a pornotopian space 
of universal sexual access and violent excess, a “land of sexual opportunity for young European 
males” (Morrissey 147). Pringle’s ostensible concern for female readers’ modesty ensures 
continued respectability of his publication and, at the same time, profitably increases the 
Supplement’s frisson. At issue is not Prince’s credibility as a moral agent; it is Pringle’s ability 
to remove audience’s scruples as they relate to the continued circulation of his pamphlet. Lastly, 
for the sake of clarity regarding abolitionism’s message, it would not do to show the flogged 
slave as holding the whip herself. 
Risking what Saidiya Hartman has deemed historians’ too liberal bestowal of agency on 
slaves, I would suggest that the image of Prince flogging another slave woman allows for another 
“vision of value and desire—a competing gaze.”159 Pringle censors the incident not only because 
Captain William’s sexual relationships with the two slave women are unseemly, threatening the 
                                                 
158 MP 101n; Macqueen “Colonial Empire,” 749; see Baumgartner 262; see Haynes 26-7; Sharpe 2002, 121, 140-1, 
Thomas 2014, 136; Todorova 297. Sue Thomas shows that when Pringle edited another slave women’s “case” in 
March 1833, he freely acknowledged concubinage as universal practice in all of England’s slave colonies (2014, 
138). The woman, Betto Douglas, does not speak at all. Pringle’s three asterisks would become “one of the specific 
counts of libel cited by Wood, a count that meant that Prince could be subjected to questioning about her sexual 
history in court” (Thomas 2014, 136; see Thomas 2005, 115). Pringle’s censorship actually leads to a massive 
proliferation of public sexual counter-discourse in the form of court testimonies, newspaper articles, and magazine 
essays, demolishing Prince’s narrative authority. In the end, the political urgency of slavery’s system of sexual abuse 
and concubinage is rhetorically defused and serves as bawdry courtroom amusement while colonial capitalism 
continues for another year. The stakes are high, as Macqueen’s slanderous article loudly proclaims; they are “the 
LOSS OF ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY MILLIONS STERLING of British capital and property” as well as 
“deep national humiliation and degradation” (“Colonial Empire,” 754, 764; see Bohls 180). The second half of 
Macqueen’s twenty-page Blackwood’s essay is a long apologia in favor of slavery, including a detailed six-page 
breakdown of Britain’s colonial assets and trade volume depending on slavery’s continuation. Macqueen had 
adjusted the number down: in the earlier one-page appeal to Lord Grey from February 1831, he had claimed “One 
hundred and fifty millions of British property in the colonies” (“British Colonies,” 186). Also see Thomas 2005, 
116, for Macqueen’s promulgation of planter myths regarding African slaves’ improvement through Christian 
civilization and hard work. 
159 Miller-Young 29; see Hartman 54-5. 
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stability of the white colonial family and the nation, but because Prince’s violence towards 
Phibba draws attention to the competitive impulse at the root of the carnal transaction and of 
British slave economy itself.160 Prince flogs the other woman because she risks losing profits, 
which would reduce her already scant chances to manumit herself and impact her standard of 
living (see Sharpe 2002, 149). Most Prince scholarship leaves this event unexplored, since 
Prince’s participation in the very regime of violence that shaped her circumstances may 
contradict critical desires. 
Nevertheless, it is a useful reminder that such a “competing gaze may not always be 
successful, or progressive, but [it is] always contestatory of existing looking relations” (Miller-
Young 29). The two reports of Prince flogging Phibba destabilize the dichotomy between subject 
and slave, and they potentially short-circuit the critic’s own speculative gaze. The possibility that 
Prince brutalized others as she was brutalized herself troubles the abolitionist (and perhaps 
critical) fantasy of the slave’s needy passivity and complicates Prince’s retroactive elevation as 
anti-racist icon. They further confirm that agency exists “in the interstices of performances by 
black people on display,” rather than in the spectacle itself (Young 53-4); that is, Prince’s 
complicity in the oppressive system means that she appropriated slavery’s technologies of power 
in the absence of other ways to negotiate freedom. 
                                                 
160 Mary Prince’s sexual history might also be under so much scrutiny due its proximity to the seat of colonial 
power. According to Antigua’s slave registers from 1824, Rowland Edward Williams, Sr., owned a slave woman 
named Phibba who was about five years younger than Prince (T 71/248). His son, Samuel Williams, was a Captain 
in the Royal Navy. His brother, Rowland Edward, Jr., married the daughter of Sir Patrick Ross, Lieutenant Governor 
of Antigua (“Antigua and the Antiguans” 334). Samuel Williams and Samuel Abbott share the same first name, 
which could account for the Times’s error in reporting that Prince and Phibba fought over Abbott. It is also possible 
that the powerful Williams family interfered before the Times report appeared since Blackwood’s had already 
revealed the identity of “Captain William” through Martha Wilcox’s testimony (Macqueen “Colonial Empire,” 749). 
The letter Pringle had censored in the History’s third edition was written by John Adams Wood and addressed to 
Mr. Taylor, Sir Patrick Ross’s secretary. 
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Taken together with Pringle’s unflattering ‘character’ of his servant as well as 
Macqueen’s reports about Prince’s “very sullen disposition,” Prince’s flogging of Phibba 
counteracts pro-slavery truisms about slavery’s beneficence and the requirement that slaves 
simulate consent and pleasure. It also works against abolitionism’s demand for the liberated 
slave’s gratitude.161 Prince’s work slowdowns, “ill temper,” and recalcitrance (Macqueen scolds 
her refusing to eat cold meat upon her arrival in London) must be read as alternative 
performances during which Prince proclaims herself to be captive and dissatisfied.162 Having 
internalized the colonial gaze, Prince seems to gaze back at those British experts debating 
slavery’s future with an attitude of continuous “compliant noncompliance.”163 She likely knew 
that her resistance would neither erase past physical traumas, nor fundamentally improve her 
situation, but perhaps she confronted everyday domination by exasperating first her owners and 
then her employers, never quite consenting nor arriving at ideologies of liberal selfhood in whose 
historical emergence she was entangled (see Hartman 51). 
As Barbara Baumgartner notes, the History presents Prince’s physical debility as another 
important source of resistance against her owners.164 If the slave is made to work by the threat of 
corporeal punishment, the History imagines pain as allowing slaves to muster opposition, 
establishing a metonymic relationship between Prince’s “quite done up” and “sickly” body and 
                                                 
161 Macqueen “Colonial Empire,” 750; see Hartman 38. 
162 Macqueen “Colonial Empire,” 745; see Young 59.  
163 Young 60; see Hartman 54. 
164 Baumgartner ‘bestows’ the agency to communicate her resistance via pain onto Prince; I understand this 
performance to be embedded within the History’s sentimental register. 
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the failing system of slavery.165 Although the narrative is extremely attentive to Prince’s long 
series of injuries and degradations, it is incapable of actually describing the slave’s pain without 
resorting to spectacular descriptions of sights and sounds available to the observer rather than the 
sufferer. The following passage, depicting Prince’s work in the salt ponds on Turk’s Island, is 
one of the few instances in which the experience of pain is actually related:  
the sun flaming upon our heads like fire … Our feet and legs, from standing in the salt 
water for so many hours, soon became full of dreadful boils, which eat down in some 
cases to the very bone, afflicting the sufferers with great torment (MP 72). 
 
Pain is a communal, shared, general sensation, rather than Prince’s alone. Whenever the History 
refers to Prince’s physical condition, for instance in the many passages that cover the causes and 
manifestations of her rheumatism, it prioritizes the visual outcome. Baumgartner suggests that 
Prince’s body performs illness as protest against the demand for increased (labor) performance 
(260). However, this performance, soliciting the reader’s sympathy with the slave, is limited by 
the narrative’s inability to represent black interiority. 
The History mobilizes illness to heighten Prince’s victimization through economic 
exploitation, but quickly and conveniently ‘forgets’ the debilitating effects when the narrative 
praises other aspects of Prince’s fledgling liberal selfhood, like her work ethic and quest for 
freedom. For instance, the narrator mentions her painfully swollen joints necessitating the use of 
a cane, and then, on the very next page, relates her eagerness, and ability, to labor energetically 
when reaping the profits herself.166 Prince takes in washing “to earn money to buy my freedom,” 
although laundry work causes the debilitating illness which completely halts her work for the 
Woods and later forces her to run away in London (MP 81, see 80-6). Macqueen notes the 
                                                 
165 MP 94; see Baumgartner 253-4; Thomas 2014, 136. 
166 MP 80-1; see Baumgartner 258. 
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contradiction as well, accusing the History’s editors of “sophistry” and of “calumniat[ing]” the 
Woods.167 Considering the History’s self-contradictory rhetoric of the slave’s undeserved, 
passive martyrdom and her simultaneous advancement into liberal selfhood, Macqueen’s first 
allegation is probably correct. I would argue that, according to the History’s logic, unwaged 
labor leads to (communal) physical depletion and pain, while the labor necessary to acquire 
profits is liberating, pain-free, even productive of joy. Because Prince, in the course of her 
narrative, turns into a working-class domestic servant in need of future employment, her bodily 
pains remain mostly inaccessible and irrelevant. Her suffering can be shown, but not outside the 
parameters of abolitionist pornotopia. 
 
Spectacles of Skin, Scenes of Horror 
 After the History’s narrator relates Prince’s childhood in more or less Arcadian terms 
(her mistress only ever hits her once for coming home late), the slave’s downward spiral into 
brutalization and grotesque horror begins with what abolitionists perceived as slavery’s primal 
scene, the auction. Especially for those metropolitan readers who had never witnessed slave 
auctions themselves, the spectacle of racialized bodies’ commodification was associated with 
Baartmann’s and other “Venuses’” suggestive performances via a series of cultural 
displacements and surrogations (see Young 56). Both metropolitan burlesque spectacle and 
public colonial traffic in enslaved bodies at the auction were instantiations of colonial force and 
required that the “exercise of power was inseparable from its display” (Hartman 7). There is no 
doubt in historians’ minds that white men perceived their intimate probing and examining of 
                                                 
167 “Colonial Empire,” 748. Thus Macqueen: “During those periods at least, sickness seems to have forsaken her” 
(747). 
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slave bodies at auction as erotic. Women’s bodies were inspected for their youth, health, and 
beauty with the explicit intention to use them for community concubinage, private sexual 
exploitation, and reproduction of the slave owner’s labor force. The auction is a pivotal cultural 
event because it is an “explicitly sexual, even pornographic process of exhibition, performance, 
and psychosocial trauma” producing ways of reading black female bodies that continue to shape 
modern ways of looking (Miller-Young 31). 
[The vendue master] took me by the hand, and, turning me slowly round, exposed me to 
the view of those who attended the vendue. I was soon surrounded by strange men, who 
examined and handled me in the same manner that a butcher would a calf or a lamb he 
was about to purchase, and who talked about my shape and size in like words—as if I 
could no more understand their meaning than the dumb beasts. (MP 62) 
 
The History’s narrator highlights the indecency of the child’s auction-block exposure by drawing 
attention to the spectators’ invasive, dehumanizing participation. Anti-slavery publications 
commonly represented auctions as “the ultimate in human pathos—a potent sentimental symbol 
of the inhumanity of slavery.”168 The scene gains much of its melodramatic effect from the 
preceding funereal parting scene in which Prince’s mother laments the transformation of her 
children into property, the dissolution of the family, and the possible extinction of her children’s 
lives (see Rice 21): 
The black morning at length came; it came too soon for my poor mother and us. … she 
said, in a sorrowful voice, (I shall never forget it!) ‘See, I am shrouding my poor 
children; what a task for a mother!’—She then called Miss Betsey to take leave of us. ‘I 
am going to carry my little chickens to market,’ (these were her very words.) ‘take your 
last look of them: may be you will see them no more.’” (MP 61) 
 
Pringle and Strickland’s imagination rather than Prince’s likely furnished the scene with a “pious 
image of a Madonna and children” (Aljoe 76), requiring two parenthetical emphases to assure 
skeptical readers that Prince’s mother had actually uttered those words. The narrator’s stance of 
                                                 
168 Aljoe 75; see Mallipeddi 19. 
 103 
victimized exposure is counteracted by the apparent pride in having been sold for fifty-seven 
pounds at the scene’s very end (“I had fetched a great sum for so a young a slave,” MP 63). The 
passage’s final sentence deflates the passage’s critique of chattel slavery and returns the reader to 
the speaking situation of the grown-up slave who appears to have internalized slavery’s 
dehumanizing value system. If Prince’s pride in her “great sum” and the scene’s intended 
sentimental cachet seem at odds, as Nicole Aljoe writes (75), their contiguity is not coincidental. 
As I will show, the History continuously shifts back and forth between pious, scandalized 
containment of slavery’s centuries-old pornographic tropes and bursts of exhibitionist narrated 
selfhood. Mass popular desire and anti-slavery abhorrence entwine when the former slave 
narrates her own commodification, closely detailing the erotic dimensions of objectification. As 
such, sentimentalism with its repeated reminders of the slave’s wounded modesty fuels the 
pornographic spectacle. 
 In his other writings Thomas Pringle repeatedly utilized the trope of the family-as-torn-
apart at the slave venue, often voicing outrage that participants were immune to the sentimental 
charge that so affected Pringle: “the distressing spectacle of the wife torn from the husband, and 
the children from the parents, is so familiar as scarcely to interest the feelings of the spectators” 
(1827, 290). The observers’ capacity to feel deep affliction is a marker of their heightened 
sensibility (and attendant cultural authority), while the common “spectators” have become 
desensitized. “Coarse jocularity and indecent merriment seldom fail, on such occasions, to be 
rudely bandied between the auctioneers and the rival bidders,” as Pringle writes, dismissing the 
bawdy in favor of pathos (1827, 290). The slave’s interiority—what it must feel like to be sold 
away thus—is less rhetorically stressed than the abolitionist’s own cultivated affect. This 
explains why Pringle’s editorial note below the History’s auction scene so obviously competes 
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with Prince’s ability to report the experience of being sold away. Not only is it twice as long as 
the narrator’s account, but it hyper-aestheticizes the spectacular commodification of bodies.  
While the sale was going on, the mother and her children were exhibited on a table, that 
they might be seen by the company, which was very large. There could not have been a 
finer subject for an able painter than this unhappy group. The tears, the anxiety, the 
anguish of the mother, while she met the gaze of the multitude, eyed the different 
countenances of the bidders, or cast a heart-rending look upon the children; and the 
simplicity and touching sorrow of the poor young ones, while they clung to their 
distracted parent, wiping their eyes, and half concealing their faces … furnished a 
striking commentary on the miseries of slavery, and its debasing effects upon the hearts 
of its abettors. (MP 63; see Pringle 1827, 294) 
 
Obviously, Pringle, in describing this tableau, wants to make a point about the ethics of the slave 
auction. However, his aestheticizing gaze cannot spot its own complicity in reifying the spectacle 
(see Thurston 192n40). What is so striking about this footnote is that it does not even solicit 
readers’ empathy owing to its overriding objective to educate readers in scopic sensibility. If the 
reader’s empathy is contingent because it invites facile identification that makes no space for the 
other’s difference or sentience (see Hartman 20), the kind of sensibility Pringle invites risks an 
even greater violence because it freezes the moment of maximal personal and familial anguish 
into an aesthetic object to be contemplated and consumed at leisure. Aestheticizing the 
dissolution of the slave family “naturaliz[es] this condition of pained embodiment” (Hartman 20) 
and turns slavery’s physical and psychological injuries into necessary accessories of white 
bourgeois self-constitution. This process ensures that slavery’s subordinations continue as 
aesthetic sensation enshrined within liberal bourgeois ideology even after abolition has been 
won. Pringle’s aesthetic sentimentalism not only turns suffering into art; it attempts to neutralize 
the long-term political effects of suffering. Although scholars have long considered subjective 
experiences of pain to be essentially unrepresentable169, Pringle’s aestheticizing observations of 
                                                 
169 See Scarry 35; Schroeder 264. 
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slaves here and in his South African writings erase black consciousness, even sentience, to 
enable his own “wielding of power and the extraction of enjoyment” (Hartman 23). It is not a far 
cry from abolitionism’s romantic elation to the register of auctioneers’ lecherous enthusiasm: 
both states signify property relationships creating pleasant affect in the observer. 
Matters were more complicated when white women became observers of slavery’s public 
spectacles. A crucial element of provincial abolitionist media campaigns run by women during 
the 1820s concerned the public flogging of slave women.170 As Moira Ferguson observes,  
flogging was one of the worst punishments evangelical women could imagine—
especially, but not only, in the case of females—since it combined absolute control and 
remorseless abuse of the female body by males … Flogging, in a word, was anti-
Christian. Worst of all, it was a public act, involving an exposed nakedness and an 
unsolicited male gaze, sometimes even attracting spectators and enthusiasts.171 
 
When Parliament passed resolutions for the amelioration of slavery in 1823, flogging of female 
slaves had been prohibited, which illustrates the strength of male and female abolitionists’ 
abhorrence of the practice.172 Nevertheless, abolitionist writing in the 1820s and 1830s continued 
to focus on flogging because the practice continued mostly unabated in the colonies. Not 
incidentally, the height of abolition coincided with an increase in flagellation obscenity, leading 
some reviewers to remark on slave narratives’ moral corruption. The image of the flogged slave 
                                                 
170 Ferguson 1992, 293; see Whitlock 1995, 253. See Colligan 68-70, for a brief account of flogging’s cultural role 
in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century England, most prominently as an educational device utilized to form 
‘gentlemen’ at public schools. Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, childhood memories of schoolroom 
whippings were erotically transposed onto fantasies starring sadistic schoolmistresses and blushing youngsters. 
Plantation pornography replaced the whipped white boy (or girl) with the black slave (often a woman), catering to 
white men’s “punitive desires” (Favret 32). Whipping scenes were culturally associated with the education of reason 
at school as well as the initiation into sexuality (Favret 26). The chains of signification were never causal or simple, 
however, as associations with Christian martyrdom and agrarian animal labor were also evident. Although slave 
narratives focused on ritual floggings, in the colonies, the whip was most often casually used as a means to speed up 
slaves’ work (Wood 2000, 260). 
171 Ferguson 1992, 293; see Altink 130. 
172 Midgley 95; see Aljoe 10. 
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woman had already circulated for a century and strongly suggested sexual transgression 
(Colligan 70-2). Many female abolitionist campaigners, when drawing attention to floggings and 
public vendues of female slaves, focused on public exposure of skin instead of, say, the loss of 
freedom or the experience of severe pain. To shield themselves from accusations of 
salaciousness, women abolitionists framed public flogging and the resulting exposure of skin as 
“a crime of the heart” (Hartman 27). By exposing their bodies in public, flogged mothers and 
wives were imagined to lose moral guardianship over their children and become disgusting to 
their husbands (Altink 132). In 1828, for instance, the Bristol Female Society argued that their 
reform agitation was not “unbecoming” in light of the 
deep degradation of our own sex under this dreadful system, for the exposure of their 
persons to the lacerating whip, and the exposure of their untaught minds to the most 
awful licentiousness in its most debasing form, which even leads its captives to glory in 
their shame. Surely these things must stir up our spirits within us, when we behold so 
large a number of our own sex helpless victims alternately of cruelty and lust173 
 
While accounts of flogging usually relied on actual cases, stories about abused slave mothers and 
raped women were often sentimental imaginings (Altink 130-1). The History’s relative silence 
about Prince’s sexual abuse and motherhood reflects the generic default, intended to highlight 
Prince’s dehumanization and resulting physical debility under the whip (see Altink 81). 
Notwithstanding the editors’ reluctance to concentrate on Mary Prince’s sexual experiences 
under slavery, the History contains scenes of abuse indicating that sexuality and corporeal 
punishment were part of the same system of social control and discipline.174 Interracial sex 
remains the taboo that cannot be spoken, despite the many instances of implied nudity, wherein 
bodies are reduced to flesh, observed by whites. 
                                                 
173 Second Report 11; see Midgley 96. 
174 Cooper 201; see Haynes 26; Rice 21; Sharpe 2002, 132, 201-2; Thomas 2014, 136. 
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For instance, Prince notes her regular experiences of humiliating violations while living 
with the Inghams at the age of twelve: “To strip me naked—to hang me up by the wrists and lay 
my flesh open with the cow-skin, was an ordinary punishment for even the slightest offence” 
(MP 66). The description of torture is repeated nearly verbatim when the narrator recounts her 
years on Turks Island: “Mr. D— has often stripped me naked, hung me up by the wrists, and beat 
me with the cow-skin, with his own hand, till my body was raw with gashes.”175 Prince mentions 
that her transfer to a new owner is like “going from one butcher to another”; the children Cyrus 
and Jack are beaten “at [the Inghams’] pleasure” until their “flesh [was] ragged and raw with 
licks ”; Mrs. Ingham “lick[s], and flog[s], and pinche[s] … the neck and arms” before worse 
punishments ensue; Prince observes how Darrell “fling[s] [salt] upon the raw flesh till the 
[elderly slave Daniel] writhed on the ground like a worm, and screamed aloud with agony”; his 
“wounds were never healed, and [were] full of maggots” (MP 72, 66, 74). Similarly, Darrell 
throws the old woman Sarah, “who was subject to several bodily infirmities, and was not quite 
right in her head,” “among the prickly-pear bushes” which enter “her naked flesh so grievously 
… that her body swelled and festered all over, and she died a few days after” (MP 75). Finally, 
although likely subjected to a less barbarous regime at the Woods’, Mrs. Wood still “fretted the 
flesh off my bones” (MP 85). This textual display of defenseless nudity and ruptured skin, even 
if restricted to the same repetitive phrases, likely produced mortification and possibly titillation 
                                                 
175 MP 72-3. Moira Ferguson had already identified “Mr. I—” as John Ingham (or Ingraham) of Spanish Point, 
Bermuda (1992, 376n25); Maddison-MacFadyen suggests that the sadistic “Mr. D—“ and his son, “Master Dicky,” 
are Robert and Richard Darrell, respectively. Most of these families arrived on Bermuda in the 1620s, had 
intermarried, and worked as maritime traders, specializing in slave transport throughout the Caribbean, shipbuilding, 
(illegal) salvaging, and salting. Maddison-MacFadyen shows that Prince was sold within a tightly knit family 
network; for instance, Sarah Williams, Mary Spencer Ingham, and Margaret Gilbert Wood were all descended from 
the Albuoy family; Sarah Williams was the daughter of George Darrell (who had bought Mary Prince as a child) as 
well as Robert Darrell’s half-sister (Maddison-MacFadyen 2008; also see her 2013 and 2014 essays). Maddison-
MacFadyen also notes that “Rebellious slaves were often split from their families and sold out of the colony for 
punishment, and this is probably what happened to Prince” (2014, 8).  
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among the History’s readers, encouraging visceral, political outrage at Prince’s owners, the 
Inghams, Darrells, and Woods. 
 
Rape’s Eloquence: Death of the Mother 
The History’s most violent episode concerns Hetty, the Ingham’s pregnant slave. 
Abolitionist tales often prefaced the narrator’s own abuse with an eyewitness account of another 
slave woman’s beating to establish the speaker’s reliability and prepare the reader for the (often 
feminized) martyrdom the narrator would have to undergo. Hetty’s horrific experience 
anticipates the full scope of Prince’s own, and since Prince cannot tell her sexual abuse in detail, 
the narrative employs Hetty as Prince’s double, or “othermother,” to do so.176 Hetty, a “French 
Black” Captain Ingham captured from a pirated vessel, embodies the innocent woman punished 
for following her prime duty, motherhood, a stock motif employed by abolitionists to demand an 
end to the flogging of pregnant women (see Altink 135). Miscarriage after flogging was cited as 
the primary cause for the British Caribbean’s lack of natural increase among its slave 
populations. In the context of the History, miscarriage is displaced onto a body that, in its 
Frenchness, is even more foreign than Prince’s. Hetty’s speech is the History’s only 
representation of creole dialect, ‘bad speech,’ that exoticizes her and affirms Prince’s status as 
the observing subject (Aljoe 82): 
my master started up from his bed, and just as he was, in his shirt, ran down stairs with a 
long cow-skin in his hand. I heard immediately after, the cracking of the thong, and the 
house rang to the shrieks of poor Hetty, who kept crying out, ‘Oh, Massa! Massa! me 
dead. Massa! have mercy upon me—don’t kill me outright.’—This was a sad beginning 
for me. (MP 65) 
 
                                                 
176 Thomas 2014, 127; see Sharpe 2002, 130. 
 109 
Prince’s introduction into the Inghams’ home begins with the auditory witnessing of a flogging 
that, considering Ingham’s state of undress and the mentioning of “his bed,” could equally well 
involve a rape. Since Hetty is already pregnant, the scene doubly announces her status as chattel. 
Hetty’s screams indicate that Ingham indulges in both reproductive and destructive sexual 
activities (see Favret 34). Hetty’s fate warrants a longer quotation, despite its heinousness: 
Poor Hetty, my fellow slave, was very kind to me, and I used to call her my Aunt; but she 
led a most miserable life, and her death was hastened … by the dreadful chastisement she 
received from my master during her pregnancy. … One of the cows had dragged the rope 
away from the stake to which Hetty had fastened it, and got loose. My master flew into a 
terrible passion, and ordered the poor creature to be stripped quite naked, notwithstanding 
her pregnancy, and to be tied up to a tree in the yard. He then flogged her as hard as he 
could lick, both with the whip and cow-skin, till she was all over streaming with blood. 
He rested, and then beat her again and again. Her shrieks were terrible. The consequence 
was that poor Hetty was brought to bed before her time, and was delivered after severe 
labour of a dead child. She appeared to recover after her confinement, so far that she was 
repeatedly flogged by both master and mistress afterwards; but her former strength never 
returned to her. Ere long her body and limbs swelled to a great size; and she lay on a mat 
in the kitchen, till the water burst out of her body and she died. … I cried very much for 
her death. The manner of it filled me with horror. … After Hetty died all her labours fell 
upon me, in addition to my own. (MP 67) 
 
After having been torn from her mother, Prince looks to Hetty as a surrogate relative and forges 
ties of familial intimacy to resist the insulating effects of slavery’s objectifications. Hetty who 
likely carries Ingham’s child is exclusively defined by her reproductive and maternal potential. 
From the beginning, Prince’s relationship to the Inghams is ambivalent: if Hetty is her 
aunt/substitute mother, Mr. Ingham turns into the girl’s father/uncle, while his jealous wife, the 
evil stepmother, stands ready to deny and destroy the kinship through ritualized violence. After 
miscarrying the child—a result the Inghams perhaps intended to bring about—Hetty’s body 
continues to swell until it gruesomely ejects edematous fluid, slavery’s monstrous afterbirth, 
upon the kitchen floor. Hetty’s gothic death suggests that intra- and cross-racial kinship is 
impossible. Slavery’s sexual violence results in slave women’s unwilling maternity and finds its 
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horrible climactic release in the abject soiling of the space where the system nourishes its 
laboring bodies. Prince is the next body to be inserted into this atrocity-producing economy, as 
the girl inherits “all her [that is, Hetty’s] labours.” The slippage of productive and reproductive 
labor is unmistakable.177 
With this in mind, it is useful to analyze the scene of extreme corporal punishment that 
occurs right after Hetty’s story. When ordered to “empty a large earthen jar” with a long crack 
running through it, Prince feels the jar coming apart in her hands. “[D]readfully frightened,” she 
reports the “accident” (nevertheless “my fault”) to her mistress who gives her a severe beating 
and denounces her to Ingham. Her master then ties her “up upon a ladder, and [gives her] a 
hundred lashes with his own hand.” When he pauses to catch his breath, a sudden and 
supernatural “heavy squall of wind and rain” occurs before “a dreadful earthquake” shakes the 
house, destroys part of the roof, and provides the girl with the opportunity to run away. Prince, 
“all blood and bruises,” finds herself near death as she hides under the porch until the next 
morning.178 Nature mirrors the narrator’s inner perturbation and comes to her rescue when she 
undergoes the worst bodily chastisement yet. Brought near the brink of death, Prince’s body, her 
earthen jar, and earth itself break open during the crazed bout of arbitrary violence. All three 
vessels equally signify femininity and become irreparably damaged. I would suggest that the jar 
scene signals Prince’s absent maternity as terrifyingly violent haunting because a literal 
description would be “too, too bad to speak in England” (MP 68). The twelve year-old child’s 
experience of physical and sexual violence materializes as a broken jar, “part[ing] in my hand” 
                                                 
177 Later in the narrative, Prince’s body “dreadfully swell[s]” due to rheumatism (MP 86). Hetty’s ghost is still 
present. 
178 MP 68-9; see Aljoe 140. 
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(MP 68). The abuse finds its catastrophic culmination—the last rung of the ladder to which the 
slave girl is tied—in a final and literal natural cataclysm. On the day the jar breaks, Prince is 
raped by Mr. Ingham, perhaps not for the first time, since the jar bears the mark of an “old deep 
crack” (MP 68). The event is so horrifically brutal that her ‘vessel’ breaks. The earth’s opening 
and the jar’s destruction signify Prince’s miscarriage or sterilization, metaphorizing the slave 
woman’s impossible motherhood as raw, gothic violence.179  
The jar episode with its atmospheric stage directions (“the weather was very sultry,” MP 
68) and nightmarish causal determinism presents the girl’s abuse as gothic drama, implicating 
the reader in the orgasmic, pornotropic spectacle with its barrage of erotic signifiers: the white 
mistress flogging with irrational fury; the sadistic male punisher getting “hot” and “exhausted” 
from whipping the girl; Ingham’s voyeuristic son, Benjy, standing by to count the lashes; the 
earth “groaning and shaking”; and, finally, Prince’s body, first “trembling,” then “all blood and 
bruises … moaning piteously.”180 Prince is reduced to bloody flesh close to death, her identity 
about to dissolve even as the first-person narrator continues to provide auditory and visual cues 
(“moaning piteously,” “when they saw me,” MP 69). Subsequently, Prince mentions that Mrs. 
Ingham constantly reminds the girl of the broken jar, possibly encoding accusations that Prince 
seduced Mr. Ingham and that there had been a pregnancy. The next sentence relates that the cow 
had freed itself again, just when the girl is “milking” it (MP 69). Two pages prior, Hetty’s brutal 
beating had occurred for precisely the same reason. Prince has inherited Hetty’s place, and the 
                                                 
179 Ferguson cites evidence for an earthquake occurring on 19 February 1801. Weather conditions in Bermuda 
during Prince’s youth were prone to hurricanes (MP 37n20). Ferguson considers sterilization a possible result of the 
many beatings Prince endured (1992, 289). While I prefer to read the earthquake as gothic spectacle, Nicole Aljoe 
sees connections to zombie iconography and voudou via Hetty, thus endowing Prince with the compositional 
authority to undergird her narrative with African diasporic ontologies (140). I remain skeptical. 
180 MP 68-9. For the common trope of men’s sexualized exhaustion as they take turns whipping female slaves, see 
Favret 38. 
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two women’s association with a runaway milk-cow is likely not coincidental. Mr. Ingham 
notices the cow’s flight, brutally beats Prince’s lower back with a boot (her “agony” is not 
described, only its manifestation as a “shriek”), inducing the girl to run to her mother (MP 69-
70). The unbearable, undeserved violence of slavery’s (re)productive labor leads to bovine and 
human escape—both valuable, lactating commodities whose pain is inarticulate.  
The editors’ display of the tormented body forestalls descriptions of the slave’s pain and 
invites readers to immerse themselves in the sadistic spectacle (see Baumgartner 256). Overall, 
the jar scene, along with later scenes that operate similarly, serves as an official educational 
exercise in mastering the passions as they are called forth (Favret 21). Through recourse to 
(repeatable) sadistic fantasy the scene wants to educate the metropolitan reader about the 
destruction of the self while reconstituting it in corrected form. This is why, in the world of the 
History, Ingham’s cruelty lies in his emotional detachment as a punisher rather than his sexual 
abuse of slave women. The arbitrary, wildly disproportionate punishment is rationed into “a 
round hundred,” total percentage, and Ingham delivers this totality illegally and without 
consideration for the girl’s survival. 181 Readers observe the abandonment of liberal rationality as 
contained by precisely one hundred lashes. Similar to other white men starring in depictions of 
slave torture, Ingham, like his account-keeping son, “is spectacularly unexcited and unaware,” 
his feelings having become entirely deadened.182  
A few pages later, Prince’s next owner, Darrell, oversees Prince’s punishment with the 
same calculated disengagement: 
                                                 
181 MP 68. The maximum number of lashes for women, regardless of whether they were pregnant, old, or disabled, 
had been 39 since the introduction of the 1788 Slave Law (Altink 129). 
182 Wood 2013, 178; see Woodard 139. 
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Mr. D— was usually quite calm. He would stand by and give orders for a slave to be 
cruelly whipped, and assist in the punishment, without moving a muscle of his face; 
walking about and taking snuff with the greatest composure. Nothing could touch his 
hard heart—neither sighs, nor tears, nor prayers, nor streaming blood; he was deaf to our 
cries, and careless of our sufferings. (MP 72) 
 
Punishment, in the History (as in slavery in general), functions as a system of controlled excess. 
Even as these scenes disclose the truth of colonial Englishmen’s moral monstrosity, readers learn 
that, in the colony, sexual fury is permissible when it is numerically and situationally accounted 
for. Since slaveholders have trained their passions to operate hydraulically, white colonial 
masculinity retains its difference from the dissoluble identity of white women and slaves (see 
Favret 21). As Marcus Wood suggests, for metropolitan readers, an impassivity like Darrell and 
Ingham’s becomes “the unacceptable and un-acknowledgeable face of slavery, a new kind of 
demon who is uninterested, and uninteresting, and one of us” (Wood 2013, 179). Learning that 
the slave-owner acts with the same degree of self-restraint as themselves, readers at home ideally 
rework their initial erotic excitement into intellectual and activist desires, and, at least in public 
maintain heightened control over their erotic and aggressive impulses. The History wants to 
teach properly acculturated Englishmen (and –women) to reject cruelty and to uphold sexual 
morality by protecting women’s bodies from harm and the gazes of others, while allowing for the 
endlessly repeatable consumption of the sadistic scene.183 Abolitionism must show how the 
slave-owner constitutes himself to encourage the audiences’ own, superior self-constitution in 
the form of a moral national identity that favors intellectualism and anti-violence. To make this 
education attractive, it is offered in the potentially self-defeating register of repeatable 
                                                 
183 See Altink 145; Favret 35-6, 39. Further see Pringle 1827, 291, for a similar account of a planter’s cold sadism. 
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voyeurism.184 Meanwhile, “the activity of [the abolitionist’s] own body remains out of sight,” 
and the slave woman’s body is deprived of a legacy (Favret 39). 
It is obvious that Pringle was aware of the possibility of sadistic enjoyment of the 
spectacle. Elsewhere, he observes that slavery’s scenes of violence derive from the most 
essential of human impulses, the primary obstacle to abolition: “the love of power” which, once 
it “approaches … absolute despotism,” is ever more “desired and enjoyed” (1828, 161-2). 
Whereas Mary Prince’s narrator believes that “to be free is very sweet,” Pringle, outlining the 
inner logic of slavery’s pornotopias, reverses the thought and echoes Tacitus’s position “that 
there is nothing so sweet to the human heart, as the gratification which arises from the 
consciousness of having the life of a fellow-creature at one’s disposal” (1828, 162). Therefore, 
“to find a pleasure in the sufferings of human beings, and even in teazing and tormenting them, 
is no uncommon thing to be witnessed in the present state of colonial society” (Pringle 1828, 
162). 
As a few scholars have noted, the History’s washing scene provides a final clue to the 
immensity of the narrative’s factual elisions regarding Robert Darrell’s sexual exploitation of 
Prince: 
He had an ugly fashion of stripping himself quite naked and ordering me then to wash 
him in a tub of water. This was worse to me than all the licks. Sometimes when he called 
me to wash him I would not come, my eyes were so full of shame. […] he was a very 
indecent man—very spiteful, and too indecent; with no shame for his servants, no shame 
for his own flesh. (MP 77-8) 
 
                                                 
184 Pringle’s program of reeducating men is apparent elsewhere as well. In his 1830 poem, “The Slave Dealer,” the 
speaker repents flogging a woman to death: “‘There’s blood upon my hands!’ he said, / ‘Which water cannot wash; / 
It was not shed where warriors bled / It dropped from the gory lash, / As I whirled it o’er and o’er my head, / And 
with each stroke left a gash. // With every stroke I left a gash, / While Negro blood sprang high; / And now all ocean 
cannot wash / My soul from murder’s dye; / Nor e’en thy prayer, dear Mother, quash / That Woman’s wild death-
cry!” (Pringle 1834, 92). The twice-repeated spectacle of the bloody “gash” overrides concern for the woman’s 
experience. At the end of the poem, the slave dealer realizes he will not ascend to heaven. The speaker’s primary 
concern is his soul rather than the consequences of the suffering he has caused. 
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This passage is marked by the restrictions imposed upon the vocabulary available to Prince—or 
Strickland—as the History attempts to relate what cannot be told. Only two words, “shame” and 
“indecent,” hint at the nature of Prince’s relationship with Darrell. Particularly the passage’s last 
sentence is a stumbling attempt to rein in meaning; its staccato echo cannot avoid tautology in its 
struggle to make the reader understand when understanding must be prevented for propriety’s 
sake. The narrator tells of degradation and violence to produce the reader’s political arousal 
while pretending that no such telling occurs. Stuck between telling and not-telling, the language 
becomes repetitive, fettered, and narrow, manifesting the limitations imposed upon the narrator’s 
otherwise analytic discourse. The disruption, even mutilation, of syntactical and semantic flow in 
the above sentence is not only suggestive of the mutilations Prince’s tormenters unleashed on her 
body (see Hartman 108), it is proof of the linguistic restraint under which the History operates. 
The sheer effort required to keep the discourse respectable loudly announces that disrespectable 
acts have occurred. ‘Washing’ functions as an inverted rhetorical substitute for and concentration 
point of the implied sexual activity with the master, effectively besmirching speaker and master 
rather than cleaning them. Although the scene purports to preserve the slave’s innocence, its 
narrator’s incomplete self-censorship indicates that the editors already believe in the slave 
woman’s moral fall. 
The effect of ‘washing,’ “shame,” is conferred upon both Darrell and Prince, confirming 
the suspicion that rape renders slave women unchaste.185 The other tag, “indecent,” however, is 
solely applied to the master. The narrative hence seems to allow for variations in moral guilt. 
                                                 
185 Incredibly, scholars themselves appear to uphold such moral standards: Woodard calls the abuse at which the 
bathing scene hints “further improprieties” (140). Pringle’s South African biographer, Randolph Vigne, sounds 
disapproving when he notes that, despite all the “stigma” surrounding Prince, she is “admired today,” “whatever her 
faults” (Vigne 2012, 220). Also see Cooper 201, and Haynes 26, for similar moral pronouncements. Whitlock’s 
analysis of the bathing scene balances “impropriety” with “abuse” (2000, 21). 
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Both the rapist and the victim are accountable for sexual trespassing, but Darrell’s culpability 
weighs heavier than Prince’s. The sentence might even vindicate Prince’s conduct. It 
acknowledges the moral blemish, yet resists the assumption that both parties are equally 
blameworthy. Since female virtue thus becomes negotiable and gradable, the speaker’s half-
swallowed confessions “effect a [temporary] reversal in which the standards of virtue are 
deemed inappropriate in measuring the lives of enslaved women.”186  
In an episode strategically placed directly prior to the ‘washing’ revelation, the text 
performs a crucial rhetorical move that assures its readers of Darrell’s moral depravity: 
My old master often got drunk, and then he would get in a fury with his daughter, and 
beat her till she was not fit to be seen. […] I found my master beating Miss D— 
dreadfully. I strove with all my strength to get her away from him; for she was all black 
and blue with bruises. He had beat her with his fist, and almost killed her. The people 
gave me credit for getting her away. He turned around and began to lick me. I said, ‘Sir, 
this is not Turk’s Island.’” (MP 77) 
 
Just when Miss Darrell’s violated skin risks becoming as “black” as her own, Prince saves her 
from her nearest relation and legal guardian. Although Miss Darrell’s wounds are “not fit to be 
seen”—the narrator obviously delimits the scope of representable violence here—the formulation 
“all black and blue with bruises” leaves sufficient room for prurient fantasy. If, as Collette 
Colligan writes, “the image of the flogged slave woman in abolitionist print culture roused 
sadistic flagellation fantasies about whipping white women” (71), Darrell’s assault on his 
daughter, although a beating rather than a whipping, contains some incestuous pornographic 
charge.187 It is this unspoken erotic valence that makes this scene an especially effective 
recruitment tool for abolitionist campaigners. White female readers were supposed to take this 
                                                 
186 Hartman 105-7; for alternative interpretations, see Cooper 201; Sharpe 2002, 140; Thomas 2014, 133. 
187 See Altink 82, for abolitionists accusing planters of incest and abuse of their white or mixed-race offspring.  
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scene personally, to project Darrell’s violence onto themselves, and to remember their own 
civilizing responsibility vis-à-vis English men.188 The message is that slavery not only degrades 
slaves but, far worse, corrupts Englishmen’s attitude towards their female kin, producing 
undutiful fathers (see Midgley 98). The shared victimization (“bruises”) establishes social 
allegiance between black and white women on the corporeal level, the rhetorical mainstay of 
female abolitionist writing. Prince’s loyalty to her white mistress allows her moral triumph over 
Darrell while leaving power hierarchies intact; the passage suggests that abolitionist anti-violent 
action occurs on behalf of defenseless (white) women with the slave having the last word.189 
 Prince’s verbal resistance to Darrell’s violence—she reminds him that the excesses of 
Turk’s Island are socially unacceptable in Bermuda, where the family has returned—invokes the 
abolitionist’s fantasy that “morally upright speech” is sufficient to stop male violence (Sharpe 
2002, 134). While this episode is probably unrealistic, it caters to female abolitionists’ belief in 
their project’s political efficacy and assures them that words, printed matter and speech, will 
bring about an end to British slavery (which they did). However, it negates the effectiveness of 
other less respectable or ennobling forms of slave resistance, such as fighting or yelling back (see 
Sharpe 2002, 134). It is clever strategy to place Prince’s rescue of Darrell’s daughter at this point 
in the narrative as the History will test readers’ allegiance right away. The subsequent ‘washing’ 
disclosure likely anticipates readers’ reflexive censure regardless of Prince’s assurances that she 
habitually refused to obey Darrell’s commands and later negotiates with her “indecent master” to 
be sold to the Woods (MP 78). 
                                                 
188  Pouchet Paquet optimistically reads this scene as indicative of “an incipient motherhood and cross-class, cross-
racial sisterhood that suggests an organic unity of interests in the deviant agency of the slave” (2002, 301). Also see 
Aljoe 77-8; Cooper 201. 
189 See MP 70, for another instance of Prince’s talking back at her owner (Mr. Ingham in this case). 
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When There Is No Opting Out 
After the History’s first two editions had circulated for a few weeks, coinciding with a 
surge in passionate anti-slavery campaigning spearheaded by women’s organizations, Pringle 
received “inquiries … from various quarters respecting the existence of marks of severe 
punishment on Mary Prince’s body” and added to the History’s third edition a letter written by 
his wife and addressed to Mrs. Townsend, “benevolent” secretary of the Birmingham Ladies’ 
Society for Relief of Negro Slaves, dated March 28, 1831.190 Although the narrative argues 
repeatedly that Prince’s experiences, her ‘character,’ and her Christian soul endow her with the 
authority to speak (and entitle her to be believed), that authority crumbles pitifully in light of 
Prince’s black female corporality. Put bluntly, the Birmingham Ladies suspect that Prince is a 
liar asking for welfare handouts.191 The visual spectacle of flesh, for the abolitionists, was far 
more trustworthy than ‘voice’ or corroborated historical details. 
In order to prove that she had actually undergone the torture depicted in the History, 
Prince—either voluntarily or under pressure—exposed her body to a group of women comprised 
of Strickland; Pringle’s wife, Margaret; her sister, Susan Brown; and their acquaintance, Martha 
                                                 
190 MP 130. Pringle regularly corresponded with women’s committees, including the Birmingham Ladies’ Society, 
regarding manumission of individual enslaved persons. For instance, with their assistance, he bought the freedom of 
a slave woman from St. Vincent, Nancy Morgan, along with that of her son (who had remained in Tobago with 
Morgan’s husband, a free black) sometime between April 1831 and April 1832. Morgan’s case reads eerily like 
Prince’s. She had been brought to England by her owners, realized that she was free on English soil, and applied to 
the Anti-Slavery Society for help, stating that “she would almost rather die than go back into Slavery” (Seventh 
Report 38). Although her owners initially demanded £120 for her manumission, they eventually agreed to £60. 
Pringle had raised this sum on his own, £20 of which had been a contribution from the Birmingham Ladies. 
According to the Birmingham Ladies’ Society report, Morgan boarded a ship to Tobago to be reunited with her 
husband and son before the report went into print in the spring of 1832 (Seventh Report 39, 59; see Midgley 88; 
Vigne 2012, 204). 
191 See Ferguson 1992, 294-5; Rauwerda 406; Whitlock 1995, 253. The baring of the slave’s scars is a generic 
performance by 1831; after Emancipation in 1834, American fugitive slaves such as Frederick Douglass would 
continue the public spectacle of lacerated skin (see Colligan 68). English audiences demanded to see fugitive 
American slaves’ back scars until the American Civil War (Fisch 53).  
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A. Browne. Strickland’s name, as those of the other women, is included to identify her as 
“authoritative spectator” (Whitlock 1995, 253). While Margaret Pringle doubtless wished to 
corroborate Prince’s account, her and her friends’ voyeuristic inspections of Prince’s body —this 
was the second—suggests a degree of mistrust and disregard for Prince’s “modesty or 
decency”192 that would have been unthinkable if her body had been white: 
the whole of the back part of her body is distinctly scarred, and, as it were, chequered, 
with the vestiges of severe floggings. Besides this, there are many large scars on other 
parts of her person, exhibiting an appearance as if the flesh had been deeply cut, or 
lacerated with gashes, by some instrument wielded by most unmerciful hands. (MP 130) 
 
The white English ladies, enacting the common rape law procedure that required the examination 
of the raped woman’s body by a female witness, confirmed the veracity of Prince’s story by 
reading the scars on her back.193 In order to convince the Birmingham Ladies’ Society to send 
five pounds for Prince’s support and to recommend the History to the Ladies’ Society’s 
members, Mrs. Pringle and her friends investigated and interpreted the grotesque bodily ‘text’ 
Prince supplied and passed a final judgment upon Prince’s credibility as witness and her story’s 
authenticity.  
Although the abolitionists believed themselves to be acting with best intentions, the racial 
condescension that permeates this procedure, as it permeates the History’s entire Supplement, is 
structured by tacit opinions concerning Prince’s racial inferiority, unreliability, and distance from 
proper British acculturation. The systematic inspection of Prince’s naked body conducted by the 
four white women invokes associations with the appraisal of black bodies for sale upon the 
                                                 
192 Prince’s narrator had explained earlier that slaves experience shame and humiliation when flogged and forced to 
strip in public: “There is no modesty or decency shown by the owner to his slaves; men, women, and children are 
exposed alike” (MP 93). 
193 Harrington 16; see Schroeder 269-70; Whitlock 1995, 253. 
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colonies’ auction blocks, processes accommodating buyers’ sexual exploitation of slaves and 
optimizing the organized prostitution. Both settings frame black bodies as readable surfaces 
without regard for consent or humiliation. 
Gillian Whitlock reads this scene as “the obverse of this public spectacle in terms of the 
male gaze” since “the context here is private and benevolent, for only women view the scars.”194 
She cites Ferguson’s suggestion that Prince could have well avoided exposing her back because 
the group of evangelical women would have withdrawn had Prince modestly refused to undress 
(see Ferguson 1992, 295). Ferguson further argues that Prince “not only permits but probably 
desires her body to be used in this way, as a space of inscription, for it offers a rare opportunity 
to speak her history … corporeally to the world.”195 I find this assessment as well as its particular 
formulation risky on two grounds. First, the scopic inspection by Margaret Pringle and her 
friends is problematic in light of Prince’s employment in the Pringles’ home and her status as 
beneficiary of the Birmingham Ladies’ Society generosity. Given her penury and failing health, 
Prince could hardly refuse to show her body to Mrs. Pringle and her friends. Second, Prince’s 
scarred back—“her space of inscription … to the world”—immediately exits the private space of 
a spectacle meant for sympathetic female eyes and enters the realm of public consumption when 
Margaret Pringle’s letter reaches her husband, the Birmingham Ladies, and eventually all readers 
of the third edition. Whitlock forgets that not everyone in this audience is female—as if all 
women are automatically immune from assuming the male gaze or from perceiving Prince’s 
                                                 
194 Whitlock 2000, 23. To be fair, Whitlock also comments on the inspections’ “disturbing features” (2000, 23-4). 
195 Ferguson 1992, 295. Also see Ferguson’s similar assertion: “She responded by claiming a silent subjectivity, by 
presenting her body as a text of the ‘truth’ of her history; this body could not lie” (1992, 294). Baumgartner (264) 
and Haynes (24) agree with Ferguson; for Thomas (2014, 152), the inspection is a return to the experiences of 
objectifying “butchery.” 
 121 
scars as arousing—or benevolent, or has agreed to honor Prince’s exposure as a private and safe 
event.196 If Prince can expect to receive money for exhibiting her scars, and if some participants 
in this textual spectacle can be expected to be titillated, her vulnerable nakedness turns into 
something else entirely. 
Prince, having “her body … used in this way,” as Ferguson rather infelicitously puts it, is 
prostituted again—possibly voluntarily, probably coercively. Mary Favret cautions that many 
feminist scholars mistakenly expect abolitionist women to be exempt from participating in the 
visual politics of arousal caused by slavery’s pornotopias. Such scenarios “offered a fantasy 
scene to white women … an opportunity to participate vicariously in sexual excesses otherwise 
denied to proper gentlewomen,” even if they were placed in these settings to “filter” 
pornographic content (Favret 41, 40). The staging of white women as agents within the 
pornographic scenario not only emphasizes their racial difference by infusing the potentially 
prurient scene with chastity, it allows Pringle to guard himself against accusations of distributing 
pornography using his own wife’s name as guarantee.197 If Strickland’s presence as the virginal 
“Miss S—” in the History assures readers of the text’s overall propriety, it requires four 
respectable women, among them Strickland and the editor’s wife, to legitimize the inclusion of 
the letter in Pringle’s Supplement. The short letter reenacts nothing but the “ritualistic, private 
eroticism at the heart of domination” (Miller-Young 32). It reveals (and revels in) slavery’s 
                                                 
196 See Colligan 94n15, for a note on early nineteenth-century women vendors and consumers of pornography and 
the under-researched possibility of prurient female gaze. Some abolitionist writers pointed to white mistresses’ lack 
of compassion and suggested that their inaction was due to sexual arousal during scenes of flogging, especially 
when women slaves were punished (Altink 137). Why should abolitionist women themselves be safe from similar 
prurience? 
197 Pringle identifies the slippage between female compassion and cruelty elsewhere: “I have even known ladies, 
born and educated in England, charitable and benevolent in their general character, yet capable of standing over their 
female slaves while they were flogged, and afterwards ordering salt and pepper to be rubbed into their lacerated 
flesh!” (Pringle 1827, 292). 
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continued non-optional corporeal intimacy as well as the locked-in power differential between 
black and white bodies, anchored in an institutional gaze that believes in its own neutrality.  
 The ritualized inspections of Mary Prince’s back, then, follow a standard pornographic 
script and speak as much to Prince’s abuse as to the female abolitionists’ desires. Prince, 
partially dressed, turns her bare back to the four white women, her facial expressions or words 
unrecorded. Contemporary pornographic composition relied on depicting states of half-undress 
and the fragmenting objectification of the body by excising the head or face (M. Wood 2013, 3). 
If the History defends its protagonist’s agency by virtue of the first-person narrator, Margaret 
Pringle’s letter strips Prince of all vestiges of liberal selfhood, her “degree of sentience” is zero 
(Hartman 93). As Marcus Wood notes, the exposed back is vulnerable in a way different from 
any other area of the human body: “Uncovered backs somehow look more naked than other 
naked body parts; maybe it is the fact that […] we cannot see our own backs, and that they 
consequently essentialize defenselessness, and even an unknown, unseen part of our own bodies” 
(2013, 178). Perhaps Prince never had the opportunity to look at her back in a mirror. The four 
women and the reader enjoy the dubious privilege of observing Prince’s “chequered” skin, the 
macabre blazon of martyrdom, a view from which Prince herself is excluded. In this scene, as in 
the History at large, the presence of white respectable femininity allows for the illusion that 
violence may be represented without committing further violence. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
WHAT’S NOT IN THE HISTORY 
 
Obeah and Rebellion 
As I have argued, the History’s narrow emplotment in the service of abolitionism’s tenets 
not only delimits the narrator’s agency, but enfolds whatever agency is left within the strictures 
of evangelical emancipation and enlightenment. Prince accuses her owners of mistreating her, 
repeats her wish to achieve freedom, and, displaying admirable newly-Prostestant work ethic, 
exploits her small economic independence to save up for manumission. As such, she acts within 
the confines of, and towards, Western self-owning subjectivity and Christianity (see Sharpe 
2002, 120, 135), while other, non-teleological possibilities of interiority or power are not shown. 
Although most, if not all, of Mary Prince’s ancestors were of African descent, the History does 
not stage Africa as the origin of cultural traditions or customs, nor does it acknowledge West 
Indian creole culture as constitutive of Prince’s sense of self.198 For instance, despite the 
History’s implication in Western medical discourses—it diagnoses Prince with rheumatism and 
St. Anthony’s fire—important traditions of how slaves conceptualized bodily phenomena remain 
unrepresented, likely because the editors dismissed them as unimportant, superstitious, and 
                                                 
198 Cynthia James reads the absence of African markers as an effect of Prince’s self-fashioning as Caribbean subject 
and of her view of slavery as the tradition into which she is born (44). While the latter is certainly correct, I would 
contend that it is likely that Pringle and Strickland were careful to filter signifiers that were culturally foreign. For 
Caribbean slaves’ creolization, see Aljoe 19-21. 
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ideologically risky. Scholarship of the past forty years has investigated African-based systems of 
medical and reproductive knowledge and affirms their indispensable contribution to West Indian 
slaves’ understanding of their existence. This research usefully supplements the History by 
demarcating non-British knowledges that were possibly familiar to Prince and by providing an 
indicator of the epistemologies Strickland could not hear and Pringle could not print.199 Such 
scholarship also enables me to speculate on reasons for Mary Prince’s alleged childlessness, 
keeping in mind that the veneration of motherhood and the conceptualization of “women as the 
primary guardians and perpetrators of the life cycle” in West African and later Caribbean 
cultures undergirded black women’s cultural identity and fed into kinship patterns, ancestral 
veneration rites, and larger systems of faith (Dadzie 37). 
From a Western view, traditional African medicine is marked by a “complete 
interpenetration of ‘magico-spiritual’ and ‘rational’ elements,” the former having been ignored or 
ridiculed for centuries.200 African healers transmitted their knowledge orally, much of which was 
lost when European systems of medical practice, giving primacy to written language, inserted 
themselves aggressively into slaves’ daily lives in the form of white plantation doctors who were 
almost universally loathed and feared.201 In many African cultures, disease, misfortune, and 
death were ascribed to specific supernatural causes and agents, such as spirits and sorcery, as 
                                                 
199 Western methodologies render these knowledges intelligible to scholars today. Jerome Handler remarks that 
“traditional topical and methodological interests of historians, including a general reluctance to treat African 
ethnographic materials and apply them to the early West Indian setting,” severely limit discussions of slave 
medicine (57n2). 
200 Finch 140; see Handler 159, Sheridan 73. Slave rebellions in Bermuda, Prince’s birth place, were rare after 
1700—despite a failed plot in 1761—possibly because the island did not experience much influx of new arrivals 
from Africa, and because it lacked the extremely harsh conditions of other Caribbean islands’ large-scale sugar 
plantations. Punishments for infractions were “somewhat milder” than elsewhere, although they included hangings 
and two reported burnings at the stake (Bernhard 200; see 199). 
201 Finch 141; see Sheridan 82. 
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well as to violations of moral, social, or spiritual rules due to their disruptive effect on group 
harmony. Treatments of disease were seen to be incomplete without attendant psycho-spiritual 
cures, often accompanied by ritual dancing or story-telling (Finch 148). Existing evidence 
indicates that such etiological conceptions continued to exist in the Caribbean (Handler 60). 
Colonial observers condemned West Indian slaves’ non-European system of beliefs and 
ritual practices, or ‘obeah.’ Scholars have difficulties determining how slaves themselves 
conceptualized obeah because all surviving sources are Eurocentric (Handler 65). It seems clear, 
however, that obeah encompassed a secret set of practices slaves “employed for both socially 
positive objectives (e.g., curing illness, finding missing property) and for socially negative ones 
(e.g., causing death or harm).”202 Obeah also referred to herbal lore and poison preparation, 
diagnosis of illness, and fetish and charm practices, all of them carefully guarded from white and 
non-qualified black appropriation.203 From a white perspective, obeah constituted an illegal 
cluster of “diabolical superstitions,” likely due to its ability to provide slave communities with an 
effective system of resistance to slavery (Bush 75). Practitioners themselves probably viewed 
obeah primarily as a practice providing healing and protection, including the diffusion of 
practical knowledge about everyday circumvention or subversion of white laws. Historical 
sources indicate the existence of obeah people, usually men, in the 1780s, although their 
presence in the Caribbean had diminished over the previous two decades (Handler 64). Within 
slave communities, they were socially powerful and charismatic figures to be respected and 
feared (Lazarus-Black 42, 44).  
                                                 
202 Handler 65; see Handler and Bilby 87; Mathurin 20. For African, particularly Coromantee, cultural survivals in 
Antigua, see Lazarus-Black 40-1. 
203 Handler 65, 69; see Sheridan 74, 77-8. 
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Obeah people are said to have contributed prominently to slave uprisings throughout the 
West Indies, some of them in Antigua.204 In the 1810s and 20s, during Mary Prince’s lifetime, 
colonial legislatures passed several anti-obeah laws, although, by that time, only a minority of 
slaves had been born in Africa.205 The practice was still widespread on Barbados by 1830 
(Handler 76). By the early nineteenth century, obeah people were likely creoles who used 
everyday objects or animal products to cure or prevent disease ritualistically. Moreover, they 
aided in the creolization of West Indian religion, the formation of social hierarchy among people 
of African descent, provided a politico-legal sensibility with regards to questions of justice, 
taboo, and retribution, and organized group resistance to slavery (Lazarus-Black 45).  
There is little indication in the History that the African-descended slave communities of 
which Prince had been a part “found their identity above all in music,” as Louis James writes 
(23). However, traces exist. Prince reports that slave owners on Turks Island twice pulled down a 
structure where slaves could meet and “pray” (the owners were later punished by a “flood”), and 
the Times article on Wood v. Pringle mentions Prince’s remarks that Antiguan slaves would 
dress in white, dance, and have a “stir-up” during Christmas time, a practice forbidden by the 
ministers.206 It is noteworthy that both examples of independent slave gatherings operate within 
and against Christian paradigms (including the diluvial reference). Susette Harriet Lloyd’s 
Sketches of Bermuda (1835) cautions that former slaves on the island had “embraced the 
                                                 
204 Handler 66, 77n45; see Handler and Bilby 88; Lazarus-Black 41; Sheridan 78, on the role of obeah in aiding 
rebellion. 
205 The Barbados legislature sought to curtail obeah by making it “punishable by death if it caused the death of any 
slave, or transportation from the island if poison was administered to a slave that did not result in death” (Handler 
75). Antigua outlawed obeah in 1809 and continued to pass legislation aimed at eradicating certain practices until 
after Emancipation (Lazarus-Black 44). 
206 MP 76-7; Times March 1, 1833, 7. 
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profession of the gospel, [although] they adopted its name without receiving its influence in their 
heart.”207 Although the History makes no references to the central significance of drumming, 
body movement, and dramatic musical performance to slave communities, Prince’s participation 
in forbidden “stir-ups” has both spiritual and political valences. Dances were the primary means 
by which slave communities regenerated their cohesion ritually, ensured individual and group 
health, and prepared for rebellion or war.208 The fact that such festivals occurred during 
Christmas time may speak to the intermixing of African and European cultural practices. 
Drumming and chanting were outlawed for periods of time in Trinidad and Jamaica for inciting 
slave rebellions, and Europeans associated these practices with obscenity, excess, and subversive 
claims to freedom (L. James 2014, 23-5). 
Demonstrating the same aversion to black signs of independence, Pringle criticizes Prince 
for her “considerable share of natural pride and self-importance” (MP 115), and thereby echoes a 
major complaint of many West Indian owners with regard to female domestic slaves (see Bush 
51, 61). While these are qualities that likely allowed Prince to survive slavery for as long as she 
did, it must be added that many West Indian slave women were brought up in a culture of self-
respect, assertiveness, and other ritualized behaviors running counter to metropolitan ideals of 
bourgeois femininity. Lucille Mathurin suggests that female confidence was the result of various 
African cultures’ emphases on “militancy and aggressiveness” as well as the high status of 
women (and mothers in particular)—despite West African cultures’ unquestionably patriarchal 
                                                 
207 Lloyd 94; see M’Baye 180. 
208 On the cultural importance of dance in slave societies, see Dadzie 36; Handler 62; Hartman 67; Lazarus-Black 
42; M’Baye 181-2. 
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structure.209 Many legislators and slave owners rejected abolitionist demands for a limit on the 
number of lashes to punish female slaves, citing such women’s habitual insolence and 
“Amazonian cast of character” (“Amelioration” 1123). Europeans often remarked that slave 
women were more difficult to deal with than men, possibly because European gender norms led 
them to expect men to be more assertive than women, and because women were more likely to 
be sexually coerced and exploited than men, therefore increasing their opposition to slavery 
(Dadzie 25).  
As the History indicates, Mary Prince participated in the common strategy employed by 
many domestic slave women to assert her “nuisance value” in the local court system as well as in 
her owners’ home. Historians have established that slaves, albeit illiterate, were well aware of 
their privileges and limited legal entitlements, and female slaves were infamous for voicing 
official complaints often and insistently.210 Along with obeah, black women’s litigiousness 
should be considered part of “a wider system of illegalities that counters hegemony” which is 
outlined indirectly in the History and mobilized for abolitionist purposes (Lazarus-Black 54). 
The History illustrates that Prince had internalized the amendments created by the 1798 
Amelioration Acts, affording the slave community very limited, yet occasional protection against 
mistreatment (Lazarus-Black 49). Prince mentions having gone to court (and won) over a 
property dispute with another slave woman involving a pig.211 Nevertheless, on Mrs. Wood’s 
behest, she was flogged and “put in the Cage” for a night, possibly because she had been too 
                                                 
209 Mathurin 2, also 18; see Altink 139; Bernhard 191; Dadzie 24, 34-6; Midgley 103. 
210 Lazarus-Black 4, 52; Mathurin 16-8. 
211 MP 80. Unfortunately, Antiguan court records of the time have not survived (Lazarus-Black 51). 
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successful at harassing her owners and the magistrate (see Mathurin 17). She probably 
anticipated, and accepted, the possibility of punishment. 
It is hard to say how much of the History’s emphasis on illness reflects Prince’s physical 
debility or a planned work slow-down as an act of common and extremely effective resistance.212 
There is no reason to disbelieve Prince’s assertions that she worked hard as a ‘higgler’ or 
‘huckster’ woman to earn money; obviously, making money she could keep for herself appears 
to have been the most important strategy to gain her manumission besides enabling her to buy 
clothes, furniture, and goods to be traded.213 Historians understand slave women’s limited 
economic independence, like Prince’s, to constitute an important and essential remnant of 
traditional African mores, and point out that pilfering from owners’ stocks often must have laid 
the groundwork for clandestine assertions of independence.214 Three years after Prince landed in 
London, Antiguan slaves rebelled violently against officials’ attempts to ban slave provision 
trading on Sundays (Lazarus-Black 74). The History does not mention, however, that higglering 
alone was unlikely to yield sufficient money for Prince to buy her freedom.  
 
 
                                                 
212 See Bush 56-8; Mathurin 10. This is not to say that Prince exaggerates the amount of work she was forced to 
perform. The History’s representation of Mary Prince’s workload is likely realistic as female slaves carried out 
much of the heaviest labor (Dadzie 22; see Baumgartner 258). 
213 See Beckles 72. A pro-slavery attack on Pringle and the History printed in the Bermuda Royal Gazette on 
November 22, 1831, cites “witness” accounts according to which Prince received three new suits annually, as well 
as muslin, stockings, shoes, and Irish linen from the Woods, and fattened her pigs using the Woods’ resources (3). 
The article probably overstates the Woods’ generosity. Reading across the available sources it can be inferred that 
Prince looked out for herself economically and materially. Bermudan slaves, more than on other islands, often 
flaunted expensive dress to announce their owners’ incapacity to stymy illegal trade—it is possible that Prince 
continued that tradition in Antigua (Bernard 212; Morrissey 147). 
214 Bernard 201; Bush 91; see Morrissey 5, for a critical discussion of the widespread claim that women had control 
over marketing and provision grounds. 
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Complicating Christianity: Concubinage, Capitalism, and Conversion 
 White women were rare in the Caribbean and most white men of authority—overseers, 
ship captains, bookkeepers—had black or mixed-race mistresses, although some of these men 
were in fact married to white women who were present on the island as well. As Joseph Phillips 
had mentioned in his letter to Pringle, sexual relations between white men and women of color 
were such a fundamental part of the social structure, often accompanied by exploitation and 
violence, that no one among the plantocracy thought they were particularly noteworthy.215 
Women who refused to submit were generally subjected to severe violence. If white metropolitan 
discourse perceived slave women’s reputations to be tainted by prostitution, many of them, in 
fact, sold their bodies, sometimes to one man for an extended period and sometimes in rapid 
succession and to many men from all social strata at once. Owners often declared that slave 
women sold themselves voluntarily and, given that slavery legally erased slave women’s 
consent, it is impossible to speculate about the percentage of voluntary forms of prostitution 
compared to those that were forced. It was obviously convenient to slave owners to suggest that 
slave women benefited from casual rape. 
However, at times feminist scholars, often unwittingly echoing moralistic prescriptions of 
the nineteenth century, appear to struggle with the historical reality of black women’s self-
prostitution and, because actual numbers are unknown, minimize the magnitude of interracial 
intercourse despite the “high incidence of miscegenous unions in the West Indies.”216 Slave 
women’s motives were manifold and justified, even if they were frowned upon by some 
segments of the very heterogeneous slave community. Historical evidence suggests that many 
                                                 
215 Beckles 142; Bush 11; Sheridan 243. 
216 Bush 18; A. Davis 116; Morrissey 69; for instances of this continuation of moral discourse, see Bush 17, 94, 117. 
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non-slave-owning white men came through urban centers, harbors, and non-agrarian trading 
posts—such as Antigua’s towns—which fostered a formalized system of black prostitution 
(Morrissey 69). Concubines and sex workers likely sought to improve their own and their 
children’s living conditions, and hoped for eventual manumission as well as protection from 
other men’s sexual advances, exploitation, or violence. Sometimes those unions arose from 
emotional attachment or physical attraction. It was also absolutely normal for a slave owner to 
“hire out” slave women as “housekeepers” to white acquaintances, guests, or even black slaves 
in overseer positions for specified periods of time, without consideration of these women’s 
willingness or preparedness for sexual intercourse. Such trafficking, often much more profitable 
than the sale of female slaves, likely caused anger and resistance among the slave community in 
some places while it was unremarkable in others.217 Some owners allowed slave women a share 
or the total of the profits to stymy such resistance. For many slave women, freedom was best 
attained through intimacy with European men. 
Mary Prince’s remarks that she “took in washing” and sold provisions to ships’ captains 
when her owners were absent—real personal liberties that probably included independent travel 
and the maintenance of her own social network—should be understood in the context of the 
general assumption that hired female slave labor, especially domestic tasks, included sexual 
access as well. The narrator’s assurance that she strove to earn cash “by all honest means” at her 
disposal is a very obvious disclaimer intended to deny the possibility of self-prostitution, an 
automatic expectation for any reader who had visited the West Indies.218 Labor power and sexual 
services were conflated in the West Indies (Beckles 42), and most men with whom Prince 
                                                 
217 Altink 67-9; Beckles 141-2; Bush 117; Morrissey 69, 157. 
218 MP 81; see Altink 75; Morrissey 4. 
 132 
interacted likely perceived her with this reality in mind. The many male advocates mentioned by 
Prince—Captain Abbott; Captain William; the black cooper, Adam White; the freedman, 
Oyskman; Mr. Burchell—should give readers pause since all of them are reported to have either 
promised to help Prince with her manumission or to have cohabited with her.219 Female slaves, 
especially in urban areas, earned manumission money by prostitution, and asked their clients to 
support them in their appeals to their owners.220 At times, white owners manumitted their own 
mixed-race children and their children’s mothers, which turned sexual relationships into 
important tools of social mobility for slave women (Morrissey 4).  
As in so many feminist histories, scholarship on Prince has struggled to position itself in 
relation to the possibility of Prince’s enforced or voluntary self-prostitution. Jenny Sharpe 
suggests that Prince might have “undermined her master’s right of ownership by asserting her 
status as property,” a complicated power transaction disrupting the History’s straightforward 
emplotment of the slave’s quest for self-ownership and subjectivity (2002, 150). Antje 
Rauwerda, on the other hand, cautions that Prince’s relationships with white men did not lead to 
any fundamental improvements of her situation. Such relationships not only demonstrate her 
“powerlessness and inability to refuse men’s sexual advances,” according to Rauwerda, but made 
it more difficult for her to attain her freedom (409n14). Considering the non-optional nature of 
slave women’s sexualization, I agree with Rauwerda, although the dearth of information makes it 
                                                 
219 MP 81, 85; Times March 1, 1833, 7. Mr. Burchell expected Prince to serve him for “a while” after her 
manumission (MP 81). 
220 Beckles 149. Helena Woodard reads Prince’s affairs as sexually liberating (143); she understands her to “struggle 
to maintain sexual and reproductive control” (144). I am doubtful as to the usefulness of the ahistorical category 
‘sexual liberation’ in light of Antigua’s system of concubinage before and after emancipation. Jenny Sharpe 
understands Prince to gain “greater autonomy” through concubinage, even if it is a paradoxical autonomy—
controlling exploitation through self-exploitation (2002, 140); see Ferguson 1992, 295; Miller-Young 49; Thomas 
2014, 138. 
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impossible to assess whether Prince’s relationships with men resulted in improved material 
conditions. Accommodation to and within slavery’s sexual regimes should not be equated with 
absolute powerlessness. It should further be noted that not a single record of a Bermudan slave 
owner ever manumitting black or mulatto children exists (Morrissey 66). Since the extended 
family that traded Mary Prince among its members was originally based in Bermuda, John 
Adams Wood’s adherence to that culture on non-manumission ought to be considered when 
speculating on Prince’s sexual agency. Manumission on Antigua was similarly rare, although not 
unheard of. Less than one percent of Antiguan slaves were manumitted annually (with numbers 
increasing as Emancipation drew closer), and chances improved for urban slaves who were 
domestics or artisans and had saved up enough money.221 Prince’s determination to collect 
money is understandable, as she was favorably positioned despite her owners’ rigid stance and 
the steady increase of manumission prices before Emancipation. 
It is entirely possible that freedman Daniel James and Prince had an arrangement 
including concubinage that culminated in a marriage encouraged by the Moravians.222 James, a 
free carpenter and cooper, was likely unable to find a wife among the freed black population as 
free women of color tended to prefer affairs with white men due to significant status and income 
advantages (Lazarus-Black 81). Hence, he was forced to seek a mate among the enslaved, aware 
that his future children would be born into slavery, and despite legal disincentives to marry.223 
                                                 
221 Lazarus-Black 98; see Morrissey 71-2. 
222 For the history of the Moravian church and its spreading throughout the non-Christian world, see Salih 2004, xxi-
ii. See Thomas 2014, 123-4, for Moravianism on Antigua. By the time Prince joined the Moravians, they served 
more than half of the island’s slave population (Thomas 2014, 124). 
223 See Lazarus-Black 81, on the improved living conditions and growing social influence of the free black 
community on Antigua. 
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Missionaries on Antigua were eager to regulate black couples’ sexual relations or those of 
congregants who were non-monogamous, although it was illegal for ministers to marry 
freedpersons and slaves without the owner’s consent. What the History fails to note is that the 
Moravians excluded slave women from congregations as well as from church-run schools if they 
resisted marriage too long or if they had committed adultery.224 In case Mary Prince saw literacy 
and Moravianism as possible avenues to freedom—despite the Moravians’ preaching of 
European gender hierarchies and the sexual double standard—her marriage might not have been 
solely a spiritual matter. Prince probably utilized most strategies towards manumission available 
to her, including income-generating activities such as prostitution, domestic work, and 
marketing, as well as increasing her respectability and economic leverage through conversion 
and marriage. Prince reports that she would only marry James after his conversion to 
Moravianism.225 
By embracing Christianity, Prince enters the ideological universe of the History’s target 
readers (her tale becomes intelligible to English readers) and makes visible the increasing 
influence of Western marital models, notions of status and respectability, and civilization in 
Antigua.226 Ideologically correct, and perhaps tracing a real change of heart, Prince reports that 
she only learned of fornication’s sinfulness when she joins the Moravians: “I never knew rightly 
                                                 
224 See Lazarus-Black 68, 91-2; see Altink 86, 92, 95. 
225 MP 84; see Cooper 202; Ferguson 1992, 289; Salih xxii. Although execrable in its vicious racist stereotyping, 
Macqueen’s assessment in the Glasgow Courier from July 26, 1831, that Pringle “sees nothing but purity in a 
prostitute, because she knew how and when to utter the name of the Deity, to turn up the whites of her eyes, and to 
make a perfect mockery of religion” might reflect historical circumstances more accurately than the History 
(Macqueen “Anti-Slavery Society,” 1; see Thomas 2014, 135; Thomas 2011, 83). 
226 I am complicating Helena Woodard’s interpretation, which sees Prince as achieving “moral healing” by joining 
the Moravians (144). By the time Prince was born, the Moravians had already established a well-oiled conversion 
industry. Also see Ferguson 1992, 284; Paquet 2002, 29-30, 37-8; Salih 2004, xxi-ii. 
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I had much sin till I went there.”227 Moravian encouragement of monogamy and Christian 
courtship was probably closely tied to planters’ belief that promiscuity led to infertility as well as 
to the visibility of respectable, free black women who had joined the Anglican Church after 
1816. As the History illustrates, by the third decade of the nineteenth-century, the church 
wedding had become established as a cultural ideal among Antiguan slaves, denoting “civility, 
education, financial stability, enduring love, and religious salvation.”228 Many slaves actually 
followed the model outlined by the History in which initial, sometimes decades-long 
experimentation with multiple partners and occasional polygamy was followed by eventual long-
term monogamy, not necessarily accompanied by cohabitation.229 The History hints that Prince 
and James maintained a visiting relationship because the Woods forbade James to live on their 
property and perhaps because the couple preferred it that way. Visiting relationships were the 
most common form of romantic relationships among slaves, and husbands were generally free to 
take more wives if they could afford it to increase their status.230  
                                                 
227 MP 83. Jenny Sharpe was the first to point out that the History’s chronology—and its smooth conversion 
narrative—is likely wrong as Prince was already a member of the Moravian society when she started cohabiting 
with Captain Abbott (2002, 142). Sue Thomas’s spectacular find regarding Captain Samuel Abbott’s conviction of 
manslaughter in 1827 as well as the 1833 Times report, according to which Prince had lived with Abbott “seven 
years before,” suggest that Prince and Abbott separated sometime in 1826, three or four years after she joined the 
Moravians and in the same year she married James (Thomas 2014, 208n100; Times March 1, 1833, 7). For other 
takes on Prince’s relationship with Abbott, see Bohls 168; Ferguson 1992, 287; Maddison-MacFadyen 2013, 658, 
661n15; Salih 2004, xxix-xxx. 
228 Lazarus-Black 93; see Altink 91; Beckles 131. 
229 Lazarus-Black 85-7; see Beckles 117. 
230 Beckles 121; Bush 97; Morrissey 84. Wood, according to the Times report, allowed James to “live with her” 
(March 1, 1833, 7). Of course, John Wood could have been lying when he wrote to Pringle that Daniel James had 
taken another wife during Mary Prince’s absence from Antigua (MP 101). However, it does not appear entirely 
unlikely that James in fact remarried as having a wife (or multiple wives) conferred authority and status (Beckles 
121; Morrissey 89). ‘Divorce’ was common for slaves (by necessity and as part of African cultural heritage), which 
induced the plantocracy to argue that black relationships were shallower than whites’ (Altink 93, 117-8; Bush 101). 
Wood also implies here that James is an ineffectual, emasculated husband, as he has no control over his world-
traveling wife. Pringle notes that he has a letter from James accusing Wood of directing “his friend Mr. Darrel”—
undoubtedly either Prince’s former owner or a member of the same family—to tell James that Prince has already 
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Considering that Captain Abbott was in charge of one of John Wood’s vessels, it is 
further possible that Wood actually encouraged Prince’s cohabitation with the former.231 In 
urban coastal areas it was common for masters to “lease” female slaves out to nautical crews. 
This would also account for the Woods’ anger about Prince’s unapproved marriage to James and 
for Prince’s keeping it a secret for three or four months—Prince reports she was whipped by 
Wood when he found out—since, in case Prince actually began to live monogamously, the 
Woods would not only have lost an important source of profit but incurred financial obligations 
due to Prince’s marriage.232 Furthermore, white men risked fines of up to one hundred pounds if 
they raped a ‘married’ slave woman, although owners often ‘broke’ slave marriages at will 
(Lazarus-Black 69-70). Social pressure on proprietors to encourage their slaves’ morality as well 
as concern for Prince’s morale might have prevented Wood from flat-out denying Prince the 
right to stay married. Owners believed they were entitled to full sexual access to domestic slaves 
and housekeepers. Even if it is unlikely, it cannot be ruled out that Prince and John Adams 
Wood’s domestic intimacy had at times—or always—included a sexual dimension that was 
stymied or complicated by Prince’s marriage.233 In fact, a past of shared sexual intimacy 
implicating John Wood would help explain both Prince’s refusal to respect Wood’s authority as 
                                                 
been unfaithful and to evict James from Wood’s property while the family is in England (MP 106; see Thomas 
2005, 127).  
231 According to the cross-examination report printed by the Times, Prince “slept with” Abbott “in another hut she 
had, in addition to her room in [Wood’s] yard” (March 1, 1833, 7; see Cooper 202-3). The hut might have been 
provided by John Wood who perhaps wanted to avoid that Prince’s sexual transactions occurred on his property (his 
letter to Pringle Wood claims that he “induced” Prince “to take a husband,” MP 100). Wood might have also 
encouraged Prince to end her pregnancies, as they would have been an inconvenience to the household and 
interruptions to “business.” According to Wood’s slave registrations, no child was born on his property between 
1817 and 1832, although he owned (and sold) a few female slaves of childbearing age (T 71/244, 247-50).  
232 MP 80; see Times March 1, 1833, 7. 
233 See Altink 94; Beckles 143. 
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well as Wood’s refusal to sell Prince.234 Even if Wood had never been intimate with Prince, the 
circumstances under which she had helped raise Wood’s children235 and become a confidante of 
the family for more than fifteen years, helps explain her ambivalent position236 and Wood’s 
stubbornness. 
 
Creole Obstetrics 
There is great archival evidence that African and creole slaves used plant medicines and 
that white medical professionals adopted this knowledge. However, there is insufficient evidence 
to trace the systematic use of plant medicine over time.237 It is clear, however, that African 
societies availed themselves of hundreds of plant, mineral, and animal substances to treat illness, 
that some of that knowledge survived and evolved in the colonies, and that it co-existed, 
sometimes uncomfortably, with European medical practice (Handler 61). Medical care of slaves, 
as described in the History, is primarily concerned with re-establishing Prince’s economic 
productivity. The History claims that the Woods were not interested in Prince during the lengthy 
periods of her incapacitation and that Prince received care from an old slave woman owned by 
Mrs. Greene, the Woods’ neighbor. Most African cultures allocated pediatrics, obstetrics, and 
                                                 
234 I would wager that John Wood, as a member of the Antiguan elite, was unlikely to have had sexual relations with 
his slaves. Nevertheless, concubinage was normative for middle and low-ranking white men (Lazarus-Black 81-3; 
see Ferguson 1992, 290; Rauwerda 402). 
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Prince around 1815. 
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general complains to older women, while surgery and special diagnostic and therapeutic 
challenges were men’s domains.238 Mary Prince’s rheumatism would have been treated with 
willow bark among Bantu-speaking people (Finch 154); the History suggests that the old woman 
boiled “the bark of some bush” against the pain and prepared hot baths for Prince.239 The water 
baths were prescribed by a doctor, possibly Dr. Weston or Dr. Coull, hired by the Woods (“Anti-
Slavery Society” 3). In any case, Prince’s physical complaints were extremely common among 
slaves (Sheridan 200). 
As a result of slaves’ general debility, low fertility and premature deaths characterized 
almost all of the West Indian islands. Apart from the Bahamas and Barbados, no island reported 
positive natural increase in the period between 1816 and 1834 (Sheridan 196). Most slaves died 
in their fourth decade of life. After the ban of the slave trade in 1808, island governments 
encouraged slave owners to adopt pro-natalist policies to ensure the natural reproduction of their 
work force—to no avail. Conditions never improved significantly. Contemporaries, including 
anti-slavery writers, tended to blame black women’s promiscuity—associated with infertility, 
venereal disease, and possibly self-induced abortion—as well as neglect of their children, and 
their ignorance regarding ‘proper’ medical care for the low birth rate (Altink 83). Depictions of 
black women as licentious probably owed much to white masters’ wishful thinking, which 
allowed them to suspend bourgeois sexual norms without guilt and blame slaves themselves for 
that suspension.240 These depictions are likely false and, especially when repeated by historians, 
                                                 
238 Finch 148; see Morrissey 68-9. 
239 MP 79; see Sheridan 74, on the importance of old female practitioners in slave medicine. On aromatic baths as a 
staple of slave medicine, see Sheridan 81. 
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evince a profound disregard for slave women’s living conditions, nutritional status, likely 
psychosexual circumstances, and culturally variable patterns of forming and maintaining sexual 
relationships.241 In an effort to reduce such bias, recent scholars have pointed at African customs 
governing sexual and child-rearing practices, widespread disease and debility (especially 
tuberculosis which can cause infertility), unhealthy living and working conditions, as well as the 
psychological effects of slavery to help explain the extremely low birthrate in the West Indies.242 
It appears that slave owners’ insistence that women perform hard labor throughout the pregnancy 
(which led to extremely high numbers of miscarriage) as well as dangerous conditions during 
childbirth contributed to the decrease among the slave population (Sheridan 224). As Hetty’s 
example makes clear, no concessions were made for pregnancy when a slave woman was 
punished. Regardless of pregnancy, women and men were punished equally harshly.243 As 
Barbara Bush, Jennifer Morgan, and others have shown, racialist myths about African women’s 
ability to give birth quickly, painlessly, and often were used to defend the disregard for pregnant 
women’s need for rest.244 Further, recent research suggests that slaves’ use of fertility control 
techniques must be added as a plausible contributing factor to slave women’s low fertility. 
Although contemporary writers did not differentiate between contraception and sterility 
or between spontaneous miscarriage and intentional abortion, slaves in Antigua and the wider 
Caribbean very likely used Obeah-informed techniques to prevent conception and bring about 
abortion in a struggle to preserve their health and to avoid increasing slaveowners’ economic and 
                                                 
241 Collins 155; see Altink 16-7; Bush 125; Grainger 15-6; Higman 548; Morrissey 6-7; Sheridan 224. 
242 Sheridan 222; see Dadzie 27; Morgan 134. 
243 Dadzie 24; see Altink 11; M. Lewis 389; Mathurin 7; Morrissey 5-6. 
244 Bush 133; see Morgan 8, 47. 
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personal powers.245 In 1746, Edward Trelawny, the Jamaican Governor, complained that 
abortion prevented the slave community from reproducing itself (Dadzie 30). On the same 
island, in 1816, “Monk” Gregory Matthew Lewis wrote of the slave women on his plantation 
that they “can produce children at pleasure, and where they are barren it is just as hens will 
frequently not lay eggs … because they do not like their situation” (82). When British colonial 
governments changed their policies to encourage pregnancy during slavery’s final decades, 
enslaved women, long accustomed to being considered “work units” rather than “breeders” 
(Bush 128), had already fostered a century-old culture of reproductive accommodation to the 
circumstances of slavery. This likely took the form of surreptitiously self-induced miscarriages 
and abortions as well as extended periods of weaning during which sex was taboo.246 In Lewis’s 
words, “the children do not come” (M. Lewis 381). Barbara Bush lists the wide variety of herbs, 
shrubs, roots, and barks that female West Indian slaves employed to end a pregnancy, stimulate 
the onset of menstruation, or aid in the expulsion of the afterbirth, among them yam, mango, 
papaya, snakeroot, cotton root, and wild cassava.247 Most of these techniques functioned 
(sometimes fatally and sometimes not at all) by poisoning the body and thus inducing cramping, 
vomiting, and diarrhea. They could leave a woman permanently disabled and sterile (Bush 140-
2). Such knowledge was usually passed down from mother to daughter, and can be traced back to 
West African practices (Klepp 27). It must be added, however, that feminist scholars risk 
overestimating the degree to which slave women controlled their fertility and, in an effort to 
ascribe sexual agency to female slaves, downplay living and work conditions leading to 
                                                 
245 Dadzie 27; Klepp 26; Lazarus-Black 44; Finch 146-7, 154; Sheridan 75. 
246 Sheridan 245; Bush 139; Kiple 1983, 109; Morissey 111. 
247 Bush 140; see Dadzie 30; Goodson 198-200; Klepp 26-7; Morgan 114; Morrissey 114-5; Sheridan 243-4. 
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structural biological ‘subfecundity’ or the strong cultural mandate to have children in opposition 
to slavery (Morrissey 112-3, 119). 
Scholars who understand the History’s silences as loud signifiers of Prince’s claims to 
agency tend to read the absence of pregnancy and motherhood as Prince’s self-conscious 
mobilization of her body as “a site of resistance” (Baumgartner 260), an interpretation that risks 
overstating slave women’s political investments. Research appears to prioritize explanations that 
empower Prince in terms of Western feminist commitment to reproductive control although 
Prince’s living and working conditions allow for an endless variety of scenarios, including 
sterility, contraception, miscarriage, self-induced abortion, politically motivated infanticide, 
forced neglect, and childhood death (see van der Spuy 133). Although Prince, when she arrived 
on Antigua, was among the most fertile group of female West Indian slaves—between 25 and 34 
years old and employed as a domestic servant rather than a field hand—physical abuse, 
starvation, diseases, decades of stress and psychological trauma, and other factors probably 
hastened the onset of menopause. If Prince actually had given birth, it seems likely that her 
pregnancy would have been a difficult one, owing to decades of hard labor, severe malnutrition, 
inadequate clothing, physical abuse, and likely rape.248 Her child might have been born weakly 
and suffering from nutrient deficiencies that were virtually universal among West Indian 
newborns. Many children died from tetanus due to unhygienic conditions and inadequate 
obstetric knowledge among white and black doctors. Only half of all children born to slave 
mothers survived the first year. On Antigua the infant mortality ratio within the first year only 
slightly decreased to thirty per cent after 1834. About a quarter of all cases of infant mortality 
                                                 
248 See Bush 137; A. Davis 108; Higman 548; Kiple 1985, 107-11. 
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was not recorded if the child had died very young since owners had to register their slaves every 
four years.249 
 
The Story of a Disappearance 
As Thomas Pringle wrote on March 6, 1833, a week after losing the libel suit Wood had 
brought against him, “[s]lavery will be extinguished throughout the British dominions before 
January 1835—and Mary Prince shall go back to her husband … in spite of the spiteful Mr 
Wood” (Vigne 2011, 23). Archival traces of the legal and very personal conflict between Pringle 
and Wood end here, and Prince, discursive conduit between two colonial men equally 
“spitefully” defending their respective ideological and economic interests, disappears from the 
archive. Pringle’s prophecy about the abolition of slavery having been correct, it only stands to 
hope that the prediction regarding Prince’s return to Antigua, contingent on her health and ability 
to raise money for her passage, was realized as well (Thomas 2014, 164). Unlike most parts of 
the British Caribbean, neither Antigua nor Bermuda transitioned from slavery to a repressive 
apprenticeship system, and after August 1, 1834, Prince would have set foot on either island as a 
free woman. In the wake of Emancipation, John Adams Wood returned to England and was 
awarded £10,575 in compensation monies by the British government.250 He died in London in 
1836, fourteen months after Pringle had passed away from tuberculosis. 
                                                 
249 Altink 17; Bush 134; Kiple 1983, 113; Kiple and King 97; Sheridan 194. Prince reported that she had her own 
two-room house apart from the Woods’ main domicile (Times March 1, 1833, 7). According to the Leeward Island 
Amelioration Acts, masters were encouraged to set aside a two-room house for pregnant slaves (Lazarus-Black 88). 
However, according to the slave registers, Prince was the most ‘senior’ domestic slave working for the Woods and 
therefore likely to have her own shack, bug-infested as it may have been. See Thomas 2014, 162. 
250 Thomas 2014, 164. About $1.7 million in 2013 currency. 
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 As I hope to have shown, proslavery and abolitionist writers agreed that slave women’s 
sexual conduct in the colonies—regardless of their consent—disqualified them from discursive 
participation in the political struggle to end slavery. Abolitionist materials framed sexually 
exploited slaves as soon-to-be-virtuous prostitutes deserving of affective and pecuniary charity, 
whereas proslavery accounts took advantage of centuries-old stereotypes of black licentiousness. 
Regardless of whether Prince was enfolded within abolitionism’s visual regime of pornographic 
melodrama or in pro-slavery’s discourse of African barbarity, Prince’s possible non-monogamy 
excludes her from authorial ownership and forestalls her reproductive legacy. Pringle and 
Strickland’s socioethic expectations produced a narrative that precariously maneuvers the 
paradoxical assumption that an enslaved woman, despite having no mastery over her body, 
sexually contaminates white men, women, and English civilization at large. The History judges 
Prince’s capability to report slavery’s atrocities by the impossible standards of liberal selfhood 
and white female domesticity. For all that is known about Mary Prince, this kind of domestic 
morality might have been completely alien to her for the majority of her life, even if she might 
have identified it as a vehicle for attaining increased respectability—which, in the colonies, was 
accompanied by greater safety from physical violence and, in rare cases, freedom from slavery’s 
legal commodification of humans. 
When studying The History of Mary Prince and its archival aftermaths, we must 
remember that we are looking at elite metropolitan writings, penned against an increasingly loud 
threat of mob activism that began to disturb “the nearly ubiquitous belief that some people are 
naturally subordinate to others, which is central to maintaining social order through consent” 
(Wheeler 2000, 254). Pringle, Strickland, Wood, and Macqueen were united in their admiration 
of social elevation and property, and they all viewed democracy as dangerous to the political 
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order and as degenerating the attainments of English civilization and culture. Civilization, for 
them, denoted European social and religious institutions and values, standards of living enabled 
by the consumption of consumer goods and luxury articles, and a generally expansionist attitude 
regarding individual and national existence—all of these markers being “the arguable cause and 
result of a profitable slave trade” (Wheeler 2000, 284). As much as the History reveals about 
slavery’s atrocities, it is hugely indicative of its editors’ professional aspirations, pre-Victorian 
trends in the literary marketplace, inner-European political tensions about class and gender, 
English identity and the nation’s moral character, and a move towards specular pornographic 
entertainment.251 It is an historical consequence of slavery that the slave woman’s body 
functioned as the site onto which all of these personal, material, and political struggles were 
projected, enabling the formulation of a British moral and economic code for a post-slavery 
social order. 
Most scholarship on Mary Prince overestimates the importance of phenotypical 
difference in her subjugation and underestimates the role of national xenophobia and hostility 
towards religious difference in the emergence of nineteenth-century racial ideologies and 
scientific racism (Wheeler 2000, 240). Writers who had actually lived in the colonies tended to 
focus more on complexion than their metropolitan contemporaries, contributing to the later 
association of skin color with essential group identity under scientific guise—but only after 
British slavery had ended (see Wheeler 2000, 260). Both Pringle and Wood preferred to view 
Prince as locked into relations of servitude, demanding her humility, labor, and loyalty (see 
Sharpe 2002, 143). Both sides’ rhetorical strategies shared a commitment to ensuring that slave 
populations, along with working-class Englishmen (and, obviously, all women) would be forever 
                                                 
251 See Fisch 3-4; Schroeder 271. 
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barred from equitable political and economic participation. Put more sharply, humanitarian 
abolitionists as well as plantocratic writers weaponized ideologies of sexual morality in a post-
revolutionary backlash against demands from below to broaden working-class inclusion in the 
political process while furthering the commercialization of Britain’s colonial assets in Africa, the 
Caribbean, and, increasingly, India. 
 As with Saartjie Baartmann, what remains in the Eurocentric archive are Prince’s 
“performative remains” (Ndlovu 29), fragments of body parts and testimonies, re-organized to fit 
historical as well as recent ideological trajectories of epistemological desire. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to locate the historical person’s agency in such contexts (see Young 51). In the 
process of re-writing Prince’s history, scholars, the self-proclaimed custodians of her legacy, 
should be wary of the impulse to identify with her political and social position because such 
identification will continue to silence, victimize, or sanctify her, perpetuating the idea that 
Prince’s life matters solely because of her sexual and racial alterity. Inattention to the social and 
material conditions of the History’s production risks scholars’ involuntary compliance with 
Pringle and Strickland’s original ambitions, and neutralizes, rather than unpacks, the voyeuristic 
spectacle they created in her name.252 Prince’s own experiences of slavery are likely forever 
closed off to scholarly interest and we should cultivate “a way of knowing that respects the 
‘opaqueness’ of the body, a way of knowing that is comfortable with the unknown, the forgotten, 
and the silenced: a way of knowing that allows us to realize the limits of the archive” (Ndlovu 
27). To describe the historical rape of slave women requires the careful extraction of layers of 
psychic life, social interaction, and embodied sensation, all of which are mediated and obscured 
by memory, the historical conventions of literary production, and subsequent scholarship.  
                                                 
252 Ndlovu 19; see Fausto-Sterling 89; Holmes 114; McKoy 96. 
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PART TWO 
MOTHERHOOD’S BURDENS: ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING, RAPE, AND 
THE PLEASURES OF THE SPECTACLE 
 
Introduction 
As a working mother, EBB possessed greater insight into pregnancy, childbirth, and 
motherhood than her male poetic peers (Faulk 43), and her verse offers many instances of 
surprisingly frank references to women’s sexual experiences, positive and negative. She believed 
that the “light and air” of her poetry would produce the sympathy necessary to bridge the cultural 
gap between different social classes as well as between the sexes, and her use of erotic imagery 
was intended to shock readers into clearer thinking on such matters (see Mermin 203). To 
dampen the impact of explicit sexual allusion, EBB’s maternal tropes “slyly intertwine[d]” 
subjects traditionally associated with women authors—such as philanthropy and motherhood—
with the conventionally unspeakable and scandalous topics of prostitution, rape, childbirth, 
illegitimacy, and female sexual desire.253 With her densely interlaced metaphors EBB merged 
mothering and politically contentious writing into the same process of “stringing pretty words 
that make no sense / [a]nd kissing full sense into empty words,” as Aurora Leigh’s eponymous 
                                                 
253 C. Kaplan 15; see Cooper 146. Critics have commented at length on EBB’s bizarre and sexualized references to 
her cultural moment. In Aurora Leigh, the poet addresses “this live, throbbing age / [t]hat brawls, cheats, maddens, 
calculates, aspires” (5.203-4) and “suck[ing]” the “paps” of the “full-veined, heaving, double-breasted Age” (5.219, 
216; see Bristow 17; David 1985, 121; Rosenblum 327; O. Taylor 2006, 163). 
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heroine famously remarks.254 Scholars suggest that EBB’s own corporeality lent her poetry 
irresistible moral force, and that she understood her bodily and spiritual difference from men to 
constitute “the basis of [her] poetic power” (Brown 195).  
EBB walked a fine line with her invention of high feminine aesthetics. While she shared 
Victorian writers’ belief in literature’s ability to awaken feelings of mutual cultural belonging 
and foster gradual political progressivism (Mermin 202), the production of readers’ heightened 
affect through sexually explicit verse posed serious risks to her own reputation—and consequent 
ability to be taken seriously. Publishing women were suspected of immodestly advertising and 
circulating the products of their labor in the literary market. The act of publishing invited the 
conceptual slippage from the circulation of the writer’s text to the sale and sexual display of the 
writer’s body. This was especially true for women poets, particularly when verse became more 
feminized around mid-century and women poets’ connection with sentimental altruism, 
heightened emotional charge, domesticity, and spirituality was naturalized. Over the course of 
her long career, EBB learned to confront the problem of art-as-prostitution.255 A few months 
before her death, she wrote to William Thackeray that 
I don’t like coarse subjects, or the coarse treatment of any subject. But I am deeply 
convinced, that the corruption of our society requires not shut doors and windows, but 
light and air: and that it is exactly because pure and prosperous women choose to ignore 
vice, that miserable women suffer wrong by it everywhere.256 
                                                 
254 AL 1.51-2; C. Kaplan 15. 
255 S. Brown 2005, 195; see Gallagher 40; Houston 214, 224-7; Mermin 156.Catherine Gallagher points to the sheer 
omnipresence of this trope in Victorian public discourse: “Both the woman artist and the prostitute … are 
established in the sphere of exchange that excludes ‘natural’ generation and substitutes for it an exhilaratingly 
dangerous love affair with a multitude.” (Gallagher 55). 
256 LEBB 2:445; see Cooper 178, 195; David 1985, 120; C. Kaplan 9. Sixteen years prior, in 1845, EBB had 
conceptualized Aurora Leigh as “a sort of novel-poem, . . . running into the midst of our conventions, & rushing into 
drawing-rooms & the like ‘where angels fear to tread’; & so, meeting face to face & without mask the Humanity of 
the age, & speaking the truth as I conceive of it, out plainly” (BC 10:101-4). When Aurora Leigh had appeared, 
EBB, reflecting on hostile reviews, wrote, “I don’t habitually dabble in the dirt … What has given most offense in 
the book, more than the story of Marian—far more!—has been the reference to the condition of women in our cities, 
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Reviewers naturally accused EBB of “coarseness,” usually in reference to those verses that 
implied the existence of independent female sexuality, even if that sexuality was expressed via 
projection onto mythology, landscape, or art (see C. Kaplan 16).  
The following three chapters aim to respond to Marjorie Stone’s call for further feminist 
investigations into the confluence of aesthetics and ethics by analyzing EBB’s complex moral 
decisions in some of her most well-known political verse as well as those choices’ contingency 
on historical circumstance and cultural possibilities of expressing women’s embodied experience 
(2002, 150). EBB’s political poems challenge contemporary views of poetry as written and 
received by men, and performs the female poet’s “liberation” from this cultural straightjacket by 
turning the poet’s coming-into-being into the subject of her verse.257 Analogous to Thomas 
Pringle and Susanna Strickland’s philanthropic self-creation as members of the liberal cultural 
elite, EBB uses the figures of enslaved and working-class women in her verse to imagine the 
poetic subject of liberal feminism. By bringing to light inequities caused by the sexual double 
standard, the elite’s hypocritical materialism, and the sexual and material exploitation of 
enslaved and working-class women, EBB constitutes her own identity as spokeswoman for the 
English soul. 
The simultaneous consideration of EBB’s poetic aesthetics and her verses’ ethico-
political purpose to make historical suffering intelligible creates difficult questions about the 
pleasures generated during poetry’s consumption. Moreover, as I will show, the subjectivity of 
EBB’s abused women is fragile, particularly when her suffering bodies belong to women who 
                                                 
which a woman oughtn’t to refer to, by any manner of means, says the conventional tradition. Now I have thought 
deeply otherwise. If a woman ignores these wrongs, then may women as a sex continue to suffer them; there is no 
help for any of us-let us be dumb and die” (LEBB 2:254).  
257 Cooper 145; see David 1987, 141. 
 149 
are of lower social status than the author. With its focus on the poet’s divinely inspired voice, 
EBB’s verse fails to respond fully to questions raised by that subject’s grand plea to end 
oppression (C. Kaplan 16). The poet’s conviction that political injustice primarily originated in 
the sexes’ unequal claim to liberal subjectivity, rather than also from class exploitation or other 
power relations, allowed EBB to normalize her own and other elite women’s presence in the 
literary marketplace. Yet her self-fashioning as individualistic, anti-collective, and culturally 
elitist poet weakened her ability to intuit how social ills affected other women’s lives. 
As scholars have noted, EBB’s poetry depends on “a firm identification with male modes 
of political thought and aesthetic practice,”258 and, similar to other elite writers of her day, she 
was weary of working-class agitation and slave resistance. She also tended to infantilize 
subordinate women in her work, and focused on problems that had conventionally appealed to 
middle-class abolitionist and ‘condition-of-England’ writers, such as moral degradation and the 
separation of the nuclear family.259 Although she challenged traditional patterns of philanthropic 
writing by imagining her oppressed subjects as active speakers and agents of change, her 
marginalized women benefit from and depend on the poet’s maternalistic intervention. EBB’s 
maternalism unites the poems under consideration in the following chapters—the anti-slavery 
poems “The Runaway Slave at Pilgrim’s Point,” “Hiram Powers’ Greek Slave,” and “A Curse 
for a Nation,” as well as the immensely popular Aurora Leigh—and it will be considered as an 
effective rhetorical yet ethically problematic strategy to shape public discussion and effect 
political change. Sexual violence is a crucial trope in EBB’s maternalist project of aesthetic, 
moral, and political reform, and, by focusing on its various representations and outcomes in her 
                                                 
258 David 1987, 98; see Forster 220; Brophy 285-6. 
259 See Stone 2003, 47; see Wheeler 2013, 154-5, for the history of this trope. 
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oeuvre, I trace the poet’s engagement with the politico-poetic representability of rape and 
resulting childbirth. 
EBB implies in her correspondence and her work that the two processes of liberation—
the heroic female intellectual’s self-liberation within a hostile marketplace of ideas and the 
liberatory content of her poetry (the call to end the oppression of prostitutes, slaves, and child-
laborers)—work analogously towards greater freedom.260 Historically, this conjunction was 
never quite as easy. This is not to say that EBB did not imagine female solidarity across class 
barriers. EBB sides with the fallen working-class woman—the usual, if illogical, scapegoat of 
various middle-class reformers—when she frames prostitution and Marian’s rape in Aurora 
Leigh as the result of men’s catastrophic sexual entitlement. Aurora Leigh famously celebrates a 
coming-together across difference that results in mutually beneficial spiritual elevation, even if it 
happens on the more powerful woman’s—the poet’s—terms. Marian has to become a “virtuous 
untouchable” (25), as Cora Kaplan puts it, who remains ineligible to participate in the passionate 
heterosexual circuit of social reproduction EBB imagined. Although Marian powerfully 
articulates the origins of her victimization, her political subjectivity is always mediated by 
Aurora’s authorship. Marian’s unrealistically bourgeois ‘voice’—just like that of the slave 
woman in “The Runaway Slave at Pilgrim’s Point”—is inscribed by the poet and is sublimated 
into aesthetic form to guarantee the poet’s continued speaking.261 The isolated fugitive slave 
                                                 
260 David 1987, 141-2; Mermin 96. 
261 Contemporary reviewers pointed to Marian Erle’s impossible dignity and command of standard English dialect 
and vocabulary. Critics have continued this line of critique, particularly Cora Kaplan who remarks on Marian’s 
“embourgeoisement in terms of language and understanding [that] occurs at embarrassing speed” (11-2; see David 
1987, 114; Leighton 148). Dorothy Mermin wonders why EBB should be interested “in a realistic portrayal of 
uneducated speech.” What matters is that EBB drags the trafficked working-class body into the center of bourgeois 
attention, out from the cloak of “modesty and shame” (216). This is certainly a worthy riposte; yet, EBB’s 
“embourgeoisement” of Marian elides the historical efforts of working-class reformers and organizers to join the 
public debate on prostitution. 
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woman in “The Runaway Slave,” bound by melodramatic genre conventions and racial 
difference, is excluded from such coming-together of poet and rescued subject, and finds her 
release in death. In both cases, EBB does not have a very precise understanding of the historical 
conditions of oppression, but a strong sense that using oppressed women as poetic speakers 
radically subverts political and genre conventions (see Leighton 1992, 103). 
The concept of work, in terms of productive and reproductive labor, will also direct the 
analysis below. The placement of “The Cry of the Children”262 opposite “The Runaway Slave at 
Pilgrim’s Point” in EBB’s 1850 collection Poems suggests a connection in the poet’s mind 
between working-class exploitation and slavery (Stone 2003, 47). As argued in previous 
chapters, the abstract concept of slavery was intelligible to elite metropolitan audiences in terms 
of their own interactions with (overwhelmingly white) servants and laborers. Roxann Wheeler 
notes that the material, cultural, and literary history of exploited British work—in European 
factories as well as in the slave colonies—is indeed a shared one. This history interlinks, 
imbricates, and substitutes racial and class concerns in ways that contemporary Victorian studies 
have not always successfully formulated. The conventional focus on paradigmatic difference in 
terms of race and class elides the historical prioritization of socioeconomic hierarchy based on 
the nature of productive and reproductive work, particularly in the writings of those who do not 
                                                 
262 EBB published “The Cry of the Children” in Blackwood’s in 1843 which elicited a lively debate before Lord 
Shaftesbury’s ‘Ten Hours’ Amendment Bill, introduced in March 1844. The poem, often considered a sentimental 
and propagandistic “tear-jerk[er],” (Leighton 1992, 94; see B. Taylor 2008, 414), attacked the corrupt system of 
thought responsible for the exploitation of child labor and appealed to elite readers to push for social reform. As is 
the case in most of her verse, EBB, in “The Cry of the Children,” frames the socio-economic relationship between 
the exploited and the larger institutional apparatus system—a soulless, mechanistic world—as a familial relation 
between children and tyrannical fathers (Leighton 1992, 94-6). Inheriting Romantic idealism, EBB refutes 
“mechanistic models of selfhood” in favor of affective ones (Gottlieb 65). 
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perform physical labor.263 The focus in Victorian studies has been on the study of living 
conditions, rather than on conditions of labor, producing a sharp and somewhat arbitrary divide 
between black and white workers who shared in many of the same oppressions, including 
severely restricted social mobility across generations. While the rhetorical conjunction of the 
plight of European industrial paupers and slaves has a long and complex history264, in what 
follows I will point to the inherent instabilities of this conjunction. Ultimately, I argue that 
scholars are ethically compelled to distrust the reader’s identification with the suffering figures 
in EBB’s oeuvre while they must not discount literature’s ability—and its imperative—to make 
historical suffering intelligible. 
  
                                                 
263 Wheeler 2013, 153; see Poovey 10. EBB’s insistence on the moral and financial necessity of elite women’s work, 
particularly after the 1857 publication of Barbara Bodichon’s Women and Work, complicates this issue further (see 
Mermin 202 and below). 
264 See S. Brown 1995; Wood 2000, 273-4; Wheeler 2013, 153-67. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ABOLITION AND THE VIOLENT EROTICS OF READING 
 
Ambiguity and Abolition: “The Runaway Slave at Pilgrim’s Point”  
Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s family had acquired a substantial share of their wealth from 
colonial trade and large sugar plantations in Jamaica that operated using slave labor, a 
circumstance that EBB deplored.265 She gladly received the news of abolition in 1833, although 
the Barrett family suffered financially in the Emancipation Act’s aftermath (Battles 93-4). 
                                                 
265 Stone 2002, 39; see Mermin 15. From her grandmother’s Jamaican-born companion, Mary “Treppy” Trepsack, 
EBB learned “infinite traditions of the great grandfather [Edward Barrett, 1734-98], who flogged his slaves like a 
divinity—: & upon the beatitude of the slaves as slaves” (BC 13:23-5; see Stone 2003, 35). The first thirty years of 
EBB’s life were informed by Caribbean slavery, her father and brothers taking frequent trips to inspect their 
Jamaican holdings. Edward Barrett Moulton Barrett, EBB’s father, began to take an active interest in the 
management of the Jamaica plantation in 1806 (Barrett 52). In 1823, the family “abolished the whip” on Jamaica, 
and they encouraged monogamy and church attendance among slaves. In 1826, the family owned more than 2,000 
slaves; 500 of them belonged to Edward Barrett. EBB was glad when British slavery was abolished in 1834 and 
even her conservative father held the anti-slavery position. The family lost much of their fortune, including their 
luxurious estate, Hope End, because of the Jamaican ‘Christmas’ Insurrection of 1831-2, Emancipation, and the 
drawn-out litigation between seven grandchildren over an initial inheritance of ninety-two slaves and fifty cattle 
(1801-1837) (Mermin 157-8; see Barrett 47; Forster 4). EBB wrote in May 1833, before the passing of the 
Emancipation bill,  
The West Indians are irreparably ruined if the bill passes. Papa says that in the case of its passing, nobody 
in his senses would think of even attempting the culture of sugar, & that they had better hang weights to the 
sides of the island of Jamaica & sink it at once. Dont you think certain heads might be found heavy enough 
for the purpose? No insinuation I assure you against the administration … I am almost more sorry for poor 
Lord Grey [Prime Minister from 1830-34] who is going to ruin us, than for our poor selves who are going 
to be ruined. (BC 3:80-2) 
Three months later, EBB wrote to the same correspondent, “the late bill has ruined the West Indians. That is settled. 
The consternation here is very great. Nevertheless I am glad, and always shall be, that the negroes are—virtually—
free!” (BC 3:84-7; see Stone 2003, 36). Unlike Antigua, Jamaica introduced the apprentice system after 
Emancipation which mandated six years of continued service for former field slaves and four years for domestic 
slaves. Samuel Moulton Barrett, EBB’s uncle, had 1,100 “apprentices” in his employ in August 1834; 387 of them 
belonged to EBB’s father. When the latter died in 1857, his estate was worth was £63,695,12s. 1d. He had been 
awarded more than £12,000 in compensation after Emancipation, as did his brother Samuel. These financial interests 
have survived into the present. Edward Richard Moulton-Barrett, the last of the Barrett landowners in Jamaica, 
passed away in 1992 (https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/18032; Barrett ix; 137). 
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Nevertheless, family legacies deriving from slave labor supported this white Victorian lady’s 
artistic endeavors as well as her mostly sheltered and comfortable life.266 One of her biographers, 
Julia Markus, suggests that EBB believed she was partly descended from African slaves through 
her maternal grandfather, Charles Moulton. While other scholars have been unable to establish 
that she had genetic ties to Africans enslaved by her family, other branches of the Barrett clan 
were certainly biracial and EBB grew up cognizant of her familial ties to the descendants of 
slaves.267 Her strident and deeply personal opposition to slavery famously manifests in her 
“rather long ballad, written at request of anti-slavery friends in America” (BC 16:197-202), 
entitled “The Runaway Slave at Pilgrim’s Point” (1848) as well as in two later poems, “Hiram 
Powers’ ‘Greek Slave’” (1850) and “A Curse for a Nation” (1860). Verses depicting slaves’ 
plight had long been associated with poetesses as it was assumed that they could safely express 
cross-racial compassion—an often explicitly universalist maternal sympathy for the enslaved—
to the public. 
                                                 
266 See Lootens 2008, 32n1; Mermin 13; Stone 2002, 139. 
267 Stone 2002, 140; see Cooper 114-7; Kennedy 22-43; Marks 190. The Barretts are thought to be of Cornish origin, 
having owned “considerable [landed] property” since at least 1180 (Barrett 6). EBB’s ancestor, Hercie Barrett, 
landed on Jamaica on May 9, 1655, intending to help colonize the island as part of the “Protestant expansion of the 
world” (Barrett 1). The following is an incomplete sample of the Barrett men’s paternity of mixed-race children, 
most likely resulting from sexual relationships with slave women. In 1722, Hercie’s descendant, Hearcey Barritt, 
stipulated in his will that his son James would inherit “three woman slaves of his house: old Rose, Judith, and Jane, 
and the three mulatto children of Jane—Katey, Neddy, and Nanny” (Barrett 16). Hearcey purchased Katey’s 
freedom for £67.10s in 1725 and he compensated his son for that amount. By that time, the third generation of 
Barretts resided on Jamaica and the men served as high-ranking administrators on the island. In 1766, Major George 
Robert Goodin, Edward Barrett’s [of “divinity” fame] brother-in-law, distinguished himself by bringing slave 
insurrections to an end (24). The will of Edward’s brother, Richard, decreed that his parents were to purchase the 
freedom of “a negro wench named Sibilla and her issue” (Barrett 24). Edward’s younger brother, Samuel, also 
released a slave upon his death—“Madgikan or Migeckan otherwise Ann Molly” (Barrett 24). Edward’s youngest 
son, George, was a slaver who joined the Jamaican House of Assembly in 1787, serving on committees that oversaw 
the manumission of planters’ children with slave women. George had a six “quadroon” children with his 
“housekeeper,” Elissa or Eliza, all of whom were manumitted, in addition to Elissa herself (Barrett 35; see Marks 
220). 
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When the poem of thirty-six stanzas begins, its speaker, a young fugitive slave woman, 
after fleeing north, has arrived at Pilgrim’s Point to “bend [her] knee” where “exile turned to 
ancestor” (ll. 6, 3). Invoking the souls of the Pilgrim Fathers, she curses the land the pilgrims 
once “blessed” as the haven of perpetual freedom. Their descendants, the “hunter sons” pursuing 
her, have perpetuated the same tyranny that initially induced the pilgrims to flee to America, 
continuing the cycle of oppression over countless generations (ll. 21, 30).268 After reflecting on 
possessing “dusky features” in a world obviously arranged for the benefit of “white creatures” (l. 
27), she tells her story of forbidden love, her lover’s murder, flogging, rape by white men, 
ensuing impregnation, and flight. The poem’s center of gravity details the drawn-out killing of 
the white-faced child she bears following the rape. At the poem’s close, the woman curses the 
men chasing her, they surround her, and she dies, possibly after being stoned to death.269 
Scholarship of the past four decades has produced contradictory interpretations that 
fluctuate between praise for EBB’s “antislavery ballad,” particularly its radical proto-feminist 
rhetoric, and criticism of its various conservative and appropriative agendas. This includes the 
oft-noted suggestion that the poem’s politics are merely abstractly aesthetic and moral and do not 
reflect the circumstances of American slavery.270 Particularly owing to some of its declamatory 
and melodramatic features, earlier critics dismissed the poem as “unintentionally ludicrous.”271 
Recent scholarly engagements with the poem, much inspired by Marjorie Stone’s and Tricia 
                                                 
268 See Avery 108; Brown 1995, 128. 
269 She exclaims in stanza XXXI, “Man, drop that stone you dared to lift!” (l. 211); see Cooper 121. 
270 EBB quote in BC 14:115-21. See Battles 95; Brophy 275-80; Leighton 1986, 40; Miller 639; Stauffer 29; Stone 
2002, 150; Stone 2003, 36-7. For critique of appropriation, see Brown 1995, 127. 
271 EBB quote in BC 14:115-21; critical quote in Forster 204; see Cooper 1; Leighton 15, 40-1; Parry 122; Taplin 
194, for responses. 
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Lootens’s sustained interest in its transatlantic antislavery contexts, generic instabilities, and 
critical afterlives, emphasize its radical unconventionality and subversive originality, while also 
paying attention to the burden of its generic “abolitionist radical national sentimentality.”272 The 
emancipation of British slaves had encouraged women writers’ trust in the political potency of 
feminine sentimental poetry to enact further grand-scale liberations for the betterment of nation 
and Empire, and EBB’s performance of national poet critically depends on the memory of 
previous abolitionist victories. 
Barrett Browning wrote her first abolitionist work during her honeymoon in December 
1846, when she was herself a fugitive. Her father had forbidden her union with Robert Browning 
and disowned his eldest daughter after she defied his wishes to stay single.273 Although she had 
not been engaged in antislavery activism prior to composing “The Runaway Slave,” EBB 
conveys explicit “militant abolitionist sentiments” that are surprising in their insistence and 
iconoclasm.274 EBB penned the poem following an invitation from the editors of the Boston-
based anti-slavery gift-book, the Liberty Bell, which had called for immediate abolition since 
1839 and organized an annual National Anti-Slavery Bazaar to raise funds for the cause. EBB, 
after having cultivated correspondences with a range of American writers and publishing in 
                                                 
272 Lootens 2008, 29; see also Brown 1995; Krueger; Lootens 2017; Parry. 
273 Stone 2002, 140; see Brophy 279; Cooper 111-5; King 2; Krueger 281; Leighton 1992, 98; Lootens 2017, 160; 
Mermin 158; Miller 639; Parry 118; Stone 2003, 35. See Stauffer 30-1, on previous scholars’ erroneous speculations 
about a delay in “The Runaway Slave’s” publication owing to its politically radical content (Parry 116) and the 
likely publication timeline. The poem was solicited in late 1845; EBB mailed it to Boston on December 23, 1846; 
and it appeared in the 1848 issue, sold at the Christmas bazaar of 1847 (see also Stone 2005, 30). EBB was—
unknowingly—two months pregnant at the time she sent the poem to America. She suffered a miscarriage “of five 
month’s date” in mid-March 1847, after repeatedly denying the possibility of pregnancy. Stone writes that “the 
poem reflects repressed fears of a miscarriage or still birth, combined with terror of death in childbirth—not an 
unreasonable mix of fears for a recently married woman of forty with chronically frail health in the nineteenth 
century” (2002, 140). 
274 Stone 2003, 35; see Leighton 40-1. 
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American periodicals during the early 1840s, famously remarked to Hugh Stuart Boyd that her 
“anti-slavery poem for America [was] too ferocious, perhaps, for the Americans to publish: but 
they asked for a poem & shall have it.”275 “[M]aking it bitter,” she meant the poem as a 
provocation to transatlantic abolitionist audiences (BC 14:115-21). Similar to Mary Prince’s 
History, “The Runaway Slave” employs standard abolitionist rhetoric as well as several motifs 
and topoi commonly found in abolitionist writings, such as the lonely fugitive slave, the doomed 
slave romance, the enslaved’s religious struggle, and slave mothers giving birth to their owners’ 
offspring. As I will show below, despite its reliance on tropes typical for the Liberty Bell and its 
peer publications, the poem is extraordinary for its detailed, graphic, and protracted 
representation of infanticide and its aftermath over the course of thirty-one out of 253 lines (see 
Battles 96). 
The Liberty Bell, previously disparaged as a feminine “abolitionist stocking-stuffer” 
(Stauffer 30), has recently become an important point of departure for EBB critics.276 Scholars 
concede that her poem’s melodramatic features appear much less objectionable when read in the 
context of the Liberty Bell and other abolitionist works.277 Along with the invitation to publish, 
EBB had received earlier Liberty Bell issues for reference and she had probably read similar 
publications elsewhere. She was sufficiently immersed in anti-slavery literature to include 
imagery and affective appeals that were familiar to the Boston abolitionists.278 However, EBB 
                                                 
275 BC 14:85-6; see Battles 93; Stauffer 29; Stone 2002, 139; Stone 2003, 34, 42, 50. EBB mentions having sent off 
her poem directly following the remark that Thomas Carlyle expected Robert Browning’s poetry to work for the 
benefit of the English people more “than from any living English writer.” EBB tacitly, but decidedly, includes 
herself in the mission to serve England’s standing in the world. 
276 Stone 2003; MacNeill; King. 
277 Stone 2003, 45; see Parry 122. 
278 See Stone 2003, 45-53, for comparisons of poems and prose printed in the 1844 and 1845 issues of the Liberty 
Bell with “The Runaway Slave.” EBB’s slave-owning cousin Richard Barrett, Speaker of the House of Assembly in 
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updated the Liberty Bell’s generic paradigms by enfolding them within a dense dramatic 
monologue in which a female slave not only utters wildly insurrectionary ideas, but inhabits the 
interconnected roles of religious questioner, grieving lover, infanticidal mother, and 
insurrectionist martyr on behalf of her race.279 Representing the fragmented, non-linear 
recollections of a consciousness strained by a string of horrific—and, to many metropolitan 
readers on either side of the Atlantic, ‘exotic’—experiences, “The Runaway Slave” condenses 
the issues of miscegenation, rape, illegitimate motherhood, infanticide, and politically radical 
cursing into a mere two hundred and fifty lines. 
Similar to the publications of the Anti-Slavery Society in Britain, the Liberty Bell was 
among the most important American abolitionist publishing organs, regularly featuring major 
British and U.S. contributors like Frederick Douglass, Harriet Martineau (very much admired by 
EBB), and Lydia Maria Child. For its editor, Maria Weston Chapman, the Liberty Bell provided 
                                                 
Jamaica, might have also written out a story “about a run away negro” for her when she was a child. See BC 5:211-
4. For critical opinions, see Battles 93; Cooper 111; Parry 118. Stone refutes this popular scholarly narrative: 
Richard Barrett’s “Jamaican Story” and “The Runaway Slave” actually have little in common (2003, 37; see Stone 
and Taylor 191). EBB’s unpleasant cousin, “an old enemy” who bankrupted her father and who was graced with a 
“perpetual scowl,” visited London to plead before Parliament on Jamaican planters’ behalf and against the 
amelioration of Jamaican slaves’ living conditions which had been intensively discussed between 1823 and 1832 
(Barrett 83). 
279 Stone 2003, 33, 54. Runaway slaves in American antislavery poetry were usually male. Likewise, slave theodicy, 
as developed in stanzas IV to VIII of “The Runaway Slave,” was conventionally associated with male slave 
speakers. EBB may have taken her cue from Frederick Douglass’s slave theodicy in his 1845 Narrative (Stone 2005, 
9, 30; see Stone 2003, 51; Stone 2002, 145). The setting of the poem at Pilgrim’s Point and the female slave’s 
kneeling posture—not in prayer, but in bondage—while cursing the land of slavery, echoes and undermines the 
Liberty Bell’s most frequently employed images of freedom (Stone 2003, 51; see Battles 95). The abolitionist 
invocation of the Pilgrim Fathers—America’s originary patriarchal tradition—in the service of a call to universal 
manumission was already an established and fairly politically progressive convention. Many Liberty Bell 
contributors considered themselves heirs to the Pilgrims’ pursuit of liberty (King 7; see Lootens 2008, 29-30). EBB 
radicalizes that convention by having her eloquent slave woman utter a curse on white Americans and their children, 
presumably including abolitionist readers. In stanza XVII, the slave recounts that “white … ladies” refused to sit 
next to her in church “but yesterday” (ll. 117-8; see King 13). EBB’s jibe at her poem’s target audience is diffused 
by the invocation of another patriarchal system, Christianity, at the poem’s close (Miller 641; see Brophy 278). The 
concentration of power in male hands is not questioned in the poem—rather, it depends on (and upholds) 
patriarchy’s power structures to mount its anti-slavery critique, much to some feminist scholars’ chagrin. 
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an important means to pursue editing and activist work, and helped expand the range of public 
activities deemed appropriate for middle-class women. Chapman frequently compared the 
negation of women’s rights in marriage to chattel slavery, and linked her anti-slavery campaign 
to the pursuit of women’s legal selfhood.280 The Liberty Bell promised liberty in the sense of 
liberal subjectivity not only to American slaves but to female philanthropists, an analogy taken 
up by EBB’s poetry. Particularly for women writers, the Liberty Bell was an important organ to 
gain widespread public exposure and hone political writing skills, and many of them were among 
the members of the Seneca Falls convention.281 
The annual had emerged out of a confrontation among factions within the Boston Female 
Anti-Slavery Society in 1839. The Society, along with the entire American abolitionist 
movement, had split over women’s proper public and political roles. Led by William Lloyd 
Garrison, the radical wing of the movement stood for immediate abolition and advancement of 
women’s rights, along with non-institutional spirituality and pacifism. The more conservative 
wing, forming the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society under Lewis Tappan’s leadership, 
favored a gradualist, legislative approach to slavery under the guidance of clerical and 
evangelical groups. The Boston members who sought affiliation with Garrison went on to found 
the Liberty Bell. They were mostly upper-class and Unitarian women calling themselves 
                                                 
280 Parry 116; see Avery 107; Mermin 157; Stone 2003, 44. 
281 Joshua King studies Liberty Bell writers’ penchant for imagining white northern abolitionists as martyrs on a 
messianic mission rather than reserving that role for black slaves and activists who feared for—and gave—their life 
during advocacy work. White abolitionists sometimes (and, hopefully, unintentionally) wrote about slavery’s 
beneficial effects on white abolitionists’ spiritual and ethical growth (King 18). The widespread trope of a black 
woman kneeling before a more powerful white woman who “liberated” her was also common in American 
abolitionist writing, including in the Liberty Bell (Stone 2003, 48; see Brown 1995, 132). White readers were invited 
to experience the pleasure accompanying consciousness of their benevolent power over blacks. Analogous to Mary 
Prince’s metropolitan readers in England, they traded an arousing affective response for the promise that power 
relations between the races would remain unaffected by abolition. 
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‘Chapmanites.’ Middle-class evangelical women tended to side with Tappan.282 Public 
defamations prove that the Garrisonian women risked their reputations to elevate cohorts of 
female anti-slavery campaigners into the realm of early feminist political agitation. 
It is unclear whether EBB was much invested in the Garrisonians’ political commitments. 
It is probably safe to assume that she sympathized with their message of ecumenical Christianity, 
racial integration, immediate rather than gradual reform of slavery, and, ultimately, women’s 
rights.283 She turned against the official agenda of American Evangelical as well as British 
abolitionist organizations, although her non-participation in the abolitionist movement indicates 
that she could enjoy the thrill of publishing a politically daring piece without having to fear 
consequences in her immediate circle.284 As was usual with her, EBB saw her intervention as an 
ethically necessary one, although contrary economic concerns never disappeared from her mind. 
She wrote in an 1860 letter to Julia Martin that she cared little about the continued union 
between the American North and South since the perpetuation of slavery meant that “the nation 
perishes morally.” Abolition’s effects on vested interest weighed less heavily for her than its 
moral consequences: “It is the difference between the death of the soul and of the body … a 
                                                 
282 Midgley 123-4; see Lootens 2017, 37; Stone 2003, 42-5. The evangelical British and Foreign Anti-Slavery 
Society did align itself with Tappan. 
283 See King 3. EBB, nominally a Congregationalist, held widely ecumenical and Nonconformist views (although 
these were sometimes troubled), avoiding adherence to creed, proscription, and institutional leadership. Her letters, 
particularly those of the early 1840, show a deep engagement with the religious questions of her time (Stone 2005, 
8; see King 15). See, for example, her letter to Richard Hengist Horne [(December 6, 1843), BC 8:75-8], in which 
she stated that “I hope there is nobody in the world with a stronger will & aspiration to escape from sectarianism in 
any sort or sense [than myself]”; or her letter to Thomas Westwood [(February 2, 1854), BC 20:94-7], which again 
affirmed, “Sectarianism I do not like—even in the form of a State Church.” Instead, her idea was that of a universal 
“Truth … apprehended,—& Love, comprehending” (in aforementioned letter to Horne), available to “every body of 
men who call on Christ” (BC 14:105-10). Notable is the overlap of this spiritual theme with the Liberty Bell’s 
authors’ religious preferences. However, EBB lacks “their triumphantly exclusive identification of Christ’s true 
body with their messianic cause” (King 14; see Cooper 112; Stone 2005, 11, 16, 31).  
284 See Brophy 274; Parry 125; Stone 2003, 46. 
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compromise of principle would be fatal.”285 Prioritizing moral principle over political procedure, 
she framed slavery’s complex structures of oppression as amenable to change via an elementary 
moral choice: “A difficult question yes! All virtue is difficult.”286 Yet, EBB’s reverence for age-
old vested interests is apparent in her 1853 comments to Mary Russell Mitford:  
I am an abolitionist, not to the fanatical degree, because, I hold, that compensation should 
be given by the north to the south, as in England. The states should unite in buying off 
this national disgrace. (BC 19:45-9) 
 
She conceded that “[t]here might and ought to be a pecuniary compromise,” but maintained that 
the moral burden of slavery outweighed financial or nationalistic injuries (LEBB 2:417). Overall, 
her interest in institutional activism was weakened by the prejudices common among her class. 
After meeting Maria Weston Chapman at an elite social gathering in Paris almost five years after 
sending off “The Runaway Slave,” she painted the following, and (to scholars of abolitionism) 
disappointing, scene for her sister: 
Then, Mr Thompson, the abolitionist, who is rather a philanthropical bore, it must be 
confessed—he would insist on talking to me about his flight from Boston from the mob 
of five thousand, & various circumstances appertaining. I sympathize with him so utterly, 
you see, that nothing remains to be said—and he is not eloquent in conversation … for an 
orator! Then, Mrs Chapman, the female mover of the American abolition-movement .. a 
pupil of Dr Channing’s—I had had one or two letters from her, years ago. She is a clever 
woman, & still pretty, though with two grown up daughters. … People not of the highest 
interest, but in their degree, interesting enough.287 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
285 LEBB 2:417; see Parry 119. 
286 BC 19:45-9; see Parry 119. 
287 BC 17:156-61; see Stone 2003, 55. 
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Unstable Utterances 
By changing the speaker of “The Runaway Slave” into from a man into a woman after 
the first draft, EBB highlighted the particular violations to which female slaves were vulnerable. 
This allowed her to claim an obligation to speak on behalf of enslaved women.288 The poet, 
working within a traditionally male tradition, imagined herself to be in possession of a 
“privileged vision” (Brophy 275) that made her more sensitive to the enormousness of slavery’s 
moral infractions than her male peers, and consequently more entitled to argue in favor of 
nations’ choosing the difficult, but morally correct, path. Lest we forget how socially 
unacceptable this sort of self-framing was, we should keep in mind that Dante Gabriel Rossetti, 
in 1875, denigrated EBB’s “falsetto muscularity,” and that Alice Meynell wondered as late as 
1903 at EBB’s “anxious decisiveness … a very habit and trick of violence, … acquired as an 
assertion of strength.”289 
The poem’s most politically incendiary quality is perhaps EBB’s adoption of some of 
Robert Browning’s techniques for dramatic presentation of an individual consciousness whose 
race, social caste, and cultural as well as geographic location likely appeared unfathomably 
foreign to EBB’s middle-class audiences—many of whom had trouble intuiting the subject 
position of working-class girls in their very midst. EBB’s representation and circulation of a 
raped slave woman’s subjectivity during a period when politics and literature denied the very 
existence of such subjectivity is indeed a revolutionary innovation (Brown 1995, 131-4), and 
constitutes an unusually daring tool to arouse abolitionist sentiment. The dramatic monologue, 
tracing the complex decision-making process of a mother about to perform infanticide, invited 
                                                 
288 Stone 2005, 31; see Cooper 1; Stone 2003, 43, 46. 
289 Rossetti 152; Meynell 353; see Cooper 1, 5, 101; B. Taylor 1992, 7. 
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readers to identify directly with the fallen slave. The poem’s reception, as well as the troubled 
reception history of “Hiram Powers’ Greek Slave” and “A Curse for a Nation,” indicate that EBB 
and her audiences did not always agree on the best relationship between such poetic innovation 
and the representation of historical atrocity.290 The slave woman’s death upon ascension into 
liberal selfhood arguably illustrates the shakiness of EBB’s experiment. 
The poem’s hybrid form partly aligns with the recent invention of the dramatic 
monologue, although it is also indebted to the eighteenth-century ballad tradition, the 
monodrama of the Romantic period that emerged from it—with its sympathetic depiction of 
unwed mothers as pathetic and indigenous deviants—and dramatic first-person verse of the 
1830s.291 The poem’s ellipses, generic instabilities, and ambiguous political investments have 
caused much recent scholarly discomfort (Lootens 2006, 500). At least part of that uneasiness 
derives from “The Runaway Slave’s” borrowing from the already archaic ballad form, especially 
the ballad’s traditional distance from liberal humanist subjectivity, and the poem’s reliance on 
precisely that model of liberal subjectivity to bridge the alienating divide between white, middle-
class metropolitan readers and the poem’s speaker, an enslaved black woman. Susan Brown, for 
example, notes the jarring “disjunction between [the slave] as a speaking subject and herself as 
constructed in language.”292 These contradictory modes of speaking, tied to the melodramatic 
                                                 
290 At the heart of the disagreement was often economic as well as sociopolitical contention (see below and Miller 
653-4). 
291 McDonagh 80-1; see Stone 2002, 139. Wordsworth’s “The Thorn” is the most prominent example of Romantic 
monodrama and an important pre-text for “The Runaway Slave.” 
292 Brown 1995, 131; see Cooper 10, 120, for the opinion that the poem helped EBB “locate her own consciousness” 
in rebellion against her father. I agree with Susan Brown that, perhaps apart from EBB’s rage at having been 
disowned by her father, there is “nothing ‘authentic’” about the poem’s depiction of aggrieved interiority (1995, 
134; see Brophy 281; David 1987, 138). Slinn’s assessment that “‘The Runaway Slave’ offers an unmediated 
account of the slave’s experience,” despite her language’s mediation “by other discursive requirements—lyrical 
formalism, British literary speech patterns,” appears inattentive to EBB’s lack of first-hand experience with 
historical slavery, let alone the fact that she had never personally met an enslaved person (63; see Krueger 281, for 
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ballad tradition on the one hand, and to liberal, embodied selfhood, on the other, and the 
dramatic monologue as an intermediary between the two, intermesh and collude throughout the 
poem. Critics’ enthusiasm for the work has been dampened by the many moments in which the 
speaker’s ‘solidity’ destabilizes. 
What appears to be at the core of critics’ queasiness is the poem’s troubled relationship 
between the mimetic (or documentary) responsibility of an unequivocally political poem and the 
threat to mimesis (or “authenticity”) by the poem’s overt artificiality. Can the poet mobilize a 
universal ethics, contained within the aesthetic form, to elicit politically resonant sensations 
among her readers? The poem’s subject—the slave woman—conveys artistically stylized, yet 
historically “true,” messages and functions as primary site of identification. As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, slave women, particularly those who had experienced sexual violence, were 
not permitted to relay their stories directly, if they were able to share their stories orally or in 
writing at all. Most slaves were illiterate, of course, and had no access to the publishing circuit. 
A mediator, a white editor, author, or interrogator, took their place, and, by determining the 
aesthetic form in which slavery should be portrayed, increased the cultural, social, if not 
ontological, distance between readers and the historically “real” embodied experience of 
slavery.293 Concerns about “how much” subjectivity the slave woman is accorded in “The 
Runaway Slave,” then, warrant a brief look into the poem’s indebtedness to the ballad form. 
According to some critics, this form denies the speaker’s utterances mimetic accuracy and 
prevents ethical identification with the slave woman. I suggest that those concerns, while worth 
                                                 
the same assertion). I would argue with Brown that, by posing as the mimetic, unmediated voice of a slave woman, 
“The Runaway Slave” is “obviously appropriative” (1995, 127; see Miller 639). However, that posture is attenuated 
by the poem’s very artificiality to which it continuously draws attention. 
293 See Brown 1995, 127; Brophy 275-7. 
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pondering, are ultimately moot because the supposedly melodramatic, non-mimetic ballad form 
is itself tied to the history of insurrectionary public speech about rape and infanticide as gendered 
indicators of systematic oppression. Form, rather than mimesis, is the conveyor of politically 
rousing information in the “Runaway Slave.” 
The Jacobin ballad tradition, running roughly from 1770 to 1790, centered around the 
complaint of the poor village maiden after her “seduction” by an aristocratic libertine. In the 
early nineteenth century, low-brow melodrama provided compelling parables for the ways in 
which the rich took advantage of the poor. The link between patriarchal hierarchy and capitalist 
property ownership was represented as a sexualized and melodramatically polarized bifurcation 
of the world.294 The ballad, a traditional medium of orally transmitted knowledge about class 
conflict, also featured child murder as rural women’s customary response to unwanted 
pregnancy, committed to avoid public humiliation and loss of honor.295 Mid-Victorian ballads 
written by elite writers such as EBB modified the genre by lessening its original admonitory 
function, recasting it as ‘folklore’ to make it palatable to middle-class audiences, adding some 
“sugary sentiment,” and converting it to high literature.296 Contrary to mid-nineteenth-century 
appropriations, the street ballads of the late eighteenth century were mostly devoid of the polite 
register of sentimentalism and, arguably, elite poets’ high lyricism. Instead, they exaggerated and 
fictionalized pastoral life’s worst-case scenarios, and broadcast gloomy cautionary tales to amuse 
and instruct mostly illiterate audiences. Moreover, while the traditional ballad represents the 
                                                 
294 Clark 1987 14; see McDonagh 109; Parry 122; Slinn 83. 
295 McDonagh 79; see Geyer-Kordesch 104, 109. 
296 Geyer-Kordesch 111. EBB’s 1846 ballad, “A Year’s Spinning,” told by a seduced and abandoned village girl 
who buries both her child and her mother, falls into that category. 
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speaker’s circumstance and actions openly, underlying causes, developments, and motivations 
have to be intuited or pieced together. The genre does not lay claim to realistic representation of 
the speaking individual’s circumstances; the emphasis is on developing social and political types 
who respond to the effects of injustice rather than on initiating lasting, heroic social action (see 
Parry 115-21). Similar to Mary Prince’s presentation in the History, which also fluctuates 
between typification and mimetic individualization, the female slave in EBB’s poem symbolizes 
all enslaved women, although she also emerges as “unique and real” when her words evoke 
situationally concrete scenes and thoughts (see Battles 93). While this is one of the important 
affordances of the dramatic monologue, the poem’s connection to historical precedent is virtually 
non-existent. 
By virtue of its poetic innovations, “The Runaway Slave” caricaturizes sanitized early 
nineteenth-century works written by men that responded to the ballad tradition, such as Goethe’s 
Faust (1808) or Scott’s Heart of Midlothian (1818). Johanna Geyer-Kordesch summarizes their 
overall plots thus: “A girl had loved imprudently, had been swept off her feet by a lover, and 
despair led to child murder … The seducer now came back remorsefully in the last scene to show 
the error of men’s sexual ways” (110). EBB’s slave has indeed loved imprudently, witnesses the 
murder of her lover, is “swept off” by a gang of “seducers,” and murders the resulting child in 
despair. The “seducers” return at the poem’s conclusion to kill her, highlighting “the error” of 
slaveholders’ “sexual ways.” EBB presses the familial ramifications of slavery into an abortive 
pastoral courtship plot, since, I would argue, this plot affords a convenient vehicle through which 
the poet may address grand-scale economic and political injustice without incurring self-
defeating censorship. It allows her to employ language that is much more drastic than that of her 
male predecessors. 
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“The Runaway Slave” abides by the ballad’s generic restrictions and faithfully develops 
the archetypical setting297: the reader encounters the rural, unwed, destitute, and mentally 
impacted girl in nature after she has been sexually violated by a man who of higher social rank. 
The poem leaves unexplained the reasons for the murder of the slave’s lover in stanza XIV, the 
rape in stanza XV—rendered in unconventionally explicit terms as “a deeper wrong”—or the 
sudden (and startling) appearance of the child on his mother’s breast like an “amulet that hung 
too slack” in stanza XVI (l. 99).298 The three decisive events in the slave’s immediate 
psychosexual past are compressed into twenty-one lines and form the rough plot of a 
nightmarish, yet well-known, story of programmatic sexual exploitation within agrarian and 
hierarchically organized societies—in this case, the American slave system. 
Wrong, followed by a deeper wrong! 
    Mere grief’s too good for such as I. 
So the white men brought the shame ere long 
      To strangle the sob of my agony. 
They would not leave me for my dull 
Wet eyes!—it was too merciful 
     To let me weep pure tears and die. 
 
Stanza XV (ll. 99-105) condenses the ballad’s central catastrophes into seven lines. The first 
“[w]rong” represents the murder of her lover; the second retaliative gang rape indicated by the 
allusion to the slave woman’s loss of honor.299 From the slave’s perspective, the institutional 
                                                 
297 See Krueger 281; McDonagh 70. 
298 See Stone 2002, 131. EBB added the explicit reference to the rape in stanza XV in her first fair copy (Stone 2003, 
50-2; see Cooper 117).  
299 Although the Liberty Bell proudly addressed taboo issues surrounding slavery, its writers indicate owners’ rape of 
female slaves using the euphemistic term “pollution” (Stone 2002, 131; see Stone 2003, 38). Stone notes that EBB 
says “the,” not “her,” shame (2003, 53). The article “the” bears the load of the author’s moral challenge to the 
conventional view that raped slave women are fallen and somehow to blame for their rape. This subtle grammatical 
strategy is similar to the different weighing of “indecent” and “shame” in Mary Prince’s History, effected by 
deliberate grammatical choices. 
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props of slavery, recursive flows of money, goods, bodies, and ideological statements, are 
invisible and insignificant. The reader is claustrophobically confined to the slave woman’s 
fragmentary perceptions and episodic recollections, “forming a sort of hurricane’s eye for the 
compulsive narration of trauma” for the conversion of American readers into abolitionists and 
active political reformers.300  
When EBB composed “The Runaway Slave,” the spectacle of the mother’s reluctant 
infanticide had been a long-standing literary trope and, like the ballad form, had become near-
archaic. Infanticide traditionally served as writers’ final resort to awaken sympathy among the 
most hardened readers. In his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755), Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau hypothesized that “terrible agitation must be felt by this witness of an event in which 
[the reader] has no personal interest! What anguish he must suffer in seeing it and being unable 
to do anything to help the fainting mother or the dying child!”301 Nineteenth-century 
philanthropists, including abolitionists, seized the figure of Rousseau’s grieving mother—a 
figure borrowed from the Christian Stabat Mater—to create a triangulated economics of pity and 
suffering. In the case of “The Runaway Slave,” the speaker’s monologue, skipping over the 
period of pregnancy and delivery, lingers upon the infanticide committed under post-partum 
duress. It provides in agonizing detail the slow death of the child for a full quarter of the poem. 
Within this spectacle of heighted affect, the mother observes the child’s pain, and also suffers on 
account of her bond with the infant. The reader or spectator views the child along with the 
                                                 
300 Lootens 2006, 500. The structure of the poem mirrors the slave woman’s “psychic disorientation.” Joshua King 
notes that the slave experiences “her own black body as a prison and instrument for white people’s uses,” but he 
does not remind us that this representation is the effect of white projection (12; see Cooper 116; Sánchez-Eppler 
103). Analogous to my analysis of the critical reception of Mary Prince’s History, EBB scholars also tend to elide 
that “The Runaway Slave” is a white woman’s projection of black female slaves’ experiences (see Lootens, 2006, 
498).  
301 Rousseau 46; see McDonagh 34. 
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mother, then inhabits the child’s perspective, or observes the scene as a privileged, distant 
observer. The plethora of identifications—and the enjoyable passage in and out of those 
identifications—affords variable and pleasurably heightened emotional responses such as pity, 
disdain, fear, arousal, outrage (see McDonagh 37). In the case of abolitionist literature, the play 
of identifications unlocked by the infanticidal scene tested whether the reader was ultimately 
more invested in human sociality based on familial (or, in critics’ parlance, “sentimental”) bonds 
or in economic contract. As I will argue next, identification and pleasurable horror produce 
politically resonant and potentially prurient affect in “The Runaway Slave’s” representation of 
infanticide. 
 
“My Little Body”: Rape and Infanticide in “The Runaway Slave” 
The ballad’s failed courtship plot in “The Runaway Slave” suggests that familial relations 
between oppressor and oppressed, while not inconceivable, are unachievable for the present. 
This plot is complicated by the poem’s unusual emphasis on the child, family’s future, as the 
cause of devastating anguish. In light of EBB’s biography, this might not be surprising, as 
Dorothy Mermin writes. EBB, with her slave-owning clan and vengeful father, conceptualized 
oppression as an intimate, personal relation, both familiar and familial.302 In “The Runway 
Slave,” the child, “my fruit … ha, ha!” (l. 155), materializes slavery’s economic incentives as 
intimate flesh, a contradiction that drives the slave woman “mad.”303 EBB imagines the inner 
                                                 
302 Mermin 13; 158; see Sánchez-Eppler 92, for the generic conflation of slavery and family bonds in abolitionist 
writings. Stone notes that EBB’s brothers joined her father for a while in his condemnation of her elopement with 
Robert Browning. She suggests that they might make a figurative appearance in the poem as the “hunter sons” 
(2002, 140). 
303 An early title for the poem was “Mad and Black at Pilgrim’s Point” but EBB “wisely” decided to expand the 
poem’s political claims to include issues of captivity and freedom rather than focusing on racialized puerperal 
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turmoil of a woman whose ‘natural’ maternal instinct is at odds with the sense that her son’s 
white face represents slavery’s crimes against herself and her people: “the white child wanted his 
liberty / [h]a, ha! he wanted the master-right” (ll. 125-6).304 The speaker confronts the 
contradiction that her “heart” (l. 119) urges her to nurture a being who is of her flesh yet, in its 
imperial “desire for liberty,” is inimical to her very survival.305 Connecting sexual and racial 
subjection to white fatherhood, the poem interrogates and rejects the mystique of Western 
patriarchal succession, even if it continues to require men “to steady” the poet’s words.306 
    And in my unrest, could not rest. 
Thus we went moaning, child and mother, 
One to another, one to another,  
    Until all ended for the best. (ll. 109-12) 
 
The conflict between motherhood’s instincts and racial allegiance, the forced contribution to the 
growth of the Pilgrims’ “race” (see Cooper 119), produces painful restiveness in need of a 
solution. A black child fathered by the murdered lover would have begun a new succession based 
on rebellious, intra-racial love.307 Instead, this form of burdened motherhood demands archaic 
retribution and severance of the maternal bond. Driven to decide between motherhood’s ties and 
those of race, the slave mother, ominously, announces that infanticide is ‘better’ than subjecting 
her child to the curse of racialized violence in the future. 
                                                 
insanity alone (Stone 2002, 146; see Ficke 259; Stone 2003, 55; Stone 2005, 29). The slave’s insanity is not the 
main issue, after all—it is the effect of slavery’ incompatibility with domestic maternity. 
304 The speaker incessantly focuses on the child’s unbearable whiteness. For example: “in the single glance I had / 
[o]f my child’s face, I tell you all, / I saw a look that made me mad!” (ll. 141-2); “the babe who lay on my bosom so, 
/ [w]as far too white for me” (ll. 115-6); “I could not bear / [t]o look in his face, it was so white” (ll. 120-1). 
305 Leighton 41; see Slinn 58; Stone 2005, 28 
306 Leighton 41, 43; see Cooper 120. The slave’s song, her lover’s name, eventually reconciles her to her child. 
Likewise, EBB depends on her readership—many of them men—to legitimize her poem (see Leighton 43). 
307 Leighton 43; see Lootens 2008, 29-30 
 171 
Abolitionist authors usually framed slave mothers’ infanticide as an act of mercy and 
defiance which, by breaking the long cycle of dispossession, protected children from growing up 
enslaved. Such compassionate murder may even have been ethically justifiable to some 
readers.308 If considered in the context of this tradition, the speaker’s exclamation that she 
“twisted [the child] round in my shawl” because she “wished to save it from my curse” (ll. 146-
7)—the curse being her own enslavement—adheres to conventional abolitionist paradigms. The 
decision to kill the child appears as natural and tender “as wrapping it in a shawl for 
protection.”309 However, the poem ends with the slave woman’s half-detracted curse on white 
men’s offspring and the threat of violent uprising and retaliative murder. As she covers the child 
in the “kerchief there / … his face in close and tight” (l. 122), her act is not unambiguously 
nurturing. Rather, she imposes darkness upon him because he is a racialized enemy.310 At the 
moment of greatest race antagonism the slave mother, in an “oddly wooden, didactic 
pronouncement” (Lootens 2006, 495), proclaims that  
                           A child and mother 
Do wrong to look at one another  
   When one is black and one is fair (ll. 138-44) 
 
                                                 
308 Also see “Influence of Woman” in the Liberator (1837), written by “a woman” abolitionist who calls attention 
“to the most dreadful scenes … where the female slave murders her infant in the dark recesses of the grove, that it 
may never know the horrors of slavery” (152); see also Stone 2003, 55. In addition to the poem’s decidedly 
Caribbean (rather than Massachusettsian) local flavor—such as the mentioning of mango trees (ll. 137, 154) and the 
cocoa-nut bowl created by the slave’s lover during “the roar of the hurricanes” (ll. 76-7)—EBB’s understanding of 
slave inheritance appears to be of the Jamaican, rather than the American kind. In the U.S. any child of one black 
parent was deemed black and inherited chattel status. In the Jamaican tradition, white owner’s children with black 
slave women were at times sent to England for schooling. This is why the slave woman’s fears that the child could 
claim the “master-right” is not merely figurative (Cooper 118). The six ‘quadroon’ children of EBB’s great uncle, 
George Barrett, with the slave woman Elissa Peters were manumitted and educated in England (Barrett 36). 
309 Leighton 41; see Lootens 2006, 497. The slippage from the mother’s caress into the murderous grasp was a 
traditional trope within abolitionist writings, for instance in Guillaume Thomas Raynal’s 1779 Political History of 
the Two Indies which showcases the infanticidal mother’s sudden “fury mingled with a spirit of revenge and 
compassion” (Raynal 105; see McDonagh 54). 
310 See King 11; Cooper 118. 
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Throughout these stanzas, the speaker’s racial didacticism alternates with sentimental motifs that 
reinforce the power of the maternal bond.311 Because she kills the infant to uphold the ideal of 
racial integrity, her “heart,” sentimentalism’s central zone, shatters: “He moaned and beat with 
his head and feet, / … [h]e struck them out … / [a]gainst my heart to break it through” (ll. 127-
30). Violence, murder, and quickening comingle gruesomely in this image of the child’s kicking 
feet against the mother’s inner seat of feeling (Lootens 2006, 499).  
The poem’s already noted “ferocious” quality derives precisely from the speaker’s 
suggestion that, after risking a single look at her newborn, she realizes she hates her child, a 
foreign and horrific idea to EBB’s contemporaries and to the poet herself. The murdered child in 
abolitionist infanticide narratives is usually a girl, and the slave mother prays to God to take the 
infant and protect her from the inevitable rape by white men (Stone 2003, 53). As Dorothy 
Mermin pointedly writes, “male children command maternal attention” (195); they compel the 
mother’s gaze with “the master’s look, that used to fall / [o]n my soul like his lash .. or worse” 
(ll. 144-5), as the speaker exclaims. The child’s unbearable whiteness, its gaze’s triggering of 
“traumatized fear” scotches the otherwise natural and holy bond between mother and child. The 
sight of him reenacts past memories of lost love, murder, and, above all, rape.312 When the slave 
mother strangles or “twist[s]” the child, she reenacts the crime that the rapists committed against 
her: After killing her lover, the white masters stifled her own “sob of agony” (l. 102). Now, she 
stifles that of her son. The child, want[ing]” his “master-right,” “moan[s] and struggle[s]” as she 
                                                 
311 Sentimental tropes are most apparent when the slave’s recollections match those of the ballad tradition. See, for 
example, the exclamation “hark!” ([l. 113) before she reveals the color dichotomy between herself and the child (see 
Stone 2002, 144). 
312 Stone 2002, 145; see Brown 1995, 130-1; Cooper 118; Ficke 258. 
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kills him to end white men’s racial hegemony (l. 124).313 After she has suffocated the child, he is 
“still and mute” (l. 152), as is she. 
For nine out of the poem’s thirty-six stanzas, the slave mother spectacularly reenacts 
rape’s violence on her child’s body. EBB transfers the scene of the slave woman’s violation onto 
the dying child’s white “moan[ing],” and “shiver[ing]” body (l. 149). The scene violently inverts 
the relationship between master and slave, and turns the slave mother into “the oppressor of a 
white male infant” (David 1987, 139). The rape, instead of killing her, catalyzes enraged and 
triumphant retribution.314 The slave woman’s own body remains largely invisible until stanza 
thirty-two, although it begins to merge with the infant’s corpse soon after his death. The endless, 
compulsively repeated details of the child murder flesh out the speaker’s painful (and “mad”) 
self-division through simultaneous denial and affirmation of her body’s continuity with her 
son’s. She refers to the dead child first as “the body,” then as “the little body,” and finally as “my 
little body” (ll. 165, 170, 176). Both mother and child seem to “stiffen[]” after the child’s death:  
And he moaned and trembled from foot to head, 
    He shivered from head to foot; 
Till after a time, he lay instead 
    Too suddenly still and mute 
I felt, beside, a stiffening cold” (ll. 148-52)315  
 
                                                 
313 The language throughout is slippery—she might also wish to prevent her son having to confront the fact that he 
can never attain his “want[ing],” i.e. absent, “master-right” (Stone 2002, 145). 
314 See Parry 124. Miller traces the “mediating function” of the “metaphor of penetration” in EBB’s slave poems. He 
suggests that the seized female body emerges “as a transformative pathway between divinity and corporeality” 
(646). We will encounter another woman writer’s framing of rape as aesthetically or psychically generative—even 
wholesome—in my analysis of marital rape in Daniel Deronda in chapter 9.  
315 Lootens draws attention to the fact that the child—“it” in line 147—turns into a “he” in line 148 (2006, 497). At 
the precise moment when the slave mother’s infanticidal action begins, when she becomes morally culpable, she 
begins to think of her son as a person rather than injustice’s embodiment. 
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The “moaning” child (the word is repeated four times across seven stanzas) who “lay on my 
bosom so” now “lay[s] on my heart like a stone . . . as chill” (ll. 115, 167). She does not let go of 
the body, but, “day and night, / I carried the body to and fro” until “I felt it was tired at last” (ll. 
164-5, 178). Since the child is dead, he cannot tire. After carrying the child around her neck like 
Coleridge’s albatross for a month (she drags him around in penance just as she drags out the 
narration of the killing), the speaker finally buries the child. By then, the distinction between 
herself and her son’s body has disappeared.316 
Once buried, the infant “changed to black earth … nothing white … / [a] dark child in the 
dark!” (ll. 185-6). Following the interment, the speaker feels “comfort, and my heart grew 
young” (l. 187). The sudden change of agony into comfort, along with her “smiling” (l. 188), the 
two ellipses, and the monomaniac repetition of “dark,” suggest the slave’s woman’s final mental 
disruption, even when making allowances for melodrama’s low standards for psychological 
realism.317 She imagines that the Pilgrims’ “fine white angels … sucked the soul of that child of 
mine … [h]a, ha, for the trick of the angels white! / [t]hey freed the white child’s spirit so” (ll. 
157-63). This appeal, although directed at the Pilgrims, must have struck readers of the Liberty 
Bell as overt criticism of their righteous convictions. EBB suggests that, to slaves, abolitionists’ 
Christianity is part of the ideological apparatus that justifies slavery’s racialized hierarchy and, in 
the end, is responsible for the murder of white children (see King 3).  
 
                                                 
316 Joshua King has recently drawn attention to EBB’s likely borrowing the image of the “amulet” from Coleridge’s 
“Ancient Mariner” (9). See Battles 97-8. My reading responds to Sarah Ficke who notes the importance of the 
child’s soul for the speaker “to the near-exclusion of the child’s body” (257). I suggest instead that the poem is 
overwhelmingly concerned with the white child’s body. 
317 My reading contradicts Ann Parry’s (125; see Battles 98). For the poem’s failure to adhere to psychological 
realism, see Lootens 2006, 499; Stone 2002, 145. 
 175 
“The Runaway Slave” and the Violent Erotics of Reading 
Stories of infanticide usually served as evidence for female abolitionists’ and reformers’ 
argument that unjust social arrangements intervened in the supposedly natural bond between 
mothers and children. Infanticide, as a literary trope, indicates a breakdown of the self-regulating 
social order and encourages the expansion of bourgeois domestic moral values to slaves or 
working-class women.318 In the abolitionist context, it reminded readers that slavery entailed 
atrocities that had been “forgotten for the perpetuation of the nation” (McDonagh 145). 
Infanticide ultimately served to imagine alternative nationalisms and liberationist imperial 
missions that did not depend on atrocity but on benign paternalism (see Brown 1995, 133-4). The 
poem’s overall political argument—the sanctity of motherhood is critically defiled by slavery’s 
sexual and racial violence—would be inoperative without the ideal of domestic motherhood as 
its ideological foil. The spectacle of infanticide in “The Runaway Slave” does not reflect 
historical family relations under slavery, but articulates a purposefully distorted image of the 
British family.319 EBB’s “deeply liberal and humanist assumptions about the self” enable the 
telling of the slave mother’s psychic disintegration, and rely on the idea that, by default, liberal 
subjectivity is white and male (Brown 1995, 129). Moreover, EBB’s confidence that she would 
get away with her “ferocious” poem depends on the long legal-humanist tradition of absolving 
infanticidal mothers on account of puerperal insanity.320 This legal stance upheld the bourgeois 
                                                 
318 See Altink 96; Ficke 250; Leighton 40. 
319 See McDonagh 58-60. In the late 1850s, exacerbated by the Indian Mutiny in 1857, infanticide became “an over-
determined sign of oriental danger” (McDonagh 139). It had been associated with foreigners and primitiveness since 
at least the eighteenth century. 
320 Further, the fact that, in 1850, EBB’s name was on the shortlist for Poet Laureate of Great Britain should be 
remembered here: after all, “her reputation and race permitted her to take the licenses that she did” (Stone 2002, 
144). When EBB drafted Aurora Leigh, her contemporaries considered her to be the most prominent female poet of 
her time. 
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ideal of maternal love’s “biological” or “instinctive” inevitability even when confronted with the 
evidence of maternal violence and cruelty (see Ficke 257). If EBB designs the “mad and black” 
slave as the rebellious counterpart to hegemonic white masculinity, the slave woman’s authority 
to speak depends overwhelmingly on male auditors’ willingness to listen, for as “The Runaway 
Slave” demonstrates, the gaze “of masculine dominion … underpins the degrading relationships 
of slavery” (McDonagh 59). The psychological simplifications of melodrama always cater to “a 
male imagination” (Geyer-Kordesch 114). Melodrama, EBB’s poem included, erases abused 
women’s reproductive ignorance and the anguish of an unwanted pregnancy. Its insistence on 
virtue magnifies existing social tendencies and inscribes them as moral imperatives. 
In contrast to many recent scholarly accounts pointing to “the contingencies of [EBB’s] 
sympathies with marginalized women” (Brophy 275), I would pivot somewhat and suggest that 
the poem is meant to have emotional effects for white, male, middle-class metropolitan readers. 
Through its conflation of metaphorical and literal bodies the poem critically increases the 
“visceral, physical force of strong sentimentality’s half-corporealized metaphors” (Lootens 2006, 
498). This holds true despite the fact that the poem’s appeals to visceral immediacy (the surest 
way to communicate the subject position of the oppressed to powerful men) are meant to 
encourage reform of American masculinity. The drawn-out scenes of the moaning and squirming 
infant boy under duress figuratively infantilize white male readers who are then, again 
figuratively, killed by an insane black woman. The point of the poem is to make men feel that the 
current instantiation of white American manhood is non-reproductive, just as it feeds white fears 
about the long-term demographic outcomes of miscegenation and the inheritance of traits.321 
                                                 
321 See McDonagh 59; Stone 2002, 141. The poem also risks catering to planters’ assessment of black women’s 
unsuitability for domestic motherhood. James Adair, estate doctor on Antiguan plantations, wrote in 1790 that slave 
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Infanticide in “The Runaway Slave,” serves to highlight the primitive economic and social mores 
at the heart of slavery (particularly in light of the Britain abolition of slavery fifteen years 
earlier), to awaken humanitarian concern and compassion for the lot of enslaved women, and—
an insight critics tend to shun—to create material for sexual titillation (see McDonagh 66-7). If 
“The Runaway Slave’s” historical valences are to be fully explored, the troubling version of the 
poem’s representation of infant suffering as pornographic spectacle must be considered. 
The “Runaway Slave’s” previously noted violent erotics of reading, its affordance of 
pleasurably shifting identifications with “violator, victim, and spectator,”322 potentially produces 
variable emotional responses to infant suffering, such as horror, disgust, arousal, and desire.323 
An implied male reader observes how slavery kills white boys, with the dying mother as the 
message’s articulate but ultimately politically impotent conduit. It would be difficult to arouse 
men’s pity for an unmarried and black victim of “seduction,” particularly when that pity would 
likely be tempered by disgust in light of her murderous action. Because pity is necessary for the 
creation of the pleasures of the spectacle, the poem again and again returns to the violated infant 
body. This shift of readers’ attention from the violated mother as the initial object of sympathy to 
                                                 
children died due to “the inattention of the mother, whose natural affection for her offspring does not seem in 
general to be so ardent as that of white women” (131; see Altink 16; for a similar observation, see M. Lewis 123). 
322 Josephine McDonagh theorizes the play of identifications of the infanticidal scene under slavery thus: “The 
mother is both the miserable witness to infant suffering, but also its agent; and the spectator, who is also the real 
violator—the … slave owner—is both the man of feeling, but also the violent brute. In this instance, the spectacle 
becomes something like a mirror, reflecting back to the [white man] the true horror he inflicts. But there is a further 
inversion, for the mirror will reveal that the sufferings of the Negro are those of the European too: slavery harms 
‘their true interests’ … their own humanity is wounded by their oppression of others. In this moment of refraction 
and fragmentation, the slave owner is thrust into all three positions at once—as spectator, victim, and the violator; 
shame, pity, and suffering conjoin, as the slave owner performs the abjection of the slave” (55). Note that, within the 
poem’s economy of violence, the child and the mother inhabit the three positions as well. This multiplicity of 
violations and complicities yields cumulative and overlapping substitutive shifts in the reader’s identifications which 
are further complicated if the reader fantasizes shifts in his or her own gender. 
323 McDonagh 37; see Lootens 2006, 495; Stone 2002, 144. 
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the child is, in fact, a longstanding and “clever conceit” within literary representations of 
infanticide. Its purpose is the revelation that the white, male, infant body (read: the future of the 
white body politic) is “the real site of suffering” (McDonagh 42). 
It was obviously the pious hope of the Liberty Bell’s editors that its readers would 
approach its anti-slavery materials as defenders of moral virtue and integrity. However, as noted 
in the previous chapter, the “slippage” from morally upright spectator to lascivious voyeur is an 
“easy” one to make, encouraged by the “play between the pleasures of witnessing what one 
shouldn’t, and the realm of fantasy” that abolitionist literature unlocks (McDonagh 60, 64). 
Abolitionist texts always risked sabotaging their reformist message by representing trauma and 
abjection as titillating spectacle. Tricia Lootens has remarked on students’ tendency to rush 
through “The Runaway Slave,” for example, “to get over these textual moments as quickly as 
possible” (2006, 406). I suspect this is because the poem evokes in readers a sense that looking 
too closely, pondering its images and terms too slowly, might reveal something lewd. There is an 
anxiety about shifting into—or witnessing—illicit identifications in this text that purports to side 
with black mothers and highlight the historical atrocities of systematic rape under slavery. 
There is ample room for pornographic fantasy in the “Runaway Slave.” The motif of 
infanticide under slavery provides an opportunity for erotic fantasy as it concerns mothers’ 
existential threat to men, a masochistic male fantasy with urgent social and political 
dimensions.324 The infanticidal mother, the violent, cruel, vengeful, cursing woman, directs her 
anger at the helpless infant son rather than the adult men who violated her. (When she actually 
confronts the adult “hunter sons,” standing “five a-breast,” she dies soon after.) Under the male 
masochistic gaze, the slave woman’s fury reads as horrible sexual lust, and we witness “a 
                                                 
324 See McDonagh 69; Jarvis 11. 
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spectacle of degraded and violent female desire” as she commits an assault on her child 
(McDonagh 63). I argued before that the slave mother’s infanticide reenacts the white men’s 
rape, merging sex and violence. The terms of the child murder could as well describe the slave 
woman’s original rape, making visible the slave woman’s physical expressions during the rape 
while catering to abolitionist men’s arousal.325 As in other infanticide literature of the period, the 
murder of the child turns into an unthinkable sexual act. 
“The Runaway Slave’s” political ambition therefore “uneasily co-exists with—and . . . is 
inadvertently undermined by—a quasi-pornographic representation of sexual violence against 
enslaved women, which has the potential to titillate, as well as move and inform, readers,” as 
Holly Kent has pointed out about American abolitionist literature generally (par. 24). The poem 
freezes historically recorded suffering into an aesthetic object for white consumption, which 
raises the question if formulaic artistic expression, such as the ballad form employed by EBB, 
can (or should) be expected to do justice to human suffering. Is suffering an ethically suspect 
topic for verse, particularly when it includes the possibility of the spectator’s pornographic 
enjoyment of the slave’s debasement (see Stone 2002, 136)—or of his own? EBB was certainly 
aware of this ethical impasse, for instance when she wondered if “The Runaway Slave” might be 
too graphic for American audiences.326 And finally, when does human anguish negate the 
                                                 
325 The mother moves from a tender embrace to a strangling hold that elicits the following reactions from her son 
(including the speaker’s perceptions): “moaned” (four instances), “struggled,” “beat,” “struck,” “break,” “pulled,” 
“fall,” “twisted,” “trembled,” “shivered”—concluding with “suddenly still” (ll. 110-52). 
326 When in her early twenties, EBB posed this question in her reading notebook after perusing the aesthetic works 
of Hume, Hobbes, and Campbell. She wondered why “does the mind find pleasure in the representation of 
anguish?” (qtd. in Stone 2002, 136). The black abolitionist Charlotte Forten, aged sixteen in 1854, noted the 
affective power of “The Runaway Slave”: “How earnestly and touchingly does the writer portray the bitter anguish 
of the poor fugitive as she thinks over all the wrongs and sufferings that she has endured, and of the sin to which 
tyrants have driven her but which they alone must answer for! It seems as if no one could read this poem without 
having his [sic] sympathies roused to the utmost on behalf of the oppressed” (63; see Stone 2002, 144).  
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possibility of aesthetic expression—are there experiences that are too painful to be articulated 
and that should perhaps not be turned into aesthetic objects?327  
The spectacle is indispensable for the poem to function as abolitionist propaganda. 
Saidiya Hartman argues that the slaveholder’s violence, acting upon the slave’s body, constitutes 
the “inaugural moment in the formation of the enslaved”; it is the slave’s “primal scene” (3). The 
subjectivity of the slave originates in the unleashing of brutality upon the body and, as Hartman 
shows, in women’s cases, female subjection is often inaugurated in scenes of rape. Hartman 
warns that “the ease with which such scenes are usually reiterated, the casualness with which 
they are circulated, and the consequences of this routine display of the slave’s ravaged body” can 
“immure” readers to pain because that pain—this range of world-shattering sensation that is 
fundamentally unrepresentable, as Elaine Scarry has argued—becomes familiar and banal (3). 
Black suffering, according to Hartman, has had by convention a “spectacular character”; it needs 
to be shown to become viscerally apparent and politically “real.” The spectator’s role in this 
theatrical setting can be that of a witness “confirm[ing] the truth of what happened” or that of a 
“voyeur fascinated with and repelled by exhibitions of terror” (3). Empathy is slippery, as 
Hartman cautions, because it demands that “suffering be materialized and evidenced by the 
display of the tortured body” and because it is contingent on the audience’s ability to understand 
another’s body as capable of experiencing pain in the first place (4). Was it EBB’s assumption 
that her readers could not and would not empathize with a black woman’s experience of abuse 
but that they will be stirred by the death of the white child? We must remember that the pain of 
slavery-as-infanticide is communicated on the cultural and aesthetic terms of abolitionist 
audiences. 
                                                 
327 I will return to these questions in my discussion of EBB’s poem “Hiram Powers’ Greek Slave” below. 
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EBB’s dramatic monologue renders audible black maternal subjectivity where it is 
usually silenced, although (and perhaps because) the author is a white poet with a long-standing 
familial complicity in slavery. In terms of feminist and postcolonial critical aims, the poem 
constitutes “an unpardonable act of literary appropriation” because it mobilizes a fictional, 
suffering black body to circulate among the white writer and her (mostly) white readers, 
producing pleasant frisson.328 On the other hand, it is “an extraordinary act of imaginative 
identification” that accomplished what it set out to do: it aroused consternation in its target 
abolitionist audience.329 Although never openly admitted, the erotic convergence of transatlantic 
consumerism and abolition that we will encounter again in the discussion of EBB’s sonnet, 
“Hiram Powers’ Greek Slave,” was an important selling point for Liberty Bell’s editors. EBB’s 
unusually racy contribution to the Liberty Bell helped raise the publication’s profile, making it 
more desirable as a consumer product, and endowing its owners with fresh cultural capital.330 In 
the words of Harriet Beecher-Stowe, the Boston Anti-Slavery Christmas Fair had become 
“decidedly the most fashionable shopping resort” by 1855.331 As Karen Sánchez-Eppler has 
argued, the Liberty Bell, with its gilt edges and embossed leather binding, was able to maintain 
such a high profile in part because it sold the “allure of bondage,” satisfying readers’ fascination 
                                                 
328 For example, when the hunters have caught up with the slave woman, she exclaims, swooning, “I’m floated 
along, as if I should die / [o]f liberty’s exquisite pain” (l. 248-9). Manuscript D802 shows that Robert Browning 
suggested the use of the much more sensual “exquisite” in place of the earlier “glorious” and “wonderful” (Stone 
and Taylor 202; King 19). “Exquisite,” with its valences of pain and pleasure suggests that the speaker is 
overpowered by anguished rapture, a specifically sexual and aesthetic experience reminiscent of consummation and 
orgasm (see Jarvis ix). 
329 Stone 2002, 140, 153; see King 19. 
330 Stone 2003, 43; see King 3; Lootens 2006, 494. 
331 Beecher-Stowe 1855, 6; see Lootens 2017, 161-2; Stone 2003, 43. 
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with and desire for spectacular suffering.332 Black bodies were commodified, circulated, and 
exchanged for profit among upwardly mobile white women, and, even if the Liberty Bell traded 
in fictional bodies, domesticated many of its stories to woo less politicized readers, and meant to 
liberate slaves in earnest moral righteousness, it appears likely that “the valuation of depictions 
of slavery … rest[ed] upon the same psychic ground as slaveholding itself” (Sánchez-Eppler 98). 
 
Shaky Redemptions in the “The Runaway Slave” 
When the five hunters catch up with the slave woman—or when she believes herself 
surrounded333—she addresses them, apparently at the height of her power (“I see you staring in 
my face— … shrinking back,” ll. 219-20). She curses the children of the white men, the future 
descendants “of the Washington race,” by wishing “[e]ach for his own wife’s joy and gift / [a] 
little corpse” (ll. 221, 213-5). By extending the retributive logic of her own infanticide to the 
“hunter sons,” she essentially calls for an end to the white (slave-owning) race. To justify her 
anger, she presents to them the marks on her wrists (“[I prove what I say] / [r]opes tied me up 
here to the flogging place,” ll. 223-4), and, analogous to Mary Prince’s inspection, faithfully 
enacts the conventional trial procedure of abolitionist literature. White men, producing white 
children with black and white women, reap grotesque fruits hanging by the wrists, “as a gourd 
hangs in the sun” (l. 226). Slavery will soon come to a violent end, the speaker warns, as “[w]e 
are too heavy for our cross / [a]nd fall and crush you and your seed” (ll. 243-5). The slave 
                                                 
332 Eppler-Sánchez 98, 100; Lootens 2006, 494; see Stone 2003, 43-4.  
333 As this stanza begins with the exclamation, “I am not mad: I am black” (l. 219), it is unclear whether the slave 
woman’s recollections have been reliable. Stone suggests that the child murder occurs during “a period of temporary 
madness” but the slave woman “is not mad as she speaks” because she recounts the events retroactively. Lootens 
(2006) counters that the slave woman’s “madness” destabilizes the speaker’s account across the poem. 
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expects that slavery will be overthrown in a violent uprising and predicts that slave-owners’ 
murderous rage will be visited upon themselves.334 
At the end of “The Runaway Slave,” the poem shifts from narrative monologue to less 
psychologically antislavery ballad, finally obliterating the spoiled black body as the inescapable 
outcome of sexual slavery. A doubly fallen mother, the black slave woman is ineligible to serve 
as an ancestor in the Pilgrims’ tradition and her final moments are overwritten by didacticism. 
The final stanza enacts the slave woman’s death as theatrical performance (“I fall, I swoon!” l. 
246), followed by dramatic revelry in the martyr’s glory.335 Her hold on life tenuous, the speaker 
gazes at the sky and realizes that she has achieved the freedom America promises. She will meet 
her child in the “death-dark” afterlife “where we may kiss and agree” (ll. 251), where differences 
in skin color are obscured by the eternal absence of light. For the sake of the white child, she 
drops her curse (“White men, I leave you all curse-free”), but ends her song with the reminder 
that she passes out of the world full of her “broken heart’s disdain” (ll. 252-3). The slave 
ambiguously reiterates her previously lifted curse, suggesting that either her disdain is more 
powerful than even her curse, that she defiantly forgives the white men, or that her own curse is 
broken when she leaves them “curse-free” (see Battles 99). Her disdain affectively burdens the 
                                                 
334 See Leighton 43; Mermin 158. 
335 “I am floated along, as if I should die / Of liberty’s exquisite pain” (ll. 248-9); see Brophy 279; Lootens 2008, 31; 
Miller 643; Parry 122. Some scholars interpret these lines to suggest that the slave woman throws herself “off the 
rock to her death” (Avery 111; see David 1987, 139). Others understand the slave’s swoon to indicate a “feminine” 
relinquishment of power that ensures that the slave woman’s transgressive words are contained by “conventional 
discourses of Christian passivity” (Miller 643; see Lootens 2008, 31). Her “fall [and] swoon” could echo the slave’s 
prediction of the coming violent, rather than redemptive, uprising when the burden of slavery, having become “too 
heavy,” allows slaves to “fall” from their unholy crosses to “crush you and your seed” (see King 20-1; Miller 642; 
Stone 1986, 163). In this case, the divine judge witnesses impassively and silently (“While HE sees gaping 
everywhere / Our countless wounds that pay no debt,” ll. 237-8) as men, white and black, visit endless war upon 
each other (see Avery 110). The “fall” may also refer to the violated slave woman’s (double) fall. 
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future emotional structure of black citizenship: the slaves’ free descendants will remain in the 
“subjected role of the privatized internal enemy,” as Lootens cautions.336 
Freedom and emancipation from slavery, as imagined by EBB, is contingent on the black 
mother’s heroic death. The poet does not offer a solution to slavery’s annihilation of personhood 
on the basis of black female corporeality and instead reinscribes that same annihilation as 
maternity’s glorious victory. There is no room for the slave mother’s body in the poem’s world 
after her successful series of defiant acts. The slave mother’s resistance consists of refusing to 
bear (the sight of) white men’s fruit, killing the product of her labor, and ending her corporeal 
existence. EBB does not imagine a form of black subjectivity that can survive in corporeal form. 
The protracted, gruesome, and potentially titillating spectacle in “The Runaway Slave” 
catastrophically burdens the poem and forestalls the fugitive’s motherhood while the child is 
alive. The poem’s a non-conciliatory end means that the paradoxes caused by the speaker’s 
blackness remain critically unresolved.337 For EBB, the slave woman’s rescue lies in her 
obliteration.   
                                                 
336 Lootens 2008, 30; see Battles 9; King 21. That citizenship threatens to “crush” white “seed” forever. 
337 As Stone writes, “although many black things in God’s creation are beautiful, [the slave] is not viewed as 
beautiful; and that, although even the animals take black people ‘for men,’ [as the slave woman says] they are not 
granted human status” (2005, 29-30). The nominally discredited connection between pathology and race (“I am not 
mad / I am black” [l. 218]) is never severed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE HARD WHITENESS OF “HIRAM POWERS’ GREEK SLAVE” 
 
“A Robe, of Purity” 
Only relatively recently has it been suggested that “Hiram Powers’ Greek Slave,” EBB’s 
“aesthetic treatise in miniature,” as well as “A Curse for a Nation” complement the poet’s other 
‘social problem’ poems, particularly “The Runaway Slave” (Miller 637). This chapter responds 
to the dearth of “thick” contextualization in EBB scholarship, particularly regarding EBB’s anti-
slavery poetry, and draws from art historical accounts to argue that her verse was embedded 
within—and responsive to—contemporary discussion about the drawbacks of sentimentality as 
political discursive register, appropriate ways to publically engage racialized nudity in art, the 
commercialization and fetishization of abolitionist propaganda objects, and the role of the 
maternal poet to effect political change. I argue that “Hiram Powers’ Greek Slave” and “A Curse 
for a Nation” depend on ethically burdened erotico-aesthetic appeals to establish the female 
poet’s ability to address injustice and win her audience’s attention. In the process, the poet 
forecloses the possibility of more sustained challenges to the complex interlocking hierarchical 
systems of gender and race that her verse addressed. 
Hiram Powers’s marble sculpture, The Greek Slave (1844), represents a nude young 
woman posed like a classical Venus on a pedestal. After having been captured by the Turks in 
the Greek War of Independence (1821-32), this young Greek Christian faces exhibition in 
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Constantinople’s slave market. Her expression is tranquil, if ambiguous, and her face is averted, 
deferentially avoiding a reciprocation of the observer’s gaze. Her left hand incompletely shields 
her pubis, while her right rests on a phallic column covered—in contrast to the figure—in an 
ornamentally fringed and carefully draped shawl. Her wrists are shackled and connected by a 
double chain.338 Her overall attitude is composed. Two necklaces, a locket symbolizing love and 
a Christian cross, as well as a Greek liberty cap adorn the post against which she leans (see 
Hackenberg 32-2), suggesting that the slave has not only been stripped of her garments but of her 
culture (Kasson 187).  
Powers penned a detailed narrative, printed in a thirty-page exhibition guide along with 
selected reviews and poems, to shape viewers’ initial engagement with the statue. The pamphlet 
drew audiences’ attention to the historicizing frame narrative, the statue’s finely worked face, 
and the moral lesson to be gained.339 The pamphlet explained that the slave, after the loss of her 
family, stands in dignified, resolute resignation, and contemplates her likely fate of being sold to 
a Turkish harem. She arrives at the conclusion that she should trust to be liberated in heaven. The 
slave represents purity’s triumph over adversity or, as Powers put it, “a pure abstract human form 
tempered with chaste expression and attitude ... calculated to awaken the highest emotions of the 
soul for the pure and beautiful’” (qtd. in Brody 67-8). Powers was aware of his contemporaries’ 
“fastidiousness” with regards to nude sculpture, particularly in the United States (qtd. in Kasson 
176), and relied on his narrative to both deflect and draw attention to issues of erotic prurience. 
                                                 
338 The chain is ahistorical and somewhat illogical, as contemporaries observed—had the slave been undressed 
before being shackled? Powers argued that the chains were aesthetically appropriate but eventually changed the 
slave’s fetters to historically accurate manacles in his sixth version of the sculpture (Yellin 122; see Kasson 187). As 
detailed below, this change has crucial implications for the sculpture’s associations with American slavery (see C. 
Nelson 78-9). 
339 See Hackenberg 34; Kasson 178; Miller 647. 
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Both mitigating and enhancing the statue’s sexual allure, Powers also provided contextual 
information about the gestation of the piece. He assured the public that the live model he used 
had been a virtuous one, for example.  
The narrative, quasi-historical context supplied by Powers obviously served to assuage 
audiences’ uneasiness at the sight of a barely pubescent nude white woman in chains, 
tantalizingly half-covering her pudendum. The Turkish harem had 
long been associated with secrecy, sensuality, and voyeurism, 
newly reinforced after Ingres’s 1839 painting, Odalisque with 
Slave, which features a starkly white nude woman in supine 
position awaiting an erotic visit (Kasson 175). Although the 
harem is not portrayed in The Greek Slave, Powers’s narrative 
relied on audiences’ familiarity with its unspeakable cognates: 
female sexual slavery, erotic bondage, men’s fully 
institutionalized and architecturally realized carnal gratification. 
The slave’s nudity and poised Christian resignation allowed 
observers to guess how her story would unfold—“her future in the 
harem is the great unstated drama that gave the sculpture its 
poignancy” (Kasson 176). Although the figure’s pose suggested 
calm modesty and embodied the Victorian ideal of female 
sexuality, Powers’s narrative hinted that her fate would be one of 
terror. Modesty would not be rewarded on earth. 
Most cultural commentators did not discuss the sexual frisson generated by Powers’s 
narrative of endangered white female sexuality. When confronted with the sculpture’s nudity, 
Fig. 1. Hiram Powers’s  
The Greek Slave at the  
Yale University Art Gallery,  
New Haven, Connecticut  
(Wikimedia Commons, 2006). 
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they denied it. Observers lauded her spirit and saw her wearing a “robe, of purity.”340 Such 
fervent focus on moral purity, spirituality, and ideal form may well have resulted from 
sublimated eroticism (Kasson 181). A few unfavorable reviewers opposed the enthusiastic 
reading of the moral purists and complained that the slave’s controlled posture and sedate 
expression were unrealistic. Given that she anticipated a violent future that many viewers would 
have considered worse than death, her “air of total unconsciousness” was deemed 
inappropriate.341 The sculpture’s lack of self-awareness, her chaste and aloof resignation instead 
of visible anxiety about her nakedness or the rape that awaits her, allows Powers to imagine a 
situation in which a woman, publically exposed and grafted into a sexual scenario, could yet be 
considered in full possession of her modesty. Audiences were compelled to agree that the slave’s 
Turkish captors were fundamentally distinct from themselves. To view the slave lecherously 
would mean to view her like a “barbarian.” Powers’s narrative ensured that the statue was not 
morally responsible for the sexual gaze directed at her.342 When bourgeois audiences paid for a 
ticket to see her, what they purchased was a sense of this ethnic and moral distinction, and they 
learned to control the way they gazed at and thought about nude bodies in public (see Brody 71). 
The sculpture did not challenge onlookers’ assumption that women’s sexualized exposure in any 
other scenario would continue to be shameful. Viewers’ urge to protect or pity the figure played 
into middle-class benevolent sexism, and reinforced the notion that men were expected to 
purchase or fight for white women’s beauty (see C. Nelson 82). Her resignation was deemed not 
                                                 
340 James Freeman Clarke’s “The Greek Slave,” qtd. in Roberson and Gerdts 18; see Barret-Ducrocq 18; 
Hackenberg 34; Stone 2002, 134; Yellin 108. “The Greek Slave is clothed all over with sentiment; sheltered, 
protected by it from every profane eye,” opined the Reverend Orville Dewey in 1847 (160; see Kasson 179). 
341 Dewey 161; qtd. in Yellin 108. 
342 Kasson 178, see C. Nelson 80. 
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merely a highly appropriate subject, but the ultimate object of didactic art (Kasson 179). To 
many admirers, the slave’s spiritual power in the face of bodily degradation, rather than her 
nubile form itself, (supposedly) represented her most attractive characteristic. 
Accompanying The Greek Slave’s American tour—particularly once it moved to the 
Southern and Western regions—was the question whether the statue should be viewed 
“promiscuously,” that is by men and women simultaneously, or whether the exhibit should be 
separated by sex. Some cities prevented women from seeing the statue in the presence of men to 
protect women’s modesty. Obviously, the displacement of viewers’ desirous gaze by horrified 
self-recognition and -correction was not guaranteed. Advocates of mixed-sex viewings posited 
that separating men and women would be tantamount to acknowledging the exhibit’s 
questionable decency. Commentators who argued for segregated viewings were themselves 
accused of having “impure and common” minds. Cloaking the nude statue in class-inflected 
rhetoric of nobility and sexual purity, defenders of Powers’s work argued that critics revealed 
their own lewdness by having brought up the question. Nevertheless, later viewings were, in fact, 
segregated by sex and many prominent figures, including Powers’s friend and patron Nicholas 
Longworth, refused to attend mixed-sex showings. At least some audiences were aware of the 
statue’s potential to titillate, even if most observers took pains to deny the statue’s erotic 
appeal.343  
Powers created six full-size versions of The Greek Slave between 1844 and 1869, in 
addition to several dozen busts and smaller replicas, all of which were privately sold or 
publically exhibited. More than a hundred thousand people saw the statue as it traveled through 
Europe and the United States, allowing Powers to achieve fame and wealth as the first American 
                                                 
343 Kasson 181; see Hackenberg 34; Miller 650, 654; Yellin 108. 
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artist to win widespread international acclaim.344 The Greek Slave was shown in London starting 
in 1845, including at the Great Exhibition in 1851, and received near universal accolades 
(Roberson and Gerdts 12). English reviewers admired it for its adherence to classicist ideals, its 
celebration of female purity, its soft texture, and its nostalgic evocation of a lost past. It became a 
ubiquitous cultural image on both sides of the Atlantic, reproduced in engravings and sketches in 
art journals, guidebooks, and magazines, or sold as affordable miniature figurine.345 Popular 
articles, poetry, pamphlets, travel guides, and sketches exhaustively described the sculpture itself 
as well as the experiences of its viewers (Kasson 174). Queen Victoria, for instance, was said to 
have spent more than thirty minutes gazing at the sculpture before the Great Exhibition opened 
its doors to the public. According to countless reports, imagining the slave’s plight produced 
psychophysiological reactions like weeping and excitement, particularly in women.346 The 
statue’s ability to produce emotional effects in the observer while disavowing the particularity of 
the slave’s biological body—its colors, textures, secretions, wounds, rhythms, and functions—is 
the central problem to which I will now turn. 
 
                                                 
344 Brody 67; Kasson 174, C. Nelson 75, Hackenberg 32. 
345 Hackenberg 30; Kasson 174; C. Nelson 78. In 1903, Henry James commented on The Greek Slave’s powerful 
cultural visibility: “so undressed, yet so refined, even so pensive, in sugar-white alabaster, exposed under little 
domed glass covers in such American homes as could bring themselves to think such things right” (H. James 1903, 
114-5; see Hackenberg 30). He remarked that sculpture during the mid-1800s catered to audience’s appetites for 
sentimental romance and nostalgic anecdote—art had to tell a story, either literary, biblical, or historical (Kasson 
172). Marjorie Stone writes that the sculpture “epitomize[s] the triumph of safe Victorian sentiment” (2002, 132). I 
would argue that the “Victorian sentiment” and concomitant physiological reactions were all but “safe.”  
346 C. Nelson 78-80. Joy Kasson notes the fascinating impact viewing The Greek Slave had on some women: E. 
Anna Lewis apparently sunk into a five-hour trance, while Clara Cushman reported that she experienced “a train of 
dreamy delicious revery, in which hours might have passed unnoticed” (29; see Kasson 180). To modern readers, 
these reminiscences might suggest that Lewis and Cushman found “delicious” sexual abandon in bondage fantasy 
(see Yellin 111), something surely quite distinct from slave women’s experience of being exhibited on the auction 
block. 
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Adding Some Color 
Many Victorians assumed that sculpture represented the world in an ideologically 
coherent way (Kasson 172). The marble’s self-enclosed, white impenetrability, far from being 
ancillary to the sculpture’s overall aesthetic quality, functioned as indispensable facilitator of 
audiences’ public acts of viewing, which, in turn, helped produce a specific English embodied 
subjectivity vis-à-vis the shackled female slave.347 John Gibson’s Tinted Venus, on display at 
London’s International Exhibition in 1862, for example, was received as “a ghastly thing” by a 
female observer, owing to the statue’s faint, yet noticeable, all-body coloration in the tradition of 
classic Greek sculpture.348 Some viewers clearly found the evocation of a white woman’s skin 
tone offensive because the flesh color materialized the marble body not as an abstract emblem of 
moral or spiritual principle, but as an all-too-biological object capable of influencing—and 
inviting—audiences’ own, decidedly immoral, bodily responses. Tinted Venus’s subtle wax-and-
paint layer of pigment shifted observers’ attention away from neoclassicism’s imperative for 
transcendent beauty, morality, and timelessness, towards the arousing—or, to many, 
distressing—possibility of gazing at an actual person or, perhaps, a hyper-realistic pornographic 
doll.349 Flesh color, I would argue, invalidates the illusion of the marble’s self-enclosed hardness 
and instead invokes the relative weakness conventionally associated with female bodies. It 
necessitates interpersonal negotiations of power and proximity. The pornographic doll mediates 
                                                 
347 Jennifer DeVere Brody provides an associative chain of synonyms showing that the marble’s whiteness “was 
related to the ‘material’ in an equation that reads as follows: White = pure = solid = cold = complete = perfect” (69).  
348 C. Nelson 60; see Brody 7, 71. 
349 Resourceful entrepreneurs profited from the The Greek Slave’s pornographic appeal in setting up poses 
plastiques of flesh-and-blood women performing the sculpture’s pose at nearby venues. They thus siphoned off 
viewers from The Greek Slave and considerable lowered Powers’s earnings in Baltimore and Washington, D.C. 
(Miller 654; see Wunder 227-9). Clearly, spectators choosing to see the live women instead were less interested in 
benefitting from the sculpture’s potential abolitionist message. 
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between biological and marble bodies, infusing the spectator’s gaze with a seductive sense of 
total control over the figure on display. Due to these associations, the absence of color in 
sculpture was thought to shield observers from their own bodies’ untoward visceral eroticism 
and ensure not only the undistracted reception of pure moral and aesthetic ideal, but also the 
wished-for stimulation of appropriate physiological reactions (such as tears, swooning, or 
exclamations of awe), historical accuracy or artistic precedent notwithstanding. The Greek Slave 
existed in a conceptual force field between resigned submission (to audiences’/her captors’ gaze) 
and silent, steadfast power (to remain unmoved by shameful public exposure in the 
museum/slave market), creating sufficient frisson to keep audiences enthralled. 
Perhaps not incidentally, Hiram Powers agreed that Gibson’s Tinted Venus had been done 
in bad taste and suggested that it was the marble’s whiteness that allowed the nude sculpture to 
transcend the realm of the corporeal, inviting onlookers and artists alike to celebrate the triumph 
of the spiritual without risking indecency (C. Nelson 65). Exhibit catalogues underlined that The 
Greek Slave was to be encountered in a reverential attitude, encouraging a range of acceptable 
behaviors for the newly museum-going public, such as the removal of men’s hats, subdued 
conversation, and open, yet self-contained, displays of fascination.350 Gazing at The Greek Slave 
as prescribed was tantamount to assimilating bourgeois codes of propriety, ensuring audiences 
that the high-minded project of self-cultivation promised by the consumption of art would be 
successful. As the pamphlet created for the sculpture’s American tour grandly proclaimed, The 
Greek Slave “raise[s] above degradation by inward purity and force of character.”351 Thus given 
a ‘character,’ the sculpture trained audiences in the correct ways of looking at nude art. 
                                                 
350 Kasson 188; see C. Nelson 80. 
351 “Introduction” 4; see Kasson 187. 
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Compared to Gibson’s Tinted Venus—whose flesh-like tint was variously dismissed as 
insignificant, vulgar, or disruptive—the absence of color in The Greek Slave as well as the 
behavioral codes surrounding audiences’ visual consumption assured viewers of their own 
refined taste, heightened social rank, moral correctness, and spiritual power. Lecherous ways of 
looking were tacitly dismissed as “barbaric” (or Turkish), although the statue very obviously 
produced pleasurable erotic sensations in some of its viewers.352 
Although Powers had achieved the The Greek Slave’s remarkably lifelike finish by using 
special tools he had invented (Kasson 167), its hard whiteness and “subdued pensiveness” 
prevented it from being perceived as immediately real or pornographic (Smith 3). Artists 
preferred marble for its ability to universalize the white body, including its “classic” Caucasian 
features and proportions. Neoromantic sculptors installed the female body as the apotheosis of 
aesthetic value and morality just when colonial activity was highly visible in English public life 
(C. Nelson 62). The Tinted Venus’s complexion made visible the abstract fiction of white 
marble’s universal ambition, and brought the question of phenotypical difference and biological 
particularity immediately before the viewers’ eyes. The medium of white marble not only served 
to control viewers’ sexual arousal responses by sublimating erotic sensuality into moral 
reflection, but conveniently prevented a sustained engagement with the representation of black 
bodies.353 Of course, by the mid-nineteenth-century, American and British middle-class 
audiences strongly associated slavery with racialized bodies. Statues and busts of non-Caucasian 
subjects had ethnographic and social, rather than aesthetic, connotations, and sculptors took 
                                                 
352 See Kasson 180. The Greek Slave was framed by scarlet velvet drapery, creating the arousing illusion of a “rosy 
tinge flushing the pure marble,” according to Clara Cushman (29; see C. Nelson 69). The distinction between 
sensual and aesthetic contemplation was clearly quite porous. 
353 See Miller 654; C. Nelson 68. 
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pains to displace contemporary colonial politics onto white subjects to produce what audiences 
perceived as a high moral tone, spiritual messaging, and historical instruction (C. Nelson 75, 79). 
The sanitation and aestheticization of slavery via marble Caucasians was deemed necessary 
because, in the words of Harriet Beecher-Stowe, “slavery … is too dreadful for the purposes of 
art.”354 The power of abstract allegory proved to be tenuous, 
however, when Punch published a conservatively satirical 
illustration in response to Powers’s successful showing of 
The Greek Slave during the Great Exhibition. Entitled “The 
Virginian Slave, Intended as a Companion to Power’s [sic] 
‘Greek Slave,’” the cartoon lampoons the English frenzy for 
Powers’s high-minded idealization by purposefully 
depicting a dark-skinned American slave woman in the most 
hackneyed attitude. Hands clasped imploringly, 
melodramatically lifting her eyes, “The Virginian Slave” not 
only minstrelized The Greek Slave, but branded as 
hypocritical Powers’s attempt to dissociate his statue from 
the slave system his native country upheld. Since she is not 
clothed in the “robe, of purity,” she is vulgarly naked (even 
though she wears a draped cloth). The phrase “e pluribus unum” on the pedestal as well as the 
                                                 
354 Beecher-Stowe 1852, 10; see C. Nelson 80; Sánchez-Eppler 100. Beecher-Stowe further: “A work which should 
represent [slavery] strictly as it is, would be a work which could not be read.” 
Fig. 2. “The Virginian Slave, 
Intended as a Companion to Power’s 
‘Greek Slave’” by John Tenniel 
(Punch 20, 7 June, 1851, p. 236). 
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American flag draped around the post yank slavery from occasion for pleasant reflection on 
transcendent and universal questions to the mundane realm of contemporary geopolitics.355 
Punch was not the only outlet to point out Powers’s and his admirers’ hypocrisy. On the 
day of the Queen’s viewing of The Greek Slave, black American abolitionist and fugitive slave 
William Wells Brown placed the Punch cartoon at the feet of Powers’s sculpture and publicly 
praised “The Virginian Slave” as its rightful companion, fueling the controversy.356 This striking 
challenge to the royal entourage’s participation in the sentimental cult surrounding The Greek 
Slave was mirrored in some American publications. A writer for the abolitionist weekly National 
Era, for instance, noted that  
in the midst of the pleasing emotions excited by this admirable work of art, there came 
sad thoughts of the wondrous hardness of that nature which can weep at sight of an 
insensate piece of marble … and yet listens unmoved to the awful story of the American 
slave! There were fair breasts, that heaved with genuine sympathy beneath the magic 
power of the great artist, that have never yet breathed a sigh for the sable sisterhood of 
the South!357 
 
The image of the white slave was undoubtedly an effective, if problematic, strategy in that 
viewers were encouraged to identify as slaves and imagine themselves to be pruriently observed 
as slaves (see Hackenberg 39). Abolitionists regularly compared the Ottoman enslavement of 
Greek Christian women to that of African women by Christian Americans.358 The supplicant 
naked slave woman in chains—most often shown in a kneeling position—had already 
proliferated as the emblem of women’s antislavery agitation in the North of the United States 
                                                 
355 Brody 69-70; see Yellin 120-2. 
356 Yellin 122; see Stone 2002, 134; Kasson 184-5; Miller 653. 
357 Smith 3; see C. Nelson 94. 
358 See Hackenberg 4; Yellin 100. 
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(Yellin 99). Powers’s indebtedness to such abolitionist iconography in fact occasioned much 
commentary on The Greek Slave’s connection to American slavery. Particularly the Punch 
cartoon drove home the realization that The Greek Slave stood as an emblem against white, 
black, or mixed-race slavery, its exhibition creating contradictory overlapping vectors of power 
and complicity (Hackenberg 35). Some viewers realized, for instance, that The Greek Slave’s 
pedestal was an uncomfortable analogue to the auction block, implicating white viewers (or 
buyers) of The Greek Slave and its various miniatures in a trafficking of naked, shackled bodies 
that had its real-life equivalent in the United States.359 White abolitionist women in America 
particularly identified with the chained figure and felt called upon to move into the public sphere 
to end slavery and challenge the sexual double standard.360 While Frederick Douglass, in a letter 
to The North Star, explicitly tied Powers’s sculpture to the political goals of American 
abolitionism (Yellin 110), some reviewers were hostile to female abolitionist agitators and 
understood the statue to convey Christian resignation, quiet suffering, and ultimate martyrdom as 
proper responses to oppression.361 
In hindsight, much of the buzz created around The Greek Slave relates to its ambivalent 
“relationship to the exercise of power,” as Kasson notes (187). Simultaneously sexually 
vulnerable and spiritually triumphant—owing to her ability to transcend suffering—the sculpture 
                                                 
359 Hackenberg 34, 39; see Kasson 184-5; B. Taylor 2008, 419; Yellin 109. 
360 As Sara Hackenberg notes, The Greek Slave is an instance of the American abolitionist “tragic mulatta” or 
“octoroon” trope in which mid-nineteenth-century feminism and abolitionism intersect. It allowed white abolitionist 
women to recognize slavery as a mirror for their own condition, mobilizing harem and auction block alike as spatial 
metaphors that helped them articulate their legal disenfranchisement (Hackenberg 40). The tendency to read “black 
as white” can be found in both minstrel performance as well as abolitionist imagery and writing. Although pursuing 
different ends, they tapped into similar representational repertoires (see Brody 81). 
361 Yellin 100-2; see Miller 648. The 1848 introduction to the pamphlet accompanying exhibits of The Greek Slave 
proclaims that it “is an emblem of all trial to which humanity is subject, and may be regarded as a type of 
resignation, uncompromising virtue, or sublime patience” (3; see Kasson 187). 
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materializes, aestheticizes, and eroticizes a mid-century bourgeois sense of high Christian 
morality. Obviously, to do so, its cold solidity also freezes slavery’s regime of rape in perpetuity. 
Having long refused to link The Greek Slave to the contemporary American context, Powers 
finally acknowledged that it should be read as an abolitionist emblem and even prided himself on 
the correctness of his views—but only after emancipation had been gained (Miller 648). After 
the Civil War, he cast a final full-sized version of The Greek Slave wearing manacles rather than 
chains (Hackenberg 46-7). Explaining why he had chosen a female figure for his larger-than-life 
statue, America (1848-50), Powers wrote that, 
Perhaps by associating the beauties and advantages of our government with the form and 
attributes … of woman, the hearts of our woman-loving and women-respecting people 
might be inspired with … love for our institutions, and the wisest and finest government 
upon the earth. (qtd. in Yellin 113).  
 
Apparently ambivalent, but ultimately supportive, of American feminists and their involvement 
in abolitionism, Powers tied American patriarchy’s benevolent sexism to the public’s “love” for 
the American political system.362 For my purposes, it is crucial to isolate the connection Powers 
drew between the nude female form, offered for aesthetic visual consumption, and viewers’ 
intimate affective ties for American institutions. I suggest that EBB’s sonnet, written in 
admiration of Powers’s work, operates precisely in the same way by imagining the sculpture’s 
“passionless perfection” (l. 5) as a vehicle of political change. 
 
Visual, Textual, and Imaginative Crossings 
EBB’s “Hiram Powers’ Greek Slave” appeared in Dickens’s Household Words in 
October 1850, before the Great Exhibition, and was part of the rich poetic canon created in the 
                                                 
362 For the abolitionist iconography Powers used for America—in particular the statue’s crushing of chains of 
despotism with her left foot—see Yellin 112-9. 
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wake of the sculpture’s exhibition tour. In May 1847, the Brownings had met Powers in Florence 
where he showed them a version of the sculpture in his studio.363 The poem responds to thematic 
concerns many other poets and reviewers had raised about the statue as well as the Greek 
Revolution, while it also investigates the political implications of this poetic corpus itself. Most 
scholars, in their consideration of “Hiram Powers’ Greek Slave,” focus on the poem’s 
investigation of whether resignation or rebellion should be considered the correct response to 
enslavement.364 
The sonnet ponders the meaning of Powers’s controversial decision to deploy a 
neoclassical female nude to raise awareness about the realities of slavery and the sexual double 
standard, while operating fully within neoclassical and Romantic aesthetic paradigms also shared 
by Powers.365 The sonnet’s octave sets up the implications of the initial conceptual contradiction 
between “ideal beauty” and “the house of anguish” (ll. 1-2), inviting readers to ponder the 
sonnet’s various conceptual “thresholds” (Stone 2002, 132). The sestet resolves the conflict by 
suggesting that moral power, the result of art’s passion and communicated by feminine beauty, is 
mighty enough to end oppression. The speaker suggests that “Art’s fiery finger” (l. 9), 
materialized in the shape of the marble sculpture, confronts and ultimately demolishes the 
institution of slavery: “The serfdom of this world! appeal, fair stone, / [f]rom God’s pure heights 
of beauty against man’s wrong!” (ll. 10-11).366 By emphasizing moral activity—even its political 
                                                 
363 BC 14:203-11, 214-23. 
364 See Brophy 282; Mermin 150; Yellin 123-4. Michele Martinez argues that sculpture was one of EBB’s 
“governing metaphors,” particularly in Aurora Leigh, due to EBB’s close friendship with the sculptor Harriet 
Hosmer (215). 
365 See Martinez 214; Miller 637. 
366 See C. Nelson 94; Avery 111. 
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manifestation, progressive activism—as art’s ultimate purpose, the poem challenges 
commentators who praised The Greek Slave for representing women’s Christian resignation. 
EBB’s utopian hope is that power reversals be effected through high art’s revolutionary might.367 
Echoing Jennifer De Vere Brody, I would suggest that EBB’s reverence for the 
sculpture’s “[i]deal beauty”—in her “passionless perfection” of “fair stone” with a “divine face” 
(ll. 10, 12)—simultaneously invokes a racialized kind of beauty that is not without some 
nationalistic undertones (see Brody 69). At the same time, the speaker’s first reference to the 
sculpture, “[a]lien image,” establishes the slave’s distance from the poet in appearance, 
experience, and her relationship to spoken and written language (l. 3). The sonnet’s speaker 
imagines herself as fundamentally dissimilar to the sculpture (perhaps to acknowledge and 
remove herself from the controversy surrounding it), and thus performs crucial rhetorical work to 
fashion the appropriate subject position for the female British poet (see Miller 638). The statue—
“shadowed not darkened where the sill expands” (l. 6)—resists racialization as black, but takes 
on non-white hues as the light (or the inquiring gaze) falls on her undulating curves, allowing the 
observer to pass the “sill” and “enter” (if ever so tentatively, protected by the marble’s hardness) 
the “house of anguish,” the “shadowed” experiential realm of institutional rape under slavery, 
hitherto (and forever) foreclosed to the white bourgeois woman poet (ll. 1, 2). Here, EBB faces 
the challenges posed by what Marjorie Stone has called the “interlocking aesthetic and ethical 
regimes that writers have had to negotiate in representing the experience of slave women” (2002, 
132). EBB can only refer to Powers’s orientalist narrative “obliquely” since the poet’s words are 
entirely policed by the “faceless arbiters of art” (Stone 2002, 132, 134) who have the “say” as to 
which facets of human experience poetry can or “cannot” describe (l. 1). “They,” the sonnet’s 
                                                 
367 See Kasson 187; Miller 652; Yellin 124. 
 200 
very first word, constrains each of the 108 subsequent words and ensure the poet’s adherence to 
publically admissible ways of articulating female slaves’ “anguish.” The sonnet thus exits within 
and contiguous to the social order. While EBB assures suspicious readers that her poem honors 
Powers’s adherence to the representational rules of high art, to “strike and shame the strong” is 
to produce politically revolutionary affect against the American (and former British) “wrong,” 
the legality of “serfdom” (ll. 13, 11, 10). She also claims to speak only for herself and not for 
Powers by including the conditional “as if the artist meant her” in line 4—the sonnet’s 
subsequent political charge is EBB’s alone.368 The notion of “shame,” produced by the 
sculpture’s exposed vulnerability that causes oxymoronic “thunders of white silence,” also enters 
the mind of the reader, who, in turn, is ‘struck’ and ‘shamed’ by The Greek Slave’s ability to 
remain politically steadfast in the face of overwhelming economic incentive to perpetuate chattel 
slavery (ll. 13, 14).369 The sculpture is thus imagined as powerful enough to “overthrow[]” elite 
resistance to change, including the readers’ (l. 14). The observer, unable to break away from the 
overwhelming influence of her perfection (arguably without needing to read EBB’s poem in the 
first place), the “ideal sense” of erotically tinged sensation communicated by her form, become 
chained to her “divine face”—they are themselves subdued and mastered by her “appeal” (ll. 8, 
12, 10). 
The sonnet’s final six and a half lines contain six imperative verbs (“Pierce,” “break up,” 
Appeal,” Catch up,” “strike and shame” [ll. 8, 9, 10, 12, 13]), infusing the statue with the newly 
gendered force of poet’s political arousal. Her global ambition to end enslavement—that is 
                                                 
368 See Brophy 282, for the opposite reading. 
369 Dorothy Mermin notes that the sonnet’s stylistically complex final image, the synesthetic and oxymoronic 
“thunders of white silence,” challenges poetic conventions that expected female poets to produce to clear and simple 
verse (159). 
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“man’s crimes in different lands,” “serfdom of this world,” “man’s wrong,” “not alone / [e]ast 
grief but west” (ll. 7, 10, 11, 12-13)—derives from the statue’s erotico-aesthetic appeal, 
channeled into both divine ethical commandment and support for real-world legislative 
change.370 When exhibit visitors purchased small replicas of the statue to take home, the figure 
indeed “[p]ierce[d] to the centre,” of the American and English capitalist order, the domestic 
household (l. 8). There, it “bodie[d] forth” (Mermin 159) a reminder of the uncomfortable fact 
that the political and economic might of the West, helping create millions of cozy bourgeois 
parlors on both sides of the Atlantic, had been achieved through four centuries of large-scale 
slave productive and reproductive labor.371 The Greek Slave thus invaded Western homes, at 
least those of politically conscious consumers who, as Henry James put it, “could bring 
themselves to think such things right.” It was a fetish object designed to simultaneously spark 
and mollify a guilty white conscience and to make that process as aesthetically and somatically 
pleasurable as possible. The sculpture and EBB’s sonnet abstract and aestheticize sexual 
violence to a degree modern feminists tend to find intolerable but for which we can at least 
account when considering Powers and EBB’s (likely) theoretical knowledge of the matter. 
Similar to the ethically suspect promise of the self-contradictory “thunders of white silence” to 
wipe out slavery without incurring some form of collateral damage—as if white people’s passive 
refusal to speak in favor of slavery would necessarily create the “thunder” of abolition—the 
                                                 
370 See Hackenberg 41; Mermin 160; Miller 646. 
371 Sara Hackenberg draws attention to the statue’s multiply overlapping and mutually reinforcing oppositional 
energies that account for its long-standing cultural visibility: “Powers’s image, literally taken into the bosom of 
English and American domestic spaces, figured a woman simultaneously chaste and exposed, naked and clothed, 
pure and sullied, fallen and raised, ancient and modem, beautiful and awful, white and black, Eastern and Western, 
abstract and particular, idealized and problematic, unique and relentlessly reproduced, alien and deeply familiar. Its 
uncanny impact makes it central to an imaginary Eastern ‘Turkish bazaar’ that traded in flesh as well as to the 
project of the antislavery ‘charity bazaars’ that, run by female abolitionists, bought and sold objects for the 
amelioration of trading in flesh on the South’s auction block” (45). 
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statue, after all, paradoxically objectifies a white female slave’s body to achieve black slaves’ 
emancipation. Abolitionists produced, circulated, and celebrated representations that were mired 
in the same ethically suspect politics of sexual spectatorship that had colluded in the rise of 
slavery in the first place. 
The sonnet itself enacts a translation of the statue’s pleasantly visual message (supported 
by Powers’s narrative and reception history) into an equally pleasurable textual one, switching 
from Powers’s scopic and deeply conservative economy to one that is both more textually than 
visually imaginative and, overall, respectably progressive. EBB understood that The Greek Slave 
owed its success to “the sculptor’s manipulation of … female passivity and the idealization of 
white womanhood” (Miller 648), and, emulating Powers’s own aesthetic strategies, the sonnet 
installs the poet as the one who chooses the target “Art’s fiery finger” is supposed to penetrate—
erotic connotation included. The sculpture itself, of course, remains “a puppet” (Brophy 282), or 
a “transformative conduit[]” (Miller 645), exposed to audiences’ visual consumption that 
vacillates between high-minded aesthetic concerns and exploitative pornotroping. Male viewers 
who wished to “pierce” the sculpture had to shatter the fetters that shielded her sex. The end to 
slavery, embodied by the sculpture, visually and literarily promised sexual access to the previous 
beneficiaries of slavery. If Powers’s and EBB’s works are thus read together, the slave’s bondage 
defers the viewer’s erotic fulfillment (see Miller 646), forecasting the (continued) sexual 
availability of slave women after they had thrown off slavery’s shackles. The transformation of 
libidinal arousal into its political form virtually guaranteed that existing sexual hierarchies would 
remain intact indefinitely. This is The Greek Slave’s essential promise, hard and durable as 
marble. 
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Whatever form viewers’ and readers’ desires took, EBB suggests the possibility that they 
might be harnessed to enact change. Crossing between the visual and aural/vocal, the statue’s 
nudity (or, to the lecherous observer, nakedness) is ‘clothed’ in ever more poetic discourse, 
helping nudity to attain respectability (see Mermin 160). Drawing from bare skin’s potential to 
offend and arouse, it helped energize a revolutionary movement against slavery that would 
culminate in the American Civil War. EBB’s sonnet is indeed ‘complicit’ in Powers’s neoclassic 
and “genteel pornography” (Mermin 160), and it harnesses the body’s affective response to 
foster audiences’ anticipatory “love” (Powers’s word) for a post-slavery America that was yet 
fifteen years in the future and which EBB did not live to see herself. 
 
“A Curse for a Nation” and the Poet’s Maternal Martyrdom  
EBB’s slave poems, “The Runaway Slave,” “Hiram Powers’ Greek Slave,” and “A Curse 
for a Nation” are centrally concerned with the morality of institutionalized slavery, women’s 
ability to speak out against that institution, and the risks that accompany such public self-
exposure (see Mermin 233). Marjorie Stone has also suggested that EBB’s three slave poems 
express her guilty conscience with regards to her slave-owning kin (Stone 2002, 140). Writing to 
John Ruskin in 1855, EBB noted that “I belong to a family of West Indian slaveholders, and if I 
believed in curses, I should be afraid.”372 After her elopement with Robert Browning, EBB was 
entitled to family legacies that were unconnected to income derived from her family’s slave 
plantations. Living on untainted income, EBB began to explore the business of cursing more 
fully (see Stone 202, 140).  
                                                 
372 BC 21:343-7; see Donaldson 139; Lootens 2017, 159; Stone 2002, 140. The sentiment is repeated in EBB’s letter 
to Robert Browning: “I would give ten towns in Norfolk (if I had them) to own some purer lineage than that of the 
blood of the slave!—Cursed we are from generation to generation!” (BC 11:251). 
 204 
When The Liberty Bell requested of EBB another anti-slavery poem, she sent them “A 
Curse for a Nation,” published in 1856. Thereafter, EBB revised the poem, added a new seventh 
stanza, and published it as the concluding poem of her 1860 collection, Poems before Congress. 
The volume was not well received; in fact, it caused a near-universal and fierce reaction among 
English reviewers.373 Reviewers found fault with the collection’s overt political focus, 
considered unseemly for a “poetess” (a term EBB rejected), and were appalled at what they 
perceived to be EBB’s critique of British imperial politics, particularly the country’s complicity 
in U.S. slavery. William E. Aytoun’s review in Blackwood’s, “Poetic Aberrations,” was a 
particularly hostile rejection of female meddling in politics, a forceful backlash against women’s 
leadership in the abolition of British slavery. Aytoun’s 1860 review erases all memory of 
antislavery writing by women that had swayed (and morally benefited) the nation three decades 
earlier, complete with the speculation that EBB’s reclamation of female political cursing was the 
result of “a fit of insanity.”374 According to Aytoun, the personal language of “A Curse for a 
Nation” strongly suggests that its speaker is unbecomingly aroused when testing women’s ability 
to wield linguistic and representational power over global and domestic politics. Aroused she is: 
the three short stanzas in the poem’s second part do not comprise twenty lines, but include such 
                                                 
373 Stone 1986, 169; see Brophy 282; Montwieler 312. Also see Donaldson 139, for the Atlas’s positive review of 
Poems before Congress which lauded EBB’s “passion and prophecy” and deemed her cursing a “little indiscretion.” 
Overall, the collection has not fared well over time either, as feminist scholars tend to find it insufficiently 
politically explicit and aesthetically engaging. Brophy deems “A Curse for a Nation” “powerful in its affective 
dimension, but … also entirely derivative.” She argues that “the female poet’s writing does not threaten the status 
quo regarding gender relations, because it amounts to a form of non-speech” because EBB frames her verse as the 
result of “weep[ing]” (ll. 43, 46; Brophy 283). Brophy’s critique that EBB’s verse lacks revolutionary ambitions 
ignores how overwhelmingly gendered poetic speech still was during mid-century. As I argue below, EBB cannot 
write politically without claiming to be overwhelmed by grief. EBB was aware that women wept and cursed “night 
and day”—“And no one marvels” (l. 44). Leaving her private couch to publically send a curse to a nation for its 
policy on slavery was a serious breach of gendered poetic protocols (see Stone 1986, 157). 
374 Aytoun 492; see Lootens 2017, 161; Montwieler 291; Donaldson 139-40.  
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violent images as a “broken … chain,” “brand and thong,” “writhing bond-slaves,” “strangling 
martyrs,” and, eventually, and appearance of “the fiend” himself (ll. 53, 56, 63, 69, 68).375 The 
actual subject of the poem, however, is not the rather “abstracted” issue of slavery, especially 
when read in its context of Poems before Congress, but EBB’s condemnation of mid-century 
British self-aggrandizing patriotism (Lootens 2017, 164). 
The spectacle of women’s transgressive poetry was so profitable that Poems before 
Congress saw a second edition within EBB’s lifetime. The American newspaper The 
Independent offered EBB one hundred dollars for every pre-published poem, “though as short as 
a sonnet.”376 EBB was overall sanguine about the reception of the volume, writing that “I have 
had that deep satisfaction of ‘speaking though I died for it,’ which we are all apt to aspire to now 
and then.”377 At the same time, EBB felt she was obliged to fend off friends’ suspicions that she 
lacked patriotism. She reasoned—rather fuzzily—that the poem’s central curse “was involved in 
the action of slave-holding” rather than emanating from her pen against Britain.378 While she 
claimed both privately and publically that “Curse for a Nation” exclusively addressed American 
slavery, its presence in Poems before Congress, a collection dedicated to the success of the 
Italian Risorgimento, and her revisions, particularly the addition of a stanza which included the 
ambiguous geographic marker “Straits” (l. 26), traditionally employed for the Strait of Gilbraltar, 
have led critics to view EBB’s assurances with skepticism and make it difficult to situate the 
                                                 
375 See Mermin 234; Stone 1986, 157. 
376 LEBB 2:387; see Donaldson 141. 
377 LEBB 2:387. The phrase “speaking … though I died for it” also appears, for instance, in Anna Eliza Bray’s 
immensely popular romance Courtenay of Walreddon from 1844 (336) and was a staple in melodramatic prose 
fiction of the period. EBB is cracking a joke here, both making light of the blow to her reputation and mocking 
Blackwood’s overly vituperative reviewer. 
378 LEBB 2:367; Stone 1986, 169. 
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poem in global politics and within generic histories. EBB appeared to be unsure herself, 
famously confessing to Isa Bladgen in April 1860 that “between you and me, Isa, certain of those 
stanzas do ‘fit’ England ‘as if they were made for her,’ which they were not, though.”379 
EBB was aware and proud of the backlash her aggressive political speech in Poems 
before Congress elicited, and, anticipating that certain female friends in her circle might censure 
her daring, invited them to side with her. She asked her friend Fanny Haworth, “Did you see how 
I was treated in ‘Blackwood’? In fact, you and all women, though you hated me, should be vexed 
on your own accounts.”380 As is the case in her correspondence, Poems before Congress, EBB’s 
aesthetic exploration of women’s ability and duty to address systematic injustice on an 
international scale, anticipates the backlash against such meddling, ponders the possible 
psychological effects of hostile reproach upon the poet, and, most crucially, tests rhetorical 
strategies meant to minimize negative feedback.381 EBB felt entitled to insert herself in such 
conversations, as her famous letter to Mitford indicates: 
is it possible that you think a woman has no business with questions like the question of 
slavery? Then she had better use a pen no more. She had better subside into slavery & 
concubinage herself, I think, as in the times of old,—shut herself up … in the “women’s 
apartment,” & take no rank among thinkers & speakers382 
 
Here, EBB slides effortlessly from chattel slavery in America to women’s sexual slavery in 
Britain. “A Curse for a Nation” similarly evokes the history of British abolition to call for 
                                                 
379 LEBB 2:375. See Donaldson 140-1; Montwieler 309-10; Lootens 2017, 158, 163; Stone and Taylor 280; Stone 
1986, 157; B. Taylor 2007, 59-60.  
380 LEBB 2:387. EBB’s echo of Pringle’s question in the previous chapter—“Do you see how MacQueen is abusing 
me in Blackwood?” (n20)—in the same context of criticizing slavery is uncanny. 
381 See Montwieler 294; Miller 651. 
382 BC 19:45-9; see LEBB 2:110-1; Brown 1995, 127-8; Mermin 234. 
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bourgeois women poets’ intellectual emancipation, capitalizing on American slavery’s political 
urgency and re-writing the fading memory of British abolition as ineffectively sentimental and 
feminine. 
The poem is divided into three parts. In the “Prologue” of thirteen stanzas, the female 
poet-narrator383 reports her conversation with a visiting angel who urges her to send his curse 
“over the Western Sea” (l. 4). The speaker (in obvious contrast to EBB) remains reluctant to 
write the curse due to her familial and emotional allegiance to the land across the sea, her own 
country’s moral failings, and her gender.384 Yet, this supposedly demure female speaker not only 
dares to contradict her male supernatural visitor thrice (“Not so, my lord!”), but possesses 
sufficient courage, clarity of moral vision, and political literacy to observe and challenge her own 
nation’s miserly welfare system, elite vested interest, and corrupt “oligarchic parliament” (l. 29; 
see Montiweler 10). Her feminine self-effacement and mournful lack of patriotism combine into 
a rhetorical strategy meant to convince skeptical audiences of her entitlement to authoritative 
speech by borrowing “the authority of patriarchal Christianity.”385 Her own social subordination 
grants her the moral advantage: women’s writerly authority is powered precisely (and 
paradoxically) by the conventional performance of feminine modesty in speaking. It remains 
unclear whether the speaker merely writes the angel’s curse or whether, in writing it, the curse 
becomes her own contribution, authorized by the divine envoy. The latter possibility would 
                                                 
383 EBB’s reviewers made clear that mid-century conventions of reading verse dictated the conflation of female 
narrators with their author (Lootens 2017, 167). 
384 Lootens writes that the histrionics of self-effacement in the Prologue, the self-presentation of the narrator as 
“shamed and silenced,” suggests a critique by EBB that the project of British expansion has rested on its post-1834 
moral high ground for too long without renewing its global liberationist commitments (2017, 164). Expansion is the 
ultimate drive, of course, but patriotism must be renewed by domestic critique and global righteousness (Lootens 
2017, 170). 
385 Stone 1986, 167; see Lootens 2017, 172. 
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imply that to be a writer is a curse in itself, as her perspicacity and conscience—figured as the 
male angel (or God)—coerce our unwilling heroine to expose herself before a rabidly hostile 
world.386 Her response to the angel, in any case, constitutes a culturally explosive “response of 
appalling, even terrifying, arrogance” (Lootens 2017, 168). Convinced by the angel to write, she 
proceeds by instituting the sentimental register of weeping, aware of her own compromised 
position as British narrator (“So thus I wrote, and mourned indeed” [l. 49]). 
EBB’s speaker proceeds to justify the angel’s curse in “The Curse, Part I,” based on the 
monumental hypocrisy of enlightened nations’ countenancing of “writhing bond-slaves,” 
including Britain’s (l. 63). Each of the three stanzas creates a causal relationship between the 
nation’s action and the curse. Similar to “The Runaway Slave,” the curse censures liberal 
political systems for celebrating the moral achievement of democratic freedom while refusing to 
grant the same to others in their very midst. Part II consists of the curse itself, addressed to the 
reader who represents the nation at large. It is a six-stanza sequence of worldly successes, three 
of them visual and three aural, spoiled by conscience: When praise or power is gained, “you” 
will be aware of your complicity, yet remain painfully mute. Because dignity and integrity are 
unobtainable when “you” support injustice, “your” life will be one of continuous, silent self-
flagellation. In the end the reader realizes that “consciousness of the curse is finally the curse.”387  
Each stanza of Part II ends with the paratactical command “This is the curse. Write.” The 
speaker still appears to be under the angel’s influence, repeating the divine injunction like a 
painful, mechanic, self-reflexive “rite.” Whether or not the angel—and, by extension, God—
                                                 
386 Donaldson argues that EBB ensures that both interpretations remain operative throughout the poem (143). 
387 Stone 1986, 168; see Mermin 234; Montiweler 311. 
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speaks through the poet, the nation actively contributes388 to its own curse and must work to lift 
it. EBB imagines that, in order to clear the nation’s guilty conscience, active writing must “right” 
things. Where writing/righting does not occur, the burden of complicity in injustice dooms sinful 
nations to paralysis and Empire’s expansion stops. Whether the speaker commands the reader or 
herself, EBB imagines political work as a divinely ordained task of self-aware writing/righting, 
tying the poet’s activism to producing written language for the transatlantic publishing circuit in 
the service of a morally rejuvenated, if permanently painfully burdened, imperial program. The 
poem, similar to the volume as a whole, ends by addressing (and cursing) its readers, 
commanding them to become active writers/righters—or to go under in never-ending carnage.389 
By unwillingly yielding to the overwhelming power of the male angel—the impersonation of the 
moral imperative, replete with possible sexual390 innuendo—the speaker martyrs herself in her 
writerly quest for justice. Similar to the runaway slave, the Greek slave, and Marian Erle (see 
below), the speaker of “A Curse for a Nation” inhabits the subject position of the coerced, if not 
(sexually) violated, but still well-meaning woman striving for serene propriety but chosen by a 
male-identified power to act as conduit for the divine will in a fallen world. She must expose 
herself and sacrifice her proper silence to maintain internal moral coherence, as ordained by a 
                                                 
388 The phonetic similarity to “wright,” archaic form of “work,” is surely also intentional. “Write” functions as a 
threefold homophonic pun with “rite,” “right,” and “wright.” 
389 See Montwieler 312; Lootens 2017, 176. EBB leaves unexplored the question how exactly activist writing will 
“right” global political and economic exploitation because writing-as-witnessing-and-addressing-men is the woman 
poet’s single way of political participation. EBB announces her membership within the progressive ideological 
tradition that considers the act of writing as revolutionary in itself while likely concealing mechanisms of policy-
making that have the opposite intended effect (see Lefebvre 28-9).  
390 Miller reads the refrain of “A Curse on a Nation” as a rhythmic instantiation of labor pains. The poem’s speaker 
is cursed to bear her moral burden as non-optional maternal suffering that parallels the bondage of slavery. The 
poem’s addressees are powerful men, invited “to release the submissive poetess from her labor … by releasing 
American slaves from theirs” (Miller 651). 
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greater, relentless moral force. “A Curse for a Nation” develops the internal logic of “The 
Runaway Slave” and “Hiram Powers’ Greek Slave” further by articulating more sharply the 
political stakes of EBB’s overall progressive message while mostly dispensing with her previous 
poems’ overtly sexual connotations. 
In all her abolitionist verse, then, EBB utilizes traditionally feminine figures who are 
formally or informally bound to (or by) a masculine-coded sexual power, as stand-ins for 
herself. She depicts women who unwillingly depart from their traditional roles on necessary and 
radical quests of liberty which will return them to the Victorian ideal of sexual and moral purity 
that political adversity has put out of immediate reach. The speaker in “A Curse for a Nation” 
styles herself as the angel’s amanuensis, rather than as the curse’s originator. This 
representational strategy of mobilizing conservative gender scripts for progressive ends is 
intended to make it difficult for progressive and conservative audiences to find fault with the 
message: EBB’s speaker neither assumes inappropriate male prerogatives nor does she display a 
lack of political radicality (Miller 651). EBB’s call for the emancipation of slaves—and the 
emancipation of female political poets of international celebrity—promises a future that is 
without slaves, but not without gendered hierarchies. EBB’s progressive “program” is a 
gradualist and, with regards to women’s political emancipation, a fundamentally individualistic 
one. As she proclaims the need for America’s slaves to be relieved of their shackles, she claims 
freedom from the rhetorical restraints on the poet, but not for every bourgeois domestic woman. 
Scholars’ assessment of EBB’s progressivism must thus be tempered, as progressive politics are 
likely futile without the promise of eventual democracy. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
WELCOME TO AURORA’S HOME FOR FALLEN WOMEN: 
AURORA LEIGH AS REFORM MANUAL 
 
                                           The human race 
To you means, such a child, or such a man, 
You saw one morning waiting in the cold, 
Beside that gate, perhaps. You gather up 
A few such cases, and, when strong, sometimes 
Will write of factories and of slaves, as if 
Your father were a negro, and your son 
A spinner in the mills. All’s yours and you,— 
All, coloured with your blood, or otherwise 
Just nothing to you. Why, I call you hard 
To general suffering. (AL 2.189-99)391 
 
The Liberal Woman Poet and the Impossibility of Collective Action 
Over the past four decades, feminist scholars have commented at length on the 
relationship between Marian—Aurora Leigh’s lone working-class character—and Aurora, the 
novel-poem’s eponymous heroine. Some critics of the 1980s commend Marian’s elevation into 
liberal subjectivity which, in their estimation, creates “radical” cross-class feminist sisterhood 
and a “truly democratic” union of the working and middle classes.392 More recently, scholars 
                                                 
391 This epigraph was chosen for its neat summation of this chapter’s main argument. Spoken by Romney, these 
lines accuse Aurora of willfully refusing to reflect on the structural dimensions of social injustice. Instead she 
approaches the alleviation of suffering as a duty based on intimate, familial relations. He insults her by implying her 
youthful verse’s proximity to sentimental philanthropic poetry which reveals EBB’s ironic detachment from the 
history of British anti-slavery campaigns and working-class agitation to stabilize the Poetess as national hero (see 
Lootens 2017, 46). Nevertheless, Romney has a point. 
392 Zonana 55; Armstrong 1993, 369.  
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counter that the poet’s success—the sustained self-analysis over the course of Aurora Leigh’s 
nine books and her ultimate status as “triumphant goddess,” complete with a millennial vision of 
the New Jerusalem393—comes at a cost. Marian’s “meek” and “doglike” disposition, her 
incapacity to “wonder of herself / [f]or being so sad a creature” (AL 4.281; 3.849-50), energize 
Aurora’s trajectory towards liberal subjectivity, and teach the poet political responsibility. 
Having sprung up “like a nettle” (AL 3.854), Marian, the essentially natural woman, remains 
unaffected by society’s condescension towards women’s professional ambition. Instead, after 
undergoing rape, abandonment, and rescue, she is reclaimed from the “gutter” and ascends into 
divine motherhood (AL 6.672). Saving Marian allows Aurora to realize that physical love must 
animate her vision, as opposed to men’s soul-less “diagrams” and “formal universals” (AL 3.744, 
747). This realization allows her to unify the contradictory roles of prophetic poet and 
conventionally love-starved woman.394 EBB’s “new aesthetic”395 marries Aurora’s erotically 
charged idealism and lofty artistic goals with a sustained critique of mid-Victorian social 
crises—women’s subordination, economic exploitation, urban poverty, and the sexual double 
standard. Aurora erects her poetic legacy on subordinated women “to effect her own 
                                                 
393 For interpretations of that New Jerusalem, see Cooper 187; David 1985, 119; Houston 231; Hudd 80; Stone 1987, 
122; B. Taylor 1992, 25; Thorne-Murphy 242; Zonana 242, 259. 
394 Cooper 186; see Brophy 273-4, 283; David 1987, 104, 115; Gottlieb 57-9; Hickok 131; Houston 214; Leighton 
147; Mermin 204; Reynolds 11, 41. See Case 17-30, for the generic balancing act EBB’s Küstlerroman-as-love-
story has to perform to merge the two narrative modes. Reynolds has wondered at EBB’s depiction of Marian’s 
physical attributes which seem to be the poet’s own (see AL 3.809-26, 6.399-401, 9.277-8): “That Marian should be 
depicted as her author’s physical self, while the character of Aurora portrayed her intellectual self-construction in 
writing, suggests again the inevitable duality which Barrett Browning conceived as necessary to the writing woman” 
(Reynolds 45). 
395 B. Taylor 1992, 24; see S. Brown 2005, 193. For the long-standing tradition of reading Aurora Leigh’s speaker as 
proximate to and sometimes indistinguishable from EBB, see Armstrong 1993, 369-70; David 1985, 133. 
 213 
transformation into subjectivity,” and to showcase the poet’s daring political vision and aesthetic 
innovation.396  
After reading reviews of Aurora Leigh ranking the work among the most important 
contributions to the ‘Woman Question,’ EBB wrote to Julia Martin in 1858 that she “did not 
fancy that this poem would be so identified as it has been, with that question, which was only a 
collateral object with my intentions in writing.”397 Although EBB had aligned herself openly 
with liberal feminists, collecting signatures for the married women’s property reform petition, 
she rejected the movement’s collectivist impulses.398 Campaigns for the expansion of women’s 
rights of the 1850s focused on property law and waged labor, and preceded early demands for 
suffrage in the 1860s. EBB supported women’s economic autonomy because, in liberal societies, 
individuality and citizenship derive from property ownership (see Dalley 527). Feminism and, to 
a lesser extent, socialism, wielders of the totalizing gaze EBB abhorred, remain “collateral” to 
the poet’s private individual liberty and expression. The truly politically radical element in 
Aurora Leigh is the free expression of Aurora’s erotic desire, her ecstatic expression of feminine 
selfhood. Yet, as critics have noted, that selfhood depends on men’s recognition and approval of 
her poetic mastery and originality as well as on Marian’s abjected body.399 To many feminist 
scholars’ frustration, EBB’s liberal feminist poetics pursue individual freedom for the widely-
                                                 
396 Cooper 178; see Brophy 284. 
397 Qtd. in Reynolds 18; see Cooper 195. 
398 S. Brown 2005, 195; see Dalley 525-7. The petition was known among contemporaries as “'as the petition of 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Anna Jameson, Mary Howitt, Mrs. Gaskell” (Leighton 1992, 103). In 1856, she, “& the 
rest of us militant, foam with rage” over Coventry Patmore’s sentimental refutation of feminist claims to economic 
independence in “The Angel in the House” (BC 23:103-5). 
399 Reynolds 17; see Dalley 536; C. Kaplan 34. 
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circulated poet rather than a collective feminist future.400 Although Aurora “co-opt[s] the 
ideological power” of the male artist to reconcile the previously incompatible roles of “woman” 
and “artist,”401 that reconciliation is shaky: Aurora Leigh expresses an elite woman’s “fantasy of 
power” (Case 18, 30). The model Aurora suggests for women’s self-recognition and artistic work 
is hardly applicable to anyone else but herself, the exceptional subject of the female epic, even if 
her poetics claim an obligation to and responsibility for other women’s plight.402  
Analogous to EBB’s treatment of feminism, scholars have also studied the representation 
of class difference and economic critique in Aurora Leigh. Isobel Armstrong notes that Aurora 
Leigh’s investigation of class relations is “far from adequate” because her political radicalism is 
“suffused with the affective life of poetic insight, [providing] a vision rather than a theory” 
(1993, 368-9). In imagining a sentimentally charged and “‘fixed’ vision of justice” rather than 
concrete steps to reform society EBB perpetuates conventional bourgeois stereotypes of the 
masses “which her private needs dictate as if they were absolute,” Margaret Reynolds warns.403 
Angela Leighton points to the uneasy juxtaposition of EBB’s reverence for individualism and her 
concern for the greater good of society (1992, 109). Likewise, Cora Kaplan notes that EBB’s 
“answer to the misery of the poor” lies in “her own brand of Christian love—and poetry,” a 
                                                 
400 EBB wrote to Mitford that she was “not … a very strong partizan on the Rights-of-woman-side of the 
argument—at least I have not been, since I was twelve years old. I believe that, considering men & women in the 
mass, there is an inequality of intellect, and that it is proved by the very state of things of which gifted women 
complain,— & more than proved by the manner in which their complaint is received by their own sisterhood” (BC 
10:83-5). EBB claimed that women’s inferior education was to blame for this intellectual disparity, and expressed 
support for women reformers, particularly writers (C. Kaplan 6-7; see David 1985, 115). 
401 Case 18; see Hudd 68. 
402 Borrowing from Carlyle, Aurora considers writing poetry an “epic action” leading to a new social order (Mermin 
183; see Gottlieb 80). Of course, the size and breadth of EBB’s oeuvre as well as critics’ veneration of her set the 
standard for women poets afterwards. 
403 Reynolds 41; see Brophy 285; Hudd 80; Lawson and Shakinovsky 107; Thorne-Murphy 242. 
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response to class conflict that appears even less materially satisfactory to present-day critics than 
solutions proposed by nineteenth-century socialists (C. Kaplan 12). Although critics concede that 
EBB’s artistic project takes a socially radical stance with its powerful proclamations of women’s 
shared experience of sexualized oppression, they also caution that, overall, EBB fails to imagine 
that the psychological response to that oppression differs depending on social class.404 Marian’s 
transformation from ‘pure body’ to sanctification suggests that her rescue is contingent on the 
absence of self-generated desire because such desire would raise the specter of working-class 
sexual dissolution. With this in mind, Cora Kaplan argues that EBB’s “theory of art and politics” 
is largely divorced from “material reality and deeply elitist” (12). This latter insight is far from 
new: John Nichol, writing for the Westminster Review in 1857, had already sharply criticized 
EBB’s figuring of heroic verse as reformist action. Nichol writes that 
Art and the perfection of the poetic sentiments follow, or are contemporaneous with an 
age of prosperity. They do not constitute, nor can they supply the place of material 
comforts and free institutions. Artistic culture, far from standing in the place of 
philanthropic effort, depends upon the success of that effort for its own permanence. 
(412) 
 
I would like to build on such suggestive critique and flesh out Aurora Leigh’s anti-
collectivist politics further. I suggest that, in addition to borrowing male poets’ ideological power 
to justify her status as social prophet, EBB employs the strategies of middle-class social 
reformers and female philanthropists to write the female poet into liberal—and professional—
subjectivity. Instead of relinquishing the socialist methods advocated by Aurora’s cousin 
                                                 
404 It warrants highlighting as just how daring and transgressive EBB’s portrayal of Marian was received in the 
conservative press. The Spectator noted that 
in the story of Marian Erle she has joined together the central incident of Clarissa Harlowe with the leading 
sentiment of Ruth—that healing and reconciling influence of the maternal passion for a child whose birth 
is, according to common worldly feeling, the mother’s disgrace. The combination is striking and original, 
not to say courageous in a lady. We mention it to disavow any feeling of repugnance to the moral, though 
we certainly do question the propriety and good taste of introducing the Clarissa Harlowe calamity under 
any amount of reserve, or for any emotional effect, in poem or novel. The bar of the Old Bailey is the only 
place where we wish to hear of such things. (“Mrs. Browning’s Aurora Leigh” 1240). 
 216 
Romney wholesale, EBB reimagines the relationship between elite and poor women as an 
individualistic reform project carried out by the working maternal philanthropist. The 
exceptional woman poet opens her own home to the fallen woman and establishes her verse as 
the institution in charge of social healing. 
 
“All Your Social Labor Come to Nought”: EBB Writes the British Dystopia 
Although the early nineteenth-century Christian socialists Robert Owen and Charles 
Fourier famously advocated for the relief of the oppressed, they are not treated generously in 
Aurora Leigh. EBB had some knowledge of their theories and distrusted them (Leighton 1992, 
108). She had gleaned information about Fourierism—and French socialism generally—in an 
article of the North British Review in 1849 that covered the reception of Fourier’s theories by 
German socialist writers (BC 16: 228-9). The British reviewer pointedly noted that Fourier held 
“singularly liberal views on the emancipation of women,” a reference to the socialist’s famous 
correlation of women’s emancipation and society’s claim to civilization.405 Although she agreed 
that women should be safe from sexual assault—an idea central to Fourier’s conception of 
utopian community, the Phalanx—EBB was worried about socialism’s cost to individual 
freedom. In 1848, she wrote to Mary Russell Mitford 
But make a government-scheme of even so much, & you seem to trench on the individual 
liberty–– All such patriarchal planning in a government, issues naturally into absolutism 
… Liberty & civilization when married together lawfully, rather evolve Individuality than 
tend to generalization. Is this not true? I fear, I fear that mad theories promising the 
impossible, may in turn make the people mad. (BC 15:48-52) 
 
Dismissing socialism’s “impossible” promise to upend class distinctions, EBB evinces the fear 
of the mob that was common in her circle. Writing to Isa Blagden in 1850, she opined that if 
                                                 
405 “Art. IV. German Socialism 424”; see Thorne Murphy 248. 
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Fourierism could be realised, which it surely cannot … the destinies of our race would 
shrivel up under the unnatural heat, & human nature would, in my mind, be desecrated & 
dishonored. Because I do not [believe] in purification without suffering, in progress 
without struggle, in virtue without temptation— Least of all, do I consider happiness the 
end of man’s life. We look to higher things—have nobler ambitions. Also, in every 
advancement of the world hitherto, the individual has led the masses. Thus, to elicit 
individuality, has been the object of the best political institutions & governments. Now, 
in these new theories, the individual is ground down into the multitude … Genius 
is always individual.406 
 
Two years later, EBB referred again to socialist maxims’ threat to individualism, saying that she 
“would rather … live under the absolutism of Nicolas of Russia, than in a Fourier-machine, with 
my individuality sucked out of me by a social air-pump” (BC 16:136-40). Feudal class 
distinctions appear more palatable to EBB than the equalizing technologies invented by 
socialism. EBB’s moralizing stance in these letters—her privileged dismissal of “happiness,” her 
virtuous normalization of mass “suffering” and “struggle,” her reverence for “noble” individual 
leaders—must grate feminist scholars’ sensibilities, despite their integral contribution to Aurora 
Leigh’s theory of poetics. Although she liked to style herself as a “democrat” in her 
correspondence, EBB understood the concept to signify the people’s will to instate powerful 
heads of state, such as Louis Napoléon, who promised to protect traditional hierarchies and 
social order. EBB’s “veneer of democracy was easily scratched,” writes Cora Kaplan, especially 
when her writing addressed mass popular movements.407 
In Aurora Leigh, Aurora rejects socialist methodology for its totalizing, materialist grasp 
of society in the form of “aggregates,” “systems,” and “statistics” (AL 8.801-2), leaving little 
                                                 
406 BC 16: 228-9; emphasis EBB’s. EBB echoes Mill in her assertion that the individual under socialism would be 
“ground down” (see Dalley 529). 
407 C. Kaplan 32-3; see Mermin 204; B. Taylor 2008, 410. For one of the dozen claims to being a “democrat,” see, 
for example, BC 17:208-15. In Aurora Leigh, EBB more often than not associates herself with the landed classes 
whose power continued to shrink (David 1987, 113). 
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room for the female will.408 Throughout the poem, Aurora counters socialist theory with an 
assertion of idealism’s superior capacity to work social change: “Fouriers failed, / [b]ecause not 
poets enough to understand / [t]hat life develops from within” (AL 2.484-5). Her theory of 
political progress requires the “poet’s individualism / [t]o work your universal” as well as “a 
high-souled man, / [t]o move the masses … [i]t takes the ideal, to blow an inch inside / [t]he dust 
of the actual” (AL 2.478-83). Aurora mocks Romney’s marriage proposal by accusing him of 
already being wed to “social theory” (AL 2.409-10). Imagined as a sexual competitor, Romney’s 
Fourierism—particularly his experimental Phalanstery that welcomes everyone, including fallen 
women—impedes Aurora’s capacity to develop her own political vision and become a subject 
under the auspices of liberal capitalism. 
Romney’s loss of sight at the poem’s conclusion literalizes his initial blindness with 
regards to Aurora’s promise as a poet, and punishes him for his political myopia, aggressive 
declaration of masculine superiority, and his plans to marry Marian (see C. Kaplan 24). After an 
angry mob burns down his Phalanstery, Romney realizes that the poor are constitutionally unfit 
to embrace the order that his Utopian socialism promises. This insight and the destruction of his 
                                                 
408 See Reynolds 17; Dalley 533-4. EBB is echoing Carlyle here—she was “an adorer” of his writings (BC 5:276-
84). In his essays, Thomas Carlyle posited that poetry would serve as a counterweight and antidote to the English 
obsession with “Mechanics,” that is, statistical data, “external circumstances,” and their political manifestation in 
legislation such as the 1832 Reform Bill (“Sign of the Times” 472-3; see Bristow 14). In “Signs of the Times” 
(1829), for instance, Carlyle invokes the quasi-divine “primary, unmodified forces and energies of man, the 
mysterious springs of Love, and Fear, and Wonder, of Enthusiasm, Poetry, Religion” (474). In “Characteristics,” 
Carlyle bemoaned the separation of “Opinion and Action” in English society, imagining that the Roman Republic 
owed its vigor to that fact that “individual man was in himself a whole, or complete union.” For Carlyle, “the Poet” 
personifies the simultaneity of prophetic opinion and action, indicator of an age’s “vigour and well-being” and of the 
nation’s “true health and oneness” (“Characteristics” 357-8). Throughout, Carlyle imagined the Poet to be male. He 
mentioned in his notebook that “there are female geniuses too, minds that admire and receive, but can hardly create. 
I have observed that in these also the taste for religion and poetry go together” (Froude 98). EBB challenged 
Carlyle’s notion of an essential male poetic genius in Aurora Leigh, appropriating his insistence on work and that on 
work as independent from the calculations of political economy, even if her pronouncements are less sure-footed 
than Carlyle’s. She reworks his hero by adding to it women’s sympathy and sexual/spiritual love (Bristow 16; see 
Cooper 162; Dalley 537; Gottlieb 79-80).  
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ancestral estate (read: the poor will eradicate old wealth without using it productively) produces 
a shock that blinds him.409 EBB framed the blindness as a positive spiritual awakening for 
Romney, telling Sarianna Browning that Romney “had to be blinded, observe, to be made to 
see,” similarly to Marian who “had to be dragged through the uttermost debasement of 
circumstances, to arrive at the sentiment of personal dignity.”410 Romney, after his “violent 
reconfiguration,” if not castration, considers himself “[t]urned out of nature, / mulcted as a man” 
and, accordingly, asks Aurora to speak for both of them.411 He also finally accepts that art and 
poetry are more beneficial to society than socialism’s political instruments, abandons his work, 
and promises to support Aurora’s.412 Aurora may thus pursue her ambition to cure the nation’s 
ills through poetry while receiving sexual gratification. She slips into the masculine role vis-à-vis 
Romney but yet secures the respectability of a married woman, and, as an added bonus, keeps 
her aristocratic family’s wealth together. This ending establishes Aurora as a working wife, 
incidentally free from the threat of rape, birthing ever more poetry to influence other men’s 
perception of the world and founding “new dynasties in the race of men” (AL 9.945).413 On a less 
exalted level, Aurora binds an infantilized and dependent Romney to herself, as she does Marian. 
                                                 
409 See David 1987, 136. Much has been made of Romney’s similarity to Jane Eyre’s Rochester, an analogy that 
EBB steadfastly denied, claiming in a letter to Anna Jameson that she had forgotten the particulars of the novel’s 
ending (BC 23:163-6). George Eliot reviewed Aurora Leigh in the Westminster Review and pointed out the 
similarity, complaining that “the lavish mutilation of heroes’ bodies, which has become the habit of novelists, while 
it happily does not represent probabilities in the present state of things, weakens instead of strengthening tragic 
effect” (408). EBB had Milton rather than Rochester in mind, as she told Jameson. See also Armstrong 1993, 368; 
Carpenter 52-5; C. Kaplan 24, 32; Rosenblum 335; Zonana 258. 
410 BC 23:148-50; see Reynolds 43-4. The only main character in the poem who is not materially degraded or 
physically injured is Aurora herself (Hudd 67). 
411 AL 9.564; S. Brown 2005, 195; see David 1985, 124; Faulk 51; C. Kaplan 24. 
412 C. Kaplan 8; see Mermin 202-4. 
413 Cooper 187; see Armstrong 1993, 368; Mermin 183. 
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Marriage to Romney gives life to Aurora’s poetry, and allows her to claim the role of “literary 
‘grandmother’ of future generations” of women writers.414 
Just as she considered Romney as figuratively married to his “social theory,” Aurora 
frames the social conflict between elite and pauper social strata—and her involuntary 
spectatorship of and competition with this conflict (“What a sight!” AL 4.550)—as a specifically 
spectacular and sexual problem. Romney’s ideé fixe of marrying Marian serves his larger goal to 
unite the classes both figuratively and literally by creating a new line of biologically mixed-class 
people. On the day of Romney’s abortive wedding, Aurora paints a “vicious picture” of the poor 
entering St. James who breathe the “unaccustomed air / [w]ith hideous interfusion.”415 EBB’s 
grotesque descriptions provide visual evidence as to why Romney can never marry ‘down.’ As 
Aurora notes from her elevated place by the altar, the “people,” attending the service 
“uncompelled,” are composed of the “[l]ame, blind, and worse-sick, sorrowful, and worse” (AL 
4.543-4). Romney’s wish to heal “the peccant social wound” by marrying Marian seems 
laughable to Aurora when she gazes upon the sheer mass of the “miserable” poor, the walking 
personifications of the social wound’s “humours,” as society’s pus is being “pressed out, poured 
down upon Pimlico,” the fashionable residential district in London’s West End (AL 4.544-51). 
They are already dead, Aurora speculates; she sees a “finished generation, dead of the plague / 
[s]wept outward from their graves” with the “moil of death upon them” (AL 4.548-50). The 
                                                 
414 B. Taylor 1992, 25; see O. Taylor 2006, 153. This is a function that EBB certainly performed, historically 
speaking. Aurora Leigh was read by “everybody in polite society,” including the Queen, and the text became a 
“universal” text modeling the economic liberation of women (C. Kaplan 14). EBB was delighted when she learned 
that parents prohibited their daughters from reading the poem and that it changed the minds of elderly matrons. This 
should serve as a reminder that, under the right circumstances, women poets did have enormous cultural impact on 
economic thought and that the poet’s lone vision in fact realized its “revolutionary potential” (Dalley 539). 
415 First quote from C. Kaplan 11; AL 4.546-7; see Bristow 17; Brophy 273; Carpenter 64; Cooper 165; David 1985, 
128; Faulk 50; Hudd 66. 
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poor’s politicized presence in the privileged space of St. James, rendered as a contagion, 
threatens “the very life of the middle-class body” (Levy 37-8). EBB, borrowing from social 
science writing of her time, represents social and economic relations as moral or hygienic 
information since morality allows for the atomized focus on society that she prefers. With the 
individual as the sole relevant category of social observation, she neutralizes the visual evidence 
of increasing poverty that threatens Aurora’s and her peers’ complacency (see Levy 26). As if 
these observations—made over fifteen lines—were not enough, Aurora continues the drawn-out 
descriptions of urban misery, and the spectacle’s reception by the rich, for another fifty lines, 
immersing her middle-class audience in the horrific spectacle of the mob. 
I would like to linger on this scene a while longer because I take seriously critics’ caution 
that EBB “literally had no experience of the society she set out to represent”; her depiction of 
society’s ills is neither “very clear-sighted [nor] informed.”416 Sheltered for most of her life, 
EBB’s knowledge of the poor came from printed sources. She famously considered herself to be 
a member in an aesthetic elite, “mythologizing herself as a member of that clerisy of poets” and 
advancing a high poetic vision of an improved society (David 1987, 105-6, 101). Her 
advantageous viewpoint depended almost entirely on the representations of society she found in 
materials written by mostly middle-class male writers such as newspapers, journals, novels, and 
parliamentary reports. Starting in the 1830s, for example, the Times ran detailed crime and court 
reports as well as Parliamentary briefs on social ills in England’s cities. Next to immersing 
herself in the complete Report of the Royal Commission on the Employment of Children and 
Young Persons in Mines and Manufactories417 in February 1843—her correspondent R. H. Home 
                                                 
416 David 1987, 105; Leighton 150. 
417 See Kidd 85-6. This reading gave rise to “The Cry of the Children,” published in August 1843 in Blackwood’s. 
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was one of the report’s authors—EBB likely read journalistic commentary on labor conditions in 
factories, mines, and on living conditions in slums and working-class neighborhoods on a 
weekly, if not daily, basis.418 The working-class world described in these writings mirrors the 
one EBB employs in Aurora Leigh. That world is imagined as assaulting the senses with its  
stench, squalor, and disease, of open privies, of prostitutes and beggars living in dens 
which resembled animal lairs rather than human dwellings: it is a world consistently 
rendered in the language of the inferno where bodies tumble together in crowded hovels, 
dunghills dominate the landscape, and all is festering and pestilential. (David 1985, 127). 
 
The widening cultural gap between rich and poor in mid-Victorian England led bourgeois 
observers to articulate a “loss of personal knowledge about the poor and loss of influence over 
their behavior in an increasingly impersonal social order” (Kidd 74). Since nineteenth-century 
newspapers and periodicals often utilized literary registers to convey the living condition of the 
working classes, particularly gothic images and melodramatic affect, literariness itself becomes 
an agent intervening in the elite’s understanding of poverty.419 Working-class neighborhoods 
turn into gothic landscapes, and their inhabitants are imagined as demonic and grotesque warren-
dwellers (D’Cruze 1998, 173, 185).  
Observers like Henry Mayhew stipulated that large mixed-sex congregations of people 
led to moral deterioration and imagined working-class people as “disordered space[s] lacking 
appropriate boundaries,” “ooz[ing]” into places not meant for them and threatening to roll back 
civilization’s achievements.420 EBB’s depiction is directly based on such early sociological 
                                                 
418 David 1985, 127; see Armstrong 1993, 368; D’Cruze 1998, 176-7; C. Kaplan 32-3; Mermin 187. EBB ventured 
into working class “slums” only once in 1846 to deliver ransom money for the release of her abducted dog Flush 
(Mermin 187).  
419 The gothic was fashionable throughout the nineteenth century and permeated both elite and popular culture. 
Sublimated from traditional folk beliefs, the gothic energized artists’ and scholars’ interest in folklore—in EBB’s 
case, the traditional ballad (see McDonagh 119). 
420 Levy 31; see Barret-Ducrocq 7, 19-20. 
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accounts. She imagines the mob as a “crammed mass,” that “clogged the streets, … oozed into 
the church / [i]n a dark slow stream, like blood.” The multitude of people “[c]rawled slowly 
toward the altar from the street, / [a]s bruised snakes crawl and hiss out of a hole,” and the 
“noble ladies stood up in their pews, / [s]ome pale for fear, a few as red for hate” to “watch the 
“ugly crest / [o]f faces,”421 never seen “in the open day: / [t]hey hide in cellars, not to make you 
mad” (AL 4.554-73). Elite spectators are driven mad by the fearful sight of the social body’s 
hostile multiplicity, a reminder of the elite’s inferiority in numbers and the fragility of individual 
selfhood. These descriptions, with their “heightened emotion, stylized presentation, … use of the 
grotesque or the fantastic, … solicitation of some sort of cathartic effect of either fear or pity in 
the audience” are quintessential Victorian social melodrama (D’Cruze 1998, 185). 
Aurora, as privileged observer, is convinced that outer appearance, grotesquely 
exaggerated, reflects the mind’s essence; that ugliness indicates and results from inner moral 
degradation. This convenient shortcut between aesthetics and virtue enables Aurora to deduce 
that, with their “worn-out” “countenances” and “garments,” the people are disposed to sin: “the 
will dissolute as the acts, / [t]he passions loose and draggling in the dirt”; “[f]aces . . phew, / 
[w]e’ll call them vices festering to despairs, / [o]r sorrows petrifying to vices.” Above all, the 
mob contains bad mothers with 
                              babies, hanging like a rag 
Forgotten on their mother’s neck,—poor mouths. 
Wiped clean of mother’s milk by mother’s blow 
Before they are taught her cursing. (AL 4.576-85) 
 
                                                 
421 Stott notes that working-class crowds were often figured in terms of rising waves, composed of indistinguishable 
parts (191). At the end of the poem, Romney describes his own similarly grotesque view of the poor: “I beheld the 
world / [a]s one great famishing carnivorous mouth,— / [a] huge, deserted, callow, black, bird Thing, / [w]ith 
piteous open beak that hurt my heart, / [t]ill down upon the filthy ground I dropped, / [a]nd tore the violets up to get 
the worms” (AL 8.395-400). 
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The images employed—flowing blood and mother’s milk—are connected to the female body and 
interweave EBB’s vision of urban poverty with the condition of England’s mothers.422 In this 
scene, EBB deploys the old organicist notion of society that projects class distinctions as 
“inevitable, indeed, divinely ordained” (Kidd 74). Hence, in Aurora’s view, the social body, 
mobilized in unnatural uproar against itself, bleeds and festers; the reproduction of the unruly 
masses is imagined as a cancerous growth attacking the body’s virtuous, stabilizing center. 
Aurora blames the mob, struggling against its duty to be subservient, industrious, and, above all, 
invisible, for bringing about its own misery. Her focus on the women in the crowd suggests that 
she identifies England’s poor women as both cause of and solution to the problem, deflecting the 
threat of working-class men’s agitation and growing political influence. The women in the mob 
are vicious, hard, and utterly degraded. Their cousin, as we will see below, is the helpless, 
miserable mother, modest, submissive, and beautiful. Both are exaggerated types, filtered 
through the unshakeable bourgeois entitlement to deference and subservience. As the direct 
distribution of cash relief to poor unmarried mothers was politically unpopular at the time, 
middle-class reformers founded institutions, such as schools, hospitals, and reform homes to 
relieve misery and discipline women’s minds and bodies (see Kidd 68, 84). EBB resists her 
contemporaries’ grand-scale institutional reflexes, selecting a single victimized working-class 
mother as the deserving applicant for charity.  
Poor mothers “haunt the poem with the demonic vitality of nightmare” (Mermin 203). 
Striking in Aurora’s mob scene are the absence of compassion for people’s “sorrows” that have 
                                                 
422 See David 1987, 103; Hudd 66; C. Kaplan 11; L. Lewis 57. Although Marian’s working-class body is the 
unstable site of progressive sexual politics, as I will show below, the social body represented here suggests 
irremediable social conflict. The maternal images associated with the mob—flood of blood and, in other passages, of 
milk (4.633)—redirect a potential critique of mass poverty to a liberal feminist program based on exceptional 
women’s reproductive capacity (Hudd 66). 
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“petrif[ied] to vices” and the inability to causally link the poverty of the mob to the “broidered 
hems of perfumed handkerchiefs” and “moiré silk” of elite female spectators (AL 4.561-3). 
Poverty, to Aurora and members of her station, is primarily aesthetically unpleasant and 
psychologically frightening. Aurora’s lines, meant to educate readers “in superior cultural 
values” (David 1987, 106), naturalize extreme class differences and lament the mob’s distance 
from the imagined, mythical cultural unity to which her poetry aspires. When Aurora later 
describes the pre-industrial Eden of Italy, its pastoral beauty is heightened by the earlier 
extended discourse on London’s urban ugliness.  
 
Rape, Metaphorical and Actual: Aurora as Danae and Marian as Martyr 
Aurora Leigh, with its sustained references to rape and prostitution, has been rightly read 
as a forceful appeal to end “man’s violence” (AL 6.1226) and, integral to that violence, women’s 
financial dependence on men. EBB’s public appeal against rape as social problem is 
complicated—and politically troubled—by EBB’s invocation of metaphorical rape by a deity, 
borrowed from Greek mythology, to describe the gestation and birth of the poet’s inspiration.423 
Since Aurora Leigh’s plot is that of Aurora’s progress towards acceptance of her sexual passion, 
and because Marian’s rape constitutes this plot’s critical turning point, the figurative and literal 
manifestations of rape in the poem coexist uneasily.424 When the poet eventually integrates body 
and soul, she creates her artistic legacy, the manuscript of Aurora Leigh. Marian, on the other 
hand, experiences sexual violence as the inverse of Aurora’s life-giving poetry. Rape irrevocably 
harms the integrity of the imagined working-class body (Thorne-Murphy 246), although Marian 
                                                 
423 Thorne-Murphy 241; see Houston 232. 
424 See Mermin 211; Faulk 49. 
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achieves redemption through her son—“God’s triumph” (AL 7.331)—and moves from “the 
uttermost debasement of circumstances” to spiritual elevation.425 She inverts Aurora’s trajectory 
who, initially denying her body, ‘sinks’ to hear the pulse of her own, passionate blood. Aurora’s 
poetics are based on her ambition to speak as England’s healing prophet-mother, uniting the 
spiritual and physical realms because their cultural division prefigures and enables Marian’s rape 
(see Zonana 256).  
As scholars have cautioned, the multiple, interlocking rape motifs in Aurora Leigh, 
especially rape’s proximity to women’s poetic inspiration, risk trivializing the experience of 
sexual violence (L. Lewis 65). Aurora, the privileged receptacle of divine truth, variously takes 
on the role of Ganymede, Danae426, and Io427, and, imagining herself to be pregnant with poetry, 
                                                 
425 See David 1985, 133; B. Taylor 1992, 25; O. Taylor 2006, 158-60; Zonana 256. EBB’s conservative readers, for 
instance Nichol in the Westminster Review, certainly appreciated Marian’s transformation into the Stabat Mater: 
“There is nothing more exquisite in the poem than some of the lines which refer to this infant … a picture of 
innocence and maternal fondness such as perhaps has never before been realized in verse… Aurora’s self-
consciousness repels—her speculations do not much interest us ... There is something about Marian, on the other 
hand, that is especially attractive. All the little incidents of her early life, … the way she tells her tale, with the 
exception of one or two misplaced scientific phrases, so artless and natural,—the shrinking, clinging, half reverence, 
half love she feels for Romney, combine to exhibit a winning beauty and grace. But nothing in the book is so grand 
as the revelation to Aurora of her dreadful secret—how… lured into a home of horror in France, she “fell unaware, 
and came to butchery” (Nichol 409-10). Blackwood’s reviewer, ridiculing Marian’s diction but finding her otherwise 
“very beautifully drawn and well sustained,” did not care much for Aurora’s “extreme independence” either because 
it “detracts from the feminine charm, and mars the interest which we otherwise might have felt in so intellectual a 
heroine” (“Mrs. Barrett Browning—Aurora Leigh” 33). 
426 Zeus desired the shepherd boy Ganymede, transformed into an eagle, and took the boy to Mount Olympus. 
Aurora, in her “masculine stage as a young poet” imagines herself to be carried away by “poetry, my life / [m]y 
eagle … who has ravished me / [a]way from all the shepherds, sheep, and dogs, / [a]nd set me in the Olympian roar 
and round … [a]nd swoon back to the earth,—and find ourselves / [f]ace-down among the pine-cones, cold with 
dew” (AL 1.918-31; see L. Lewis 65). In the classical myth, Danae is the daughter of King Acrisius. Her father has 
been warned by the oracle that Danae’s child will murder him and he imprisons her for his safety. Danae is visited in 
her brass tower cell by Zeus, disguised as a shower of gold, and is impregnated. Her son Perseus kills Acrisius and 
the Medusa, among others. The Medusa’s blood, in turn, is transformed into Pegasus whose hoof-prints create 
Hippocrene, the Muses’ springs (see Zonana 255). The shower of gold, via the virgin’s body, becomes the spring 
that sustains poetry. See Thorne-Murphy 244; see Faulk 50 
427 Zeus “seduced” Io, then turned her into a heifer, and condemned her to wander the world aimlessly, continuously 
stung by a gadfly. Writing “embryo[nic]” verses as a younger woman, she “felt … in me where it burnt, / [l]ike 
those hot fire-seeds of creation held / [i]n Jove’s clenched palm before the worlds were sown.” Aurora’s 
ambiguously genital pain is immature since she has not yet identified with her essential feminine eroticism; she is 
aware of—but unable to alter—her hysterical ineffectiveness marked by “weak convulsion, woman’s ill” (AL 3.247; 
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incompletely shields the reader from the rape’s terrors. Aurora theorizes the process of poetic 
inspiration when she reflects on two sketches drawn by her painter-friend, Vincent Carrington. 
The sketches represent Danae in “[t]wo states of the recipient artist-soul” (AL 3.139). The first 
one depicts  
A tiptoe Danae, overbold and hot:  
Both arms a-flame to meet her wishing Jove 
Halfway, and burn him faster down; the face 
And breasts upturned and straining, the loose locks 
All glowing with the anticipated gold. (AL 3.122-6) 
 
Aurora rejects this first version of the eager and hungry Danae because it represents the artist as 
she puts herself “forward, personal, wanting reverence, / because aspiring only” (AL 3.140-1). 
Aurora, valuing inspiration over ambition, prefers the second sketch in which Danae  
       lies here–flat upon her prison-floor, 
The long hair swathed about her to the heel, 
Like wet sea-weed. You dimly see her through 
The glittering haze of that prodigious rain, 
Half blotted out of nature by a love 
As heavy as fate. (AL 3.128-33) 
 
Looking at the prostrate woman about to be ravished by Zeus, Aurora notes that Danae’s “[s]elf 
is put away, / [a]nd calm with abdication” (AL 3.135-6). The poet’s communion with the ever-
concupiscent god, the convergence of the spiritual and material, are figured as sexual 
communion (Thorne-Murphy 246). Aurora notes that, at the moment of rapture, the woman in 
her cell “is Jove / [a]nd no more Danae—greater thus” (AL 3.136-7). She tells herself to “be 
                                                 
251-3; 255; see L. Lewis 54-5; B. Taylor 1992, 20). In Book 7, the mature Aurora muses that “[w]hen Jove’s hand 
meets us with composing touch, / [a]nd when, at last, we are hushed and satisfied,— / [t]hen, Io does not call it truth, 
but love?” (AL 7.895-7). The body’s post-coital stillness implied here inspires Aurora’s poetry. Beverly Taylor 
suggests that over the course of Aurora Leigh, Aurora replaces Danae with Io as the exemplary female artist, 
combining intellectual, spiritual, passionate, and physical domains (1992, 23-4). Aurora, practicing her stillness (but 
“still” struggling), feels “hound[ed] … through the wastes of life / [a]s Jove did Io; and, until that Hand / [s]hall 
overtake me wholly, and, on my head, / [l]ay down its large, unfluctuating peace, / [t]he feverish gad-fly pricks me 
up and down” (AL 7.828-35; see Faulk 51; Zonana 256).  
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calm, / [a]nd know that, when indeed our Joves come down, / [w]e all turn stiller than we have 
ever been” (AL 3.141-3), becoming entirely subsumed by the deity’s presence—“complete, 
consummate, undivided,” like her ideal of poetical work (AL 7.839). Aurora’s image equates the 
process of poetic inspiration with penetration by an omniscient male muse. Defying the poetical 
tradition of the female muse, the virgin poet’s “self is annihilated in passionate receptivity” 
(Mermin 211), and during the insemination by the “glittering haze,” her body transforms into the 
agent of divine poetic truth. In Aurora’s imagination, female body and male divinity merge, and 
considerations of sex disappear when confronted with the truth of bodily and spiritual love that 
marks the presence of the divine in the poet’s body.428 Aurora imagines that the differences 
between prostitute and prophet, female and male corporeality, are moot when held up against the 
principle of an “idealized male potency” that naturally seeks to fill a “passive female vessel” 
with divine ejaculate.429 Aurora’s artistic ambition and desire are framed in terms of private 
fantasy of erotic abandonment and submission, to be realized in her physical union with Romney 
at the end of the poem (L. Lewis 65). Since references to Greek mythology functioned as class 
and gender markers in Victorian writing—one had to be classically trained at the university to 
comprehend Aurora Leigh’s dense web of allusions430—the poet’s fantasy of being raped by 
Zeus/Jove reproduces high-minded art—not a mundane bastard child. EBB participates here in a 
long-standing tradition of indicating the sexual act in respectable literature without subjecting it 
                                                 
428 See Armstrong 1993, 369-70; L. Lewis 65; Faulk 51; Houston 231; Mermin 210-11; B. Taylor 1992, 22; O. 
Taylor 2006, 154; Thorne-Murphy 244-6; Zonana 253-6. Deirdre David warns that Aurora continues the Victorian 
notion that women lack a strong sense of individualism; Aurora says, for example, that women “yearn to lose 
ourselves / [a]nd melt like white pearls in another’s wine” (5.1078-9; David 1985, 130). 
429 See Houston 231; Stone 1987, 103-4. 
430 EBB had herself been tutored by Classicists. See Stone 1987, 115-6. 
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to realistic parameters. The “[d]escriptive haze” produced by references to streams, waves, 
oceans, rays or showers of light, or opening blossoms invites the reader to “experience sex’s 
capacity to dislocate personal experience” while yet absolving the writer from committing an 
infraction of obscenity laws (Jarvis vii). 
Still, the image of Danae, lying “flat upon her prison-floor”431 beneath a “love / [a]s 
heavy as fate” adds unsettling physical descriptions of ravishment, particularly when considering 
that Danae’s rape and Marian’s exist in a shared symbolic domain. The image of Danae’s 
reception of Zeus, with her “long hair swathed about to her heel / [l]ike wet seaweed,” is later 
doubled by Marian, who, realizing that her mother intends to sell her body, stands “drenched and 
passive” with her “waterfall” of hair, “blinded” by her “stream / [o]f tresses (AL 3.1046-50). 
Zeus’s “prodigious rain” of gold reappears in Marian’s sale to the squire (see Mermin 211). 
While rape by a god brings Aurora’s poetry to life, aesthetically and spiritually, the rape of 
Marian separates the virgin’s body and spirit, figuratively murdering her. Aurora’s risky 
downward movement and Marian’s upward rise from the “gutter” both begin at the crucial 
narrative juncture of Aurora’s radical realization a raped woman may be chaste.432 
                                                 
431 Aurora reenacts the scene at the very end of Book 7 when she lies down on the floor of the Tuscan church, 
listening only to the “run and beat” of her own blood which, in turn, is figured as the rhythm of her verse (AL 
7.1270; see O. Taylor 2006, 154-5; Zonana 255). The result of this new-found passivity is that Aurora, at the 
beginning of Book 8, has learned to register her body’s autonomous and divine physical desire and writes out a 
steamy fantasy sequence that is a thinly-veiled masturbatory dream of sexual union with a “sea-king” and his 
“slippery locks,” followed by the evacuation of the poet’s womb—poetry is born (AL 8.32-48).  
432 Despite its sometimes flowery language, Acton’s 1857 tome on prostitution directly challenged the melodramatic 
plot popular literature—like Aurora Leigh—disseminated. He listed “three vulgar errors” in the public perception of 
prostitution: “1. That once a harlot, always a harlot. 2. That there is no possible advance, moral or physical, in the 
condition of the actual prostitute, 3. That the harlot’s progress is short and rapid” (52; see Walkowitz 45). 
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Marian is betrayed twice by mother figures, leading to her two social “deaths.” Marian’s 
mother sells her daughter’s virginity to the squire who threatens to destroy the family’s hut “like 
any other anthill.”433 Marian explains that “one day” her mother, 
       snatching in a sort of breathless rage 
Her daughter’s headgear comb, let down the hair 
Upon her like a sudden waterfall, 
Then drew her drenched and passive by the arm 
Outside the hut they lived in. (AL 3.1044-8) 
 
 Her mother’s release of Marian’s hair initiates the girl’s long fall. Newly enveloped by this 
prime cultural marker of erotic appeal, Marian faces 
                                  a man ... with beasts’ eyes 
That seemed as they would swallow her alive, 
Complete in body and spirit, hair and all,—  
With burning stertorous breath that hurt her cheek, 
He breathed so near. (AL 3.1050-4) 
 
Marian escapes from this horrible earthly “Zeus,” a muse whose breath inspires terror rather than 
art (Zonana 257), faints, and awakens in a wagon transporting her to a hospital where she 
overhears the chatter of fallen women. Although she is still pure, the hospital, calm and regular, 
becomes Marian’s first graveyard (see Faulk 44). Romney visits Marian at the hospital and 
provides her with lodgings and a livelihood. Haunted by her mother’s plan, Marian is then 
“adopted” by Lady Waldemar, whose former servant takes her to a Parisian brothel where she is 
drugged and violated and “murdered” again. Marian’s mothers bring about the poem’s central 
catastrophe since, in EBB’s moral universe, the dissolution of maternal bonds turns women into 
procuresses and invites male sexual violence: “When mothers fail us, can we help ourselves?”434  
                                                 
433 AL 3.836; see Faulk 48; Lawson and Shakinovsky 108; Steinmetz 352. 
434 AL 6.1229; see Leighton 1992, 105.  
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In contrast to the poem’s bad or absent mothers—Marian’s, Aurora’s, Lady Waldemar—
Marian behaves like a child herself. Her timidity allows the abstract principle of saintly 
maternity to annex her identity at the end of the poem. Not even her body claims stable selfhood: 
her skin is neither “white [nor] brown,” her hair “’twixt dark and bright,” her neck unable to 
support her “drooping” yet “small … head,” complete with a child’s “dimple” and “milky little 
teeth.”435 Only Marian’s profusion of hair—the only “fault” Aurora sees—reminds readers that 
this is “a full-blown rose” with “large … mouth” and sunken cheeks. Marian’s fate as 
exchanged, rejected, beaten, violated, and sublimated body appears to be mythically pre-
ordained which allows Aurora, once confronted with Marian’s maternity, to slip seamlessly into 
the role of Marian’s maternal benefactor.436 Aurora idealizes Marian as a modern version of the 
“intact” Virgin Mary, victimized rather than polluted by desire (see C. Kaplan 25). 
When Aurora initially visits Marian in her room at Oxford Street, she relates Marian’s 
words as she understands rather than hears them. Marian is imagined to speak  
                           with simple, rustic turns, 
Strong leaps of meaning in her sudden eyes 
That took the gaps of any imperfect phrase 
Of the unschooled speaker (AL 4.151-4) 
 
Aurora claims to “re-tell” the story “with fuller utterance,” “coloured … in after times” (AL 
3.827-30). She remarks that Marian showed less passion in telling than becomes evident in the 
poem; the poet overrides the “dumb creature[’s]” “savage spontaneity.”437 Announcing that she 
                                                 
435 AL 3.810-23; see Faulk 44; Rosenblum 331. 
436 See Faulk 49; Lawson and Shakinovsky 116-7. 
437 AL 4.159, 163. See Lawson and Shakinowsky 122, on Marian’s illiteracy and inability to access Romney and 
Aurora’s cultural scripts, despite their shared belief that Marian, “poor at writing, at the best,—and yet / [trying] to 
make my gs the way you showed” (AL 4.983-4), should try to marry herself out of her chaotic world. Walkowitz 
notes that working-class girls were usually socialized to display diffidence in the home and at work. Daughters, 
already culturally devalued, were expected to support themselves or their family as soon as they were physically 
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does not quote Marian verbatim but records her own interpretation of Marian’s words, Aurora 
slips into the simultaneous roles of amanuensis and magistrate—inquiring, recording, editing, 
and correcting. The problem of mediation of Marian’s (already fictional) story is compounded by 
the fact that, until the third book, Aurora writes retrospectively, inhabiting a previous dogmatic 
stance with regards to the working classes. Aurora’s voice controls the poem, unifying the 
multitude’s voices into a single—if sometimes unreliable—poetic narrator. Even when other 
characters’ speech is directly reported, they are “refracted through Aurora’s sensibility” (Hudd 
79). At the time Aurora emerges mature at the end of the poem, her imaginative perception of the 
poor is (potentially) altered by Marian’s individual example, although her conservative social 
theories about the mob persist.438 
 
No Subject without Rape 
Walking through a Parisian flower market, Aurora muses on the possibility of creating a 
“completer poetry” via a “larger metaphysics” that would be more responsive to the people’s 
needs than Romney’s utopian socialist schemes. As she asserts the “word’s” superiority to 
“phalansteries,” she freezes mid-sentence, having spotted the answer to her “completer poetry”: 
“What face is that?” (AL 6.231-40). Aurora has seen Marian, a child on her arm, an image 
emerging like a “dead face” arising from the bottom of a stagnant pond, “[s]o old, so new” (AL 
6.239-40). At first Aurora does not report that she saw Marian holding a child and, revealing her 
struggle to comprehend that Marian has become a prostitute, defers the revelation: “The arms of 
                                                 
able—a custom bourgeois observers found distressing. Women who had experience fending for themselves were 
less likely to have been socialized thus and may have shown their dissatisfaction more readily (16, 20). 
438 Armstrong 1993, 369; see Case 28-9. 
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that same Marian clasped a thing I … / I cannot nam’e it now for what it was // [a] child” (AL 
6.344-6). Over the course of the stanza break, Aurora moves from performing horrified silence 
when confronted with illegitimacy to breaking the representational taboo (Cooper 171). 
Aurora’s moral growth, intimately tied to Marian’s fluid, unstable body, is figured 
through water imagery.439 Throughout Aurora Leigh, water symbolizes unknown possibilities of 
the future, “the destructive forces of time and fate” (Gottlieb 77). Aurora feels herself 
“plung[ing]” into the renewed acquaintance with Marian, now a mother, who twice frames her 
own fall as a “drowning” (AL 6.242, 6.1117). Meeting her again, Aurora insists on her ability to 
direct Marian to “speak such things and names such names / [i]n the open squares of Paris,” and 
it is “[a]s if I led her by a narrow plank / [a]cross devouring waters, step by step” (AL 6.776-83). 
But their walk over roaring gulf of moral and social difference is aimless; Aurora does not yet 
have words for Marian’s situation and, challenged by Marian’s silence, remains mute as well. 
Aurora, far removed from her accustomed “drawing-rooms,” cannot imagine life at the bottom of 
the pond. Marian insists that she must return to her child and  
                              Then she led 
The way, and I, as by a narrow plank 
Across devouring waters, followed her[.]440  
 
Marian’s experience of sorrow authorizes her to take the lead across the devouring gulf between 
the classes, her son being “the silent object around whom the competing ideologies and 
discourses of Aurora and Marian whirl” (Cooper 186). Aurora and Marian both experience the 
                                                 
439 Marian looks “like a mist that changed” and throughout the poem she is associated with water: She has a soul 
made of “cataracts,” her hair is likened to “a sudden waterfall,” her “heart overflowed the world” (AL 3.811, 4.184, 
3.1046, 3.1086; Lawson and Shakinovsky 106). 
440 AL 6.500-3. See Cooper 173; Gottlieb 78; Lawson and Shakinovsky 112-4; L. Lewis 56-7; Murphy 24; Reynolds 
44; Thorne-Murphy 246-7. 
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moment of linking their existence together as maximally destabilizing: the “devouring waters” 
indicate that both women’s psychic and cultural integrity is at stake (see Lawson and 
Shakinovsky 114).  
Although she was determined to study humanity’s “warts and blains” as subject for her 
poetry, she cannot approach Marian without prejudice. The scene is burdened by Aurora’s angry 
suspicion that Marian is guilty of a moral crime and undeserving of her child (Steinmetz 357). 
Aurora follows Marian to her lodgings, “[s]carce larger than a grave” (AL 6.552), where Marian, 
after inner struggle—her “lips move[] in a spasm without a sound” (AL 6.495)—tells her story 
(L. Lewis 56-7). Since Aurora only had recourse to conventional moral law, she begins by 
reproaching Marian in the language of that law, giving her best “to be cold.”441 Acting as 
interrogator and magistrate, she rules that  
              Small business has a cast-away 
Like Marian, with that crown of prosperous wives 
… 
                                  Who’ll find an emerald ring 
On a beggar’s middle finger, and require 
More testimony to convict a thief? 
A child’s too costly for so mere a wretch; 
She filched it somewhere; and it means, with her, 
Instead of honour, blessing, . . merely shame. (AL 6.347-55) 
 
These lines exemplify Aurora’s “instinctive horror of the defiled woman” and suggests 
how deeply she has internalized the rules of sexual conduct (C. Kaplan 25). When she first sees 
Marian’s baby, Aurora reads Marian as a seduced single mother who deserves pity only when 
showing herself to be appropriately mortified and regretful. She assumes that Marian left 
Romney waiting at the altar “to take / [t]he hand of a seducer” who then abandoned her (AL 
6.746-7). Marian, in this version of events, has “filched” the child by consenting to non-marital 
                                                 
441 AL 6.612. See Lawson and Shakinovsky 117; Thorne-Murphy 251. 
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sex. As she observes Marian’s adoring caresses and exchanges of smiles with her son, Aurora, in 
a “grave and sad” tone, accuses Marian, “no mother but a kidnapper,” of being “complaisant” to 
“the wrong you’ve done” for the reward of “certain profits” from the seducer (AL 6.631, 637, 
742-4). She raises the specter of infanticide when suggesting that Marian metaphorically “kills” 
her child by touching him with her contaminated body. She says that an impure woman “damps 
her baby’s cheeks by kissing them / [a]s we kill roses.”442 Marian responds passionately after 
Aurora’s pious evocation of child murder by “turn[ing] her wild sad face from side to side.”443  
Sharing in Aurora’s moral (and deeply patriarchal) rhetoric, she claims she is free of 
shame and sexual guilt, has never been “fouled in will / [and] paltered with in soul by devil’s 
lust” (AL 6.761-2). She says “man’s violence, / [n]ot men’s seduction, made me what I am” (AL 
6.1226-7)—she even begged for mercy when “they” brought “their damnable drugged cup” 444 
                                                 
442 AL 6.735-6. Sarah Ficke points out that the scene of Marian’s careful unwrapping of the baby mirrors that of the 
runaway slave’s lifting the strangulating shawl: “You could not peel a fruit you fear to bruise / More calmly and 
more carefully than so” (6.562–564). While the slave woman’s child is cold and still, Marian’s is “warm and moist 
with life” (6.567; Ficke 261). Infanticide, writes Ficke, emerges as “a narrative possibility that is never acted on” 
(264). 
443 AL 6.737; see Ficke 261-4; Cooper 174. Marian’s tending to her child assumes an eerie, reciprocally vampiric 
quality: suckling him, she consumes him—“drinking him as wine” (6.599)—to forget about her fallenness in a 
permanent state of maternal inebriation (see David 1985, 121). 
444 Lawson and Shakinovsky 120. Marian’s body, drugged during the rape, would not show signs of struggle. This, 
in addition to her poverty, would make it difficult for her story to be believed in court. Marian’s fall and 
impregnation occur when she is unconscious, and therefore outside of what is representable (Stevenson 352; see 
Lawson and Shakinowsky 115). Barret-Ducrocq notes that working-class women, when asking for middle-class 
charity, tried to remove suspicion of prostitution by “offer[ing] an explanation which was highly fashionable in 
Victorian melodrama and trashy novels: they had been induced to surrender by a mysterious potion which robbed 
them of all willpower and made them easy prey for vice” (106). Marian’s “drugged cup” is high melodrama. EBB’s 
use of this trope also implies that EBB leaves intact the notion that female sexuality outside marriage and resulting 
childbirth is “thievery.” She is not interested in holding Marian’s rapist individually accountable—he is a mere 
manifestation of men’s culture-wide inability to merge spirit and body. EBB does not represent England’s sexual 
politics under the auspices of realism. All sexuality in the poem, be it passionate or violent, occurs outside of Britain 
(C. Kaplan 22), while Marian’s non-sexual victimizations—the attacks and objectifications performed by nearly 
everyone she knows (her parents, Romney, Lady Waldemar, and Aurora included)—occur in England. See Howell 
17-20, for the ideological work this anachronistic spatial separation of metropolitan and foreign sexuality 
performs—“the metropolitan and colonial worlds of sexuality helped to constitute each other” (17). 
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and “told him I should be lost,”—and challenges Aurora’s understanding of women’s fall.445 
Aurora realizes that her previous vision of the world was partial, that she must sympathize with 
Marian’s anguish, and become reconciled to her own femaleness (Reynolds 44). To achieve the 
same sympathy in the reader, spectacular moments of suffering are not entirely absent in Aurora 
Leigh.  
Marian’s memories of her fall have crystallized into a few elliptical images, moving from 
outer perspective to inner: “the shameful house, the night, / [t]he feeble blood, the heavy-headed 
grief” (AL 6.1226, 1210-1). After awakening from her drug-induced unconsciousness446 the next 
day, she lies “caught,” “cheek to cheek / [w]ith him who stinks since Friday!” and ends “[h]alf 
gibbering and half raving on the floor” (AL 6.1232, 676). The rape turns her “mad / how many 
weeks, I know not—many weeks” (AL 6.1235-6). Marian continues,  
‘I think they let me go, when I was mad, 
‘They feared my eyes and loosed me, as boys might 
‘A mad dog which they had tortured. (AL 6.1237-9) 
 
Women’s madness is the price of boyish fun. As Angela Leighton shows, throughout the poem, 
male violence is figured as the trampling of heavy animals upon women’s bodies (1992, 105). 
Marian, via Aurora, describes the impact of her rape as “being beaten down / [b]y hoofs of 
                                                 
445 See Cooper 176. The moment is crucial in that it creates a fundamental opposition between rape and seduction. 
The latter term was often used interchangeably—even by violated women themselves—and neutralized any claim to 
female intention or will (Stevenson 355). 
446 Chloroform had been discovered in 1847 and produced a long and quiescent period of unconsciousness. It was 
also suspected to arouse women sexually (D’Cruze 1998, 145). Some applicants to London’s Foundling Hospital 
claimed that they had been impregnated while chloroformed. This explanation lessened the women’s responsibility 
and “transport[ed] them at a stroke to the dramatic world of the popular novel” (Barret-Ducrocq 106). The 
accusation is also regularly found in court testimonies (Bartley 10). EBB’s insistence of the “damnable drugged 
cup” might indicate that she shared the widespread belief that a healthy woman could not be raped. Aurora Leigh 
perpetuates the rape myth that rapists are deviants and strangers, downplaying rape committed by family members 
or acquaintances. It works against the myth that women want to be raped and that most rape accusations are false by 
giving voice to Marian’s pain (press reports massively censored women’s statements) and, crucially, by showing an 
elite woman believing her (Stevenson 335, 349-50, 354). 
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maddened oxen into a ditch” and she links that sensation to the perversions of the “common law, 
by which the poor and weak / [a]re trodden underfoot by vicious men” (AL 6.667-8, 678-9). Like 
Io, she becomes a destitute and madly driven wanderer, “hunted round / [b]y some prodigious 
Dream-fear at my back” and chased across the French landscape by “some ghastly skeleton 
Hand.”447 The “Dream-fear” is realized when Marian finds, after the shock has passed, “bedded 
in her flesh, / … [s]ome coin of price” (AL 6.679-81). This formulation starkly links the physical 
facts of conception to its economic motive (Leighton 1992, 107). Echoing the earlier imagery of 
Danae and the shower of gold, Marian says that God “dropped the coin there: take it … / [a]nd 
keep it,—it shall pay you for the loss” (AL 6.683-4). She is taken in by a Miller’s wife in Clichy 
who finds her a position as servant in Paris. 
Her fragmented recollections indicate that Marian cannot quite remember or 
conceptualize what happened, and that the event itself is devoid of “logical or narrative or social 
connectedness” (Lawson and Shakinovsky 115). Despite all this, the scene of subjection has 
created the speaking subject (“made me what I am”). This account of female experience is new 
to the shocked Aurora who rapidly internalizes the wisdom of her working-class muse, 
“breathing by her breath” (AL 6.503; Cooper 173). When Marian has finished her story, Aurora, 
the closely observing judge, finds herself convinced of Marian’s innocence owing to the “dark 
facts to which Marian has confessed” (AL 6.791; see Cossins 153). She can dispense with 
witnesses or physical evidence owing to her intuitive access to divine truth, and she determines 
                                                 
447 AL 6.266-7, 1243; see David 1985, 123; Zonana 257. Echoing the runaway slave’s maternity that resembles an 
“amulet that hung too slack,” French Catholic peasants tie “Mary’s image” round Marian’s neck as a symbol of her 
penance that feels “as heavy as a stone” (AL 6.1256-7). Marian says that “woman has been strangled with less 
weight” (AL 6.1258; see Murphy 23). 
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on the spot that Marian is the worthy object of her charity.448 After her story has been told, 
Aurora invites Marian to move with her to Italy, the land of Aurora’s mother, and live with her in 
her pastoral home. 
Through Aurora’s mediation, Marian speaks out against “social and literary decorum” 
(David 1985, 119) while yet cloaking her meaning in “half-words, delicate reserves.” Because of 
her degraded moral and social station, Marian has no right to be heard fully “[w]ithout offence to 
decent happy folk” (AL 6.1221-2), the poem’s imagined readership. It is Aurora’s maternal 
mission to “kiss[] full sense” into Marian’s allusions and challenge respectable women’s silence 
on working-class men’s sexual violence.449 Aurora knows of course that her culture will not 
adopt this view without resistance. Aurora’s “passionate” rendition of Marian’s story is designed 
to rouse her intended readers into philanthropic action to ameliorate the trauma of their social 
inferiors. She appeals to her readers that  
                    If a man could feel, 
Not one day, in the artist’s ecstasy, 
But every day, feast, fast, or working-day, 
The spiritual significance burn through 
The hieroglyphic of material shows, 
Henceforward he would paint the globe with wings, 
And reverence fish and fowl, the bull, the tree, 
And even his very body as a man,— 
Which now he counts so vile, that all the towns 
Make offal of their daughters for its use (AL 7.858-66) 
                                                 
448 Thorne-Murphy 252-3; see Barret-Ducrocq 42; Ficke 261. This contradicts nineteenth-century philanthropic 
practice. Since “Marian had been raised as a tramp, had lived among the morally degraded, had been known to 
receive a prostitute friend into her home, had deserted her respectable fiancé, and now had an illegitimate child,” the 
conventional step for Aurora would have been to find corroborating evidence and, despite her pity, continue to 
remind (and accuse) Marian of her fallenness (Thorne-Murphy 252). Aurora even says that she is “angry that she 
melted me” (AL 6.725). The poet’s instinctive grasp of truth overrides the necessity of bureaucratic fact-checking, of 
course, and Marian has already sufficiently internalized her status as social pariah. 
449 See David 198, 120. It bears repeating how universal the injunction against ‘respectable’ women speaking out on 
sexual matters was—including sexual violence they experienced (see Clark 1983, 25). It is part of Marian’s 
performance of respectability to use “delicate reserves,” although she undercuts it by pointing out the hypocritical 
taboo. 
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When Aurora first recorded Marian’s pathetic tale in London, Aurora was unthreatened by it as it 
confirmed middle-class stereotypes and engendered feelings of benevolent charity in Aurora, the 
helpful scribe of Marian’s story. Marian’s Parisian tale, however, directly challenges Aurora’s 
values. Rather than “scrupulously hint[ing] / [w]ith half-words, delicate reserves, the thing / 
[w]hich no one scrupled [she] should feel in full” (AL 6.1222-3), Aurora reports Marian’s words 
directly. This more egalitarian dialogue where the working-class woman leads the elite poet, “is 
still suspiciously middle-class” and reminds us that Marian’s story is “absorbed” by Aurora’s 
(Cooper 172-3). Aurora’s conversion from “priggish and conventional” middle-class values to 
bourgeois philanthropist occurs in these crucial scenes.450  
I read these verses as Marian’s application interview for admission into Aurora’s reform 
home.451 In accordance with the conventional protocols of these institutions, Marian has to show 
that she was impregnated against her will, that she was otherwise chaste and had no other 
children, that her previous conduct had been flawless, that she has no money, and that her child 
was under one year of age to ensure that he would grow up morally untainted. Having obtained a 
chronological testimony of Marian’s experiences, Aurora, Marian’s confessor, weighs the 
                                                 
450 Stone 1995, 164; see Mermin 211; Thorne-Murphy 251. 
451 Reform institutions ranged from large penitentiaries with up to two hundred beds to small-scale, private homes 
with as few as five lodgers. Since the eighteenth century, London’s philanthropic institutions had included homes 
for adolescent penitent streetwalkers (or women thought to be prostitutes), lock hospitals to cure syphilitic 
prostitutes, and a host of similar establishments sponsored by philanthropic societies. The first of these asylums was 
the Whitechapel Magdalen Hospital, founded in 1758. Their mission was to both punish and reform young fallen 
women by compelling them to repent their past actions; cutting them off from their network of friends and family; 
regulating their dress, diet, work, movements, and daily habits; and instructing them in religious and moral matters 
to prepare them for a lifelong career in respectable domestic service. Lock hospitals offered medical treatment to 
prostitutes, and, to foster an ethos of self-help among working-class women, disciplined them to assume an ever-
deferential demeanor towards their social betters, acquire habits of diligence, honesty, reliability, and personal 
hygiene. 
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evidence of Marian’s overall demeanor and the richness of detail in her story.452 Aurora emulates 
the “objective” methods of the emerging social sciences and investigative journalism, 
legitimizing her superior position through close observation, privileged access to truth, and 
record-keeping. The very structure, sequence, and ellipses of Marian’s recollections—versified 
and fictional as they are—position Aurora as edited-out interrogator (see D’Cruze 1998, 155, 
163). Marian’s tale of tragic economic deprivation and maternal abuse becomes “a project of 
universal identification,” directed at middle-class women and teaches Aurora—and her 
readership—that the bourgeois subject, particularly in her insistence on sexual purity even in the 
case of rape, is fallible. The best way the bourgeois reader can make amends is by sponsoring a 
prostitute.453 
 
Convenient Self-Abnegations 
Scholars of the past four decades have critiqued Marian’s two-dimensionality at length, 
particularly her illogical moral immunity to adverse circumstances and hostile environments.454 
They have not yet considered it in terms of EBB’s immersion in the writings of her time’s social 
reformers. It is crucial to keep in mind that prostitutes were considered “public enemies, 
criminals, and outcasts who had ‘abandoned the prerogatives of civil liberty’” (Walkowitz 39). 
For Marian to speak at all after her rape, to be intelligible as a subject covered by the 
                                                 
452 The confession of sexual activity “is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not 
confess without the presence … of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the 
confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile; a 
ritual in which the truth is corroborated by the obstacles and resistances it has had to surmount in order to be 
formulated” (Foucault 1990, 61-2). See Barret-Ducrocq 41, 45; D’Cruze 1998, 155. 
453 See Clark 1987, 79; Dalley 539; Thorne-Murphy 253. 
454 Marian’s beauty, unassailable moral righteousness, domesticity, and timidity are conventional characteristics 
among young rape victims in folk romance. They usually die (see Clark 1983, 24-5). 
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“prerogatives of civil liberty,” she must keep her ‘character,’ the primary undertaking of Aurora 
Leigh’s sixth and seventh books. Marian’s atypically self-assertive lines at the end of the poem 
are spoken on borrowed confidence. Taking up narrative space “[a]s one who had authority to 
speak”—one notes the conditional phrasing—Marian’s suffering culminates in her final 
proclamation of righteous dignity with Aurora and Romney as auditors, executed in a “thrilling, 
solemn voice, so passionless, / [s]ustained, yet low, without a rise or fall” (AL 9.248-50). This is 
not “poor Marian” speaking—here, Marian speaks inspired by liberal moral law that, in a 
striking analogy with Mary Prince’s ‘welfare’ case, requires Marian’s careful (and, to Aurora, 
very convenient) self-erasure “from the scene of representation.”455 Marian speaks as exemplary 
recipient of elite beneficence, as the “daughter of the people,” not merely as an exceptionally 
virtuous working-class woman.456 
Her dramatic rejection of Romney’s socially redemptive offer of marriage proves to the 
reader that “[s]weet, holy Marian” passes Aurora’s ‘character’ test: she is greedy for the joys of 
motherhood, not those of inappropriate upward social mobility (AL 6.781). Her timidity and 
maternal feelings naturally counterbalance economic motives. Marian refuses Romney’s 
renewed proposal because, as she acknowledges, her fallen state causes unsurmountable 
difficulties for elite patriarchal succession—she would be a “married harlot” (AL 9.242). 
Although she has been cleared of wrong-doing, she is still atoning to earn readers’ continued 
pity. Wary that, if she married him, Romney might remember that her bastard “child was 
fathered by some cursed wretch,” indicated by an accidental “look,” “sigh,” or “silence,” Marian 
protects her benefactor, the “good man,” from the ungenerous and degrading thoughts that must 
                                                 
455 Brophy 283; see Hudd 79; L. Lewis 59-60; Steinmetz 366. 
456 AL 3.806; see Leighton 148. 
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inevitably arise. She is already dead to respectable society: “Once killed, . . this ghost of Marian 
loves no more . . except the child,” she repeats twice.457 Should she and Romney have children, 
her first-born’s siblings could proudly proclaim their ancestry while Marian’s firstborn would 
remain mute when “asked his name” (AL 9.389-90, 421). Marian, having “room for no more 
children in my arms,” will tend to her fatherless child as a holy calling until he is grown up 
enough “to sit with men” (AL 9.428, 435). Thereafter, she promises, she will help in “Romney’s 
work / [t]o help your outcast orphans of the world,” devoting her life to fallen women like 
herself. In the meantime, Marian says, Romney should marry “a noble wife” (AL 9.437-8). The 
aristocratic resonance of the utterance is crucial, as is the elision of the question whether Aurora 
will pay for Marian’s board and lodging indefinitely.458 Having completed her ascension into 
sainthood, Marian, freshly endowed with a ‘character’ that depends on Aurora’s continued 
material protection, secures her spot in EBB’s steeply hierarchical universe “in which the 
virtuous few answer God’s call by striving upward” (Gottlieb 66). This is how Aurora’s (and 
EBB’s) “messianic rescue fantasy” finds its apotheosis (Steinmetz 360), and it ensures the 
continued reproduction of the Leigh family name. 
                                                 
457 See Murphy 23-5, on Aurora Leigh’s sustained symbolic association with the Virgin Mary. Also see Armstrong 
1993, 369; Cooper 178; Lawson and Shakinovsky 118; Stone 1987, 121-2. Aurora Leigh builds on melodrama’s 
generic imperative that women die after losing their virginity to a “ravisher” due to the unbearable loss of honor. 
They always assert that their minds are unpolluted (Clark 1983, 23-4; see D’Cruze 1998, 185). EBB is writing 
against an old convention that defines women’s purity (and eligibility for continued survival) by their virginity. 
458 Only Ficke, Steinmetz, and Cooper ever mention that Aurora rescues Marian from poverty (264; 361; 177). I 
suspect that the poem shirks a discussion of the material aspect of Aurora’s rescue so as not to encourage the 
conflation of rescue with welfare. Marian’s (implausible) familiarity with bourgeois moral standards renders her 
dangerously close to actual “sisterhood” with her benefactress. While she requires financial support, Marian already 
possesses beauty, purity, and righteousness. One anonymous reviewer, presumably having skipped over this 
passage, complained that “there is an omission, which seems unintentional, and which the interest excited makes 
unpardonable—an omission of any mention of Marian Erle’s subsequent fortunes” (New Quarterly Review 34). 
Another considers the end of Marian’s story “very beautiful” (Leader 1144; see Faulk 46). 
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Motherhood takes up Marian’s entire identity and “kill[s]” any aspect of her being that is 
not polluted—which is literally everything but her generic self-sacrificial and divinely endorsed 
maternity.459 Analogous to the slave woman in “The Runaway Slave,” Marian, after an 
anonymous conception and birth of a “fatherless” son, is reborn as a featureless Virgin Mary 
whose existence as a living death is endorsed by the elite writer: “'I’ll find a niche / [a]nd set thee 
there, my saint, thy child and thee,” Aurora promises. Marian-as-Madonna is denied the 
passionate consummation of love that the elite couples in Aurora Leigh enjoy—Aurora’s parents, 
the Carringtons, and the central romantic pair.460 The girl conveniently understands her 
fallenness to be permanent because, without her continued insistence on already being dead, she 
would be eligible to marry Romney. Her ghostly-saintly presence at the end of the poem—
Aurora calls her an “embodied ghost” at one point (AL 5.1100)—not only literalizes death as the 
“teleological end” of illegitimate motherhood (Faulk 45), but imagines a kind of idealized female 
working-class existence that does not seem to require degrading physical labor for self-
maintenance.461 
                                                 
459 AL 9.389; see L. Lewis 62-3; Murphy 24. 
460 AL 7.126-7; Murphy 25. When Marian departs from the poem, Aurora describes her as “still and pallid as a saint, 
/ [d]ilated, like a saint in ecstasy, / [a]s if the floating moonshine interposed / [b]etwixt her foot and the earth, and 
raised her up / [t]o float upon it” (AL 9.187-8). See L. Lewis 60; C. Kaplan 25. 
461 EBB’s idealization of motherhood’s joys reflects the fact that her own maternal pleasures were enabled by 
servants’ around-the-clock care for her son Pen (Mermin 150; see Calcraft-Rennie 9; B. Taylor 2008, 405). She 
hardly idealized actual working-class mothers in her employ, her maids Elizabeth Crow and Elizabeth Wilson. Both 
women became pregnant out of wedlock and failed to inform EBB for fear of being let go. Crow, married by the 
time EBB found out about her condition, was dismissed. Wilson married and was allowed to stay on, although EBB 
repeatedly complained about feeling deceived. In 1852, Wilson asked for a raise for her services as lady’s maid, 
housekeeper, seamstress, and nursemaid. EBB’s correspondence mentions her refusal to grant the raise and her 
opinion that she paid Wilson sufficiently in affection. EBB did not accommodate Wilson during the latter’s two 
pregnancies, maternity, and marriage, convincing Wilson to leave her child with a sister in England for seven years 
while EBB resided in Italy with her staff (Forster 123-4, 272-3 302-3, 311, 325, 351). It appears that EBB, despite of 
her critique of Marian’s unfeeling employer, adhered to her class’s modus operandi: 
The appearance of an illegitimate pregnancy … brought suddenly into the light things which had lain 
hidden for years: the unassailable condescension of the upper classes towards their servants … In the 
presence of the bastard infant, masks were dropped: compassion for orphans, ... affection born out of years 
of daily intimacy, could vanish abruptly (Barret-Ducrocq 68). 
 244 
Marian’s “unspeakable,” hovering “phantasmagoric presence” cannot actually “exist in a 
legible, comprehensible world” (Lawson and Shakinovsky 123-4, see 119); she has no room in 
England, barely touches the ground in Italy, and exists outside conventional moral frameworks 
and social configurations.462 Marian, regulated and supervised, “display[s] an appropriate 
attitude of humility and repentance” that middle-class philanthropists expected when indigent 
mothers asked for support (Barret-Ducrocq 150). Aurora desires this permanent posture in her 
quarantined working-class dependent.463 Aurora Leigh models the “‘theatre’ of charity” in which 
the recipient of long-term charitable relief “appear[s] at once desperate yet respectable and 
deserving” (Kidd 69). Marian is socially disciplined and morally regenerated to such a degree 
that her very being dissolves into impossible, diaphanous virtue, side-stepping the mundane 
question of whether she also works as Aurora’s lady’s maid to earn her keep or whether she will 
tend Romney and Aurora’s future children. In a sense, Marian’s ghostly transparency at the end 
is the logical conclusion to the panoptic surveillance of the registered prostitute that the poem 
institutes.464 
                                                 
To the great bafflement of middle-class observers, working-class women seldom showed shame or repented of 
illegitimate pregnancies when questioned (Barret-Ducrocq 154; see D’Cruze 1999, 40). Marian’s self-castigation is 
(mostly) bourgeois rehabilitative fantasy. 
462 William Tait identified the prostitute’s body as the source of moral and physiological contagion, and demanded 
that penitents should be forbidden from mingling in public crowds (Tait 195; see Walkowitz 39).  
463 Howell 11. Barret-Ducrocq quotes a workhouse report noting fallen women’s expected conduct: “‘her conduct 
was uniformly good. … She was willing to do the work allotted to her and was civil and obliging. She always 
expressed a great desire of bettering her condition but from the unfortunate circumstances that has occurred she was 
prevented doing so’” (Barret-Ducrocq 151-2). The fallen woman must be taken out of the “threateningly opaque 
milieux of the working classes and installed in strictly monitored locales”—she becomes visible, yet hidden from 
respectable society (Howell 10). 
464 The average age of inmates in Magdalen homes was eighteen or nineteen, Marian’s age. Older women tended to 
be less compliant than their younger sisters and not admitted. Sick or pregnant women were rejected. Penitents were 
given domestic “training” so they would become eligible for respectable work. Reform institutions of all religious 
affiliations sold laundry services—cleaning-as-absolution served as the guiding metaphor—to keep themselves 
afloat and enforce social order within. Inmates’ permanently free labor allowed the institution to reproduce itself 
materially while penitents washed away their sins. Everyday life was communal; former prostitutes were watched 
during work, leisure, meals, sleep, and prayer; noisiness, swearing, and rude conversation were forbidden, as was 
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In order for Aurora to enjoy the full benefits of respectable upper-class wifehood while 
putting an end to her sexual rivalry with Marian, Aurora constitutes her new identity on the 
woman her new status excludes. In short, she needs Marian’s impure body—and its material 
claims on her generosity—to be forgotten. And so, Marian’s disembodied saintly “ecstasy” 
lingers uneasily next to Aurora and Romney’s final passionate embrace in the “ecstasy / [o]f 
darkness” (AL 9.815-6). Opening one’s home to a working-class woman through enlightened and 
discriminating charity is one thing—it would be quite another if that woman suddenly claimed 
equal footing. 
 
Aurora Goes A-Slumming 
Aurora rejects Romney’s first proposal in Book 2 because she fears Romney would “cut” 
My body into coins to give away 
Among his other paupers; change my sons, 
While I stood dumb as Griseld, for black babes 
Or piteous foundlings; might unquestioned set 
My right hand teaching in the Ragged Schools, 
My left hand washing in the Public Baths (AL 2.790-6) 
 
As a “dumb … Griseld,” Aurora, deprived of her voice and financial independence, would 
undergo the trials of Boccaccio’s mute Griselda whose cruel husband tested her loyalty by 
curtailing her maternal role. Aurora’s nightmare fantasy of marriage’s violent and violating 
“cutting” imagines Romney’s manic philanthropy to commodify her reproductive capacity. It 
also echoes mid-century feminists’ equation of wives with slaves. Aurora is horrified at the 
                                                 
talk during meals and bedtime. For the duration of their rehabilitation—usually two years—they enjoyed no privacy. 
If an inmate wanted to leave, she was subject to examinations by the managers, which served as effective deterrents. 
Many working-class inmates resisted such a life, caused disruptions, or fled. Rescue workers frequently lamented 
prostitutes’ independence, impulsiveness, and restlessness. The wages of former penitentiary inmates were below 
average. After completing rehabilitation, former inmates tended to perform heavy domestic work in lower middle-
class homes as wealthy families avoided hiring them (D’Cruze and Jackson 66, 74-5; see Bartley 5, 13, 40, 47-53, 
59; Walkowitz 18-20, 39, 60-2). 
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prospect of turning into the “conduit of patriarchal wealth,”465 having her body metaphorically 
divided up and doled out by her sinister husband, and the fruit of her labor, her sons (the 
“change” flowing between the stages of patriarchal succession) as well as her own work, 
committed to philanthropic action in support of African children, foundling hospitals, charity 
schools, or working-class public baths. In each case, Romney and Aurora’s potential child is 
exchanged for the children of poor and black workers, depriving the poet of her own progeny 
and establishing familial ties with the racialized lower classes that she is unprepared to accept.466 
A similar idea occurs again in Book 2. Aurora imagines Romney to say, “‘Come,  
I have some worthy work for thee below. 
Come, sweep my barns, and keep my hospitals,— 
And I will pay thee with a current coin 
Which men give women.’” (AL 2.537-41) 
 
The metaphor of the “current coin” emphasizes both marriage as women’s “profession” and 
marriage’s proximity to prostitution (Dalley 534). Scholars have read these lines as Aurora’s 
rejection of Romney’s domestic ideology (S. Brown 2005, 194). Aurora is understandably 
enraged that, according to English law, Romney inherits her father’s wealth. This adds to his 
proclaimed love for her an incentive to prostitute herself she finds insulting (AL 2.786-90). I 
would add that the point made here is not only that Aurora would be tethered to the home, but 
that she would not be in control of the products of her labor, both work and babies. Romney 
would compel her to spend her energies in the public sphere (where she wishes to work), but not 
in a line of work that would satiate Aurora’s hunger for heroic individualism. Aurora refuses to 
have philanthropic work assigned to her and spend her body on a foolish cause. With its 
                                                 
465 B. Taylor 1992, 25; see Dalley 535. 
466 Lootens 2017, 48. Romney is figured as both “metaphoric slaver and brutal antislavery fanatic,” as Lootens 
writes (2017, 47). 
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sustained descriptions of Aurora’s decidedly unglamorous and cash-strapped existence as a 
London hack writer for women’s annuals, Aurora Leigh imagines the possibility of middle-class 
women’s regular employment, a truly revolutionary moment in the poem since all independent 
economic activity of women, elite and poor alike, carried connotations of selling one’s body. 
Non-domestic labor threatened middle-class women’s status and implied a slippery slope 
towards working-class drudgery and ultimate prostitution. Earning a living as a middle-class 
woman, Aurora shows, is useful because it helps society, and particularly those who polite 
society already brands as prostitutes.467 Therefore, the bourgeois writer requires the exploited 
working-class woman, her negative double, to stake out that claim. Finally, whereas Romney 
offers Aurora the “current coin” of marriage, Marian receives its grotesque fleshly counterpart, 
the “coin of price.” Both marriage and enforced prostitution are framed as monetary exchanges 
disadvantageous to women and invoke associations with the bodies of slaves. The figure of the 
coin structures both Aurora’s and Marian’s stories, connects the rape and romance plots, and 
determines both women’s legacy—poetry and the bastard child (see Leighton 1992, 107). 
However, in the end, Aurora, as a famous poet, wields more “coin”—in the form of both divine 
showers and profane money. 
Haunted by prostitution, Aurora Leigh relies on liberal feminist philanthropists’ maxims 
and protocols for combating women readers’ social prejudice against fallen women through 
poetry. Although Marian safeguards her chastity until lured away to France, EBB, in line with 
feminists agitating on behalf of prostitutes, invites the respectable female reader to sympathize 
with Marian’s fallen friends. For example, when Marian tells Aurora about her fallen childhood 
friend Rose—“‘Poor Rose, ... / I heard her laugh last night in Oxford Street’” (AL 3.926-7)—
                                                 
467 See Dalley 532-3; Houston 230. 
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EBB mitigates the reader’s proximity to Rose Bell using several layers of reported narration.468 
Marian tells Aurora how a woman at the lock hospital complains about her “scandalous 
neighbours who had dared / [t]o talk about her as already dead” (AL 3.1160-1). After she is 
released from the hospital, Romney finds her a position and sends “her to a famous sempstress-
house / [f]ar off in London” (AL 3.1231-2), the kind of low-wage labor the bourgeois 
imagination linked most directly with prostitution (see Ficke 262). There, Marian tells Aurora, 
she is again surrounded by women who do not adhere to bourgeois sexual law and who freely 
muse on the dearth of married women among themselves (AL 4.10-11). The protagonist herself 
comes into contact with the worst sort of fallen woman, Marian’s close neighbor and dark twin. 
Visiting Marian’s home, this loose character rudely addresses Aurora from a nearby window, “a 
woman, rouged / [u]pon the angular cheek-bones, kerchief torn, / [t]hin dangling locks, and flat 
lascivious mouth” (AL 3.764-6). The scene is noteworthy since exchange between working-class 
and middle-class areas was very unequal: “working people came and went, but … [o]nly an 
occasional philanthropist or eccentric would venture into this barbarian territory” (Barret-
Ducrocq 6). Romney repeatedly mentions the “drabs” who reside at his countryside Phalanstery, 
incensing the surrounding rural community who resist Romney’s prohibition of “let[ting] men 
call their wives their own / [t]o kick like Britons” (AL 8. 920-1). From their well-off perspective, 
the living quarters of the poor are filthy sources of illness, violence, and crime. 
                                                 
468 Mermin 203; see Cooper 164; Hickock 138. Archival research has shown that working-class women in London 
tended to discuss sexual matters, including rape and abortion, openly (Barret-Ducrocq 180). Evangelical visiting 
societies already flourished between 1820 and 1850 in London: there were hundreds of such organizations in the 
1850s. Visiting working-class homes uninvited to distribute religious, moral, and practical advice could be quite 
dangerous. Middle-class rescue workers were often ridiculed or antagonized by the very women they wanted to 
help. Lady philanthropists reported that they had been threatened or attacked by drunks or brothel owners (Kidd 81, 
90). Bourgeois women certainly felt the thrill of a quasi-colonial adventure when exploring—or descending into—
‘savage’ streets on the lookout for women to rescue. 
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Apart from assuring Aurora that she is chaste, Marian does not mention how she earns 
her bread in Paris after she loses her position as a servant and walks away “shuddering head and 
foot / [w]ith blind hysteric passion,” nor does she reveal how she managed not to “sleep well 
beneath the heavy Seine, / [l]ike others of my sort (AL 7.80-1). It is her employer who 
determines that Marian is eight months pregnant. Innocent Marian had thought it inconceivable 
that “God [makes] mothers out of victims” (AL 7.49). Marian’s poverty makes her resorting to 
needlework likely—and the slippery slope from there into prostitution.469 The typical “career” of 
a prostitute began in her late teens and usually lasted only a few years. In contrast to middle-class 
stereotypes of streetwalkers, most prostitutes, particular those who only did occasional sex work, 
were never completely separated from the working-class communities from which they hailed. 
They disproportionally came from families with abusive, alcoholic, neglectful, or deceased 
parents or step-parents. Often, they already had some prior (non-commercial) sexual experience 
with men of their own class. Above all, they were “the unskilled daughters of the unskilled 
classes” working in domestic service or as seamstresses, dressmakers, milliners, shop girls, 
agricultural laborers, street vendors, and the like.470 The move into (and out of) prostitution was 
gradual and casual, and reflected the seasonal fluctuations of locally available jobs. Prostitution 
involved higher pay and shorter hours than most drudge work, although it was a physically 
dangerous and financially precarious occupation that exposed women to alcoholism, venereal 
disease, and harassment by police and the courts. Therefore, occasional prostitution was far more 
common that full-time sex work, and, after a few years on the streets, women tended to settle 
down with a romantic partner in their twenties. The melodramatic plot of the seduced, 
                                                 
469 See Thorne-Murphy 249; Howell 7-9, on Paris as the cradle of modern regulationism of prostitution. 
470 Walkowitz 15, 18, 36; see Bartley 10; Flexner 64. 
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impregnated, and abandoned temptress, so appealing to evangelical readers, applied only to a 
small number of prostitutes.471 
Romney and Aurora use Marian to test their respective approaches to curing this social 
wound. Romney’s plan fails since he cannot prevent a “world … half brutalised / [w]ith 
civilization” to invade his Phalanstery. Romney’s fallen women are still outcasts, cooped up 
away from the city in the “pernicious prison of Leigh Hall” (AL 8.937). Since he is only 
concerned with “the body’s satisfaction and no more” (AL 8.416), his social programs must 
fail.472 When Aurora searches for Marian in Paris, she slips herself into the role of the bourgeois 
rescue worker who approaches prostitutes on the streets to offer them a way into respectable 
work and practical assistance in addition to spiritual cleansing. Had Marian indeed prostituted 
herself, Aurora (acting on behalf of EBB’s readers) would have demanded an appropriate show 
of penitence. But Marian is found not guilty of having consented to her “seduction,” and helps 
Aurora understand the ugly enormity of men’s sins. The outcome is the same: Aurora rescues 
Marian from poverty and potential self-prostitution, sets up a private Italian Magdalen home with 
                                                 
471 Walkowitz 12-4, 21, 31, 18. Marian’s story in Aurora Leigh is analogous to that of Mercy Merrick in Wilkie 
Collins’s The New Magdalen, published in 1873. Collins’s example makes clear that the already hackneyed plot 
employed by EBB had devolved into near-parody seventeen years after Aurora Leigh’s publication. Mercy Merrick 
has been deserted by her father and is raised among traveling acrobats and actors by her morally lax mother. 
Variously earning money as a servant, needlewoman, match girl, errand-runner for gypsies, and beggar, Mercy 
descends inexorably. After fainting in the street from hunger, she briefly awakens to realize she has been carried to a 
brothel and drugged with wine, and is finally raped by an unknown, upper-class man. Too ashamed to mingle among 
honest people afterwards, Mercy resorts to prostitution (see Collins 270-8). Traditional seduction myths such as 
Collins’s had been in circulation for decades, usually disseminated by moral and social reform workers and 
prominent literati, who had to persuade their readers and sponsors—and probably themselves—that prostitutes were 
essentially innocent and deserving, while yet fascinating and repellant. The goal was to produce sufficient sympathy 
for prostitutes’ histories so that the taboo surrounding them could be mitigated. Towards the end of the century, as 
illustrated by The New Magdalen, opinion shifted from holding women individually accountable to a more systemic 
view of male sexual vice and severe economic deprivation (see Barret-Ducrocq 36; Bartley 5). The image of 
prostitutes as pathetic “miserable creatures, ill-fed, ill-clothed, uncared for, from whose misery the eye recoils, 
cowering under dark arches and among bye-lanes” remained remarkable unchanged until far into the twentieth 
century, however (Acton viii; see Bartley 12; Walkowitz 13, 32). 
472 See Mermin 203; Thorne-Murphy 248-50. 
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two inmates, and models for her readers the effect of poetry’s wholesome effect on the individual 
and, via literature’s diffusive effects, on society at large (Thorne-Murphy 254). 
When EBB drafted her female epic, famous feminists, politicians, and reformers as well 
as private individuals without claims to fame opened Magdalen refuges or invited fallen women 
into their homes. Josephine Butler, leading liberal feminist, lodged prostitutes in her own house. 
Charles Dickens; Adeline, Duchess of Bedford; and William Gladstone, Prime Minister, rescued 
and financially supported prostitutes with much élan. In response to large Magdalen asylums’ 
inhumane treatment of fallen women, the evangelical wing of Anglican reformers developed a 
less punitive approach to prostitutes’ rehabilitation and, starting in 1850, created a flourishing 
system of refuge homes. They prided themselves on providing comfortable retreats that were 
indistinguishable from private family residences, offering weary women havens of domesticity 
and individual care. In such homes, inmates were given new or second-hand clothes, their own 
room, and, most importantly, humane treatment based on forgiveness, sympathy, gentle 
firmness, and wisdom rather than punitive discipline. 473 Nevertheless, inmates were constantly 
supervised, although smaller homes had significantly fewer rules than large institutions. Control 
was gained through personal influence and obligation. Magdalen homes required inmates to 
submit to a hierarchical social structure that, although clothed in the language of affection, 
kindness, and love, instituted an unequal power relationship between wise, caring mothers and 
“feeble, passive and pathetic … children, incapable of exercising moral judgement” (Bartley 33). 
Affection and control went together in such homes, creating dependents who tended to be 
significantly younger than the matrons. Ultimately, they were coercive institutions that 
legitimized the supremacy of the bourgeois family. It is in this context that Aurora’s writing 
                                                 
473 Bartley 25-30, 40, 47; see Kidd 73. 
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about and reforming prostitutes should be considered. With its focus on the individual rescue, 
Aurora Leigh does not immediately challenge her period’s legal and moral frameworks and 
upholds the patriarchal definition of rape by conceptualizing rape as a moral problem that 
besmirches Marian more than the anonymous rapist (Stevenson 349). However, the poem 
establishes exceptional upper-class women like Aurora (herself a virgin) as legitimate 
discussants of fallen women’s anguish and argues for elite women’s duty to rescue their less 
lucky ‘sisters.’ 
If Aurora Leigh is further read as a public trial of Marian’s rape, Aurora slips into the 
traditionally male position of the victim’s guardian, defending her honor to the public. As the 
unmarried woman and her illegitimate child cannot be integrated into English community, her 
conduct must be made public, and the poem, acting as a public courtroom, determines her future 
claim to respectability, dignity, and ‘character.’ Marian conducts herself in accordance to the 
stereotypically innocent victim: she is virtuous, submissive to authority, and remorseful to a 
fault. As she utters her public remorse and ascends into sainthood, Marian loses her 
individuality, but is assured of salvation in heaven. Conformity to this behavioral code, 
particularly the poem’s obsession with Marian’s virtue, assures her right to public protection by 
the poet (Stevenson 353-4, 361-2). The performance of the pathetic woman-child is the “coin” 
Marian pays to secure what appears to be lifelong material support. The model of caring 
promulgated by Aurora Leigh is that of selective charity deriving from an overarching model of 
patronizing philanthropy, while diluting socialist claims to relief based on human equality.474 
Melodrama is the mode most directly available to EBB to depict the unmarried mother. 
Marian is a stock character; she is “the innocent maiden who always faints when ravished” 
                                                 
474 See Patriquin 150; Cossins 163. 
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(Clark 1987, 82), protecting her virtue—and that of her equally unpolluted benefactress—by 
blissful ignorance of the sexual act. Her final appearance, “white and tranquil as a summer-
cloud” (AL 9.298), echoes melodrama’s dying scenes that represent fallen women as “pious 
converts to chastity and religion” (Geyer-Kordesch 99). Such a revelry of sentimentalized 
womanhood would not be possible without Marian’s figurative death, her symbolic sacrifice to 
public morality. Invented by male dramatists and novelists, the figure presses working-class 
woman into the bourgeois domestic sphere, attenuating her into non-material diaphanousness. 
Marian’s trial, integral to Aurora Leigh’s assumption of moral high ground, reinforces bourgeois 
sexual norms and imagines the healing of social divisions via elite sympathy and moral 
regeneration of the poor without a disturbance to the social hierarchy. 
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PART THREE 
ELIOT’S COQUETTES: BURDENED REPRODUCTION  
IN MIDDLEMARCH AND DANIEL DERONDA 
 
Introduction 
Although George Eliot’s novels deeply engage Victorian social scripts regarding 
women’s emotional needs, social function in life, and intellectual maturation, Eliot did not offer 
any programmatic prescriptions about them. In her correspondence, she professed long-standing 
interest in the “Woman Question” and attendant political debates that shaped the gradual 
extension of women’s legal rights during the second half of the nineteenth century. However, in 
an 1869 letter, Eliot qualified her investment in projects promising to improve women’s political 
position because she felt “too imperfect a sympathy” with feminist agitators of her time (GEL 
5:58). She recognized that women chafed against social conventions and the pressure to conform 
to ideological and legal mandates, especially those related to marriage and childbearing. But, 
with her usual “even-handedness of vision,” Eliot saw that “the conditions of an imperfect social 
state” could only be corrected through slow and diffuse improvement brought about by 
cooperation.475 This might account for her refusal to sign John Stuart Mill’s suffrage petition of 
1866.476 Eliot considered women’s public self-display, including that of political campaigners, to 
                                                 
475 Flint 179; M 784. 
476 Clark 2008, 64. Lisa Surrdige notes that Eliot—still as Marian Evans—signed Barbara Leigh Smith’s (later 
Bodichon) Petition for Reform of the Married Women’s Property Law (1856). Eliot’s trust in women’s ability to 
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be deeply degrading and, despite her own prominence and literary achievements, harbored 
skepticism about openly agitatorial approaches to reform (Flint 160). In Eliot’s later novels, 
depictions of power struggles between men and women, and particularly within contemporary 
models of marriage, markedly gain in prominence. Although marriage and maternity represented 
sacred social obligations in Eliot’s view, the many unsuccessful wives, mothers, and childless 
women in her oeuvre indicate a concession that marriage and motherhood constitute problematic 
states. The maternal ideal, for Eliot, was closely related to her lifelong advocacy for sympathy 
and the need to recognize alterity, yet she did not countenance expressions of female will that ran 
counter to the greater good.477 Maybe because Eliot never had children herself, scholars suspect 
that Eliot conceptualized maternity mainly in terms of a social role, rather than as a 
fundamentally physiological process—a suspicion I hope to correct in the following chapters. 
The appearance of the word ‘dynamic’ on the first page of Eliot’s final novel, Daniel 
Deronda, to describe Gwendolen’s unsettled/unsettling glance famously elicited critique from 
her publisher John Blackwood as well as from an anonymous reviewer at the Examiner, both of 
whom challenged Eliot’s use of scientific jargon that had not yet entered her audience’s everyday 
vocabulary.478 In line with this often-cited vignette, critics usually understand Eliot to respond 
thoughtfully and prophetically to late-nineteenth-century scientific trends. In the words of the 
Examiner reviewer, Eliot’s “culture is scientific,” probably more so than any other Victorian 
novelist’s (125). Eliot famously hosted a London salon for elite intellectuals along with her life 
                                                 
represent themselves legally or her willingness to support feminist political agitation must have waned in the 
following decade (2005, 105). Eliot’s friend Bessie Parkes asked her to write for the English Woman’s Journal 
which Eliot declined, stating that her “vocation lies in other parts” (GEL 2:431; see Williams 73). 
477 Flint 168; see R. Mitchell. 
478 GEL 6:183; “New Novel” 125. 
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partner, George Henry Lewes, himself a noted philosopher and physiological theorist (Henry 
2001, 154). Studies investigating the reciprocal relationship between Eliot’s fiction, particularly 
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda, and nineteenth-century scientific writing suggest her 
familiarity with notable works by George Henry Lewes, Alexander Bain, William Carpenter, 
Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, James Sully, and others.479 Scholarship of the past three 
decades has largely focused on Eliot’s application of Victorian theories of epistemology, 
evolution, and the relationship between mind and body. What has not been achieved, to my 
knowledge, is a thorough examination of Eliot’s application of medical, cultural, and legal 
understandings of the female body. 
The final three chapters of this dissertation focus on two of Eliot’s most problematically 
visible female bodies, that of Rosamond Vincy in Middlemarch and Gwendolen Harleth in 
Daniel Deronda, and integrates readings of these bodies with contemporary professional texts 
Eliot may have accessed or owned, or which overlap culturally and professionally with items in 
her library. Although I am concerned with the politics of (non)representation of conventionally 
unmentionable psychosexual and reproductive processes in Eliot’s two novels, the non-literary 
texts I reference are not less obviously connected to Eliot’s novel-writing than those used by 
scholars who have studied Eliot’s immersion in scientific texts on the mind-body relationship. 
The methodological challenge of reading for unspeakable acts as well as scholars’ hesitancy to 
associate Eliot with what is now perceived to be quack science perhaps account for the 
comparative dearth of studies on Eliot and female embodiment. Although there has been much 
written about Gwendolen’s hysteria, for example, few recent scholars, with the exception of Jane 
Wood (2001), Louise Penner (2002), David Trotter (2004), and Jill Matus (2008), have actually 
                                                 
479 See Beer 2008; M. Davis; Rothfield; Shuttleworth; J. Wood. 
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read between Daniel Deronda and the many works on human physiology and neurology in 
Eliot’s library.480 
In the following chapters I read Eliot’s last two completed novels against the rubrics 
‘abortion’ (Middlemarch), ‘masturbation,’ and ‘marital rape’ (Daniel Deronda). First, I re-
interpret Rosamond Vincy’s fateful riding excursion in light of Victorian discourses surrounding 
miscarriage and abortion. Since Rosamond usually receives little scholarly attention—and much 
of that attention has a distinctly disdainful flavor—I hope to vindicate her character by showing 
that her successful performance of femininity dangerously threatens the stability of institutional 
rules about marriage and procreation, and makes visible the set of proscriptions by which 
Victorian fiction could articulate the end of a pregnancy. The final two chapters are dedicated to 
exploring Gwendolen’s hysteria, and build on the analysis of Rosamond, Gwendolen’s 
prototype. I propose, somewhat in opposition to scholars who read Eliot as intellectually ahead 
of her time, that Eliot’s depiction of Gwendolen’s “fits of spiritual dread,” usually carefully 
hidden under her “miraculous power of self-control,” relies on formulations of hysteria that are 
now perceived to be deeply misogynistic and conceptually flawed (DD 52, 19). Recent research 
has yielded interesting possibilities for re-assessment of Eliot’s text and, similar to Eve 
Sedgwick’s interpretation of Jane Austen’s Marianne Dashwood as “the Masturbating Girl,” I 
show that beneath Gwendolen’s often-noted “frigidity” lurks the specter—and arousing 
spectacle—of maidenly autoerotics. In order to curtail Gwendolen’s selfish sexuality, Eliot 
prescribes her heroine a cure of suffering and moral re-orientation analogous to physicians’ 
                                                 
480 None of them has read Gwendolen as a hysteric whose excessive sexual energy must be curtailed, as described in 
the contemporary medical literature. Maybe the connection is too obvious. I suspect, however, that an unwillingness 
to confront the possibility that Eliot’s “conservatism on gender” also reached into her understanding of female 
physiology might have forestalled previous investigation of the issue, seeing that most scholarly writing on Eliot 
occurs on explicitly feminist terrain (Flint 160; see Henry 2001, 143). 
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recommendations for their patients. Side effects include a deeply disturbing marriage to a 
psychological sadist whose treatment of Gwendolen aids in the legally and socially mandated 
destruction of her frisky spirit. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MIDDLEMARCH’S HIDDEN ABORTION PLOT 
 
Historicizing Abortion 
Due to the absence of a broad and traceable public debate regarding Victorian family 
limitation practices, abortion and contraception in the nineteenth century remain shadowy, 
dangerous territories for historians and literary critics to tread. Although the 1911 census 
demonstrated that the middle classes had begun limiting family size in the 1850s, and that 
fertility restriction practices must have been so widespread by the 1860s as to drastically reduce 
the average size of the middle-class family after 1870, the taboo surrounding public discussion of 
the issue and the medical profession’s condemnation of artificial means to prevent or terminate 
pregnancies make it difficult to prove the extent or the means by which fertility restriction was 
achieved.481 Demographers assert, however, that the percentage of terminated pregnancies must 
have been quite substantial since child mortality went down dramatically by the end of the 
century and families had fewer children than would be predicted by statistical models.482 
                                                 
481 Perkin 282; see McLaren 116; Woods 2000, 110-2. 
482 Keown 47; see Woods 2000, 116, 143. Hera Cook (2005) outlines reasons why middle-class women likely did 
not use contraceptives and argues that widespread sexual abstinence within marriage accounts for the declining birth 
rate. While convincing, her findings are obviously not applicable to Middlemarch. The British government began to 
regulate abortion in 1967. It remains difficult to assess the frequency of abortion before that time (Kilday 79). 
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Modern feminists have long considered family planning strategies women’s most 
important means of controlling the conditions of their lives and regulating the health of their 
bodies. Most mid- and late-Victorian women’s rights activists shunned discussions about 
abortion and contraception owing to the very real risk that other politically important causes, 
such as suffrage and access to the professions and universities, would lose public support if these 
concerns became associated with the morally suspicious issue of women managing their 
reproductive functions. Nevertheless, in what follows I will argue that the unmentionable 
question of abortion is present in Victorian fiction. While I am less interested in tracing the 
historical existence of a “female sub-culture” among Victorian abortionists that Patricia Knight 
identified more than three decades ago (67), I read George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1870-1) in 
terms of its depiction—or, rather, non-depiction—of Victorian views on abortion. Operating 
under the assumption that readers “can augment [their] reading experience by imagining the 
initial conditions of reading when the work first appeared” (Beer 2006, 16), I will historicize 
Middlemarch in the context of contemporary medical treatises on obstetrics and women’s health 
to make the case that an elaborate discourse on abortion existed during the time of the work’s 
publication. Underlying my project here, as in the dissertation at large, is my goal to articulate a 
method of reading rigorously in the absence of explicit evidence. How can we detect and write 
about a practice that was surrounded by an aura of profound silence established by cultural, 
professional, and editorial pressures, but that, demographers as well as social and medical 
historians assure us, was fairly wide-spread? 
Since abortion, similar to detailed descriptions of sexual practices, pregnancy, childbirth, 
or rape, was considered unrepresentable in non-pornographic literature of the time, the first part 
of this chapter maps the question of abortion onto Middlemarch and then analyzes the discursive 
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ramifications of that reading practice. How does the text change politically and structurally if we 
allow for the possibility that a character decides to end her pregnancy? I am interested in 
exploring the avenues of possibility that are opened up when abortion, at once a biological, 
medical, political, moral, and personal category, is introduced to the text. It is also important to 
note that the synonymous categories “abortion” and “induced miscarriage” I bring to 
Middlemarch are quite dissimilar from the publically debated and widely circulated term 
“abortion” used in twenty-first-century political and medical discourse. Victorian medical writers 
sometimes conflated contraception, miscarriage, and abortion because they were ignorant about 
the physiological processes in question, or because they wished to avoid dissemination of 
dangerously potent information. Since abortion in the nineteenth century was neither widely 
debated nor circulated in the press before the very end of the period, its presence remains 
dubious and its principles nebulous. 
The deliberate interpretation of Rosamond’s miscarriage in terms of Victorian abortion 
discourse changes the previous understanding of the distribution of social or hierarchical power 
among the Middlemarch characters and improves critics’ ability to assess the degree of control 
that Rosamond’s character assumes over her reproductive system at a time when that control was 
supposed to be the husband’s prerogative (and when reproduction was also supposed to occur 
solely within marriage). Most importantly, for Victorians, abortion was a question of the 
pregnant woman’s moral and, by extension, class standing. As she transgresses the normative 
lines of conduct for a woman of her station, Rosamond must find a way to avert deleterious 
social consequences by obscuring—by rendering accidental—what she has done, a point upon 
which I will elaborate below. How does Middlemarch anticipate, affirm, and obfuscate abortion, 
as well as the consequences of Rosamond’s transgressive assumption of reproductive control? 
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Abortion in Middlemarch emerges at the intersection of the Lydgates’ precarious program of 
social and biological reproduction. Sexual reproduction is not only brought to a crisis because of 
Rosamond’s illicit erotic desires, it is also inextricably interwoven with Rosamond’s social 
ambition, particularly her disastrous fantasies of exiting the sphere to which she is legally, 
morally, and financially bound. To contextualize what can be read as an intentional termination 
of Rosamond’s pregnancy in Middlemarch I will first compile Victorian legal and medical 
knowledge about abortion. 
 
Invisible Practice 
Traditionally, scholars have identified social and cultural developments associated with 
modernity—industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and women’s emancipation—as 
contributing to the spread of contraceptive knowledge and practices in the nineteenth century.483 
Historians such as Angus McLaren and John Riddle caution however, that, rather than attributing 
the post-1870 dramatic fall in marital fertility to a trickle-down effect of contraceptive 
knowledge and practices from the upper and middle classes to the working classes, we should 
allow for the likely possibility that the near-universal restriction of family size by the end in the 
nineteenth century is a consequence of “old practices being called into play by new social and 
economic conditions.”484 Mostly confined to pharmacology manuals, surgeons’ handbooks, and 
treatises on medical jurisprudence, printed information about abortifacients and contraceptives 
was available to a narrow group of professionals—virtually all of them men—who, while 
                                                 
483 Perkin 282; see Woods 2000, 144. 
484 McLaren 19; see Riddle 201-3. Abortion had likely been widely regarded as a backup form of contraception, 
particularly in the early stages of pregnancy, from the seventeenth through the nineteenth century (Kilday 80). 
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steadily passing on information about fertility control that British writers had collated since at 
least the early sixteenth century, avoided researching the matter much further (Kilday 78). 
Association with “the subjects in surgery and midwifery which can offend and disgust” was 
likely to put these professionals’ careers in jeopardy (“Art. VIII” 442). As the social standing of 
the medical profession was in the very process of being established, particularly during the third 
and fourth decades of the century, its members were sensitive to the dangers of seeming to 
sympathize with disreputable doctrines. Later in the century, it seemed appropriate to discuss 
procreation and abortion within the confines of professional literature while it was still 
considered necessary that the public should be shielded from these subjects (Matus 1995, 13). In 
cases where fertility control was referenced publicly, as was the case in a Saturday Review article 
from 14 March 1857, the “infamous purpose” of inducing abortion was imagined to exist within 
a “hideous web of sin and horror”; an underworld where England’s poor practiced “[f]ornication 
and adultery, incest and murder, abortion and poisoning,” at a safe distance from the offended 
middle-class observer’s gaze (“Sweet Auburn” 239). Only towards the end of the century did the 
number of guides for the bride-to-be increase, although contraceptive information was usually 
conveyed in coded language and did not address abortion explicitly (Woods 2000, 149). 
 Although abortion at any state of pregnancy had been criminalized under Lord 
Ellenborough’s Act of 1803, some historians believe that the practice, clearly widespread before 
1803, did not abate after the passing of this first criminal statute (Perkin 282). The 1803 Act 
allowed for a range of punishments, depending on whether the abortion occurred during the 
period before or after “quickening,” the time when the mother first sensed the movement of the 
fetus. The most severe punishment for administering drugs to procure a miscarriage was the 
death penalty (Keown 26). The Act targeted the professions that specialized in illegal abortions, 
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such as unlicensed medical practitioners, midwives, and quacks, while the woman herself was 
accessory to the crime. In practice, however, courts interpreted the law as pertaining to 
unmarried women, hence circumscribing abortion as an act initiated by single women who 
sought to avoid the public scandal of their illicit affairs (Riddle 207). As the medical profession 
worked to eradicate midwives’ and irregular practitioners’ involvement in maternity care and 
increasingly voiced concerns about the validity of the mother’s subjective judgment concerning 
the time of quickening, the 1803 Act underwent repeated amendments in 1828, 1838, and 1861. 
These led to the eradication of the older pre- and post-quickening distinction and did away with 
capital punishment in 1838.485 Eventually, the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act identified 
the pregnant woman as the main perpetrator who would face imprisonment for life for attempting 
to procure an abortion, regardless of whether she had actually been pregnant.486 The 1861 Act 
also criminalized the dissemination of knowledge on how to bring about a miscarriage (Keown 
33). 
As a range of historians has shown, knowledge regarding herbal abortifacients, such as 
rue, pennyroyal, ergot of rye, sage, aloe, or savin, had been orally transmitted for centuries, 
although the effectiveness and accessibility of these remedies remains contested.487 The fact that 
many women used herbal emmenagogues and purgatives as well as pessaries or suppositories “to 
elicit a late period” was frequently discussed and increasingly condemned in the medical press 
whose contributors were still divided on the nature of the relationship between menstruation and 
                                                 
485 Brookes 25; see Keown 26-7; Kilday 81-2; Smart 18. 
486 Brookes 22; see Kilday 81. 
487 Woods 2009, 247; see Riddle 12. Savin, ergot of rye, and pennyroyal have proven anti-estrogenic properties. 
Most of the other plant-based abortifacients worked by causing violent gastric and intestinal cramps that were 
thought to induce uterine cramps similar to labor (Kilday 83). 
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pregnancy (McLaren 123). The negligible number of convictions for the crime of abortion 
suggests that women who bought herbal abortifacients from apothecaries were unlikely to face 
prosecution. Rather, women who had experienced instrumental manipulation of the uterus—with 
its extremely high incidence of laceration and infection that required emergency treatment by an 
experienced, licensed practitioner—risked coming into contact with the law (Brookes 22). 
Patricia Knight argues that, throughout the nineteenth century, abortion “was probably 
the most prevalent from of contraception for working-class women,” while middle-class women 
also frequently resorted to abortion, as indicated by the widespread sale of abortion drugs, many 
of which were prohibitively expensive for working-class women (57-8). Contributors to medical 
journals complained about the widespread advertisements for “female remedies” in periodicals, 
serialized novels, and even religious tracts, and warned that respectable women might become 
victims of “a cunning system of blackmail” (Whitley 108). It seems clear that abortions were not 
confined to the working and pauper classes, although much of the respectable press approached 
it as a crime of which middle-class women were guiltless. Particularly clergy and medical 
practitioners were opposed to abortion and the spread of birth control information among the 
masses. The establishment’s class bias and hypocrisy become apparent when one considers that 
the 1911 census found that surgeons’ and clergy’s family sizes were among the smallest in the 
country (Woods 2000, 146). This suggests that these professional groups condoned or promoted 
discreet means of birth control within their own circles while insisting that, if information about 
contraceptive practices fell into the hands of the working classes, the country would drown in 
promiscuity and social disorder.488 As Carol Smart observes, the politicization of these issues 
occurred at a time when the definition of ideal motherhood had narrowed to denote a “specific 
                                                 
488 Knight 62; see Brookes 23; Smart 8. 
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model of caring activity” (Smart 15) carried out by morally pure, married middle-class women. 
These women were subjected to an increasingly institutionalized regime of enforced motherhood 
and, by the mid-nineteenth century, were ascribed a “biologico-moral responsibility” to become 
mothers (Foucault 1990, 104). Unmarried women’s abortions were discursively constructed as a 
public concern threatening the strength of the national body politic, while, for respectably 
married women, the “problem” was one to be solved privately and discreetly.489  
The debates surrounding abortion in the literature for medical experts were concerned 
with the age-old question whether medical practitioners had the right to control life. For most 
contributors, it was understood that women were excluded from the debate, although doctors did 
encourage their female patients to space their births using abstinence, the rhythm method, and 
protracted lactation as “natural,” and hence, morally sound, fertility control strategies (McLaren 
125). For the purposes of this chapter, the conflation of medical and moral authority in these 
writings is of the utmost importance because it allows for a re-creation of a normative, 
institutional backdrop against which to read the transgression of abortion in Middlemarch. 
 
Vindicating Rosamond 
Arguably, Rosamond Vincy is Middlemarch’s most successful character. When the 
narrative wraps up, Rosamond, after Tertius Lydgate’s untimely death from diphtheria, achieves 
almost everything she had desired all along. She marries “an elderly and wealthy physician” (M 
782), and gains a satisfyingly elevated social status, along with money, residence in London, 
connections, and a carriage. Although she does not complete her ascendancy into the aristocracy, 
“that middle-class heaven, rank” (M 110), of which she had daydreamed earlier, the novel makes 
                                                 
489 Smart 2; see Riddle 218. 
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the point that Rosamond is perfectly adapted to polite society’s expectations for successful 
femininity. Her achievement of laying the groundwork for and completing a series of marriages 
that guarantee her social climb is, of course, designed to evoke a bitter aftertaste in Eliot’s 1871 
audience. Given Eliot’s novels’ insistence on a didactic program of moral development and self-
sacrifice that her major female heroines have to undergo, what Laura Green calls Eliot’s 
“concern with service rather than self-fulfillment” (76), Rosamond is a flawed character 
precisely because she does not give up her aspirations when her marriage comes under critical 
pressure. The novel’s persistent representation of Rosamond’s misdirected (because mercenary) 
education and the dangerous “commodification of the domestic ideal” (Green 80) effected by 
that education render her extremely unlikeable to many readers. Few critics, feminist or not, have 
been willing to acknowledge the fact that Rosamond’s determined undermining of her husband’s 
material and intellectual aspirations is a radical—and radically successful—program of self-
fulfillment. Whereas at the end of the novel Dorothea Brooke has to lay aside grand social and 
intellectual ambitions for the sake of becoming a dispensary of “incalculably diffusive” positive 
effects on those around her (M 785), and Mary Garth’s authorship merges with that of her 
husband, Mrs. Lemon’s schooling provides Rosamond, the nouveau-riche social climber, with 
the delicate feminine accomplishments ultimately rewarded by her society. Eliot imagines the 
realistic range of women’s professional opportunities and likely successes as very narrow 
(muting the social impact of the author’s own work, and of the novel itself, in the process) and 
dwells instead on the uncomfortable fact that egoism, superficiality, materialism, and erotic 
appeal, directly resulting from the practices enforced by domestic ideology, are central to female 
achievement.490 
                                                 
490 Beer 2006, 28; see Green 80. In their assessments of Rosamond, scholars sometimes emulate nineteenth-century 
prescriptions regarding women’s mandatory relationality, that is, they are stricter in their evaluation of Rosamond’s 
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Late twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century criticism has not been kind to 
Rosamond. In accordance with the narrator’s overall treatment of Rosamond as an accessory to 
Lydgate’s story, critics tend to read her as a purely relational being whose development, in 
contrast to Dorothea’s, for instance, is rarely seen as self-contained or important in and of 
itself.491 The traditional reading of Rosamond’s character identifies her miseducation at Mrs. 
Lemon’s establishment as one of the central contributing factors to Lydgate’s professional and 
personal failure. Rosemary Ashton’s 2003 introduction to the Penguin edition of Middlemarch, 
for instance, observes that “When [Lydgate] marries Rosamond … he finds that blue eyes may 
be accompanied by selfishness and obstinacy … Lydgate is checkmated, made to bow under the 
yoke, and so deteriorates from ardent researcher to fashionable doctor in London” (xiv). Ashton 
reads Rosamond as Lydgate’s “punishment” (xv), building her argument here on the notoriously 
unreliable narrator who calls Rosamond “the irresistible woman for the doomed man of that 
date” (M 252). Similarly, Jill Matus deems Rosamond “too selfish for love and motherhood” 
(1995, 241), blaming Rosamond for not putting her husband’s views and needs before her own. 
This well-known narrative of women hampering men’s genius by erecting obstacles within their 
personal and professional lives is a highly problematic one, both structurally and politically. 
Only rarely do critics attempt to “rescue” Rosamond from such “readerly injustice,” Anne 
Patrick’s rarely-quoted 1987 attack on scholars’ sexist readings of Rosamond being a rare 
                                                 
egoism than in that of male characters. It is easy to overstate Rosamond’s egoism. Lawrence Rothfield helpfully 
reminds critics that Casaubon and Lydgate, for instance, “are merely egoists on a different scale, just as lost in the 
labyrinth of knowledge as Rosamond is in the labyrinth of her romantic plots” (90). Rothfield might underestimate 
the transgressive radicalism of Rosamond’s romantic plot. In a somewhat different register, Steedman remarks 
laconically (and not wrongly) that Middlemarch is “really … about sex and shopping” (94). 
491 Flint 164; Henry 2001, Henry 2012, 139, 192, 199-203; Michie 1987, 41, 106; Nestor 167; Rothfield 87; 
Steedman 94-9. Rebecca N. Mitchell’s recent essay (2007) investigates the limits of knowability among the couple 
and resists the facile narrative of Rosamond hampering Lydgate’s genius (see 321-2). 
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example (224). Although Patrick vindicates Rosamond, she also reads Rosamond’s character as 
integral to Lydgate’s story, arguing that Lydgate’s “flawed perspective on women” is the main 
reason for his “tragedy” (223). For Patrick, Rosamond remains a lamentable “product of her 
culture” whose character must be read primarily in conjunction with Lydgate’s flawed 
perspective on women as members of a different species (226). 
I would like to show that Rosamond neither lacks ambition, as Anne Patrick assumes 
(237), nor is she the “fair fragile creature” of Lydgate’s imagination (M 725). Rather, Rosamond 
and Lydgate are involved in a struggle over the decision-making powers central to their 
marriage, a struggle that will only end with Lydgate’s untimely demise and that reaches its 
tipping point when Rosamond procures her own miscarriage by deciding to go horse-back riding 
with Lydgate’s cousin. This overlooked detail in Eliot’s novel is politically subversive, yet 
difficult to detect. As Jill Matus has documented, Eliot’s—by post-Victorian estimates—very 
tame depiction of the progress of Hetty’s pregnancy in Adam Bede had been harshly attacked by 
one reviewer for its “intolerable” depiction of the “several stages that precede the birth of a 
child.”492 While it is possible that Eliot took this rebuke to heart and adjusted her later depiction 
of Rosamond’s pregnancy according to the reviewer’s preferences, it is important to note that we 
can trace “the subjective state of the woman approaching … motherhood” in Middlemarch, the 
factor that Eliot’s reviewer found particularly revolting (“Adam Bede” 251). As Rosamond 
anticipates becoming a mother, she does not automatically assume idealized attitudes and 
behaviors commonly associated with middle-class maternity. She refuses a form of physical 
labor that the medical establishment and culture at large took for granted, and is accompanied by 
risk to her health and her goals. Even scholars today normalize married women’s burden of 
                                                 
492 “Adam Bede” 251; see Matus 1995, 1. 
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pregnancy as a natural given. Jill Matus’ analysis of Rosamond’s pregnancy warrants a longer 
quotation here: 
Careless and irresponsible, Rosamond loses her unborn child… through her willful 
insistence in going horseriding. The loss seems not to affect Rosamond greatly; she is 
sure she would have had a miscarriage anyway, even if she had not gone riding. The 
suggestion is that she is too selfish for love or motherhood, both of which demand a 
heightened emotionality and capacity for intense connectedness. (1995, 241) 
 
While I do agree that Rosamond cannot ascend into the hallowed realm of idealized maternity at 
this stage in the narrative, I would like to depart from Matus’ reading (which interprets 
Rosamond’s miscarriage as meaningful in the context of Dorothea’s “coming of age,” 1995, 242) 
and propose that Rosamond’s miscarriage is an event that must be analyzed for the sake of the 
additional textual valences it opens up. It is possible to interpret Rosamond’s “mild” insistence 
that “the ride had made no difference, and that if she had stayed at home the same symptoms 
would have … ended in the same way, because she had felt something like them before” (M 549) 
as an indication of Rosamond’s previous attempts to induce an abortion. The above statement, 
coupled with Lydgate’s wonder “over the terrible tenacity of this mild creature” (M 549) and his 
“amazed sense of his powerlessness over Rosamond” (M 549) in the ensuing sentences is one of 
many textual instabilities allowing for the possibility that Rosamond is surreptitiously taking 
charge of the Lydgates’ family planning.  
Analyzing the extent of Rosamond’s passive-aggressive control over the fate of her 
marriage, her financial future, and her most important asset—her irresistible physicality—not 
only adds a new dimension to Lydgate’s failure to convince Rosamond that she must yield 
unequivocally to his judgment in all personal and professional (particularly medical) matters, but 
also endows Rosamond with a so far unacknowledged force of determination and political 
agency at the cost of one of the greatest moral infractions that a Victorian woman could commit. 
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Rosamond’s self-induced miscarriage functions as Eliot’s starkest critique of “the model of 
‘accomplishment’ that represented the least morally serious … version of women’s education” 
(Green 83). Eliot, not particularly renowned for her radical feminist politics, provides in 
Middlemarch a veiled representation of an abortion to warn her audiences that middle-class 
women’s morally empty education quite literally threatened to end the rule of the father.  
 
Is It 1870 Yet? 
As Gillian Beer has argued, one of the main interpretive challenges posed by 
Middlemarch is the fact that “it is endowed with the additional knowledge gained between 1830, 
the setting of the work, to around 1870, the time of its publication” (2006, 17). Beer reads the 
forty-year span between 1832 and 1871 as the novel’s “invisible structuring arc” (2006, 18), 
enabling Eliot’s first audiences to reflect on the tensions that exist between their immediate 
present and their past, thereby coming to terms with Victorian society’s (in)capacity for change. 
In terms of Rosamond’s willful miscarriage, the insight gained from Beer’s observation is that, 
since the novel is set before 1861 when women became liable for prosecution (Brookes 25), 
Rosamond’s action, if deliberate, is not directly punishable. Some of Eliot’s readers in 1871, 
however, might have been aware that self-induced abortions now carried the punishment of 
imprisonment for life as did the act of procuring drugs or the use of instruments to perform 
someone else’s abortion (Jones 196). The novel’s appearance after 1870 carries a precisely 
defined legal dimension to the severity of Rosamond’s transgression. 
Rosamond’s miscarriage can also be read in the context of raging debates in the press 
during the 1860s and 70s regarding “the emancipated woman’s flight from maternity” (Perkin 
283) and the fact that middle-class family sizes continued to shrink noticeably. Robert Woods 
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maintains that abortion in England remained too dangerous and its mechanisms largely unknown 
in England before 1850. However, in the second half of the nineteenth century, “induced 
abortions [were] responsible for a growing share of fetal deaths” (Woods 2009, 248). Reasons 
for this shift, according to Woods, were changes in middle-class expectations of well-being, 
leisure, and consumption which prompted restrictions of fertility (Woods 2000, 114). Rosamond, 
it can be argued, marks this shift in abortion-awareness in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Middlemarch is very much a product of its publication’s time as Rosamond’s 
assumptions and behaviors can be applied to societal changes after 1850. The complaint of a 
contributor to the Saturday Review is illustrative. In September 1871, this writer detected in 
women “a decided diminution … in reverence for parents, trust in men, and desire of children” 
and bemoaned the existence of women who seemed to “[despise] the pleasures and [contemn] 
the duties of maternity” (“British Mother” 335). While this particular Saturday Review’s 
contributor had in mind women who sought entry to the professions and institutions of higher 
education, Rosamond shares with these “New Women”493 social ambition and perseverance. 
Dorothea Brooke has been read as a precursor to the New Woman who, in the absence of a 
robust political movement, “cannot sustain an individual challenge to society at large” (Beer 
2006, 28). In Middlemarch, Eliot divides the emerging New Woman of the early 1870s into two 
constituent parts: New Women’s grand social and intellectual ambition is personified by 
Dorothea, while Rosamond exemplifies the movement’s troublesome tenacity. 
Lawrence Rothfield suggests that, next to clinical conceptions of the body, Eliot allows 
for other systems of understanding physicality that “are valid without being medical” (88). In 
                                                 
493 The term “New Woman” was coined by Sarah Grand in 1894 but has been applied by scholars retroactively to 
denote various clusters of social and political movements that emerged in the 1860s and advocated an expansion of 
women’s educational, social, and legal rights (Schaffer 40). 
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order to theorize Rosamond’s intractability beyond critics’ common assertion that it arises from 
childish selfishness, it will be useful to take a look at a sample advice book for married women 
published in the 1860s. Here, bodily “rules that do not match those of the clinic but that 
nevertheless have the ring of truth” emerge (Rothfield 88). Eliza Lynn Linton, prominent 
journalist and essayist, recommended to wives in 1868: 
If a woman’s air simply says at the end of it all [after a long admonition from her 
husband], ‘I can’t answer you, but I know I am right,’ a man has a lurking sense that his 
copious rhetoric has had a smack of the cowardly as well as of the tyrannical about it. 
And so, after a vigorous denunciation of some particular thing which his wife has done, a 
husband commonly finds himself no further than before; and the very instant that, from 
sheer weariness, he ceases, the wife usually steals out and does it again. (221) 
 
Rather than “nagging,” which Linton also suggests as a last-resort strategy to triumph over one’s 
husband (Linton 1868, 221), Rosamond is said to “[turn] her neck” (M 557), a sign of “perfect 
obstinacy”494 which Lydgate, after a painful series of arguments, eventually learns to decipher 
(M 323). Silent, non-verbal protest allows Rosamond to demoralize and disarm her husband. It 
appears as if she, ostensibly born sometime in the 1810s, had been following Mrs. Linton’s 
advice to the letter. Rosamond’s “education in deceit,” which might have been a staple for 
middle-class wives in the 1860s (Perkin 262), allows Rosamond to repress, conceal, and censor 
her thoughts and opinions while, to the amazement of her husband, continuing to advance her 
plans of upward social ascension. It is my contention that Rosamond’s miscarriage can be 
understood as part of that verbally subdued, yet bodily loquacious agenda. 
 
 
                                                 
494 This fetishization of Rosamond’s neck as a marker of silent sexual power also occurs on pages 105, 150, 282, 
323, 330, 548, 557, 563, 610, 711. Helena Michie reminds readers that “synecdoche is both a way of introducing 
sexuality by implication and a fragmentation and fetishization of culturally selected parts of the female body” (1987, 
86). 
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Rosamond’s Ambition 
When Lydgate learns that Rosamond has gone on a riding-exercise with his cousin, the 
foppish Captain Lydgate, he resorts to “thundering exclamations of astonishment” and insists 
that in matters such as these, he should be “the person to judge” for her (M 548). As Mrs. 
Linton’s advice-book prescribed, Rosamond’s reaction to her husband’s admonitions is silence, 
accompanied by “a little turning aside of the long neck” (M 548). Rather than responding directly 
to his request that she promise not to go riding again, she executes another of Ms. Linton’s 
advices: to evoke Lydgate’s realization that he has behaved tyrannically, she asks him to perform 
the delicate task of fastening her plaits, “so as to make a husband ashamed of standing there like 
a brute” (M 548). Lydgate temporarily assumes the role of his wife’s maid and loses the 
argument. 
As a direct result of this disagreement, Rosamond repeats her outing with Captain 
Lydgate, “the baronet’s third son” (M 545). As Beer writes, “adultery is a threshold” for many 
characters in the novel and Rosamond is certainly “driven by this fantasy” (2006, 17). The 
narrator states without much circumlocution that “Rosamond delighted in [Captain Lydgate’s] 
admiration … and he found it easy to spend several hours of the day in flirting with her” (M 
546). Whether Rosamond performs actual or imagined adultery with Captain Lydgate is of 
secondary importance. It does matter that the narrator describes Rosamond’s feelings during her 
cousin’s visit as “unprecedented but gracefully concealed exultation” (M 545); the orgasmic 
quality of the sensation being obvious. Even Lydgate, usually not privy to his wife’s fantasies, 
remarks that she seems to prefer his cousin’s manners over his own (M 547). Captain Lydgate, 
with his “delicately scented” (M 547) fatuousness and titled father, personifies all of Rosamond’s 
aspirations. Early on in the novel we learn that Rosamond deplores her parents’ manufacturer-
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and-innkeeper origins and that marrying into “family” (M 93) sums up her life’s aspiration. 
Embodying “the spectacle of the socially … ambitious woman” (Green 85), Rosamond eroticizes 
her connections to people of rank, and, more instinctively than rationally, calculates how she can 
bring about her own social rise: “There was nothing financial, still less sordid, in her previsions: 
she cared about … refinements, and not about the money that was to pay for them” (M 110). 
Eliot’s narrative does not conceal the fact that Rosamond marries Lydgate because he belongs to 
an aristocratic family, nor that she is more invested in forging a closer connection to his relatives 
than she is in improving the relationship with him. Upon first meeting Lydgate at Stone Court, 
Rosamond already anticipates the commencement of “the great epoch of her life” and conjures 
up a “little future” with him, since he neatly corresponds to her ideal suitor, being “somehow … 
related to a baronet” (M 109). Such acquisitive fantasies indicate the “cultural uneasiness” of the 
1860s with the socially ambitious, agential “New” woman (Green 85).  
By chapter 58 Lydgate has turned out to be more difficult “to enslave” (M 110) than 
Rosamond expected, and his cousin emerges as a preferable double to her husband—he has the 
same name, is of the same “good family,” and he is even more closely related to the baronet 
residing at Quallingham. The erotic fantasy of aristocratic kinship with Captain Lydgate is so 
powerful for Rosamond “that she imagined the knowledge of what was implied by his presence 
to be diffused through all other minds … his rank penetrated them as if it had been an odour” (M 
545). Her sexual, rather than merely romantic, attraction to rank and refinement dominates 
Rosamond’s perception of social realities to the point of becoming all-encompassing. The force 
of Rosamond’s erotic social fantasy pervades her physicality and, symbolically, prevents the 
gestation of the child fathered by Lydgate. On a literal level, this fetishization of status urges her 
to actions that threaten to shut down the natural reproduction of patriarchy. 
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It is significant that the crisis of authority between Lydgate and his wife is fought out 
over the riding excursion with Lydgate’s more appealing double. Rosamond’s miscarriage occurs 
at a point when the division between her and Lydgate is reaching its climax and will lead to 
permanent rupture. The following passage encapsulates the decision-making process leading to 
Rosamond’s miscarriage and contains an intricately interconnected web of ambitions: authority 
over her husband; the performance of an erotic, exhibitionist tableau with Captain Lydgate, 
visible to all her neighbors (and the reader); the exclusion of her husband from the adulterous 
adventure; the revival of her pre-marital condition (which includes her pre-pregnancy physical 
state); and her will to social ascension: 
Rosamond had that victorious obstinacy which never wastes its energy in impetuous 
resistance. What she liked to do was to her the right thing, and all her cleverness was 
directed to getting the means of doing it. She meant to go out riding again … and she did 
go on the next opportunity of her husband's absence, not intending that he should know 
until it was late enough not to signify to her. The temptation was certainly great: she was 
very fond of the exercise, and the gratification of riding on a fine horse, with Captain 
Lydgate, Sir Godwin’s son, on another fine horse by her side, and of being met in this 
position by any one but her husband, was something as good as her dreams before 
marriage: moreover she was riveting the connection with the family at Quallingham … 
(M 549) 
 
The narrator, without judging Rosamond’s actions, reiterates Mrs. Linton’s counsel to the young 
bride: Rosamond “steals out and does it again.” The direct consequence of the betrayal of 
Lydgate’s authority is that Rosamond’s horse “took fright, and caused a worse fright to 
Rosamond, leading finally to the loss of her baby” (M 549), while Lydgate is left to wonder at 
Rosamond’s lack of compliance to his wishes as her husband and his advice as a medical 
professional. Lydgate’s reaction to his wife’s recklessness is one of outraged amazement because 
he overestimated the extent to which his expert medical knowledge allowed him to predict his 
wife’s character. Early on in the novel, Lydgate reads Rosamond, in her “perfect blond 
loveliness,” as possessing 
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just the kind of intelligence one would desire in a woman—polished, refined, docile, 
lending itself to finish in all the delicacies of life, and enshrined in a body which 
expressed this with a force of demonstration that excluded the need for other evidence. 
Lydgate felt sure that if ever he married, his wife would have that feminine radiance, that 
distinctive womanhood which must be classed with flowers and music, that sort of beauty 
which by its very nature was virtuous, being moulded only for pure and delicate joys. (M 
252, 153) 
 
Lydgate’s mistake is that he fails to suspect that Rosamond’s behavior, like that of a patient, 
could be explained by “conjunctions” of motivations that “always depend on conditions that are 
not obvious” (M 151). However, the “distinction of mind” Lydgate usually exhibits, particularly 
as a surgeon, does “not penetrate his feeling and judgment about furniture, or women” (M 141). 
To him, she is all sex. Because he classified, rather than interpreted Rosamond495, he misread, 
even failed to detect, the symptoms of arriviste determination. 
Significantly, immediately following the description of Lydgate’s impotent frustration, 
both medical and masculine, about his failure to regulate his wife’s behavior, we learn that 
“Rosamond was soon looking lovelier than ever at her worktable … She knew that she was a 
much more exquisite ornament to the drawing-room there than any daughter of the [baronet’s] 
family” (M 550). The sequence of narration highlights Rosamond’s concern to preserve her 
looks. Always “[conscious] that she was being looked at,” she prioritizes maintaining her 
appearance over the physical changes and eventual seclusion associated with pregnancy because 
she wants to continue her project of social advancement (M 109). Mrs. Vincy’s comment 
regarding her daughter’s miscarriage—“poor thing … I’m sure I felt for her being disappointed 
of her baby; but she got over it nicely” (M 535)—helps to cement further the suspicion that 
Rosamond, absolutely not crestfallen about the loss of her baby but contently “looking lovelier 
than ever,” is aware of the risk to herself and the child when she disobeys her husband’s orders. 
                                                 
495 See Rothfield 109; R. Mitchell 319. 
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Because of the degree of concealment to which Eliot’s narrator must resort to avoid censorship, 
the intentionality underlying the course of events in this chapter must be added retroactively by 
the reader. Critics have underestimated the magnitude by which Rosamond’s performance of 
physical perfection and dignified poise influences her behavioral choices. If we accept an early 
aside by the narrator and indeed consider Rosamond “an actress of parts that entered into her 
physique: she even acted her own character,” we realize that motherhood is (not yet) part of this 
perfectly staged paragon of femininity (M 109). Directing “all her cleverness … to getting the 
means of doing” what she likes, Rosamond is intently, doggedly focused on staying in character 
and maintaining her bodily status quo until she has secured permanent association with the 
baronet’s family. When Lydgate begins to “survey[] her … as if he were looking for symptoms,” 
it is already too late (M 617). 
 The narrator does not mention whether Lydgate informed his wife of the medical risks 
associated with riding during pregnancy. However, the 1860s medical press documents that 
middle-class women knew these risks. Like doctors who were taken aback by “women’s refusal 
to accept that abortion was wrong, especially since the women concerned were not usually 
depraved members of the criminal classes, but appeared quite ordinary and respectable” (Knight 
64), George Greaves, contributor to the Transactions of the Manchester Statistical Society, 
lamented in 1863 that “married ladies, whenever they find themselves pregnant, habitually 
[begin] to take exercise, on foot or on horseback … and thus [make] themselves abort” (13-4). 
Greaves furthermore criticized that married women, some of them “highly educated” and 
otherwise “most estimable” would “lightly and thoughtlessly treat this event, considering it as a 
‘mishap,’ although it is an unnatural process … altogether regardless of their social, moral, and 
religious responsibility” (13). George Napheys, in 1869, wrote that abortion was “fearfully 
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prevalent” among “respectable Christian matrons … walking in better classes of society” (123, 
emphasis Napheys’s). If we remember that Victorian abortion was often conceptualized in terms 
of class, Rosamond’s unfashionable mother, the “innkeeper’s daughter” (M 89), arouses 
suspicion as to being the possible source of the prohibited information.496 
As early as 1660, in The Diseases of Women with Child, and in Child-bed, François 
Mauriceau had stipulated that miscarriage could be induced by “‘falling, leaping, dancing, and 
running or riding,’” next to a plethora of other accidental causes (qtd. in Woods 2009, 107). 
Alfred Swaine Taylor’s Manual of Medical Jurisprudence, first published in 1844 and reissued 
until far into the twentieth century, identified “violent agitations of the body, as by riding or 
driving over a rough pavement, in which case no marks of violence would be apparent” as some 
of the main causes of “criminal abortion.”497 Napheys suggests that “taking drugs, or using 
instruments” were the means usually applied, along with less definite “want of care” (123). 
Finally, the 1873 edition of Taylor’s Medical Jurisprudence contained the court case of R v. 
Wallis: during the Winchester Autumn Assizes in 1871, a solicitor was charged with having 
aided his wife in the procurement of abortifacient drugs. However, in the opinion of three 
medical experts, these drugs could not have brought about the solicitor’s wife’s abortion. The 
wife then admitted to having gone horseback riding shortly before she miscarried, and the court 
ruled that an accidental shock sustained from riding had led to the miscarriage. The charges were 
dropped (A. Taylor 1873, 186-7). This legal precedent, occurring when Middlemarch’s final 
                                                 
496 See Barret-Ducrocq 130, on historical evidence that working-class women were expected to possess such 
“traditional know-how.” 
497 A. Taylor 1844, 591. The same passage occurs on p. 780 in Taylor’s 1865 edition of The Principles of Medical 
Jurisprudence. Scholars have identified other strategies commonly employed by women: “undertaking strenuous 
exercise, such as excessive dancing or the lifting of heavy objects; slamming stomachs into walls; tight lacing; and 
even deliberate provocations to incite domestic violence” (Kilday 83). 
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chapters were published, and the previous medical references indicate that pregnant women were 
aware of the dangers that accompanied strenuous exercise during pregnancy and that they had 
reason to feel relatively safe from prosecution. Rosamond could calculate her risks and she took 
her chances, having, as in financial matters, “no consciousness that her action could rightly be 
called false” (M 627).  
 
A Failed Union 
In Middlemarch, Eliot imagines the ideal heterosexual configuration between men and 
women in terms of an “intellectual union” in which husband and wife share similar aspirations 
and interests (Green 85). Laura Green argues that successful unions like that of Will and 
Dorothea, Fred and Mary, or Sir James and Celia are founded not upon the shared pursuits of 
professional life, but upon common temperament and mental capacity (85). Certainly, Lydgate’s 
reliance on popular metaphors about women forecloses the possibility of a union with a woman 
of his temperament. Lydgate’s admiration of Dorothea’s “fountain of friendship towards men” 
(M 723), that is, her abnormal ability to operate outside the logic of sexual relationality with 
men, leads to his quasi-religious idolization of her in the last chapters of the novel. It is probably 
Dorothea’s rank that enables this superiority—she simply is not a candidate for sexual 
reproduction with Lydgate. Rosamond, however, fully corresponds to Lydgate’s understanding 
of female physicality and intellectuality as pathologically stymied: “present in his imagination 
[was] the weakness of [women’s] frames and the delicate poise of their health both in body and 
mind” (M 610). In contrast to Dorothea, Rosamond, the parvenu, very much participates in the 
gender economy that privileges beautiful surface over moral depth and sexual attraction over 
serious communication. The uneasy encounter between Dorothea and Rosamond in chapter 43 
 281 
underscores their class differential: Dorothea’s easy grace and simple dignity can safely risk 
“sleeves hanging all out of the fashion,” while Rosamond’s vulgar and “wondrous crown of hair-
plaits, … her pale-blue dress of [perfect] fit and fashion … [and her] large embroidered collar 
which it was to be hoped all beholders would know the price of” draw attention to their owner’s 
materialism (M 406-7). Rather than supporting his ambitions, sharing his sensibilities, and 
offering herself as the reward for his hard work, Rosamond co-competes with Lydgate for 
material comfort and social standing, and fatally wrestles with him for marital authority. Because 
Lydgate—who is also, fatally, “perceptually limited” in his tissue research (Rothfield 95)—
conceptualizes his wife as “an animal of another and feebler species,” their marriage remains not 
only metaphorically, but biologically sterile until she has “mastered” him and convinced him to 
relocate to London (M 628). 
As critics note, Eliot insists in Middlemarch on the “abstract moral significance” of 
“fulfilling family ties,” such as parenthood and marriage (Green 100). Feminist scholar Carol 
Smart observes from a different political angle that compulsory motherhood in the nineteenth 
century “was a way of attaching women to marriage and the whole set of legal statuses that 
flowed from it” (30). With her miscarriage, Rosamond resists this attachment to marriage and 
parenthood. Within the logic of Middlemarch, Rosamond’s uncanny ability to evade legal and 
moral coverture symbolically seals her husband’s and her own incapacity to achieve marital 
mutuality. In a novel as invested in didactically problematizing “the deep-seated habit of direct 
fellow-feeling with individual fellow-men” (M 582), reproduction functions as the biological 
confirmation of heterosexual fellow-feeling—and Lydgate and Rosamond can ascend into this 
realm only after he has been fully “enslaved” by her (M 733). Procreation is by no means central 
to Middlemarch: Celia’s flippant maternity evokes suspicions regarding the aristocracy’s long-
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term soundness, while Dorothea’s maternal experiences are ticked off in a few sentences 
confirming that she becomes “absorbed into the life of another” and almost pays with her life for 
the privilege (M 783). However, in a letter to her friend Emily Davies, founder of Girton Collge, 
Eliot affirmed that her priorities lay with “the bonds of family affection and family duties”: “We 
can no longer afford to part with that exquisite type of gentleness, tenderness, and possible 
maternity suffusing a woman’s being with affectionateness, which makes what we mean by the 
feminine character” (GEL 4:467-8). Although Middlemarch’s last chapter confirms that 
Rosamond and Lydgate will have four children and that Rosamond happily makes “a very pretty 
show with her daughters, driving out in her carriage” (M 782), she is emphatically excluded from 
Eliot’s conceptions of ideal femininity and maternity. Rosamond’s miscarriage is a symptom of 
her unsuitableness for Eliot’s “exquisite type” of woman. 
 
What Counts as Evidence? 
Asking what would happen to Middlemarch if one assumes that Rosamond’s miscarriage 
was precipitated by a series of intentional choices makes visible certain politically incendiary 
aspects of the novel. A retroactive supplementation of the text with the rubric “induced 
miscarriage” not only brings into focus Rosamond’s willingness to sacrifice long-term domestic 
harmony for the sake of pursuing her erotic project of social self-fulfillment; it unhinges 
conventional assumptions about how often middle-class heroines manage their reproductive 
capacity and thus potentially oppose the legally entrenched wishes of their husbands. Through 
this reading practice, it is also possible to extrapolate the conditions of representability of fertility 
management in Victorian fiction. In Middlemarch, abortion occurs as a superficially accidental 
incident whose legal, moral, and political ramifications are obscured by narrative indirectness 
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and the comforting—and protective—knowledge that accidental miscarriages were far from 
uncommon at the time. 
It is very difficult, and possibly pointless, to trace the extent of George Eliot’s own 
intentionality when it comes to Rosamond’s miscarriage. The reading and composition 
notebooks she used during Middlemarch’s drafting do not provide guidance as to her conception 
of Rosamond’s character or the question of Victorian fertility control. As is the case with the 
novel, however, the notebook itself leaves traces of prohibited knowledge. Penciled into page 32 
of Eliot’s notebook at the Folger Library we find a brief entry, presumably written sometime in 
1869, simply reading “Eringo root” (Pratt and Neufeldt 21). Eliot might have gleaned the name 
of this root from her copy of the ninth edition of John Paris’s Pharmacologia (1843), in which 
Paris comments that, during Elizabethan times, eringo “had the reputation of being able to 
restore decayed vigor” (98). The Latin name for eringo is eryngium; and some species, such as 
the alpine snakeroot (Eryngium alpinium L.), were used as abortifacients in the seventeenth 
century (Riddle 154). The chapter in which Paris references eringo root also lists several plants 
with abortifacient activity, such as opopanax and hemlock (95-6). Does this isolated reference to 
eringo root prove that Eliot knew about abortifacients and possibly used them herself or 
somehow incorporated them in the narrative of Middlemarch? Not at all. But it does help 
illustrate the existence of sub-public Victorian archives of knowledge and apparatuses of 
information circulation which we have inherited in the form of stray and decontextualized 
fragments and which I have attempted to recombine in a contextually sound and politically 
meaningful way. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
TENDING TO OLD STORIES: DANIEL DERONDA AND HYSTERIA 
 
How to Talk about the Hysterical Heroine 
If it is Lydgate’s incapacity to diagnose his wife’s will to power that threatens patriarchal 
reproduction in Middlemarch, Eliot amplifies her critique of incapable fathers’ guardianship over 
their families in her next novel, Daniel Deronda. Here, fathers and husbands again exhibit a 
lackluster incompetence in their dealings with their female kin, as do Middlemarch’s Lydgate 
and Casaubon. In addition, most adult men, aside from the titular hero, belong to a type of 
masculinity that Judith Wilt calls the “unscrupulous male.”498 As decades of scholarly 
commentary on Daniel Deronda, and Gwendolen’s plot in particular, have documented, 
negligent and vicious patriarchs thrive in Eliot’s last novel and, along with unruly maidens, 
endanger the reproduction of the upper middle-class family.499 Daniel Deronda chiefly 
investigates this family’s future cultural potential and, in the end, challenges its survival. As I 
have shown in the previous chapter, Rosamond clandestinely controls the Lydgates’ family 
planning and bears four children on her own schedule. If Gillian Beer is correct when she notes 
that, in Eliot, the “future is suggested through progeny” (2009, 173), Rosamond’s actions ensure 
not only the continuation, but also the social rise of her family—an ascension that remains 
                                                 
498 Wilt 314; see DD 33. 
499 See Zimmerman 210; David 179; Herzog 38. 
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morally and intellectually empty. In the more radically pessimistic Daniel Deronda, elite 
families’ reproduction is critically threatened. None of the main characters has produced legally 
recognized offspring by the last chapter of this long novel. Instead, with Deronda’s help and after 
much suffering, Gwendolen, “the spoiled child,” chooses the path of self-improvement, albeit 
without a clear sense on whom she should practice her newfound charity. Deronda, the moral 
center of the novel, sets out on a fuzzy proto-Zionist quest, removing his rectitude from England 
and from the class in which he was raised. As many critics have pointed out, Deronda leaves 
Gwendolen isolated and anticipating more suffering.500 Even more than in Middlemarch, 
patriarchy as a biological process is in decline, the symptoms of which are again communicated 
by the heroine’s physical and psychosexual pathologies. As I will show, many of Gwendolen’s 
symptoms are fleshed-out versions of the ones already observed in Rosamond.  
This chapter suggests that Eliot’s much written-about heroine, Gwendolen Harleth, 
embodies Eliot’s continuing concern with ill-educated, sexually and socially ambitious 
femininity. In Middlemarch, Eliot pairs the female l’enfant terrible with a medical expert whose 
androcentric blinders render him incapable of diagnosing his wife’s ailment, particularly her 
wish to achieve mastery over men by using her extraordinarily seductive physicality. In Daniel 
Deronda, Eliot surrounds Gwendolen (in many ways, Rosamond’s direct successor) with male 
authority figures who are charged with correcting the heroine’s initial moral miseducation. 
Among them is Henleigh Grandcourt, almost-titled sexual predator, who exploits Gwendolen’s 
physical, social, and emotional vulnerabilities. In what follows, I suggest that Daniel Deronda’s 
Gwendolen plot explores what would have happened to Rosamond if the men in her life had not 
only registered, but capitalized on the political dangers of women’s erotically charged caprice. 
                                                 
500 Zimmerman 213-4; David 135; Weisser 10. 
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The result is a brand of malevolent patriarchy that produces abused wives and no legitimate 
offspring. 
Eliot’s plot replicates and critiques standard medical plots in which hysterical upper 
middle-class women are broken in and systematically turned acquiescent in order to function 
within a social system that primarily requires their sexual service and reproductive capacity. 
Although Eliot withholds Gwendolen’s reentrance into the reproductive economy at the end of 
Daniel Deronda, Gwendolen achieves frictionless conduct, the price of which is sterility, 
melancholy, and a glaring absence of purpose. As I have suggested, Middlemarch’s hidden 
abortion plot operates in secret tandem with the novel’s overall promotion of a pedagogy of 
female service and sexual restraint, advocating for a reining in of leisured women’s ambition and 
vanity. Eliot’s next novel sharpens this message by dissecting the legally and medically 
mandated crushing of the young heroine’s dangerously fractious temperament. When the novel 
closes, Gwendolen’s hysterical symptoms are alleviated by means of patriarchal technologies old 
and new, such as Grandcourt’s marital intimidation and rape of Gwendolen, in conjunction with 
the proto-psychiatric talking cure administered by Deronda. Before I make my case about 
Gwendolen’s hysteria—whose auto-erotic and orgasmic qualities previous critics have failed to 
note—and its terrifying cure, I will provide a brief comparison of Rosamond and Gwendolen’s 
overlapping symbolic domains, followed by a review of the many previous approaches to 
Gwendolen’s mysterious etiology, as the basis for my own contribution. 
 
Eliot’s Coquettes 
 Despite the many parallels between Rosamond and Gwendolen’s characterization, 
narrative function, and their similar moral transgressions, not many critics have made the 
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connection. I want to draw attention to both characters’ shared symbolic domain before 
analyzing such typification as rooted in contemporary medical discourse. Rosamond and 
Gwendolen represent the same type of femininity. Unabashedly vain, self-interested, and 
desiring admiration by men of rank, Gwendolen and Rosamond embody their milieu’s impaired 
moral condition.501 Their narcissism, reflective of English upper-class narcissism as a whole, has 
been nurtured by the unchecked reading of popular novels and their attendance of “showy” 
finishing schools (DD 17). Similar to Rosamond’s education at Mrs. Lemon’s, Gwendolen’s 
two-year stay at a questionable établissement rounds off her accomplishments in music and 
French and, more importantly, trains her in the mercenary art of self-display. Throughout the 
novel, Eliot’s narrator censures women’s self-commodification and employs conventional 
Biblical or pagan imagery to critique public spectacles of female social ambition, unequivocally 
tied to female sexuality. Daniel Deronda’s first few pages include four instances of Gwendolen’s 
association with a green-and-silver serpent, two with a “sylph,” albeit a “problematic” one, and 
one with “Lamia,” half woman, half snake, fatally bent on seducing men.502  
As with Rosamond, the problem Gwendolen represents to the reader regards the 
relationship between form and content, the interactions between female body and mind. Does 
                                                 
501 See Beer 2009, 205; David 179; Weisser 7. 
502 DD 5, 7. Eliot’s narrator twice calls Rosamond a sylph (M 150, 556) and twice a mermaid (M 410, 547), usually 
when the narrator criticizes Lydgate’s attraction to Rosamond’s artful display of femininity or when Lydgate 
realizes that he has been deceived by that display. Gwendolen bears the timeworn epithet “nymph” on two 
occasions, both times during archery events when she is under Grandcourt’s gaze (DD 85, 122). Eliot was probably 
aware of the semantic link to “nymphomania,” a term denoting excessive female desire that had been in use since 
the early 1700s and that was used in Ferrier’s Functions of the Brain (1876), a volume owned by Eliot and Lewes 
(OED, Ferrier 122, Baker 63). 
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Gwendolen adhere to a pre-formulated type—have we heard her story before?503 Like her 
Biblical and pagan predecessors, Gwendolen’s ambitions and motivations revolve pathologically 
around herself; she is actually not very “exceptional,” and, despite her self-absorption, lacks 
introspection. Her inner moral state—the question whether she can be redeemed—is as 
foreclosed to herself as it is to others, including the reader (Ender 236). The narrator orchestrates 
a plot in which Gwendolen, Deronda, and the reader engage in reading Gwendolen together in an 
attempt to solve the riddle posed by the relationship of female bodily performance and 
psychological configuration, mediated by Eliot’s often-ambivalent narrator. 
Similar to descriptions of Rosamond, the narrator systematically fetishizes Gwendolen’s 
physicality that has a “rare grace of movement and bearing, and a certain daring which gave 
piquancy to a very common egoistic ambition” (DD 42). Even the “long white throat” Eliot’s 
narrator reserves for Rosamond in Middlemarch occurs again in Daniel Deronda’s descriptions 
of Gwendolen. Once more it functions as a sexually appealing body part that communicates 
defiance and snake-like cunning.504 Cryptic remarks about Gwendolen’s “undefinable stinging 
quality” caused by “a trace of demon ancestry” (DD 55) suggest that the girl challenges 
                                                 
503 See Beer 2009, 202-4, for a discussion on Gwendolen’s resistance to typification and the novel’s inability to 
propose a resolution outside the marriage plot. In the end, Beer suggests, Eliot chooses “indeterminacy” for 
Gwendolen (204). 
504 DD 7, 22, 55-6, 83, 502. Eliot’s Daniel Deronda notebooks show that the name ‘Gwendolen’ was chosen for its 
rich symbolic etymology, harking back to Celtic roots for “white,” “woman,” and “Venus” as well as figures that are 
mythologically analogous to the virgin moon goddess and huntress Diana/Artemis (see Beer 1983, 183; Reimer 38). 
Eliot’s use of Diana symbolism becomes intentionally heavy-handed during the novel’s archery scenes (DD 136, 
272). ‘Gwendolen’ is a name exclusive to the British Isles, hence Eliot’s note: “Gwen is considered as the British 
Venus” (Irwin 445-6). ‘Harleth’ is a near homophone to ‘harlot,’ a connection so obvious that scholars do not 
usually comment on it. Despite Gwendolen’s complexity and depth of character, Eliot, in naming her heroine, 
creates the British virgin-harlot, a type of pathological femininity endemic to England. Eliot’s association of 
Gwendolen with a “demon” continues throughout the novel (DD 302, 348, 354, 577, 583). 
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Christian-patriarchal norms because, literally and symbolically, she operates without a father.505 
This quality poisons her attractiveness in Deronda’s eyes—and, for the implied male reader, it 
adds a titillating element to an otherwise clichéd body. When Eliot introduces Gwendolen at the 
seedy Leubronn gambling table, onlookers, including Deronda, inspect every feature of her 
face—complexion, nose, mouth—for its sexual appeal with an invasive, fragmenting gaze that 
borders on the pornographic. Eliot’s hackneyed, fetishizing rhetoric suggests a devaluation of 
Gwendolen’s sexually suffused self-staging and contains Gwendolen’s transgressions within the 
realm of stereotype.506 Because her self-staging is inherently predictable, she likely will not go 
on grand adventures. The novel’s setup as moral tale promises that she will either fall or ascend. 
As if to contain the potential for movement upwards or downwards, Gwendolen looks too pale, 
too aware of her own beauty, and is too intent on rendering her features statuesque, “immovable” 
(DD 7-8). Her one effort at semi-public acting—the famous tableau scene in which she fails to 
perform Hermione’s release from statuesque imprisonment—ends in disaster: Gwendolen must 
decide, and, when accepting Grandcourt’s proposal of marriage, she falls. 
As the novel’s first paragraph suggests, Gwendolen’s beauty coerces observers to look 
again. She is aggressive in her demand for attention and admiration which allows her to run “a 
domestic empire” composed of her mother and four younger step-sisters, all of them in awe of 
the “princess in exile” (DD 32). Gwendolen, with her flock of subservient women and her 
distaste for the “insipidly feminine,” plays at being patriarch herself, a pursuit unmistakably tied 
to her masterful horsewomanship (DD 24). Similar to Rosamond, she perceives her connections 
                                                 
505 Athena Vrettos remarks that the “demonic” constitutes Gwendolen’s “ability to appropriate and disrupt 
authorized forms of vision” (570). Although her bodily descriptions mark her as the object of Deronda’s (and the 
reader’s) gaze, Gwendolen keeps looking back. 
506 For the complexities of the narrator’s “masculine” gaze, see Ender 234-5; Vrettos 570. 
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to men of rank and the personal advantages potentially deriving from such ties as an “odour” that 
rules her choices.507 Again like Rosamond, Gwendolen has a penchant for erotically charged 
tableaus and has cultivated an “almost miraculous power of self-control” to avoid public 
humiliation (DD 503). Being of “very common” provenance, morally at least, Gwendolen, 
predictably, is compelled to put her “majestic figure” to use after her mother’s financial ruin, 
and, once married to Grandcourt, who is next in line for a baronetcy, Deronda’s friend Hans 
Meyrick half-admiringly, half-deridingly takes to calling the usually loftily poised Gwendolen 
“the Vandyke duchess” (DD 246). Gwendolen thus glides from one typification into another, 
never quite stabilizing an identity independent of spectacular performance. It is this 
“iridescence” the novel presents as pathological (DD 33). 
 
Tending to Old Stories 
Much recent scholarship explains Gwendolen’s mysterious “fits of spiritual dread” in 
terms of childhood abuse by her stepfather—the event that led to her being “spoiled”—and traces 
the incest’s burdening of Gwendolen’s marriage and her relationship to Deronda.508 A parallel 
“symptom school” resists the incest narrative, and investigates Gwendolen’s symptoms using 
contemporary medical writings.509 Most recently, Jill Matus has refuted the well-honed Freudian 
narrative of Gwendolen’s psychic development. Although she concedes that Gwendolen’s 
symptoms (nightmares, unreliable memory, and temporal confusion) constitute “textbook 
                                                 
507 DD 115; MM 545. For Eliot, the olfactory pervasiveness of scent has strong sexual undertones. It is also the sense 
that allows for the least precision in verbal representation, analogous to the extremely restricted verbal repertoire for 
female sensation, particularly sexual sensation, available to Victorian writers. 
508 See Wilt; Penner; Herzog; Reimer; Henry.  
509 See During; Vrettos; Ender; Tromp; J. Wood; Trotter; Matus. 
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symptoms of trauma or PTSD,” Matus cautions that the use of the word ‘traumata’ as signifying 
psychic wounds was not used until the turn of the century. She shows that Eliot helps create a 
discourse around psychological damage rendering memory and consciousness unreliable. For 
Matus, Gwendolen’s “hidden wound is most obviously the effect of terror in response to external 
events” confounded by Gwendolen’s interior “hauntings” (70). 
 Jane Wood provides the most thorough analysis of Gwendolen’s hysteria in light of 
contemporary nineteenth-century science to date. Drawing from neurological theory, such as 
Lewes’s Problems of Life and Mind (1874-79) and Henry Maudsley’s Body and Mind (1871), 
Wood sees Gwendolen’s “iridescen[t]” self-division as “a burden of inheritance” (145). 
Gwendolen, caught in Darwin’s deterministic headlights, is “pathologically self-obsessed,” 
Wood suggests, and lacks the “nervous equipment” to make rational choices, because her will is 
disproportionate to her physiological make-up (138-9, 142). I build on Wood’s suggestive 
reading by honing in on symptoms related to Gwendolen’s psychosexual development and 
Eliot’s conception of them as “hysterical.”510 
David Trotter, in an essay that links Gwendolen’s characterization to an emerging 
discourse surrounding agoraphobia, seeks to bypass discussions of hysteria and remarks that  
the only symptom of hysteria [Gwendolen] ever exhibits is the choking sensation brought 
about by the thought of what her husband might do to her … Unlike the hysteric, she 
suffers in mind rather than in body, and is able, to a large extent, to keep her fits under 
control. (467) 
 
                                                 
510 See DD 303, 514, 601, 683, 691. Importantly, Eliot only uses the term in its adjectival form, possibly to avoid 
classification that would counter the sensationalist and supernatural aspects of Gwendolen’s “fits of … terror” (DD 
52). 
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Although Trotter acknowledges that Gwendolen does exhibit “fits”—she has three of them over 
the course of the novel—he focuses on Gwendolen’s “spiritual dread” as an agoraphobic, rather 
than a hysterical, presentation of nervous disease.511 
 After sampling some standard nineteenth-century texts on nervous disease in Eliot’s 
possession, it is possible to revise the notion that “Eliot wanted to try out rhetorics other than that 
of hysteria in designing her novel.”512 Eliot’s depiction of Gwendolen’s pathology owes much to 
an older tradition of medical writing about hysteria that was revitalized in the 1870s before being 
absorbed by Freudian practice at the end of the century. It understood hysteria to encompass a set 
of morally questionable behaviors and personality traits, along with diffuse physiological 
symptoms, whose diagnosis occurred with an implicit “healthy,” well-adjusted type in mind—
and whose characteristics, in turn, differed from author to author. As this tradition increasingly 
located hysteria and related pathologies, such as hypochondria and nervousness, in bourgeois or 
aristocratic female bodies, the unacknowledged ideal began to correspond to an ever-narrower 
type of Victorian femininity (Micale 155). According to authors of this school, hysterics 
displayed morally questionable traits like “eccentricity, impulsiveness, emotionality, 
                                                 
511 Nightmares, phobias, avoidance of sex, and agoraphobia are symptoms of what scholars of sexual abuse now 
deem “rape trauma syndrome” (Hesford 192). 
512 Trotter 467. Eliot’s notebooks for Daniel Deronda contain little evidence that Eliot consulted medical works 
explicitly for her description of Gwendolen; most of her copious research notes relate to the history of Judaism. In 
May 1876, Eliot read Sir James Paget’s Clinical Lectures and Essays (1875) and, possibly concerned about her own 
health, as Jane Irwin notes, marked up passages relating to “nervous mimicry” (Irwin 351). Paget had been Eliot and 
Lewes’ physician since February 1874 and had presented a copy of his book to Lewes. In an effort to curb the 
inflationary use of the term hysteria, Paget describes as “nervous mimicry” all symptoms previously classified as 
hysterical, apart from the “convulsions and sense of suffocation,” which can also be called simply “hypochondriasis 
and melancholy” (175). Paget distinguishes between the “[e]xtreme nervous sensibility” (or, interchangeably, 
“hyperæsthetic or hyperneurotic” states) of the neuromimetic and the symptoms reported by “hypochondriacs” on 
the basis of their responses to the perceived disease (this passage is underlined by Eliot). Hypochondriacs react to 
trivial pain with panic; the neuromimetic is calm, proud, or self-complacent about his ability to endure torment (180, 
see Irwin 351-2). Gwendolen, according to this classification, is a hypochondriac. 
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coquettishness, deceitfulness, and hypersexuality,” but these criteria were flexible enough to 
allow diagnosis of conduct that seemed politically impermissible (Micale 24). Among its most 
eminent advocates were Wilhelm Griesinger in Germany as well as Robert Brudenell Carter and 
Henry Maudsley in England—all of whose works were extant, and some of them partially 
marked-up, in Lewes and Eliot’s library.513 It is fair to say that these nineteenth-century 
descriptions of hysterical symptomology read like Gwendolen’s blueprint, even on the lexical 
level.514 
 Earlier representatives of hysteria’s moral school515 posited a connection between 
dysfunctions of the female genital tract and psychological disruptions, although later authors 
questioned this facile chain of causation. It can be assumed that, for many of these authors, 
femaleness itself constituted a pathological condition.516 Moritz Heinrich Romberg postulates 
with magisterial concision in 1853: “The condition for the origin of hysteria is the sexual 
                                                 
513 Baker 26, 62, 81, 115, 132. Baker’s annotations suggest that Griesinger’s Gesammelte Abhandlungen (1872), a 
1874 edition of Thomas Laycock’s On Certain Organic Disorders and Defects of Memory, and Moritz Heinrich 
Romberg’s A Manual of the Nervous Diseases of Man (1853) had Lewes’s marginal notes; Maudsley’s The 
Physiology of Mind (1876) and Sir William Paget’s Clinical Lectures and Essays (1875) had Eliot’s. Baker lists no 
annotations for Carter’s On the Pathology and Treatment of Hysteria (1853) apart from a personal dedication from 
the author to one “Dr. Tweedle” from 1853, indicating perhaps that either Lewes or Eliot purchased the work 
second-hand. I also use Laycock’s A Treatise on the Nervous Diseases of Women (1840), as Carter references him. 
Romberg is mentioned by Maudsley (1876). 
514 I am unable to provide a more complete history of the concept of hysteria here; for an outline, see Micale 3-29. 
Ilza Veith’s Hysteria (1965) remains the standard historiography. 
515 See Veith 199-210; Micale 146-61. 
516 See Maines 2, 35. Jean-Martin Charcot, French “father of neurology,” polemically resisted conceptualizations of 
hysteria as originating in the uterus or ovaries, and contradicted physicians who associated hysteria with 
hypersexuality. For Charcot, hysteria could be traced back to a dysfunction of the nervous system, and its outbreak 
was aided by hereditary and environmental factors, such as physical and emotional shock. He was the first to 
classify the paroxysm and its stages, leading to a widely circulated atlas of photographs depicting hysterics 
published by his disciples between 1876-80. Like many of his contemporaries, he did not believe hysteria could be 
cured. It was only in the 1880s that he classified hysteria as a psychological rather than neurological disease (Micale 
25, 88-95, 137). Eliot and Lewes owned volumes II and III of Charcot’s 1874 Leçons sur les maladies du système 
nerveux (Baker 38). 
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maturity of the female” and “the source of the disease is permanent” (Romberg 86, 99). 
Although the range of hysterical symptoms described by my limited sample is enormous, authors 
agree that the necessary ingredient of the disease is the “hysterical paroxysm,”517 a spasm 
produced by an underlying environmental trigger and resulting in emotional disturbance, as 
opposed to the epileptic fit. The paroxysm was said to be marked by paleness, dream-like states 
of distraction, sudden panic attacks, laughing or sobbing fits, and dizziness, less often 
hallucinations, swoons, convulsions, even catalepsy and coma.518 Often, patients are “stunned by 
the shock of a calamity, or … stupefied by terror” (Carter 1853, 4); they lose control over their 
thoughts and become fixated on the origin of the unusual excitement. Causes of the paroxysm 
include “sudden fright, disappointment, or anger”; when the trigger is removed, recovery is 
instant (Carter 1853, 3, 5). Aftershock can occur, accompanied by pains of the nerves, and by an 
overall estrangement from the own body, from others, or from reality itself.519 
 The hysterical patient is usually a woman, although Griesinger and Romberg also allow 
for male hysterics; Griesinger sees uterine dysfunctions as symptoms rather than triggers of 
hysteria.520 Hysterics are often virgins and their symptoms begin at the onset of puberty; the 
disease breaks out fully in one’s twenties.521 Patients generally have relatives suffering from 
                                                 
517 For the fascinating history of this view, see Micale 149-52. Compared to his colleagues, Robert Carter’s defense 
of the paroxysm is outdated; clinicians remarked far more often on smaller fits, postures, tics, twitches, and fainting 
spells.  
518 Griesinger 1872, 174-6; Carter 1853, 2-3; Laycock 174; Paget, 175. 
519 Griesinger 1872, 173; see also Griesinger 1867, 180. 
520 Griesinger criticizes the futile local manipulation of the female sexual organs as a treatment for hysteria that was 
practiced very “eagerly” [“eifrig”] by his colleagues (Griesinger 1872, 179). Carter equally denounces overusing the 
speculum upon female patients’ request (1853, 67). I will expand upon the sexual implications of hysteria discourse 
below. 
521 See Maudsley 1867, 300; Romberg 94; Griesinger 1872, 171. 
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nervous disorders, and experience their disease as highly embarrassing “psycho-sensitive” 
interruptions at unpredictable intervals. Yet a continuous disease progression usually reveals 
itself.522 Many patients have very good self-command and appear “fresh and blooming,” despite 
bouts of exhaustion, anxiety, and trepidation temporarily colonizing their consciousness.523 
Carter writes that suppression of excess emotion causes the outbreak of hysteria. Because women 
are “more prone to emotions” than men and simultaneously more sharply required to conceal 
them, they are most affected (Carter 1853, 26). Maudsley postulates that women’s “nerve-
centres” suffer from “a state of greater instability” (1874, 473). Their passion seeks to “discharge 
itself through the muscular … system,” hence producing spasms.524 
All writers agree that hysterics are “too alert, or too highly charged with nerve-force” 
(Paget 175). They display “immoderate sensitiveness” and are usually possessed of “lively 
intellects” (Griesinger 1867, 179). Despite such seemingly sympathetic description, a morally 
deficient type of hysteric crystallizes. Laycock’s patient starts out as “a spoiled child”525 (140); 
thirty-five years later, Paget offhandedly associates hysteria with “the silly, selfish girls among 
whom it is commonly supposed that hysteria is rife or an almost natural state” (179). As children, 
hysterical women often manifest “maniacal attacks” with “singing, cursing, … nymphomaniacal 
excitement … [of a] demoniacal character,” says Griesinger, although these episodes are not well 
recalled in adulthood (1867, 180). Writers habitually warn of girls’ miseducation at schools 
whose curriculum appears to include lectures on hysterical performance: “the young female 
                                                 
522 Griesinger 1872, 171. Laycock, Paget, and Romberg also suggest the disease’s hereditariness. 
523 Griesinger 1872, 172; see Laycock 139. 
524 Carter 1853, 15; see Maudsley 1874, 469. 
525 “The Spoiled Child” is the title of Daniel Deronda’s Book I which mainly concerns Gwendolen. 
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returns … a hysterical, wayward, capricious girl … prone to hysteric paroxysms upon any 
unusual mental excitement” (Laycock 141). Education at home is equally unsafe if it is “lax and 
frivolous, allowing an uncontrolled play of every impression.” Moral training is necessary for the 
girl to control her temper. Whatever a girl’s inherited disposition might be, “The example of an 
hysterical mother developes [sic] the disease in the daughters” (Romberg 86-7). Thomas 
Laycock, in breathless crescendo, tells the story of the coquette’s formation: 
After the young female has returned home, and is introduced into mixed society, she is 
more than ever exposed to influences acting injuriously on the nervous system. The 
excitement and competition of social life, excited love, ungratified desire, disappointed 
vanity as well as affection, late hours, long and late indulgence in sleep, and the excessive 
use of stimulants, as wines, liqueurs, coffee, tea, &c., all act with more or less of 
combined energy upon the unfortunate young lady in fashionable life. (142) 
 
Finally, unmarried young women who indulge in “strong passions, indolence, and luxury” 
(Laycock 142) or in the vices of “sentimental love, jealousy, and disappointed vanity” (Romberg 
87) will witness the effects of an unproductive and high-strung existence on their system that 
becomes increasingly prone to fits. In wonderful tautology, feminine vices both cause and are 
aggravated by hysteria. Maudsley, in one of the first essays aimed at a wider, non-specialist 
audience, argued for the physiological—and sexed—materiality of the psyche: “There is sex in 
mind as distinctly as there is sex in body.”526 
 
Gwendolen’s Inheritance 
 Gwendolen’s erotically charged display of self-assurance and will corresponds to Carter’s 
indictment of hysterical girls’ “ill-regulated minds and ungoverned tempers” (1853, 78). Three 
early vignettes provide insight into her hysteria’s history. They suggest that Gwendolen inherited 
                                                 
526 Maudsley 1874, 468. This polemic statement contradicted long-held liberal views about the split between 
humans’ sexless minds and their sexed bodies. Also see Laqueur 19; Malane 30-43. 
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her symptoms from her mother and that these symptoms burden the mother-daughter 
relationship. The narrator, in a casual aside, acknowledges young Gwendolen’s “having 
strangled her sister’s canary-bird in a final fit of exasperation at its shrill singing which had … 
jarringly interrupted her own” because Gwendolen had not yet learned to assume her aristocratic 
bearing (DD 18). That “infelonious murder”—it is one of Griesinger’s “maniacal attacks”—is 
never again mentioned in the family, although it arose from intense anger. Second, one cold 
night, Gwendolen, “that healthy young lady, snug and warm as a rosy infant in her little couch,” 
refuses to leave her bed and fetch her mother’s medicine. Mrs. Davilow never receives it, suffers 
her “attack of pain” in silence, and abstains from referring to the incident again (DD 18). Third, 
Mrs. Davilow, with “a violence quite unusual,” silences twelve-year old Gwendolen’s inquiry 
about her mother’s reasons for remarrying, betraying “a slight convulsive movement” on her 
flushed face (DD 18). Mrs. Davilow’s habitual concealment of anger and its eruption as a facial 
tic suggest that she is one of Romberg’s “hysterical mother[s]” who feed their daughters cues 
about hysterical performance. In the Davilow household intense emotions are buried, yet they 
release themselves through the facial muscles and through young Gwendolen’s “passionate acts” 
(DD 18) which evolve into the unnatural statuesque poise she assumes as an adult, her “frozen 
internality of suppression” (J. Wood 13). Gwendolen kills her sister’s canary in defiance of the 
obligation to repress aggressiveness, an obligation that rules her home and, as Carter notes, 
feminine conduct in general. 
 The narrator indicates that Mrs. Davilow’s second marriage, a source of perpetual guilt 
and shame, is one of the topics that cannot be discussed, a stricture leaving Gwendolen in a 
nervous flutter. On the day of the family’s arrival at Offendene, Gwendolen observes the 
outcome of her mother’s two marriages, that is, “being dull and not minding anything,” and 
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clairvoyantly determines that, in case her own marriage should turn out to be “not a happy state,” 
she “will not put up with it.” Mrs. Davilow adheres to doctrine and gloomily affirms, against all 
evidence, that “[m]arriage is the only happy state for a woman.” Gwendolen exclaims, “I don’t 
see why it is hard to call things by their right names, and put them in their proper places” (DD 
22). A critique of marriage’s truth—it does not accommodate women’s wishes, it ravages their 
bodies, and it sometimes ends catastrophically—cannot be articulated in Mrs. Davilow’s home, 
although the novel’s symbolic domain garrulously tells a story that supplements the incomplete 
literal one. For instance, in Offendene’s master bedroom, Mrs. Davoliw’s grotesque “black and 
yellow catafalque” sits next to Gwendolen’s “pretty little white couch.” The catafalque, where a 
continually morose, twice-widowed woman’s body, afflicted by recurring painful attacks, lies in 
state at night, symbolizes the ghastly future of Gwendolen’s virginal bed. A passage from Henry 
Maudsley helps cut through the prohibited narrative: 
Through generations her character has been formed with that chief aim; it has been made 
feeble by long habit of dependence; by the circumstances of her position the sexual life 
has been undesignedly developed at the expense of the intellectual … It is not only that 
women of the better classes, not married, have no aim in life to work for, no opening for 
the employment of their energies in outward activities, and are driven to a morbid self-
brooding … their organic life is little able to withstand the consequences of an unsatisfied 
sexual instinct.527 
 
Eliot’s portrait of Fanny Davilow offers a rendition of Maudsley’s darkly pessimistic 
evolutionary tale; women “cannot disregard [their reproductive function] in the labour of life 
without injury to their health” (1874, 468). Feeble and brooding Mrs. Davilow regrets her 
“indiscreet” second marriage to a man of a class lower than her own, a “sad blunder” occasioned 
by blind sexual appetite that yields nothing but abandonment, painful chastity, and excess 
                                                 
527 Maudsley 1867, 203. The paragraph ends: “Masturbation is undoubtedly sometimes provoked, and aggravates the 
evil for which it was sought as a relief.” I suggest below that Eliot’s disclosure of Gwendolen as prone to nervous 
fits enacts the same slippage from hysterical symptom to autoerotic insanity. 
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girls.528 Eliot’s narrator appears keenly aware of the symptomatology of female hysteria caused 
by sexual frustration. The discussion of Fanny Davilow’s body is complemented by gothic tropes 
to make visible the nightmarish quality of Maudsley’s teleological view of reproduction. For 
androcentric clinicians like Maudsley, women’s hysteria is a necessary outcome of their 
constitution’s adaptation to the pressures of their culture; they must breed, no matter with whom, 
or go insane. More sharply, Eliot—who simultaneously replicates and undercuts Maudsley’s 
androcentrism—says that widowed women like Fanny are, in fact, already dead. 
 Within Daniel Deronda’s deterministic world, enervated women, ideologically 
functioning “as vessels of continuity,”529 bear superfluous girls without a sufficient number of 
morally sound men available. Useless daughters pile up everywhere in Daniel Deronda: Lady 
Mallinger has produced three girls (but no heir to Sir Hugo’s estate), as do Mrs. Meyrick and 
Lydia Glasher. If women “represent[] what men in a specific culture most desire” (Beer 205), 
Daniel Deronda’s inflationary creation of redundant women represents a critique of a culture 
that wishes to maintain a morbid state of greater supply over demand. W. R. Greg, in 1862, 
censured the “unwholesome social state” caused by superabundant genteel women, and he 
famously suggested the emigration of half a million women to remedy this “wretchedness and 
wrong.” Unable to channel their “honourable energies” into venues other than reproductive ones, 
single and widowed women live in a degenerate state as perpetual “involuntary celibates” and 
become hysterics (Greg 436, 445). The narrator’s public prose cannot describe Mrs. Davilow’s 
nervous enervation in Carter’s medical terms, but the woman’s hysterical symptoms are made 
clear through recourse to the gothic. But what about Gwendolen’s? 
                                                 
528 DD 23, 27; see also Carter 1853, 21-2, 36; Griesinger 1867, 181. 
529 Beer 205; see J. Wood 145. 
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George Eliot and the Masturbating Girl 
Carter explains that “when sexual desire is taken into the account, it will add immensely 
to the forces bearing upon the female, who is often much under its dominion; and who, if 
unmarried and chaste, is compelled to restrain every manifestation of its sway” (1853, 33). 
Gwendolen’s “miraculous power of self-control,” itself a hysterical symptom and developed as a 
barricade against public humiliation, covers up something beyond what the novel can represent. 
Gwendolen’s motivation at the novel’s outset is purely and emptily tautological, although her 
mother and uncle navigate “that border-territory of rank where annexation is a burning topic” 
(DD 17). In contrast to Rosamond, Gwendolen contentedly assumes that she will marry upward; 
“her favorite key of life” is “doing as she liked” rather than pursuing baronets. Gwendolen’s 
social rank is not quite as low as Rosamond’s: her late father descended from a titled family that 
refuses to recognize her mother’s upstart, plantation-owning clan. Gwendolen’s class affiliation 
and her schooling provide her with the liberties “to do … whatever she could do so as to strike 
others with admiration and get in that reflected way a more ardent sense of living” (DD 31). 
Middlemarch’s narrator famously over-uses “ardent” to signify Dorothea’s passionate character 
and wish for intellectual transcendence. Gwendolen, on the other hand, is “a Dorothea without 
the idealism” (Weisser 4), aspiring to transcendent sensation by creating continuous, heightened 
feedback between body and mind. Speaking with Maudsley, who, in pre-Freudian fashion, traces 
all human impulses back to two “fundamental instincts … self-preservation … [and] 
propagation” (1874, 470), I would offer the formulation that Gwendolen’s object is “self-
preservation” elevated to such a pathological degree that it forecloses that of “propagation.” 
Moreover, her object is created by the interactions between herself and her spectators. She is 
driven by an “inborn energy of egoistic desire,” a hunger for feeling intensely, or, more 
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precisely, feeling herself intensely (DD 33). This masturbatory ambition is best accomplished 
with the help of an admiring audience, preferably male, enhancing Gwendolen’s sense of self 
with feelings of power and exultation530, a set of signifiers tied to her ability to win men’s 
admiration and to her masterful horseback riding throughout the novel’s early chapters. Although 
Gwendolen requires male spectators to produce erotic sensation—her “vanity is ill at ease under 
indifference”—she is stubbornly inaccessible, physically and spiritually, to her male admirers 
and tends to ride off without them (DD 90). Her often-noted “iridescence of … character—the 
play of various, nay, contrary tendencies” results from the mismatch between her self-love and 
the cultural mandate to communicate through physical performance her sexual availability to the 
highest bidder, a requirement to which she fully commits only when faced with the specter of 
having to earn her money as a governess.531 
As Jane Wood notes, female willfulness had long been imagined in terms of 
equestrianism, the horse epitomizing the animal body and its nervous system, the rider rational 
consciousness, the latter considered woefully underdeveloped in women.532 Throughout the 
nineteenth century, women were prescribed horseback riding to reduce hysterical symptoms, 
although some doctors were wary that riding caused dangerous friction, overstimulated women’s 
abdominal muscles, and led to masturbation.533 Daniel Deronda is rife with explicit associations 
between Gwendolen’s autoeroticism, her will to transcend class and gender boundaries, and 
                                                 
530 The term is applied to Gwendolen nine times over the course of the novel. 
531 DD 33; see J. Wood 142, 161; Wilt 319. 
532 See Shuttleworth 187-8. The trope traces back to Plato. 
533 J. Wood 143. For riding as a safeguard to prevent hysterical fits, see Trall 139, 144; Romberg 97; Carter 1853, 
102; for a historical account, see Stengers 9. Stengers (88) and Maines (59) summarize medical advice against riding 
for causing too much abdominal friction. For a general overview on scholarship about female masturbation, see 
Mason 27-43. 
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equestrianism: “the beautiful creatures … sent a thrill of exultation through Gwendolen … 
[because they] were the symbols of command and luxury” (DD 258). Moments like this are 
plentiful, as most of Gwendolen’s sexual maneuvering with Rex, Grandcourt, and even Deronda 
occurs on horseback: “I never like my life so well as when I am on horseback … I only feel 
myself strong and happy,” Gwendolen tells Grandcourt (DD 92-93); when on horseback, she 
deems herself “secure as an immortal goddess” and “her blood stir[s] … with the intoxication of 
youth” (DD 58-59; 265). During the scene in which Rex’s horse breaks its knees and throws him 
off, Eliot borrows conventionally masculine-coded signifiers for Gwendolen’s erotic sprint away 
from Rex and toward heightened self-sensation. The description combines rapid visual and 
auditory information, Gwendolen’s sexual display before elite men chasing (with) her, 
abandonment of rational thought through collapsing equine and canine imagery, and the 
overwhelming feeling of embodied, galloping power. The narrator puts Gwendolen’s autoerotics 
on narrative display, providing an arousing fantasy of the virgin’s ecstasy: 
Gwendolen felt no check on the animal stimulus that came from the stir and tongue of the 
hounds, the pawing of the horses, the varying voices of men, the movement hither and 
thither of vivid color … that utmost excitement of the coming chase which consists in 
feeling something like a combination of dog and horse, with the superadded thrill of 
social vanities and consciousness of centaur-power which belongs to humankind. (58) 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, many sexually suggestive scenes like this, scholarship has 
made much of Gwendolen’s “dread of adult sexuality” (David 193). As has been well 
documented, Gwendolen rebuffs Rex’s gentlemanly advances and later freezes when Grandcourt 
initiates physical contact. The narrator’s sharp-sighted analysis of Gwendolen’s distaste for 
physical contact with men is coherently mentioned until it disappears under Grandcourt’s sexual 
coverture: “she objected, with a sort of physical repulsion, to being directly made love to … 
there was a certain fierceness of maidenhood in her” (DD 57). The reader may infer that 
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Gwendolen has no knowledge of the sexual act; her erotic riding is instinctual, inarticulate, self-
enclosed. Similarly, her distaste for male advances is all sensation unmediated by speech: 
“Gwendolen herself could not have foreseen that she should feel in this way … But now the life 
of passion had begun negatively in her. She felt passionately averse to this volunteered love” 
(DD 67). Scholars have read this passage as proof that Gwendolen is sexually “frigid.”534 They 
thereby miss Eliot’s systematic depiction of Gwendolen’s acts of hysterical self-love. For 
example, at Leubronn, Gwendolen has a nightly habit of “look[ing] lingeringly at herself for 
pleasure,” a routine Eliot’s wry narrator deems to be “surely an allowable indulgence” (DD 11). 
In the novel’s most explicit instance of erotic self-gratification, Gwendolen basks in “a naïve 
delight in her fortunate self” and kisses her image in the “cold glass which had looked so warm” 
(DD 13). Eliot reminds her readers that Gwendolen’s autoerotics are productive of neither social 
warmth nor happiness. 
Medical practitioners’ anxiety around women’s independent sexual excitement sparked 
institutional formations such as gynecology and, later in the century, psychoanalysis. The clinical 
type of the young female masturbator had gained currency among gynecologists after 1830, 
“taking on almost sinister connotations as the archetypical sex deviant” and prompting much 
anxious research into the function of the clitoris (Moscucci 60). According to Eve Sedgwick, 
before the distinction between the hetero- and homosexual individual became fully 
institutionalized in the 1890s, as described by Foucault, the masturbator, “as one of the very 
earliest embodiments of ‘sexual identity’ in the period of the progressive epistemological 
overloading of sexuality, … may have been at the cynosureal center of a remapping of individual 
identity … along modern lines” (1990, 826). That is, the masturbator was “uniquely formative” 
                                                 
534 See Weisser 3; Reimer 38. 
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in the nineteenth-century creation of the modern sexual individual (Sedgwick 826). Gwendolen, 
who does not know her own desires, nevertheless embodies the precursor to this individual. I 
suggest that the novel’s teleology attempts to suffuse her identity with conscience, to domesticate 
it for an unknowable future. 
 As historians of hysteria have shown, masturbation, like femininity itself, was seen as 
both a result and a cause of hysteria.535 Romberg warns that “[d]ebilitating influences are the 
most fertile sources of hysteria; among these we must mention over-excitement … of the sexual 
organs, [and] self-indulgence” (86). Henry Maudsley tells the terrifying story of how even the 
most innocent woman, if the life of passion begins negatively in her, like Gwendolen’s, can 
stumble onto the path of vice: 
Let it not be supposed, however, that … these things take place consciously in the 
woman’s thoughts, feelings, and actions: the sexual passion is one of the strongest 
passions in nature, and as soon as it comes into activity, it declares its influence on every 
pulse of the organic life … conscious and unconscious; … when there is no vicarious 
outlet for its energy, the whole system feels the effects, and exhibits them in restlessness 
and irritability, in a morbid self-feeling taking a variety of forms, and in an act of self-
abuse which on the first occasion may, I believe, be a sort of instinctive frenzy, of the aim 
of which there is only the vaguest and most dim notion. (1867, 203-4) 
 
Maudsley argues that temperaments such as Gwendolen’s can be easily “infected” with onanism, 
a habit leading to eventual insanity and death: Girls “who do silly and eccentric things … out of 
a morbid craving to attract notice … are often masturbators.”536 Thomas Low Nichols, in 1873, 
provides advice about how to spot a masturbating girl, “this practice” being “fully as common—
perhaps more common—with girls than boys” (280):  
                                                 
535 Finn 85. While medical writers observed female hysterics who did not masturbate, all female masturbators were 
considered hysterics. See Maines 37, 54; Romberg 86. 
536 Maudsley 1867, 414. Maudsley’s censure of masturbation is reprinted in the second volume of John Russell 
Reynold’s A System of Medicine (1870-77), a work Eliot owned (Baker 169). 
 305 
they are timid; but it is not the amiable timidity of modesty and chastity, which is very 
different from what they display. The timidity natural to a young person is an ornament to 
her; theirs overwhelms them; they are more confused than timid … They not only have 
no desire for marriage, but an invincible repugnance against it. (283) 
 
Isaac Baker Brown, in his infamous537 work, On the Curability of Certain Forms of Insanity 
(1866), suggests that masturbators are “indifferent to … domestic life” and, once married, had “a 
distaste for marital intercourse” (14, 16). Medical writers’ catalogues of the horrors resulting 
from masturbation are too long to reproduce here, but a few of their examples will suffice to 
illustrate Gwendolen’s association with the conventional medical type of the masturbating girl. 
Baker Brown warns that “There will be quivering of the eyelids, and an inability to look one 
straight in the eye” (15). When Deronda first scrutinizes her at Leubronn, Gwendolen wishes to 
avert her gaze before meeting his eyes reluctantly (DD 5). Similarly, Nichols posits that the 
“young girl who gives way to [onanism], loses her colour” (282). During the same introductory 
scene at Leubronn, observers discuss the quality of her paleness at length (DD 7). Nichols also 
warns that “solitudinarians have nervous affections,” such as “tremors and apprehensions of 
future misery”; “her eyes, mouth, her walk, her mode of speaking, all her features, all her 
carriage, in fact, bespeak languor and indifference” (Nichols 281-2). Whenever Gwendolen 
walks out alone, helpless apprehension and tremors overcome her (DD 52); while engaged in 
trivial conversation at Leubronn, however, her voice takes on a studied “languor of utterance” 
and she exclaims repeatedly that she is “bored to death” (DD 8, 9). Her family is fully aware of 
her frequent “fits of timidity and terror” (DD 52). Carter recommends co-sleeping if parents’ 
suspicions are aroused and, if appropriate, discussing the habit to ensure the hysteric understands 
                                                 
537 Baker Brown advised doctors to practice cliterodectomy to control women’s “loss of nerve power” which he 
attributed to masturbation (7). The medical controversy around cliterodectomy was “one of the most heated” of the 
century, and, after accusations that he had performed the surgery without patients’ consent, Baker Brown was forced 
to close his clinic and lost his membership in the Obstetrical Society of London (Moscucci 61, 68).  
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that her actions constitute a “crime” (1853, 149). While it seems unlikely that such conversation 
would occur in Mrs. Davilow’s household, Gwendolen and her mother share a bedroom, perhaps 
to prevent Gwendolen’s nightly “fits of … terror.” Fanny remarks at one point that Gwendolen is 
“afraid to be alone in the night” (DD 52, 44). 
Although she is unprepared for the reality of men’s sexual egoism and excess (and sexual 
intercourse in general), Gwendolen plays at being a man with her archery, hunting, and 
gambling, always aspiring to be “daring in speech and reckless in braving dangers.” Baker 
Brown warns that the hysterical masturbating girl displays “a great disposition for novelties … 
desiring to escape from home” (DD 15). Thus, in idle schoolboy fashion, Gwendolen tells Rex 
that she would like to “go to the North Pole, or ride steeple-chases”; later, when Grandcourt’s 
proposal seems unavoidable, she mentions to him improbable alternatives, such as “find[ing] out 
the North-West Passage or the source of the Nile, or to hunt tigers in the East” (DD 57, 113). The 
closest thing to adventure within Gwendolen’s reach is intrepid horseback riding, for Eliot the 
quintessential symbol of female sexual power, as Rosamond’s example makes clear.538  
Gwendolen, already “inwardly rebellious against the restraints of family conditions,” 
confronts a new challenge to her pursuit of heightened narcissistic affect when she agrees to 
submit herself to the erotic obligations imposed by Grandcourt (DD 43). Symbolically and 
figuratively, her performance of masculine will prevents her development of sexual interest in 
other men. Gwendolen rejects Rex Gascoigne’s polite attempts at courtship because her “young 
self-exultation” requires the redirection of male desire (borrowed from Rex) onto ideal feminine 
surface, herself (DD 31). With the help of admiring male spectatorship, Gwendolen’s nervous 
                                                 
538 Rebecca Mitchell provides the insight that “‘Rosamond’ is derived from the Teutonic name ‘Hrosmond,’ 
meaning ‘horse protection’” (313n14). 
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system energizes its own feedback loop of desire and exultation. For instance, when she moves 
through the long rooms at Quetcham Hall under the admiring gaze of male guests, she feels 
“exultingly that [the grand promenade] befitted her” (DD 34). Gwendolen’s pleasurable vanity, 
fueled by men’s attraction to her, constitutes a form of embodied sexual agency that 
contemporary medical writers linked to hysteria generally, and to masturbation in particular. 
 Rachel Maines argues that hysteria and its long roster of associated ailments can be 
interpreted in light of what medical discourse considers “the normal functioning of female 
sexuality” today (2). The hysterical paroxysm, understood by many nineteenth-century medical 
professionals to be evoked by terror, could often have constituted orgasmic sensation.539 Since 
Eliot’s narrative replicates clinicians’ androcentric view—although its sympathies are more 
ambivalent than medical writers’—it is possible to interpret at least some instances of 
Gwendolen’s “fits of spiritual dread” as symptoms of female sexual arousal. Thus far, critics 
have agreed that during such moments, something intensely private, unknown to Gwendolen 
herself—a repressed memory, a psychological pathology—erupts and becomes public spectacle, 
laying bare Gwendolen’s self-division that expresses itself in violent outbursts (Vrettos 570-1). 
Yet Gwendolen’s spasms have not been examined in light of Nichols’s wonder at girls’ 
“convulsions which almost always accompany the acts of solitary indulgence” (DD 283), and 
Carter’s suggestion that “the sexual passion is more concerned than any other single emotion, 
and, perhaps, as much as all others put together, in the production of the hysteric paroxysm” 
(1853, 36). 
 
 
                                                 
539 Maines 3; see Laycock 173-4; Carter 1853, 31-2. 
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Gwendolen’s Fits 
On the day Gwendolen and her female entourage arrive at Offendene, Gwendolen’s sister 
Isabel opens a hidden wainscot panel and reveals “a picture of an upturned dead face, from 
which an obscure figure seemed to be fleeing with open arms” (DD 20). Upon entering the salon, 
Gwendolen strikes a pose by the organ as Saint Cecilia, martyred patron saint of music, loosens 
her hair, and “laughs with delight,” before everyone’s attention is directed at the picture of the 
dead face. Isabel ominously remarks that Gwendolen “will never stay in this room by [her]self” 
(DD 20). Gwendolen “shudder[s] silently,” scolds Isabel for “open[ing] things which were meant 
to be shut up” and, going upstairs with her mother, continues to express her idée fixe of making 
“a tolerable Saint Cecilia” (DD 20-1). A series of gothic motifs structures this scene; as critics 
have suggested, its images of violent struggle and death are meant to be locked up in the panel, 
in the gothic space that is Offendene, or the mind.540 As has been noted, Daniel Deronda appears 
to rehearse gothic horror stories as “domesticated … family drama” (Henry 229). Yet, what tends 
to get overlooked is that Gwendolen’s “delight” breaks through the horror because, as hysteria 
discourse postulates, terror and ecstasy often co-mingle. 
As the unbending Klesmer541 reveals later, Gwendolen’s self-fashioning as Saint Cecilia 
is preposterous, because her artistic talents are mediocre at best. Since “no one had disputed … 
her general superiority,” Gwendolen is unaware that her performances are not only 
                                                 
540 For the reader inclined to analyze names (perhaps too closely), Offendene might register as “offending.” It is also 
a clean anagram of the German word “Öffnende”: ‘the thing to open’ or ‘the thing that opens’ (the letter ‘ö’ consists 
of ‘o’ and ‘e’). 
541 Eliot perhaps named her fictional German composer after the hypnotist Franz Anton Mesmer whose interest in 
the unconscious was all the rage in the last decades of the eighteenth century and whose popularity had not yet 
waned in second half of the nineteenth century (Micale 23-4; see Peterson 186-7). Eliot was “impatient” with 
mesmerism as a particularly unscientific theory, although she felt a “restless desire” to learn more about hypnotized 
clairvoyants (GEL 8:45). 
 309 
unconvincing; they are in bad taste (DD 32). Gwendolen’s penchant for self-display risks 
exacerbation of her social precariousness and might propel her away from cultured wealth 
towards the vulgar life of struggling actresses. Fraser’s, in 1869, condemns genteel ladies’ 
proclivity to act in tableaux vivants and provides useful commentary on Gwendolen’s class-less 
show. The magazine calls them “instances of frivolity illustrative of the extreme childishness of 
a certain class of educated women,” and insists that spectators do not receive “a high idea of the 
dignity and simplicity of ladies of rank” who use such performances to display their finery 
(“Women’s Education” 539). On the day of the fateful tableau vivant, Gwendolen’s wish to 
show off her “Greek dress” while in “statuesque pose” drives the gestation of the project and 
causes much delay and dispute (DD 47). However, the tableau produces something else in 
Gwendolen, that is, “that exalted susceptibility to the effects of emotion, and that insatiable 
desire for the notice of others” that Carter considers necessary for the occurrence of the hysteric 
fit (1853, 76-7). Social debasement and erotic stimulus entwine in this scene to produce 
transgressive affect as public spectacle. 
As the family and guests assemble for a tableau vivant depicting the scene of Hermione’s 
release from confinement as a statue in Shakespeare’s Winter’s Tale542, the narrator comments 
on the dilettantish execution of the scene—it is an absurd “imitation of acting” (DD 48). 
Nevertheless, anticipation fills Gwendolen with “special exultation” (DD 49). Again, as during 
the previous scene that functions as a rehearsal for this more public tableau, Gwendolen’s 
attempt to turn herself into a statue is accompanied by an ecstatically heightened sense of self. 
She wants to embody perfectly controlled, beautiful surface; a surface that she, with her limited 
and vulgar education, perceives to constitute art. By thus transcending her “distasteful petty 
                                                 
542 For an analysis of Hermione’s function in this scene, see Peterson 183-92. 
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empire,” Gwendolen turns herself into pure spectacle (DD 378). During her brief tableau as Saint 
Cecilia, Gwendolen presented a “charming picture” to her family and the housekeeper, with her 
waist-length hair suggestively let down. Now, owing to the many onlookers (some of whom she 
suspects to be her admirers), her sensation turns into “special exultation,” “an unforeseen phase 
of emotion” (DD 49). Any reader of neurological theory will be able to predict what happens 
next:  
Herr Klesmer … struck a thunderous chord—but in the same instant … the movable 
panel … flew open … and disclosed the picture of the dead face ... Everyone was startled, 
but all eyes … were recalled by a piercing cry from Gwendolen, who stood without 
change of attitude, but with a change of expression that was terrifying in its terror. (DD 
49) 
 
Gwendolen’s spectators are witnessing the “immediate effects of extreme fear or terror on 
women” (Laycock 174). Thomas Laycock had long warned of the sexually “excitant” influence 
of music on the nerves and, although Carter dismisses Laycock’s concerns regarding young girls’ 
exposure to music, he also anticipates that moments such as the tableau could lead to hysterical 
outbursts.543 In felicitous contrast to Shakespeare’s Hermione, who awakens into vitality, 
Gwendolen instead freezes into marble, accomplishing a transformation into plastik, as Klesmer 
generously calls it. This is spectacular hysterical performance to the second power; it occurs as 
and within narrative. 
She looked like a statue into which a soul of Fear had entered: her pallid lips were parted; 
her eyes, usually narrowed under their long lashes, were dilated and fixed. Her mother, 
less surprised than alarmed, rushed toward her … But the touch of her mother’s arm had 
the effect of an electric charge; Gwendolen fell on her knees and put her hands before her 
face. She was still trembling, but mute, and it seemed that she had self-consciousness 
                                                 
543 Carter 1853, 135n. Thus Carter: “a young woman whose chief enjoyment rests either upon a complacent 
contemplation of her own perfections … or else upon an imagined gratification of her sexual desires, is not in the 
best possible frame of mind for withstanding the pressure of a new temptation; such as is held out by the discovery 
that she can, at will, produce an apparently serious illness, and thus make herself an object of great attention to all 
around her” (1853, 52). 
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enough to aim at controlling her signs of terror, for she presently allowed herself to be 
raised from her kneeling posture and led away … (DD 49) 
 
Gwendolen experiences a textbook case of the hysterical paroxysm. With her eyes appearing 
fixed upon the terrifying object, she undergoes one of Griesinger’s “psycho-sensitive” 
interruptions. Once her mother touches her, Gwendolen’s body begins to tremble in the 
aftershock of nervous energy’s muscular discharge.544 Carter states that the violence of the 
hysterical attack is directly proportional to the duration of the responsible emotion’s 
concealment—in this case, the moments of Gwendolen’s “special exultation.” He continues that, 
in women, “the most common of these feelings is terror; and the most violent is the sexual 
passion.”545 Eliot stages a perfect storm of “fear and fondness” (DD 33), leading to Gwendolen’s 
frozen awe when confronted with the gothic interruption of her exultation. 
The important conjunction of terror and eroticism in this scene is produced by the gothic 
element of the “dead face” and its sudden disruption of Gwendolen’s selfish passion. Because 
the dead face belongs to Gwendolen’s future husband, Jill Matus understands Eliot’s slippage 
into gothic mode as enabling Gwendolen to become “clairvoyant about her own disastrous fate 
with Grandcourt” (Matus 67). Carter had already speculated in 1855 about nervous disease’s 
overlap with “mesmeric phenomena.”546 In this scene, Gwendolen’s heightened sensation cannot 
be contained by the narrator’s realism and produces the supernatural event. More precisely, 
sexual coverture in marriage, represented in Daniel Deronda through gothic tropes, delimits the 
                                                 
544 Eliot’s depiction of Gwendolen’s physical reaction to shock might also be indebted to Charcot’s depiction of 
paralytic seizures, his “hysterical stigmata” (Micale 25; see Peterson 185). Carter says the “hysteric paroxysm 
produced by terror, is so common among servant-girls, and in fourth-rate boarding-schools, … that it is needless 
either to cite examples or to illustrate … them” (1853, 31-2). Gwendolen’s fit is very “common.” 
545 Carter 31-2; see also Griesinger 1867, 180. 
546 Carter 1855, 230; see Vrettos 558.  
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realm of possibility—and foreshadows the horrible future manifestation—of Gwendolen’s 
maidenly arousal.547 If Maines is correct in her assertion that hysterical fits would today be 
interpreted as manifestation of “normal” female sexuality, Gwendolen’s “perfect climax,” a 
phrase used by Klesmer, indicates that Gwendolen experienced something akin to a terrifying 
orgasm. 
Eliot faithfully adheres to medical script. Klesmer intuits Gwendolen’s “mortification” 
about her “betrayal into a passion of fear” (DD 50); likewise, Griesinger observes that his 
patients evince embarrassment after experiencing paroxysmal fits. The touch of Mrs. Davilow, 
the assiduous co-sleeper, ends Gwendolen’s paralysis and rescues her for the time being from the 
future specter of Grandcourt’s total claim on her body. In order to re-stabilize the novel’s 
adherence to realism, the narrator explains that, before the scene in question, “inconvenient” 
Isabel had stolen the panel’s key from Gwendolen’s drawer and caught a glimpse of the painting, 
albeit without re-locking the panel. It must have burst open because of the piano’s “vibration,” 
that is, Laycock’s erotic stimulus (DD 50-1). In medically correct terms, the narrator attributes 
Gwendolen’s fit of terror and passion to her being a “sensitive creature,” having remarked earlier 
that Gwendolen takes her “peculiar sensitiveness” to be “a mark of her general superiority” (DD 
50, 18).  
Only after staging Gwendolen’s fit for public consumption (and readerly titillation), does 
the narrator reveal Gwendolen’s anamnesis. She has a defined “susceptibility to terror,” a 
“liability … to fits of spiritual dread,” and an interior “fountain of awe” with a tendency to flow 
                                                 
547 Gwendolen’s delirious, clairvoyant consciousness collapses time. All motifs are picked up when Gwendolen and 
Grandcourt board their boat in Genoa, “fulfilling a supernatural destiny.” The pair on the quay is “a thing to 
paint”—like the painting at Offendene, hidden by the wainscot panel, of a figure fleeing from a dead face—and 
Gwendolen’s body is again “like a statue” (DD 583). The “dead face” haunting Gwendolen in the novel’s final 
chapters is that of the drowned Grandcourt (DD 590, 592, 594, 597). 
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over at inopportune moments (DD 51, 52). Gwendolen’s shameful outburst of objectless passion 
is, in fact, a regular occurrence—which explains her mother’s lack of surprise during the 
Hermione tableau: 
[Gwendolen] wondered at herself in these occasional experiences, which seemed like a 
brief remembered madness, an unexplained exception from her normal life; … she felt a 
peculiar vexation that her helpless fear had shown itself, not, as usual, in solitude, but in 
well-lit company (DD 51) 
 
Gwendolen’s performance of masculine will is syncopated by irregular bouts of “madness,” 
occurring when the girl is without the audience necessary to channel her exultation safely into 
vanity, although her nervous system continues to operate in its habitually overexcited state. 
Carter warns that the first fit lowers the threshold for subsequent ones; increasingly strong self-
control is necessary to curtail overwhelming emotion.548 Gwendolen is not a solitary masturbator 
because the burden of half-remembered terror and its effects upon her body are too heavy: 
Solitude in any wide scene impressed her with an undefined feeling of immeasurable 
existence aloof from her, in the midst of which she was helplessly incapable of asserting 
herself … [B]ut always when some one joined her she recovered her indifference to the 
vastness in which she seemed an exile; she found again her usual world in which her will 
was of some avail … (DD 51-2) 
 
As David Trotter suggests, “[l]imitlessness, the absence of boundaries, is Gwendolen’s problem” 
(467). I would add that, in absence of paternal boundaries guiding her moral and sensual 
education, Gwendolen is allowed to play the dandy, a “petty” patriarch who rules over her 
mother and sisters (DD 378) and yet who shivers when confronted with spheres of knowledge 
that are as far removed from her own existence as the stars, or actual men. Without sufficient 
development of moral conscience to relieve the strain of nervous exultation upon her nerves, 
Gwendolen is too receptive, too unbounded an individual, unable to perceive among the flood of 
                                                 
548 Carter 1853, 41, 54; see also Griesinger 1867, 180. 
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sensations upon her body the systems of power and knowledge that determine her existence (see 
Carter 1853, 52). Whenever she is without “that reflected way” of self-assurance provided by 
others, Gwendolen experiences the world’s incomprehensible horizons, male sexuality included, 
as unarticulated (and—for sociopolitical reasons—unrepresentable) feelings of helpless, 
trembling abandon. Although Gwendolen’s “young self-exultation,” in her eyes, distinguishes 
her from others “who allow themselves to be made slaves of” (DD 31), her will falters 
completely when it is opposed by scenes of erotic terror; scenes that will be, in fact, produced by 
Grandcourt later on. If Gwendolen is to be one of “these delicate vessels” in which “the treasure 
of human affection” is “borne onward through the ages,” she must face heterosexual coition and 
have children (DD 103). Yet, Gwendolen’s erotic terror signals that she fears sex as a form of 
self-annihilation (Beer 204). Once she hands the reins to Grandcourt, her dread erupts 
spasmodically, before the narrator politely excises Gwendolen’s married body from the 
narrative. It only reappears on an empty ship in the bay of Genoa, more thoroughly hysterical 
than ever. In the last chapter I examine the politics of this incomplete representational excision as 
well as the causes of Gwendolen’s exacerbated hysterical symptoms. After all, as Griesinger 
notes, there is “great frequency” of hysteria “amongst married women.” (1867, 181). 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 DANIEL DERONDA AND THE END OF REPRODUCTION 
 
Gwendolen’s Fall 
In 1855, aged twenty-seven, Robert Brudenell Carter recommended to his fellow 
clinicians the following procedure of dealing with unmarried, hysterical women. Perhaps owing 
to his youth, Carter’s treatment fetishizes institutionalized male power and the effects of men’s 
forceful commands (see Micale 147): 
In dealing with such people, it is only necessary to meet violence by passive resistance, 
and to assume a tone of authority, which will, of itself, almost compel submission. Thus, 
if a patient … exhibits furious passion, so soon as the storm of her words has abated for 
lack of breath, she must be told to sit down, and to conduct herself like a lady. So, if she 
interrupts the speaker, she must be told to keep silence and to listen; and must be told, 
moreover, not only in a voice that betrays no impatience and no anger, but in such a 
manner as to convey the speaker’s full conviction, that the command will be immediately 
obeyed. (Carter 1853, 119)  
 
Eliot’s depiction of Gwendolen and Grandcourt’s courtship and marriage not only sedulously 
follows Carter’s advice, but—with often ambivalent sympathy—traces the reshaping of 
Gwendolen’s nature that results from such treatment. Although Gwendolen’s schooling in ways 
of the world is successful—and deepens her hysteria—the novel enacts her delirious revenge 
fantasies and suggests that Grandcourt’s ownership of Gwendolen’s body is an unconscionable 
condition. Whenever Eliot’s prose confronts representational barriers erected by legally 
entrenched male sexual and class power, her narrator depicts Gwendolen’s invaded body using 
highly conventional rhetorical devices, such as medical typification of Gwendolen’s body as 
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hysterical or animalistic, and Gothic, sensationalist imagery. In the sections darkly evocative of 
sexual trauma, Eliot’s narrative techniques function as instruments in a rhetorical negotiation of 
married women’s claim to legal, bodily, and psychological independence, and tell stories for 
which medical writers, the law, and realism at large had not yet developed a language, but that 
were in such universal circulation by the 1870s that the registers available to Eliot risked literary 
cliché. 
I argue in this chapter that Eliot, in Daniel Deronda, reflects on the need for ongoing 
marital reform, both legal and cultural. She does so in a curiously sublimated way via the 
clandestine plot of Gwendolen’s rape, psychological breakdown, and imperfect reconstitution as 
moral subject. I contend that this plot remains hidden due to three representational barriers with 
which Eliot saw herself confronted: her own aversion towards openly feminist agitation, the 
taboo surrounding the depiction of elite men’s abuse of power, and, of course, the injunction 
against explicit depiction of sexually suggestive content. However, the novel’s critique of 
mercenary marriage is thoroughly framed in terms of sadistic sexual performance, although 
Grandcourt, up until his death, officially remains “perfectly polite” (DD 575). Transferring the 
implied physical violence onto bodies other than Grandcourt’s and Gwendolen’s, Eliot mutes the 
connection between Gwendolen’s frantic sense of entrapment and her experience of mandatory 
marital sexual intercourse while consistently providing allusions to Grandcourt’s sexual 
sadism.549 As I will show, Eliot employs legal and medical frameworks to situate the 
Grandcourts’ marriage, contrasting a failed and outdated model based on patriarchal force with 
the implicit modern ideal of the companionate marriage. While it is not surprising that Eliot was 
                                                 
549 Many critics have noted Grandcourt’s sadism, for example, Bernstein 114; Dowling 332; Ender 261; Flint 175; 
Henry 227; Herzog 42; McCarron 79; Tromp 455; Weisser 5. They have not yet read systematically for sadistic 
practice in the novel. See Deleuze 20-1, for an account of modern sadism. 
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aware of the competing legal and ethical frameworks underlying marriage in the 1870s, her 
radically pessimistic representation of the Grandcourts’ union indicates a response to, and overall 
agreement with, reformist political discourses that is much more focused and deliberate than we 
might expect. 
 
(Legal) Fictions of Marital Rape 
Matrimonial law in the nineteenth century tolerated systematic sexual injury of wives by 
their husbands even as it widened definitions of intramarital cruelty. A husband could not be 
charged with raping his wife because she was understood to have granted lifelong consent to her 
husband’s sexual access to her body upon marriage.550 Victorian feminists noted that the law 
appeared to regard wives’ status as lower than prostitutes’ because the latter could withdraw their 
consent and were therefore legally able to accuse men of rape. The “marital bed”—the last 
bastion of patriarchal privacy—remained legally untouchable until 1991, more than a century 
after Eliot’s death.551 
When Gwendolen realizes that marrying Grandcourt was a mistake, her sense of the 
necessity to speak while not having anything to say “that would not be a condemnation of 
herself” (515) implies a revolt against self-prostitution, the physical act of which, like elite 
violence, remains unrepresentable in Eliot’s fiction. However, the novel’s veiled, yet continuous, 
representation of Gwendolen’s traumatic sexual experiences implies that, for Eliot, the rules of 
                                                 
550 Shanley 8, 178; see Doggett 46; H. Nelson 123-5. Nineteenth-century legal theorists cited a 1736 commentary by 
Sir Matthew Hale (that itself cited no precedent) when arguing in favor of the marital rape exemption: “for by their 
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she 
cannot retract” (qt. in Hasday 1397). Hale’s phrasing actually “acknowledged the potential divergence” of the 
husband’s will from the wife’s, and “enforced the legal presumption of consent” (Hasday 1399).  
551 Bourke 2008, 421; see Hasday 1396-7. 
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patriarchal privacy themselves are at stake. Coverture, the guarantor of that privacy, is seen to be 
complicit not only in the destruction of women’s bodies but their ability to utter dissent. As 
Andrew Dowling argues, “silence,” in Daniel Deronda, “operates as a sign of some truth beyond 
itself; of an unspeakable, and specifically sexual, horror.”552 The narrator, similar to the feminists 
in Eliot’s circle, is very much aware of Gwendolen’s interconnected legal, economic, and sexual 
vulnerabilities and consistently gestures towards them. The novel even puts Grandcourt 
conditionally on trial and declares itself unable to find him guilty: 
Grandcourt might have pleaded that he was perfectly justified in taking care that his wife 
should fulfill the obligations she had accepted. Her marriage was a contract where all the 
ostensible advantages were on her side, and it was only of those advantages that her 
husband should use his power to hinder her from any injurious self-committal or 
unsuitable behavior. He knew quite well that she had not married him—had not 
overcome her repugnance to certain facts—out of love to him personally; he had won her 
by the rank and luxuries he had to give her, and these she had got: he had fulfilled his 
side of the contract. (DD 573) 
 
By agreeing to marry Grandcourt, Gwendolen’s legal person is incorporated into her husband’s 
in accordance with the legal custom of coverture, the Victorian legal fiction of marital unity. The 
law enshrined patriarchal authority as governing the physical relationship between husband and 
wife. At the heart of coverture was men’s superior physical strength and the resulting ability to 
subdue women. If men were naturally stronger, so would be their will.553 Gwendolen’s 
“ostensible” advantages of rank and wealth are made explicit throughout the narrative; other 
“certain facts” about her “husband’s private deportment” remain unexplained because they fall 
                                                 
552 Dowling 323; see McCarron 78. 
553 Doggett 60-1. Coverture as a legal concept goes back to William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England (1765-9), which stipulates that “the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the 
marriage” (qt. in Doggett 35). 
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under Grandcourt’s privacy rights.554 The narrator seems to play by the rules despite 
conspicuously drawing attention to inexpressible circumstances. 
 Nineteenth-century feminists, among them Barbara Bodichon, Eliot’s close friend, 
identified the husband’s absolute rights to the wife’s body as the origin of women’s subjugation 
(Hasday 1412). John Stuart Mill, an acquaintance of Bodichon, in The Subjection of Women 
(1869), had already polemically declared the wife’s state to be lower than that of the American 
slave: 
though it may be his daily pleasure to torture her, and though she may feel it impossible 
not to loathe him—he can claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation of a human 
being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her 
inclinations. (57) 
 
 The usually conservative Eliza Linton wrote in 1870, “As it is, men have the right to demand 
from their wives absolute attention to their wishes, because they are their property, their 
dependent creatures whom they feed and clothe in return for certain services” (226-7). In the 
decade of Eliot’s writing, public debate regularly focused on marital rape as protected by the law 
and as unmentionable private practice in the home. Marital advice literature of the period 
negotiated the law’s tolerance for non-consensual marital sex by urging husbands to practice 
forbearance. However, authors assumed that the husband ultimately retained—and deserved—
the choice to use force.555  
Advice literature between 1870 and 1900 emphasized Mill’s point: unwanted sex was 
degrading and morally wrong, not only for the wife, but particularly for the husband. Along with 
feminist agitation, medical handbooks and marriage manuals attempted to reframe virility by 
                                                 
554 DD 353; see Bernstein 118. 
555 Hasday 1437; see Bourke 2008, 429. 
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advocating men’s daily sexual self-restraint. Early psychiatrist Henry Maudsley, influenced by 
evolutionary theory, warned that unrestrained “sexual indulgence” in both sexes would lead to 
the “destruction” of the nervous system, enervating the male body and shortening men’s lives 
(284). In a less theoretical vein, George Napheys, in 1869, assured young wives of their right to 
refuse intercourse in certain situations, especially when the family was already large. He 
provides rare insight into the sexual mores in the Anglophone world of the late 1860s: 
Continence, self-control, a willingness to deny himself,—that is what is required from the 
husband. But a thousand voices reach us from suffering women in all parts of our land 
that this will not suffice; that men refuse thus to restrain themselves; that it leads to a loss 
of domestic happiness. (121) 
 
Russell Thacher Trall, American physician and reformer, warned in his immensely popular 
Sexual Physiology that marital rape was unnatural; it only existed in wholly degraded human 
relationships. He appeals, like Maudsley, to popular fears about male degeneracy. 
No male animal offers violence to the female; he never compels her to submit to the 
sexual embrace against her desire, nor forces her to bear offspring against her inclination 
or will. But, when she is in condition to propagate her kind, and desires the co-operation 
of her male partner, she informs him of it. He … never compels her to submit to the mere 
gratification of his lust. So it is in the order of Nature, and so it should be in practice with 
human beings.556 
 
Studies of Victorian sexuality tend to agree that many, if not most, women did not enjoy sexual 
intercourse. John Cowan, in 1874, wrote with melodramatic flourish that “a great, dark, heavy 
cloud would be swept off from the hearts of … married womankind … if this law, the right of 
woman to her own person—the right to deny all approaches, save and only when she desired 
maternity—was universally respected” (394). Although a great advocate for female orgasm, 
Cowan likened all non-reproductive intercourse in marriage to prostitution. He believed that the 
conditions of prostitution continued within marriage under the same circumstances as outside of 
                                                 
556 1866, xi; see Cowan 105; Bourke 2008, 423. 
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it, and that most men initiated intercourse to satisfy their desires without consideration for their 
wives’ wishes. His words betray the same expectations about women’s eagerness for sex as 
Napheys’: “if the woman—as nearly all women do who are used by their husbands simply as 
chattels—lie passive and motionless, the husband may have intercourse and no impregnation 
follow” (Napheys 111). From Cowan’s vantage point, marriages that remained sterile—like the 
Grandcourts’—resembled prostitution even more sharply. 
 
Another Failed Union 
Shortly after the wedding, Gwendolen fantasizes about leaving her husband, and the 
novel’s tracing of foreclosed passages within Gwendolen’s “labyrinth of reflection” outlines the 
entrenched social and legal customs that keep her “an imprisoned dumb creature” (DD 514, 504). 
How could she run away to her own family—carry distress among them, and render 
herself an object of scandal in the society she had left behind her? … What could she say 
to justify her flight? ... Her husband would have power to compel her. She had absolutely 
nothing that she could allege against him in judicious or judicial ears. … How was she to 
begin? What was she to say that would not be a condemnation of herself? … her 
capability of rectitude told her again and again that she had no right to complain of her 
contract, or to withdraw from it. (DD 515) 
 
The novel’s action takes place between October 1864 and October 1866, and reassesses the more 
immediate past after legal changes allowed for the application of enlightened hindsight (Henry 
208). Eliot wrote the novel in the aftermath of Kelly v. Kelly (1870), a decision that widened the 
definition of matrimonial cruelty by which a wife could gain a legal separation from her 
husband. Previously, English law had acknowledged the existence of such cruelty only in cases 
in which one party, usually the wife, could prove that the spouse had inflicted severe physical 
injuries. If a woman decided to leave her husband without procuring a divorce, she could be 
found guilty of desertion, lose financial support and custody over her children, and face 
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imprisonment until she decided to rejoin her husband’s household.557 Gwendolen’s frantic 
thoughts represent the mind of a woman confined within the pre-1870 legal context. Procuring 
an order for the restitution of conjugal rights, Grandcourt could indeed compel her to return. 
Owing to Grandcourt’s zealous abstention from nonsexual physical violence, Gwendolen cannot 
accuse him of a legal crime. After 1870 the Divorce Court would allow for cases of extreme 
emotional or psychological cruelty, although neglect and coldness alone would not pass legal 
muster until 1893’s broader definition.558 
 Grandcourt displays behaviors that public commentators increasingly found intolerable 
although, predictably, many men were loath to cede legal and domestic authority. Gwendolen’s 
sense that her complaints should remain unheard must be read in context of the slow but constant 
whittling away of the wife’s legal coverture and the relaxation of English divorce laws during the 
1860s and 70s.559 The creation of the Divorce Court in 1857 had opened English homes to 
increased public scrutiny, and Daniel Deronda operates within a wider public discourse that 
sensationally negotiated the rules of elite marital privacy, formulating a negative code of conduct 
enumerating unacceptable marital behaviors. The target of Eliot’s critique is Grandcourt, heir to 
                                                 
557 Shanley 9, 156-8. The rule that wives could be imprisoned until they complied with the court’s order to return to 
their spouse was abolished in 1884 (Shanley 158). Before the Divorce Act of 1857, a marriage could only be 
terminated either by “ecclesiastical annulment private [or] private Act of Parliament” (Shanley 8). Afterwards, 
divorce proceedings were available to classes other than the very elite, although a wife had to prove that her husband 
was “physically cruel, incestuous, or bestial in addition to being adulterous” to secure a divorce—husbands only had 
to prove wifely adultery (Shanley 9; see Conley 534; Dowling 326). The sexual double standard ruling divorce 
proceedings remained in place until 1923. 
558 Bourke 2008, 434-5; see Dowling 326; Hammerton 94-101. In the 1870 case, the Reverend Kelly had established 
a regime of surveillance and discipline over his wife for several decades. He forbade his wife to go out alone or 
receive friends; he further displaced his wife as the manager of his household and belittled her in front of their staff. 
Mrs. Kelly suffered a decline in health and left her husband. The court was appalled by this “regime of 
incarceration,” as Hammerton calls it (97-8). 
559 Only two years after Daniel Deronda’s publication, the 1878 Matrimonial Causes Act allowed wives to separate 
from their husbands in cases of aggravated assault while remaining eligible for maintenance and custody—for a 
divorce, wives would have to prove their husband’s adultery until 1937 (Surrdige 1994, 2; Hammerton 119).  
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a baronetcy, who fears public exposure of unseemly details about his marriage and who 
admonishes Gwendolen repeatedly for transgressive talk with Deronda. His words imply that the 
Grandcourts’ marriage is vulnerable to gossip and defamatory inference:  
“You have been making a fool of yourself this morning; and if you were to go on as you 
have begun, you might soon get yourself talked of at the clubs in a way you would not 
like. What do you know about the world? You have married me, and must be guided by 
my opinion.” (DD 507) 
 
Grandcourt’s speeches replicate patriarchal law, which commissions him with the control of his 
wife and holds him accountable for her conduct. Dreading that Gwendolen is about to cuckold 
him with Deronda, Grandcourt begins to manage Gwendolen’s movements and her appearance. 
When he tells her, “You will either fill your place properly—to the world and to me—or you will 
go to the devil” (384), his threat is legalistic. In turn, Gwendolen’s recalcitrance against male 
authority manifests as exacerbating hysterical febrility, offering the only possible response—a 
physiological one—to absolute legal impotence. Marriage in Daniel Deronda emerges as a 
quasi-therapeutic institution that treats maidenly fractiousness with pointed spousal exhortation: 
Every slow sentence of that speech had a terrific mastery in it for Gwendolen's nature. If 
the low tones had come from a physician telling her that her symptoms were those of a 
fatal disease, and prognosticating its course, she could not have been more helpless 
against the argument that lay in it. (DD 507) 
 
Grandcourt’s speeches to Gwendolen indicate the legal, medical, and ideological frameworks 
sanctioning his authority. Once her husband realizes that speech will not suffice, he relocates 
Gwendolen to “the tiny plank-island” of his yacht the better to police her and oversee her 
treatment. 
 After 1870, Grandcourt’s “active divination … of refractoriness in her” could, if 
exercised long enough, constitute excessive cruelty, a point that Eliot makes in contractual terms 
(508). Although Gwendolen’s marital trouble, “the yoke she had brought on her own neck” 
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(518), might appear superficially trivial, she finds release for her intense resentment by indulging 
in fantasies of murder. Highlighting Gwendolen’s inability to tap into systems of legal support, 
the novel mobilizes Gothic fantasy to portray a mind made brittle by a history of strenuous self-
control punctuated by hysterical outbreak.560 
The thought of his dying would not subsist: it turned as with a dream-change into the 
terror that she should die with his throttling fingers on her neck avenging that thought. 
Fantasies moved within her like ghosts, making no break in her more acknowledged 
consciousness and finding no obstruction in it: dark rays doing their work invisibly in the 
broad light. (DD 518) 
 
Through recourse to Gothic delirium, Eliot balances editorial taboo (“elite men are 
untouchable”) and her heroine’s suffering (“elite men kill their wives”) to censure pre-1857 
marital norms within the context of a slowly changing legal situation. Thanks to sensationalist 
discourse around divorce, courts increasingly paid attention to the effects of spousal ill treatment 
on wives’ bodies. Daniel Deronda does not call for drastic legal changes, but the Grandcourts’ 
nightmarish union functions as dark antithesis to the companionate marriage model based on 
mutual negotiation of power rather than on brute force. Even Gwendolen’s naïve expectation 
that, once married, she would “manage” her husband, takes for granted Grandcourt’s adherence 
to the (potentially exploitable) companionate model. Eliot implies that companionate marriage 
requires husbands’ self-control as well as wives’ moral education in appropriate deference to 
their husbands because only such conduct would ensure the health of the wife’s reproductive 
body. 
 
                                                 
560 Eliot’s use of hysterical fantasy corresponds to Lord Stowell’s 1790 anticipation of wifely fears: “the 
apprehension [of bodily injury] must be reasonable: it must not be an apprehension arising merely from an exquisite 
and diseased sensibility of mind” (qt. in Dowling 325). Lord Stowell’s definition of marital cruelty remained in 
place until 1870. 
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Wedding Night 
Before turning to the novel’s creation of a causal link between marital abuse and spiritual 
and biological barrenness, I trace the submerged plot of Gwendolen’s sexual initiation. Although 
Eliot never advocated for girls’ sexual education prior to marriage, Daniel Deronda sedulously 
explores the psychological and physiological outcomes of Gwendolen’s loss of virginity. Young 
wives like Gwendolen were often shocked to find themselves at the mercy of their husbands. The 
realization that they were expected to serve as sexual objects had irreversible repercussions for 
their sense of self. As I show below, Eliot cautions that sexual abuse, if not heterosexual activity 
of any kind, shatters and reconstitutes the bride’s subjectivity. Echoing feminist reformers, the 
scenes of Gwendolen’s sexual initiation underscore that the continued legality of marital rape 
provided the essential argument in favor of the companionate marriage model.  
Gwendolen marries Grandcourt for complex reasons. She wants to avoid becoming a 
governess, leave an existence in which she must please others, prevent her mother’s descent into 
poverty, and enjoy a life of affluent leisure with a husband who is “free from absurdities,”—in 
other words, passionless (DD 115). Gwendolen’s sexual panic, already conspicuous during her 
flirtations with Rex, structures her relationship with Grandcourt from the moment she accepts his 
proposal. Previously, Grandcourt’s physical courtship had been as “inobtrusive as a wafted odour 
of roses” which mainly “gratified vanity” (DD 275). The “odour of roses” again denotes men’s 
ability to create women’s autoerotic arousal, but once Grandcourt actually begins to claim 
physical tokens of affection, that autoeroticism is replaced with terror. The novel’s sinister 
courtship scenes, loaded with unarticulated conflict, outline the rules of their sexual power play. 
Grandcourt is aroused by “her agitation,” the symptom of Gwendolen’s unwillingness to engage 
in physical contact. Gwendolen understands Grandcourt’s “reticence” to mean that he will not 
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impose “inexplicable” things upon her—she still has no idea about intercourse—a relief that is 
“delightful” (DD 277). Grandcourt’s insistence on a speedy wedding and the narrator’s previous 
comment about Grandcourt’s “pleasure in mastering reluctance,” however, hints that 
Gwendolen’s hope is illusory (DD 266, 269).  
As Helena Michie has argued, Gwendolen would have required sexual education to make 
an informed choice about Grandcourt’s marriage proposal. Although she is aware of 
Grandcourt’s sexual history, Gwendolen is neither given information about the act itself nor 
about its psychophysiological ramifications, which, in turn, complicates questions of her moral 
accountability (Michie 2006, 162). This is not to say that Eliot would have condoned such sexual 
education for Gwendolen. 
Could there be a slenderer, more insignificant thread in human history than this 
consciousness of a girl, busy with her small inferences of the way in which she could 
make her life pleasant? … What in the midst of that mighty drama are girls and their 
blind visions? (DD 102) 
 
Eliot’s narrator naturalizes the monumental demarcation between knowledge allocated to girls 
and that reserved for adults. To participate in the grown-up world of global and “mighty drama,” 
the girl must undergo ritualistic initiation into womanhood on the wedding night. The narrator 
laments the “cruel paradox” of the virgin’s uninformed consent to marriage, but does not call for 
a change to that eternally painful story (Michie 2006, 164). 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the wedding night was generally regarded as 
a period of heightened emotional and physical vulnerability for women. Medical writers and 
marital advice literature normalized the expectation that newlywed women would betray signs of 
nervous shock resulting from unexpected physical intimacy. Nicholas Cooke, in 1871, advises 
the new husband to halt all sexual advances if the bride evinces signs of fear as “the first 
conjugal act is little else than a legalized rape, in most cases” (147). George Napheys writes in 
 327 
1869 that “initiation into marriage … is attended with more or less suffering” (91-2). In his 
experience, young wives often develop nervous disorders immediately after the wedding night. 
Thomas Laycock’s patient becomes hysterical because she finds her “husband physically 
incongruous.”561 A quarter century after Daniel Deronda’s publication, Delos Wilcox outlines 
the effects of the Victorian wedding night: 
What shocks a woman … is nothing inherent in the change from virginity to wifehood, 
but rather the sudden discovery that she is no longer a free woman. Her lover was all 
deference to her wishes and respect for her personality. Her husband, when once the keys 
to her sanctuary are in his hand, is transformed by some perverse alchemy into a sensual 
tyrant. He may use violence, he may use only the persuasions of the benevolent despot; 
but her freedom is gone. (120-1) 
 
On the day of their wedding, Gwendolen, “still walking amid illusions,” exhibits “febrile 
… excitement” manifesting as constant chatter when the couple approaches Grandcourt’s 
estate.562 The following passage evokes Gwendolen’s dread of losing her virginity in terms that 
are as frank as Eliot can make them without risking censorship: 
Was it alone the closeness of this fulfilment which made her heart flutter? or was it some 
dim forecast, the insistent penetration of suppressed experience, mixing the expectation 
of a triumph with the dread of a crisis? Hers was one of the natures in which exultation 
inevitably carries an infusion of dread ready to curdle and declare itself. She fell silent in 
spite of herself as they approached the gates, and when her husband … for the first time 
kissed her on the lips, she hardly knew of it ... (DD 301) 
 
Heart pounding and unusually distracted by the inner conflict of exultation and dread in light of 
the coming “penetration,” Gwendolen evinces textbook symptoms of an oncoming hysteric fit 
(Carter 5-6). After receiving Lydia Glasher’s diamonds and the enclosed letter-curse, Gwendolen 
surrenders to prolonged hysteric spasms. Her fit announces the otherwise unrepresentable 
annihilation of her maidenly and morally unburdened self during the socially mandated “crisis.” 
                                                 
561 Laycock 143; also see Gardner 83. 
562 DD 300, 301; see Griesinger 1867, 181. 
 328 
According to critics, Gwendolen taints herself by displacing Lydia, and her moral 
metamorphosis occurs as a ritualized and, I suggest, physical event, as the consummation of 
marriage. Gwendolen’s displacement of Lydia contains its own punishment in the form of 
marital rape whose materiality is outside the scope of Eliot’s realism. The novel therefore 
represents Gwendolen’s hysterical, invaded body as a set of symptoms conveyed by 
sensationalist, spectacular narration. Her symptoms are “pallid” skin, “trembling fingers,” a 
“spasm of terror,” “shrieking,” and “tremor in her lips and hands,” inaugurating Grandcourt’s 
coming “empire of fear” (DD 364). The reflections of Gwendolen’s image, “like so many 
women petrified white,” signify Gwendolen’s moral self-division as consolidated by coition. Her 
mirror images visualize the shattering of control, mastery, even identity itself. Gwendolen 
experiences her wedding night as a maximally threatening event when her genophobia, the origin 
of her “fits of spiritual dread,” materializes to invade her body (DD 19). 
The narrator’s editorial intervention stops completely in this scene of sexual trauma. 
Likewise, interpretation of Gwendolen’s screams and the usual reporting of Gwendolen’s 
thoughts come to a halt. The moment of Gwendolen’s insemination—“the poison had entered 
into this poor young creature” (DD 303)—is also the moment of her freezing into that familiar 
statuesque, “petrified white” body. Gwendolen becomes an unconscious object, Grandcourt’s 
property, at the moment of their marriage’s consummation. With Grandcourt’s entrance into 
Gwendolen’s boudoir, rendered as “profound scopic violation” (Michie 2006, 168), her only way 
of retreat is into hysterical physicality. Grandcourt’s assumption of diagnostic vision (“He saw 
her”) transfers narrative focalization from Gwendolen to her husband, and Gwendolen’s screams 
loudly resist coverture while announcing their own futility.  
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Animal Impulses 
Gwendolen’s wedding-night paroxysm will be the final glimpse the reader has of 
Gwendolen’s body for a while. After the wedding night, Eliot, ostensibly in adherence to the 
laws of coverture, erases Gwendolen’s body from the narrative. The narrator adheres to 
Grandcourt’s privacy rights while staging auxiliary bodies in situations that, at first sight, appear 
only tangentially related to the central marriage. Eliot transfers the signifiers of sexual excess 
and violence onto other bodies—that of Grandcourt’s spaniel as well as his valet Lush—to avoid 
overt sensationalism. This device had been employed by previous realist writers to such an 
extent, however, that Eliot barely shields Grandcourt from public view. Merely pretending to 
respect elite privacy rights, Eliot actually invites the reader to peek behind the curtain. 
In May 1856, nineteen months before the new Divorce Court assembled, J. W. Kaye’s 
essay, “Outrages on Women,” inveigled against the English epidemic of wife-beating. Kaye 
focused on the socioeconomic reasons of spousal abuse among the working poor and reserved 
little space for a polemic against the upper classes. However, his short description of marital 
cruelty among people of rank spells out the rules for such cruelty’s representation in public 
discourse and fiction. They would remain in place throughout the second half of the nineteenth 
century.563 
[In] the upper classes men rarely lift their hands against their wives. ... Men of education 
and refinement do not strike women; neither do they strike one another. This is not their 
mode of expressing resentment. They may utter words more cutting than sharp knives; 
they may do things more stunning in their effects on the victim than he blows of pokers 
or hammers; they may kill their wives by process of slow torture—unkindness, infidelity, 
whatever shape it may assume—and society will forgive them. The Law, too, has nothing 
                                                 
563 See Cobbe 58; Hammerton 73; Lawson and Shakinovsky 14-6; Surridge 2005, 3-4, 108. On their wedding day, 
the couple is observed by Pennicote inhabitants, and, in the first paragraph of the chapter dedicated to Gwendolen’s 
nuptials, the narrator records a conversation between the townspeople that is heavy with foreboding: “A quarrel may 
end wi’ the whip, but it begins wi’ the tongue” (DD 298-9). Working-class speakers can express what the polite 
voice of the narrator cannot. 
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to say to them. They are not guilty of what is recognised as an assault, because they only 
assail the affections—only lacerate the heart. (235) 
 
Taboos constraining the depiction of marital abuse among the upper classes led to authors’ 
conventional displacement of such violence from the wife’s battered body to that of abused 
domestic animals, usually dogs or horses, acknowledging implicitly wives’ social and legal 
position to be as degraded (and degrading) as a pet’s. Spaniels in particular symbolized 
“gentleness, submission [and] a willingness to be beaten” (Surridge 1994, 6). Eliot provides a 
preview of the treatment Gwendolen can expect after the wedding when Grandcourt sits alone at 
breakfast, his “beautiful liver-colored water-spaniel” Fetch begging for attention. Under 
Grandcourt’s long silent stare—he wants to elicit “amusing anguish” in the spaniel—Fetch 
whimpers and fawns. Once the dog disrupts the quiet with a howl, Grandcourt commands his 
valet Lush to “[t]urn out that brute” (DD 105). The same scene, performed by Gwendolen rather 
than Fetch, occurs several hundred pages later when Gwendolen, who is now “part of the 
complete yacht,” squirms under Grandcourt’s “immovable gaze” (DD 575). Because Eliot 
cannot represent Gwendolen and Grandcourt’s “hidden rites” after the wedding night (DD 576), 
her discourse—which is nearly as polemical and sensationalist as Kaye’s—conflates the bodies 
of animals and women, critiquing the husband’s legal coverture over and virtual ownership of his 
wife’s body. By the time of Daniel Deronda’s publication this technique had been repeated so 
frequently in popular fiction that hackneyed animal imagery barely shielded the reader’s view 
from Grandcourt’s unspeakable acts. 
Grandcourt’s class affiliation makes it impossible to depict the loss of his temper or show 
him behaving aggressively, although Eliot’s narrator details his psychological vulgarity at length: 
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he utters almost nothing but slowly drawn-out expletives.564 Grandcourt is Carter’s polite 
executioner of woman’s moral education—he even supports Gwendolen’s mother and Lydia 
Glasher’s children handsomely. All is proper. Eliot relegates Grandcourt’s “animal” impulses to 
the minor character of his secretary—or “procurer” (David 184)—Lush, who embodies the 
physical aggression necessary to overcome Gwendolen’s recalcitrance.565 Lush, socially inferior 
appendage to Grandcourt’s estate, invites Gwendolen’s repulsion because she cannot ever 
express it towards her husband. (101). Grandcourt, as “a consummate picture of English brutality 
refined and distilled,” as Henry James put it, carefully guards against committing an act that 
would declass him and turn him into an object of sensationalist spectacle (1903, 166).  
When Gwendolen first meets Lush—whose name implies sexual excess—she 
instinctively shies away from him: “Mr. Lush’s prominent eyes, fat though not clumsy figure, 
and … hair of frizzy thickness … created one of the strongest of her antipathies” (DD 101). 
Lush’s vulgarly expansive physicality and his knowing, violating gaze tell a story that 
Grandcourt’s blonde and enervated refinement does not: men of rank may treat women cruelly. 
Gwendolen remembers that, during their courtship, Grandcourt had promised he would remove 
Lush to accommodate Gwendolen’s repulsion. He breaks that promise when he has Lush deliver 
the will that leaves most of Grandcourt’s assets to Lydia’s illegitimate son. In Gwendolen’s 
ignorant interpretation, Grandcourt had likewise insinuated that he would respect her dislike of 
physical intimacy. When Lush sets foot into Gwendolen’s boudoir, echoing Grandcourt’s entry 
on the wedding night, Gwendolen’s assumption is revealed to be wrong. Lush not only transmits 
                                                 
564 See McCormack 93n5 for a list of Grandcourt’s expletives—they all involve “brutes, dens, kennels.”  
565 See Surridge 1994, 17, for the long history of this rhetorical device in Victorian fiction. 
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distasteful sexual information, he is its embodiment. Gwendolen, despite powerfully aggressive 
impulses to the contrary, has no recourse to Grandcourt’s treatment but fearful silence:  
The words that she wanted to utter, as one wants to return a blow, were, “You are 
breaking your promise to me—the first promise you made me.” But she dared not utter 
them. She was as frightened at a quarrel as if she had foreseen that it would end with 
throttling fingers on her neck. … There may come a moment when even an excellent 
husband who has dropped smoking under … a pledge during courtship, … introduce[s] 
his cigar-smoke between himself and his wife, with the tacit understanding that she will 
have to put up with it. Mr. Lush was, so to speak, a very large cigar. (DD 483) 
 
Without overplaying the narrator’s gross phallic imagery, I relate the image of the smoking cigar 
to Grandcourt’s “throttling fingers on her neck,” and take them to represent Gwendolen’s 
physical sensation of suffocation. Gwendolen has no right to refuse her husband’s sexual 
advances, and the novel’s symbolic domain garrulously tells the story of Gwendolen’s legally 
mandated and “perfectly polite” sexual degradation, the actual “cure” for her autoerotic hysteria. 
  Lush, “muddy hound,” “hog,” and “toad-eater,” serves a master whose representation is 
no less steeped in animal imagery (DD 102, 258, 240). Grandcourt, all silent menace, looks as 
“neutral as an alligator” and like a “handsome lizard of a hitherto unknown species.” 
Problematically, “Gwendolen knew hardly anything about lizards.”566 She trusts that Grandcourt 
will be sexually cold; he is not as “ridiculous” as Rex had been.567 Whereas Lydgate made the 
mistake of interacting with Rosamond as if she were a preconceived type, Gwendolen lacks the 
knowledge to assess Grandcourt’s type correctly. The authorized reader has long realized that 
Grandcourt’s past sexual excess and moral enervation cast him as the most degenerate type of 
the Victorian literary repertoire. Eliot’s evolutionary joke equates the ancient cliché of the 
                                                 
566 DD 133, 115. Grandcourt continually subjects Gwendolen to his disconcerting stare, an intensification of the 
pornographic gaze that introduces Gwendolen at the beginning of the novel: “he looked at her with his most lizard-
like expression” (DD 502; see Ender 234).  
567 DD 92; see Wilt 330. 
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aristocratic rake with a case of degeneration so extreme that Grandcourt is at the reptilian stage 
of evolution. Gwendolen, whose naïveté the narrator compares to a “lap-dog’s,” cannot yet put 
together perceptual cues and their sexual meanings (DD 467). Although Eliot’s narrator 
condemns Gwendolen’s will to power, the novel structurally avenges Victorian society’s colossal 
epistemological crime of leaving Gwendolen in sexual ignorance by drowning Grandcourt, while 
Gwendolen, once more frozen into Hermione, frantically watches (see Michie 2006, 154). 
 
Honeymooning with Grandcourt 
Daniel Deronda tells the tale of Gwendolen’s moral fall from grace. Gwendolen gambles 
away her conscience for the amenities of aristocratic life and the right to vain self-display. 
Gambling, in the novel, is associated with winning money at the expense of someone else, but it 
also functions as a placeholder for sexual unsoundness.568 The story of Gwendolen’s awakening 
to the error of gambling is also the story of Gwendolen’s sexual awakening. Although 
Gwendolen “had not consented [to Grandcourt’s proposal] in ignorance” of Grandcourt’s 
illegitimate family, she consented in ignorance of sex, a story that Eliot cannot reproduce 
                                                 
568 DD 285. Eliot’s letters show that she found gambling in women to be particularly revolting (GEL 5:314). In 
October 1872 she observed Byron’s grandniece, Miss Geraldine Leigh, at gambling in Bad Homburg’s Kursaal 
whose description mirrors that of the first pages of Daniel Deronda and evokes the interior of a brothel (see Henry 
2012, 216; DD 3-4). The novel’s introduction creates the backdrop of a rootless, “fallen, threatening world” and sets 
the stage for the novel’s exploration of Europe’s cultural, and particularly moral, degeneracy (Reimer 36). Gambling 
resorts often had reputations for luxurious dissipation because they also offered other, unspeakable amenities. Many 
women traveled to Europe’s bathing spas to receive treatments for hysteria, often “massage or douches of the 
genitalia (Maines 2, 72-81). Romberg writes, “I have obtained the most beneficial effects from the use of tepid hip-
baths in cases of hysteria, in which sexual excitement, with voluptuous dreams, and the ejaculation of a mucous 
fluid, is followed by extreme prostration” (94). He cured “inveterate” hysterics by “the prolonged use of the mineral 
waters of Spa and Pyrmont”; otherwise, he recommended “cauterisation of the … uterus” (Romberg 95, 94). 
Perhaps the Baroness von Langen, Gwendolen’s cousin and travel companion, not only “taught the girl to gamble,” 
but sought the services of a gynecologist at Leubronn (DD 8). 
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directly, but whose arc she outlines carefully.569 The reader may piece together a story in which 
Gwendolen’s schooling in the “know[ledge] of the world,” administered by Grandcourt, results 
in a “mental enlargement” and “new repulsion” that is predicated upon bodily enslavement (DD 
507, 469, 364). If women’s desire for sex in Victorian fiction is represented by illicit hunger for 
food (Michie 1987, 13), Gwendolen’s repeated show of anorexia after the wedding suggests that 
she already has had enough (DD 470, 502). Gwendolen is said to “devour[] her mortification” 
instead under the “quiet massive pressure of [Grandcourt’s] rule” (DD 508, 502). Gwendolen’s 
marriage forms “a hidden wound” (DD 482) whose painfulness is increased by Gwendolen’s 
overstimulated perception and her frantic anticipation of disaster.  
Contemporary readers might be justly taken aback by the sexual martyrdom Gwendolen 
undergoes, but Eliot’s narrator, as Jill Matus reminds us, remains primarily interested in the 
psychic conditions that produce female conscience rather than traumatized consciousness (72). 
That is not to say that Eliot does not pay ample attention to Gwendolen’s psychic damage. 
Gwendolen’s fledgling conscience depends on her realization that her bodily dependence, if not 
her essential penetrability, enshrined by the law, prevents her from attaining the political agency 
she had assumed to possess before marriage. Painful sexual knowledge in the form of ceaseless 
rape enlightens Gwendolen as to her legal and social status as property and chastens her to the 
extent that she drops her wish to master others. For Eliot, marital rape is the lawful, if deplorable, 
materialization of a marriage model based on physical force, with the effect of endowing 
Gwendolen with the moral apparatus she had lacked as a virgin. The notion of rape as a 
technology of moral growth will likely be unacceptable to many twenty-first century readers, but 
                                                 
569 DD 277. Right after Gwendolen accepts Grandcourt, he offhandedly remarks that “this is such a brute of a world, 
things are always turning up that one doesn't like” (DD 258). 
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I assert that Eliot understands rape to constitute a way for willful women to come into moral 
being. 
In describing Gwendolen’s inability to get away from Grandcourt and his insistence on 
having his wife near him, Eliot seems to be taking a hint from James Schouler’s Treatise on the 
Law of Husband and Wife, first published in 1870. Schouler writes that “the refusal of sexual 
intercourse and the nuptial bed, without good excuse, is a serious wrong … [and] per se a breach 
of duty, tending to subvert the true ends of marriage” (61). However, Schouler conceded that, 
“sexual intercourse … should be mutually regulated with … kindly forbearance; and a husband 
who wantonly abuses his wife … and disregards her health and delicate organization, is guilty of 
legal cruelty” (61-2). When Deronda meets Gwendolen in Genoa, he thinks she looks 
“handsomer” than before, her bearing enriched by a “nameless something” that “makes a woman 
more interesting after marriage than before, less confident that all things are according to her 
opinion … —more fully a human being” (DD 580). For Deronda, who only studies surface, the 
“nameless something,” Gwendolen’s education in wifehood and sexual submission, conditions 
her ascension into humanity. Depicting Gwendolen’s altered state through Deronda’s 
focalization, the novel makes visible the public effects of Gwendolen’s new self-denial, the 
wished-for effect of successful therapeutic intervention. (Carter 1853, 142). Gwendolen, 
meanwhile, experiences her treatment as “misery” and “torture,” a “sort of truth” that “could not 
be uttered” (DD 574, 581). Eliot’s narrator—most aligned with Deronda’s ethical viewpoint 
throughout the novel—romanticizes Gwendolen’s loss of freewheeling temper and egotism. 
Deronda’s recognition of Gwendolen as potential fellow-subject depends on her sexual 
subjection. If readers were still in doubt about the “nameless” origin of Gwendolen’s change, 
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Eliot produces sexually explicit discourse for much of the novel’s final chapters, tracing with 
quasi-pornographic fascination the circumstances of Gwendolen’s breaking-in. 
Had she only “fancied that [Grandcourt’s] eyes showed a delight in torturing her” shortly 
after the wedding, Grandcourt is soon intentionally and aggressively “using pincers on that white 
creature” (DD 366, 503). Verbal exchanges between the couple are entirely suffused by the 
language of sadistic erotics. Although the narrative frames Grandcourt’s “mastery over her” in 
rhetorical terms (“His words had the power of thumb-screws and the cold touch of the rock”), the 
narrator reproduces the effects of Grandcourt’s mastery in the language of immediate physical 
sensation. Grandcourt encourages in Gwendolen a “habitual stifling consciousness of having an 
immovable obstruction in her life” (DD 582). She is “as fully aware” of her bondage as “of a 
locked hand-cuff.”570 The novel depicts at least one instance of the couple’s erotic exchanges in 
explicitly physical terms: Grandcourt is aroused when observing Gwendolen’s proud efforts to 
suppress her anger: “But the rage was silent, and therefore not disagreeable to him. It followed 
that he turned her chin and kissed her” (DD 510). Grandcourt has just mentioned that Mr. Lush 
will carry his will into Gwendolen’s boudoir. His kiss represents not only the breach of 
Grandcourt’s implied promise to remain chaste but announces the existence of more invasive 
sexual acts past and future, embodied by Lush’s disgusting physicality. Grandcourt’s 
enforcement of coverture even includes Gwendolen’s physical volubility that expresses her 
                                                 
570 DD 499. Gwendolen’s association with horses, symbols of male sexual prowess, is first slippery and later 
mobilized by Eliot’s explicitly sadistic sexual discourse. The narrator first turns her into a horse when comparing her 
refined and calculated femininity to that of her female relatives: “Imagine a young race-horse in the paddock among 
untrimmed ponies and patient hacks” (DD 19). Despite the repeated insistence that Gwendolen “wishe[s] to mount 
the chariot and drive the plunging horses herself,” others, first her Uncle Gascoigne and then Grandcourt, “hold the 
rein” and, after marriage to Grandcourt, Gwendolen—she who rode so well—is “brought to kneel down like a horse 
under training for the arena” (DD 115, 64, 269). She becomes one of Grandcourt’s possessions; he is “perfectly 
satisfied that he held his wife with bit and bridle” (DD 582). The sexual connotations are as obvious as they are 
disturbing. 
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(barely) suppressed rage: “the proper thing for you is to take it as a matter of course … Not to 
toss your head and bite your lips” (DD 510). 
Gwendolen’s body emerges thus spasmodically throughout the final scenes of her 
marriage. The reader participates in Gwendolen’s hysterical imagination that inflates the horror 
because it cannot be circumscribed: Grandcourt and the narrator alike “shr[i]nk from explicitness 
and detail” (DD 508). Yet, the narrator’s language insistently hints at unspeakable sexual acts. 
[H]er husband had gained a mastery which she could no more resist than she could have 
resisted the benumbing effect from the touch of a torpedo. … And she had found a will 
like that of a crab or a boa-constrictor, which goes on pinching or crushing without alarm 
at thunder. (DD 363) 
 
Gwendolen’s situation on Grandcourt’s yacht, a claustrophobic “prison,” epitomizes the 
narrowness of individual marriage as surrounded by wider patriarchal systems of power that are 
unfathomable, yet irresistible in their effects (DD 502, 578). Grandcourt’s yachting excursion 
with Gwendolen represents nightmarish, eternally drawn-out honeymoon during which 
Gwendolen is expected to “reorient” her body in spatial and psychosexual terms towards 
mandatory heterosexual practice (Michie 1997, 131). If Dorothea’s Roman honeymoon with 
Casaubon had constituted an intellectual—and possibly sexual571—failure, the Grandcourts’ 
expedition provides sufficient titillating rhetoric to assure readers that Grandcourt is scrupulous 
about his marital duties. Grandcourt is “using her as he liked,” and, “liking his particular 
pleasures,” won’t let up “suffocating” Gwendolen in the yacht’s “red silk cabin”; he is “a 
dangerous serpent ornamentally coiled in her cabin without invitation.”572 
                                                 
571 See Michie 1997, 134, for a reading of the Casaubons’ honeymoon as a locus of Dorothea’s rape. 
572 DD 511, 581, 575. See McCormack on the imperialism of Grandcourt’s yachting excursion with Gwendolen as 
his “colonized creature” (84). The yacht’s interior invokes the interior of the Leubronn gambling house on the 
novel’s first page which, with its “gilt mouldings, dark-toned color and chubby nudities” (3), in turn, has the aspect 
of a brothel. Gwendolen has indeed “sold herself” (573). 
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The novel lexically relates Gwendolen’s plight to that of English wives. In The 
Subjection of Women, John Stuart Mill had denounced marital rape as women’s degradation to 
“personal body-servant of a despot” (59). Eliot borrows these formulations verbatim in Daniel 
Deronda: the section immediately following the comparison of Grandcourt with a serpent teems 
with sexually evocative language, including use of Mill’s “despot,” supported by the narrator’s 
casual note regarding Gwendolen’s dread of pregnancy. Eliot produces maximally frank sexual 
discourse: 
Grandcourt had intense satisfaction in leading his wife captive after this fashion; it gave 
their life on a small scale a royal representation and publicity in which every thing 
familiar was got rid of, and every body must do what was expected of them whatever 
might be their private protest—the protest (kept strictly private) adding to the piquancy of 
despotism. To Gwendolen, who even in the freedom of her maiden time, had had very 
faint glimpses of any heroism or sublimity, the medium that now thrust itself everywhere 
before her view was this husband and her relation to him. (DD 575) 
 
This passage, framed, like Grandcourt’s private and public comportment, in sedulous adherence 
to representational laws, indicates that he gleefully commits what the state allows him to do, 
while his wife’s doubly “private protest” helplessly draws attention to itself. Like the legal text 
of sexual coverture, the passage only pretends to hide the fact that Gwendolen does not and 
cannot consent. Rape occurs in plain sight because elite respectability and its attendant legal 
fictions are revealed to be a sham, the “Satanic masquerade” (652) of Gwendolen’s 
hallucinations. 
During her fitful confession to Deronda, Gwendolen speaks in images even more extreme 
in their sensual and political intensity. Gwendolen’s “solitude” with Grandcourt makes her feel 
“like a galley-slave”; she imagines that “he would kill me if I resisted his will” (DD 594-6). Her 
words again evoke a famous line by Mill—“[t]here remain no legal slaves, except the mistresses 
of every house” (147)—in an analogy that, as we have seen, had much cachet with formerly 
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abolitionist feminists. In the context of proto-therapeutic breakdown, Gwendolen can speak the 
truth that Eliot cannot otherwise publish: upper-class husbands are as prone to marital violence 
as their working-class counterparts. Like her sensations, Gwendolen’s fantasies of vengeance 
break through fitfully, framed themselves in the language of rape: “plans of evil that would come 
again and seize her in the night, like furies preparing the deed that they would straightway 
avenge” (DD 583). Gwendolen’s hysterical mind clairvoyantly anticipates, if not generates, the 
final catastrophe. 
As critics have noted, Gwendolen’s hysteria challenges the novel’s otherwise 
conservative moral framework, an infraction that is itself “straightway avenge[d].” Eliot remains 
unwilling to advocate explicitly for marital reform despite outlining marriage law’s 
psychological and physiological effects upon the wife. Although hysteria enables a politically 
radical telling of secrets, “disrupt[ing] the narrative status quo with psychic … power” (Vrettos 
572), Gwendolen’s fantasies, like the narrative itself, are painfully pulled back to the status quo; 
her (re)action against patriarchal power is thoroughly punished. Female dissatisfaction’s 
undermining of the dominant narrative’s proscriptions incurs a great moral debt that Eliot’s 
narrator claims in the form of Gwendolen’s spectacular irresolution at the end of the novel. 
 
The Story of a Cure 
 Deronda’s probing and censorious gaze in Leubronn begins Gwendolen’s moral 
education because it reveals to her that her performance is somehow lacking to win his approval. 
His subsequent retrieval of her father’s Etruscan turquoise necklace signals the starting point of 
Gwendolen’s instruction in benevolent, non-violent patriarchy. By “finding” her father for her, 
Deronda incurs the onerous responsibility of confidante and moral doctor. His assumption of 
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specular and moral control over the girl is analogous to Carter’s prescriptive moral gaze: “we 
must look for a degree of perversion of the moral sense, which is most painful to witness, and 
often most embarrassing to encounter. … to check vicious propensities, and to induce the 
abandonment of vicious habits” (Carter 1853, 106). Scholars have made much of Deronda and 
Gwendolen’s proto-therapeutic relationship that, for long stretches of the novel, looks like the 
foreplay to courtship (David 144). The narrator, who calls Deronda Gwendolen’s “conscience,” 
“priest,” and “terrible browed-angel,”573 explores with these terms traditional categories of moral 
mentorship, and discards them all because they do not quite match the professional, non-erotic 
relationship Deronda himself has in mind (and wants to discharge as quickly as possible), and 
that Carter had theorized in 1853. While the novel imagines the formation of the psychiatric 
patient-doctor relationship, it maintains that romantic, even sexual, investment—something 
beyond empathy—is necessary for the cure.574 Gwendolen must be touched by “Mighty Love” 
because her affinity to Deronda counterbalances Grandcourt’s physical conditioning (DD 660). 
Carter himself anticipated such balancing. 
Deronda’s treatment of Gwendolen has apparently unhealthy results: his retrieval of the 
necklace initiates a series of events that culminates in Gwendolen’s marriage and subsequent 
abuse. In fact, Gwendolen’s route through suffering is intentional; the hysterical girl cannot be 
treated in the maternal home because it caused her miseducation in the first place (Carter 1853, 
105). Eliot, in fact, traces in splendid detail Carter’s treatment plan “to exorcise the demon” of 
female willfulness: “to obtain this end, there must be a constructive, as well as a destructive 
system, and the two must advance together, the endeavour being made to plant right principles 
                                                 
573 DD 355, 369, 577; see Weisser 7. 
574 See Weisser 7; Beer 2009, 208. 
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and feelings, as fast as the rooting up of evil ones makes room for them” (1853, 132). Whereas 
Deronda is Carter’s agent of moral construction, Grandcourt is hired to destroy Gwendolen’s 
claims to independence. Gwendolen soon becomes “conscious of an uneasy, transforming 
process—all the old nature shaken to its depths, its hopes spoiled, its pleasures perturbed, but 
still showing wholeness and strength in the will to reassert itself” (DD 362). The many almost 
identical scenes of therapeutic encouragement and punitive disciplining inject Gwendolen with 
the required dosage of reasonableness and knowledge of her own insignificance, just as Carter 
described:  
It will, however, be … found, that the deadened moral sense of an hysterical woman 
requires many and strong appeals to rouse it from slumber … In all cases it will be 
necessary to use plain words, and to convey the ideas of selfishness and falsehood by 
their simplest names, and not under the disguise of polite and elegant periphrasis. The 
patient needs to hear the truth, and to have her conduct put before her. (Carter 1853, 114) 
 
Carter further writes that the hysteric should find a healthy pursuit (“music, reading, or chess”) to 
occupy her thoughts rather than to achieve excellence (1853, 133, 138). Accordingly, Deronda 
suggests to Gwendolen that she find a purpose in training her voice. Right away, Grandcourt 
forbids Gwendolen to sing because he “doesn’t want to hear squalling in private” (DD 502). 
Construction and destruction pull Gwendolen away from aberrant willfulness. Next, Carter 
writes that the patient must be shamed for betraying hysterical symptoms; the goal should be “to 
make them appear ridiculous” (1853, 118). The narrative repeats the two-pronged system: 
Deronda tells Gwendolen to “[t]urn your fear into a safeguard” so that she may achieve a clearer 
moral vision (DD 388). Soon thereafter, Gwendolen loses her nerves in Grandcourt’s presence 
and is promptly reprimanded: “What the devil women can see in this kind of thing, I don’t 
know” (DD 581). When Gwendolen confides that she is unhappy in her marriage, Deronda wants 
her to “confess” her unhappiness and moral struggle to her husband. By thus “appl[ying] precept 
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to soothe pain” (Tromp 457), Deronda assumes that the structure that causes Gwendolen’s 
misery will be its antidote, that reasonable patriarchal law is capable of soothing wifely misery. 
Grandcourt, in turn, proves this not to be the case and imprisons her on his yacht. 
In a last step, the novel exorcizes the evil manifestation of patriarchy embodied by 
Grandcourt. For Carter’s system to work, the plot requires the coincidence of Grandcourt’s 
inability to swim: Gwendolen can never “be good” while Grandcourt is alive (DD 657). Deronda 
rewards her frantic, conscience-stricken acceptance of guilt for Grandcourt’s death with release 
from any responsibility for the boating accident and discharges her into loneliness, “the 
beginning of a new existence.”575 What’s left for Gwendolen—who has now given up on erotic 
self-transcendence—is a hysterical body, “reduced to a mere speck,” that returns to quiet country 
life and, perhaps, marriage to Rex Gascoigne who still has a weakness for her (DD 689). Purified 
Gwendolen is readied for an uncertain, but most likely utterly conventional, future in which 
kindness to her family, “that penitential, loving purpose,” overrides all claims to selfishness.576 
Crucially, Gwendolen still does not consent to her conversion into Dorothea-style idealism. 
When Deronda—and the narrator—leave her in the penultimate chapter, she submits to endless 
“fits of shrieking,” interrupted by rational assurances to her mother that she will survive and 
become better.577 This spectacle of hysteria, remarkably similar to the wedding night’s, gives 
voice to otherwise unpronounceable feelings of betrayal by patriarchal structures—both 
Deronda’s therapeutic and Grandcourt’s legal kind.578 Men continue to betray and desert 
                                                 
575 DD 659; see Herzog 54; Vrettos 573; J. Wood 155. 
576 DD 658; see Vrettos 576; Beer 2009, 203. 
577 DD 692; see Vrettos 577. 
578 See Weisser 10; Wilt 333. 
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Gwendolen, and her hysteria continues to erupt as “private counter-narrative that challenges the 
cultural and ideological presuppositions of the novel’s dominant narrative voice” (Vrettos 553). 
Gwendolen’s nervous body cannot realistically become an agent of moral rejuvenation. 
Scholars rightly deplore that Gwendolen loses her spunk and ambition as the novel 
closes. In contrast to most recent criticism, however, the novel is not as attentive to the politics of 
Gwendolen’s re-containment—both by the social order and by her debilitating hysteria’s 
continuation—as it is invested in endowing Gwendolen with the ability to comprehend and atone 
for her struggle against domestication (Matus 72). After all, Carter assures readers, “with good 
conduct on her part, there is every prospect of her complete moral restoration” (1853, 112). 
Gwendolen still has work to do—but whether she will continue the reproduction of her class is a 
future to which Eliot’s novel does not commit. As the novel ends, Gwendolen’s chances for such 
restoration are unclear. Gwendolen is received back into the care of her uncle and mother and, 
although she shows signs that her moral maturity surpasses that of her previous guardians, she 
might not be able to evade her uncle’s continued upward social ambition.579 Deronda, whose 
morals again overlap with those dominant in the narrator, suggests to Hans Meyrick that it would 
be better if Gwendolen did not marry again, thereby yanking conventional narrative closure away 
from the reader (DD 685). If scholars today are interested in holding the narrator and men like 
Deronda and Grandcourt accountable for Gwendolen’s future existence as hysterical penitent, 
Eliot herself seems to have been more interested in the operations of conscience that allow one to 
transgress and then repent (Matus 73). In light of the narrator’s (and Deronda’s) scruples 
                                                 
579 David 187. The narrator suggests that Reverend Gascoigne, secret upstart and former military captain, is as much 
to blame for Gwendolen’s prostitution as she is herself. His military past implies that he is just as ruthless in his 
dealing with women as Captain Davilow and Lydia’s abusive husband, Colonel Glasher, were. Further, he had heard 
rumors of Grandcourt’s dissolute past and, following the “practical wisdom” of a social climber, did nothing to 
protect his niece from marrying such a man (DD 118; see David 180; Henry 2001, 154). 
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regarding Gwendolen’s chances for rehabilitation, she might not get to marry again because she 
simply hasn’t earned it. Her body is too stubborn. 
 
Daniel Deronda and the End of Reproduction 
Daniel Deronda both replicates and undermines the assumption that inexpressible 
emotional and physical secrets make themselves available to authorized interpretation. Critics 
tend to consider Gwendolen’s childlessness a “fairy-tale” absence (Beer 209), declare it to result 
from her spiritual barrenness (Zimmerman 210), or speculate that her marriage’s foundation on 
“the gratification of sado-masochistic compulsions” can only lead to sterility (David 194). What 
is usually not considered is that the novel also identifies men’s bodies as the moral and physical 
seat of infertility. Grandcourt has already fathered four children (three of them girls, indicating a 
lack of virility) and appears now much depleted and “flaccid” (91). Cowan warns that men 
whose early life has seen much sexual excess father sterile children or become themselves 
infertile (344, 359). Although Grandcourt prides himself on his “remarkable physical courage,” 
he drowns without much fanfare (583). Indulging in “legalized prostitution” appears to soften 
men’s muscles and drains them of strength. 
Contemporary medical authorities read sterility as a sign that women’s moral conduct and 
their physiological preparedness for maternity were at odds. Gwendolen’s “spoiled,” hysterical 
body might not be capable of natural reproduction. Nichols had warned that masturbators risked 
sterility (288); Cowan assumed that wives’ absence of erotic feeling during sex as well as excess 
in intercourse among newly-weds might prevent gestation.580 Maudsley, who defined as “moral 
insanity” all behaviors of cultivated women who are “lost to all sense of the obligations of their 
                                                 
580 Cowan 111, 359; also see Napheys 92. 
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position,” declared that such selfishness would lead directly to “sterile idiocy.”581 The 
circumstance that all of these descriptions seem to fit Gwendolen’s pathology illustrates the great 
flexibility in medical writers’ attempts to harness female reproduction to moral discourse. Eliot 
creates a semantic link between Gwendolen’s moral deficiency and failure to conceive. 
Gwendolen not only dreads married intercourse and pregnancy (“She was reduced to 
dread lest she should become a mother”), her dread is internalized both morally and 
physiologically: “Gwendolen felt that to desire a child for herself would have been a consenting 
to the completion of the injury she had been guilty of” (DD 576), the injury being her stealing 
Grandcourt (and his money) away from Lydia’s son. The novel literally incorporates 
Gwendolen’s theft of little Henleigh’s inheritance as sterility. The whole situation is unbearable. 
Because Gwendolen remains barren, her marriage amounts even more radically to self-
prostitution than if she had borne Grandcourt a child. The body, money, and their social 
meanings are textually conjoined in this story of hysterical non-reproduction in which women’s 
selfishness and incapacity to comprehend spiritually grand horizons indicate a state of cultural 
and genetic decline.582 
Whereas, in Middlemarch, Dorothea’s motherhood is enabled by her “altruism and 
visionary idealism” which function “as positive and healthy signs of social integration” (J. Wood 
                                                 
581 1867, 316, 215; 313-9; also see Griesinger 1867, 155. 
582 The paragraph ends, “To dwell on the benignity of accident was a refuge from worse temptation” (DD 576). 
Even though the “accident” ostensibly refers to Gwendolen’s hope that Grandcourt might die in an accident, Eliot 
could be repeating the rhetorics of “accident” that obscure the guilt of Rosamond’s intentional miscarriage. 
Gwendolen, afraid “lest she should become a mother,” could very well imagine procuring an accidental abortion 
here. If Gwendolen is pregnant already, her hysterical outbursts effected by shock and guilt after Grandcourt’s death 
serve as abortifacients (see Carter 1853, 15). Finally, to emphasize the medically ‘accurate’ interlacing of symptoms 
with which Gwendolen is described, it should be noted that Brown postulated that masturbating wives displayed 
“distaste for marital intercourse and very frequently either sterility or a tendency to abort in the early months of 
pregnancy” (I. Brown 16). 
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149), Daniel Deronda interrupts the Romantic plot of the upper middle-class girl’s deserving 
ascension into the aristocracy that had ruled English literary imagination for nearly a century. 
Daniel will not marry Gwendolen; he will exit the circuit of elite reproduction and have children 
with Mirah in a different racial, geographic, moral, and spiritual location. If Austen imagined the 
quintessential English fairy tale in which the union of gentry and aristocracy would morally 
reinvigorate England after decades of revolution, Eliot’s utopianism consists in the revelation of 
Daniel’s Judaism, Mirah’s moral incorruptibility, and their common enshrinement in a Jewish 
nation-to-be. The English middle class and aristocracy are morally spent and cannot produce 
cultural rejuvenation or continuation together. As Napheys theorized, “by crossing nearly-related 
individuals … such unions lead to degeneracy and sterility” (71). Gwendolen and Grandcourt are 
simply too similar in their “piteous equality.”583 Eliot looked for renewed moral vigor 
elsewhere—science and its moralistic prescriptions, nationalism, and high art (see Henry 2012, 
210). As Zimmerman notes, Eliot might have been better equipped to detect dysfunctions within 
the social system of the 1860s and 70s than she was able (or willing) to imagine viable 
alternatives, particularly when it came to women’s roles.584 
 
Eliot’s Coquettes, Concluded 
In contrast to Rosamond, whose too expensively furnished household is not yet ready for 
the arrival of Lydgate’s children during Middlemarch’s main action, Gwendolen possibly never 
undergoes the trials of motherhood. Throughout Daniel Deronda, Gwendolen is shown to be a 
bad housekeeper: she has no idea who is assigned individual tasks in her mother’s establishment; 
                                                 
583 DD 256. See Dowling on the inversion of their initials and the similarity of their behaviors (332). 
584 Zimmerman 213; see Flint 178. 
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later, when Grandcourt takes her on an endless round of estates and foreign domiciles, he 
deprives her of ever getting settled somewhere. During the only scene that shows Mrs. 
Grandcourt in her domestic surroundings, Lush arrives in her boudoir with information that she 
will be deprived of a home—apart from the apocalyptic Gadsmere—upon her husband’s death. 
Gwendolen is a bad wife because she is bad at making a home—and making herself at home. 
The rootlessness that plagues Deronda with regards to his ancestry also affects Gwendolen, 
whose education in self-display, vanity, and aimless freedom, like Rosamond’s apprenticeship in 
aristocratic romance, is insufficient to prepare women to choose their husbands wisely and 
commit to a lifelong companionate marriage.  
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda counter Victorian sentimentalizations of family life at 
a moment when women’s expectations regarding the quality of marital companionship were 
higher than ever.585 The novels’ central failed marriages occur against a backdrop of an implied 
marriage ideal built on rational and sympathetic, rather than physical, control over women. If 
women were not taught to embrace wifely duty, pleasant submission, and reasonable, selfless 
conduct, Eliot shows, their unruly bodies would interrupt the natural progression of the family, 
and that of national culture at large. In order for the family to reproduce itself, women were to be 
raised in awareness of their moral power and educated to dispose of that power wisely. Eliot sees 
men’s training as equally misguided because it encouraged them to exploit women’s naïveté and 
to disregard women’s claims to selfhood. Although Eliot’s marriage ideal, as illustrated by 
Dorothea and Will’s union at the end of Middlemarch, consisted of dutiful wives’ ministering 
cheerfully to their spouses, she saw that too few men actually deserved women’s voluntary self-
abnegation. Like most social critics of her time, Eliot, in her depiction of Grandcourt as 
                                                 
585 See Shanley 7; Hammerton 78. 
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un(re)productive husband, aims at correcting the outgrowths of men’s legally entrenched power, 
rather than at abolishing that power wholesale. As Eliot noted in a letter to Sara Hennell, 
“nothing can outweigh to my mind the heavy desecration of family ties … One trembles to think 
how easily that moral wealth may be lost which it has been the work of ages to produce, in the 
refinement and differencing of the affectionate relations” (GEL 5:56). Wives’ social, legal, and 
sexual coverture is never at stake, but patriarchal responsibility is. Ideal marriage, Eliot wrote in 
1868, involves the “mutual subjection of soul between a man and a woman—which is also a 
growth and revelation beginning before all history.”586 Grandcourt and Deronda’s amelioration 
of Gwendolen’s moral deficit restores the community’s historically grown—and, to Eliot, 
sacred—gender hierarchy and division of moral tasks. 
Similarly, Gwendolen’s body’s hysterical interruption of the dominant narrative voice is 
not only re-contained, as scholars have suggested.587 Marlene Tromp writes that Gwendolen’s 
“sensationalized, performative madness” constitutes “an interrogation of the discourse of 
‘reason’ as a means for Gwendolen to understand her world” (452). Here, Tromp echoes Beer’s 
judgment that Eliot “presents [Gwendolen’s] ‘large discourse of imaginative fears’ not simply as 
curtailing action but as liberating experience” (2009, 206). Beer remarks further, 
Gwendolen’s predicament is that she has will without authority, rebellion without 
speculation. She enters the feminist challenge to her prescribed lot without any sort of 
theoretical or practical consciousness. She is eventually liberated by her frantic 
unconscious. (2009, 211) 
 
                                                 
586 GEL 4:468. Eliot writes to Emily Cross, “That is really the highest good of a wife—to be quite [certain] sure in 
the midst of the dimness and doubt which this difficult world surrounds us with, that there is one close to her whose 
life is everyday the better for her” (GEL 6:116-17). 
587 See Matus 2008, Tromp, Vrettos, J. Wood. 
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I am less optimistic than Beer and Tromp about the liberating possibilities of Daniel Deronda’s 
assimilation of hysteria discourse. Rather, critics’ celebration of Gwendolen and Lydia’s 
irrational, bodily interruptions of patriarchal reason might cover up another taboo unspeakable 
for feminist critics: Eliot’s fiction suggests that women do not necessarily possess the capacity 
for reason that would enable them to become political subjects. Eliot was very well aware that 
“woman’s citizenship … began, locationally, with the body” (Hasday 1420). It is precisely their 
bodies that prevent them from attaining political maturity.  
In my view, Eliot’s own authorized use of medical and legal frameworks cements 
women’s bondage to patriarchal institutions and allows Gwendolen’s hysterical body to emerge 
within the narrative. The display of Grandcourt’s “imperfect mastery” (DD 297) of the hysterical 
woman—which Marlene Tromp reads as endowing Gwendolen with “a modicum of control” 
(458) over her relationship with men—is not a loss of narrative control in light of women’s 
excessive physical affect, as scholars like Tromp have suggested; rather, it is the ultimate 
affirmation of that control, although it occurs on the terrain of sympathy. As medical writers 
were unclear about many fundamental processes governing women’s reproductive bodies, they 
resorted to morally prescriptive, and often apparently entirely fictional, delineations of them. 
Eliot taps into that same process of delineation and utilizes epistemological repertoires similar to 
those used by experts whose work she read: storytelling by means of deterministic narratives, 
figurative language, and containment by means of authoritative deployment of legally, 
medically, and socially sanctioned knowledges (J. Wood 139). Eliot’s text participates in the 
formation of cultural and institutional narratives that tie female bodies and their difficult-to-
relate(-to) symptoms ever more closely to expert scrutiny. If Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda 
are understood as both indexes of, and agents within, long-term intellectual discourses about 
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women’s reproduction of both children and excessive affect, it can be posited that they allow for 
the historicization of the standards by which the dysfunction of such reproduction was measured 
and allowed to be represented. Eliot did believe in slow reform and useful employment for 
women. However, Rosamond and Gwendolen’s selfish sexual imagination, along with their 
resentment, if not rage, at having been lured into horrible marriages, present insurmountable 
obstacles in the narrative quest for mutuality. 
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CODA 
 
Once More, with Realism 
What is the nature of the textual legacy linking Eliot’s narratives with those of EBB and 
Mary Prince? Archival traces connecting EBB and Eliot’s estates are plentiful and reveal both 
writers’ appreciation for one another. Eliot and Lewes read Aurora Leigh in late 1856 and again 
in the summer of 1857. Eliot felt Aurora Leigh gave her “a deeper sense of communion with a 
large as well as beautiful mind” (GEL 2:342), and, as has been noted, reviewed it favorably in 
the Westminster Review. She thought the poem combined “masculine vigour, breadth, and 
culture” with “female subtlety of perception, feminine quickness of sensibility, and feminine 
tenderness,” uniting the strength of both sexes to produce the complete “poetess” who 
deservingly commands the attention of the literary world (1857, 306). Eliot wrote to Sara 
Hennell that, to her, books like Aurora Leigh counted “among the great blessings of life” (GEL 
2:282). The feeling was mutual: Eliot and Lewes were invited into EBB and RB’s “congenial 
bosom” in Italy in June 1860. EBB was gratified to meet Eliot because she “admire[d] her books 
so much” and the visit was repeated.588 In 1870, Eliot revised the relationship between the 
exceptional woman artist and the common woman in her dramatic poem Armgart, using Aurora 
Leigh for inspiration (Hudd 68). Eliot clearly inherited from EBB the conviction that women 
artists deserve recognition beyond “the price / [o]f such a woman in the social mart,” as Armgart 
                                                 
588 LEBB 2:400; see Hudd 64; Stone 1987, 102. EBB, with a knowing jibe at the unmentionable nature of the 
couple’s bond, termed Lewes Eliot’s “elective affinity” (LEBB 2:388). 
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“scornfully” exclaims (Eliot 1885, 56), and, using Aurora Leigh as her foil, she took greater 
pains than EBB to depict lower-class characters realistically. 
What remains of British slavery, and the legacy of runaway women slaves as arbiters of 
Britain’s global liberationist project, are dispersed echoes that, rather than indicating Eliot’s 
assuredness of her nation’s universal moral mission, suggest that black female bodies continue to 
operate as the sites of scandalous, uncivilized spectacle—just as they did before Emancipation. 
Eliot’s narrator, in Mill on the Floss, muses that 
It is a pathetic sight and a striking example of the complexity introduced into the 
emotions by a high state of civilization, the sight of a fashionably dressed female in grief. 
From the sorrow of a Hottentot to that of a woman in large buckram sleeves, with several 
bracelets on each arm, an architectural bonnet, and delicate ribbon strings, what a long 
series of gradations! (2015, 53) 
 
The passage, in addition to its dismissive interest in the sartorial excesses of Victorian ladies, 
encapsulates the sublimated abolitionist holdover of the slave woman in pain as it materializes 
within Eliot’s realism. Analogous to Eliot’s narrator, this project has traced how the spectacle of 
women’s anguish historically moves across that “long series of gradations,” from the ‘Hottentot’ 
woman (and her apron) on the stage in Piccadilly in the first decade of the nineteenth century to 
the “fashionably dressed” lady who struggles with the injunctions of high Victorian moral law. 
From exotic burlesque to sentimental abolitionist fictionalizations, via EBB’s ambiguous, post-
Emancipation remobilization of slaves’ anguish, to Eliot’s high realist depiction of bourgeois 
moral decline, “the sorrow of a Hottentot” simultaneously burdens and enables the depiction of 
white women’s selfhood in British literature. 
Realism, according to Eliot, serves a political mode that facilitates elites’ understanding 
of poor people’s lives in the service of cultural unity. She rejected sentimentalism’s “unreality” 
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in depicting social conditions, and considered its penchant for pastoral idyll a “grave evil.”589 As 
an inheritor of the tragic paradox of pleasure, Eliot saw it as the artist’s task to produce sympathy 
in the reader, not in spite but because of social difference. Social hierarchy, for Eliot, in fact 
constitutes “the raw material of moral sentiment” (1856, 54). But even for the liberal Eliot, with 
her emphatic reverence for difference and clear-voiced support of Jewish nationalism, there is a 
limit to sympathy. As her narrator asserts in Daniel Deronda, “one man differs from another, as 
we all differ from the Bosjesman.”590 In 1876, the South African bushman, the ‘Hottentot’s’ 
blackness, still marks the underside of liberal selfhood, propping up Eliot’s realism and the 
nation a half-century after British Caribbean slaves turned into legal subjects of Empire. White 
fantasies of essential black difference survive, as does the elite prerogative to dismiss 
abolitionism’s aborted and pro-forma attempts to somehow assimilate blackness into the liberal 
state. As the 1880s roll along, we are left to observe with Deronda “that the whites had to thank 
themselves for the half-breeds” (DD 279). 
  
                                                 
589 Eliot 1856, 54; see Hudd 65-6. 
590 DD 274; Gilman 239n16. 
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APPENDIX: MARY PRINCE TIMELINE 
 
1788 born in Brackish Pond, Bermuda; owned by Charles Myners [Miners]; subsequently 
bought by George Darrell for his granddaughter, Betsey; lives in the household of 
Betsey’s parents, Captain Williams and Sarah Darrell Williams (Maddison-MacFadyen 
2014, 3) 
1800 (12 yrs) Mary hired out to Mrs. Pruden [Prudden]; Sarah Darrell Williams falls ill and 
dies; Mary and her two younger sisters, Hannah and Dinah, are sold separately; Mary 
sold to Captain John Ingham and Mary Spencer Ingham of Spanish Point; stays with 
them for five years 
1801 (13 yrs) earthquake on February 19; Mary runs to her mother at Richard Darrell’s 
house, Cavendish, to hide from the Inghams (Maddison-MacFadyen 2014, 25n5) 
1803 (15 yrs) sold to Robert Darrell on Turks Island; works there for “about ten years” (MP 
75) 
1812 (24 yrs) returns to Bermuda with Darrell and works at Cedar Hill; mother and father 
have died while she was on Turks 
1815 (27 yrs) sold to John Adams Wood and relocates to Antigua; freeman named Oyskman 
courts her (in Macqueen, November 1831, Curtin notes that Mary had “a quarrel with a 
free man, of dark complexion, named Osterman”; according to Curtin, Mary also “had 
taken up with Captain L— … a mariner,” presumably around the time of the baptism) 
1817 (29 yrs) baptized by the Anglican Rev. Curtin (April 6); Mary states this had occurred 
in August; had previously applied to visit Curtin’s school on weekdays (Curtin assumes 
she is around 25 years old); appears in the Antigua slave register as “Molly”; age given 
as “thirty” (September 19) 
1819 (31 yrs) relationship with “Captain Abbot” begins seven years before her marriage to 
Daniel James (Times March 1, 1831, 7) 
1820 (32 yrs) appears before the magistrate, presumably Joshua Dyett, twice over quarrels 
with other slave women (or the same one) involving a pig and a white Captain: 
Macqueen’s sources claim that the slave woman Phibba found Prince in bed with 
Phibba’s “husband,” a Captain William; the same incident (presumably) is reported in 
the Times report of Wood v. Pringle, only its actors are reversed: Prince found Captain 
Abbott in bed with another slave woman and flogged her; Mary is sentenced to spend a 
night in “the Cage” at her mistress’s request, although Dyett ruled in her favor 
regarding the pig (MP 80) 
1821 (33 yrs) appears in slave register as “Molly”; age given as “Thirtythree” (2 May) 
1823 (35 yrs) joins Moravian congregation (Thomas 2011, 83; Thomas 2014, 120); is later 
excluded from school for seven weeks because of her relationship with Captain Abbott; 
alternatively, she might have been turned out of the Moravian chapel for cohabiting 
with Captain (Samuel?) Williams and beating Phibba 
1824 (36 yrs) appears in slave register as “Molly”; age given as “Thirty six” 
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1826 - (38 yrs) Captain Samuel Abbott murders Samuel Frogman, a carpenter, on board the 
schooner Wellington (John Wood owns the vessel), is arrested at Crab Island 
(Vieques), Puerto Rico, in January 1827, and convicted of murder on St. Kitts in 
September 1827. He is sentenced to six months in prison (Thomas 2014, 208n100). 
Prince ends her relationship with Abbott and marries Daniel James around Christmas 
1826; attended for illness by Dr. Musgrave (until 1828). 
1828 (40 yrs) appears in slave register as “Molly”; age given as “Thirtynine” (April 26); after 
a summer journey, arrives in London with the Woods in June and resides at Leigh 
Street; receives note by Mr. Wood dated August 18; leaves Woods in early fall and 
resides with Mrs. Mash, the Woods’ new laundress, and her husband, a shoeblack, for a 
few months; works as charwoman and shares her pay with the Mashes; calls at the 
Anti-Slavery Office in Aldermanbury in late November after a woman named Hill 
advises her to do so (MP 91) 
1829 (41 yrs) Woods leave England and return to Antigua; a petition in her name “as “Mary 
Princess or James, commonly called Molly Wood” is presented to Parliament on June 
24; Mary employed as charwoman by Mrs. Forsyth in the summer until September 28; 
after eleven weeks of unemployment, Mary is hired by Pringle and goes into service at 
his house at Claremont Square (Vigne 2012, 204) 
1830 (42 yrs) Strickland records and edits Mary’s oral history late in the year and into 1831 
1831 (43 yrs) Pringle sends Mary with a note to Rev. Curtin asking to corroborate her story 
(February 7); first edition of History of Mary Prince published before February 19; 
Pringle’s post-script to second edition refers to Mary’s deteriorating eyesight (March 
22); Mrs. Pringle, Susanna Strickland, and other women inspect Mary’s back (March 
28); Mary attends Susanna Strickland Moodie’s wedding (April 4); History goes 
through three editions this year; Pringle is slandered by Macqueen on July 26 in the 
Glasgow Courier and in the November issue of Blackwood’s 
1832 (44 yrs) loses her position in June, presumably due to illness; receives weekly 
allowance of ten shillings by Pringle; asks to be readmitted to the Fetter Lane Moravian 
congregation in London (July); Wood states in Antigua slave register that “Molly” has 
“quitted my service” in England 
1833 (45 yrs) appears twice in February as a witness in libel cases Pringle v. Cadell 
(February 21, Court of Common Pleas) and Wood vs. Pringle (February 27, Court of 
King’s Bench); Pringle writes on March 6 that he hopes for Prince’s return to Antigua 
after Emancipation 
1834 (?46 yrs) Antigua abolishes slavery without introducing apprentice system (August 1); 
Pringle dies (December 5) 
1836 (?48 yrs) John Adams Wood dies in London on January 29, having received £10,575 in 
compensation (https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/431; see Thomas 2014, 164)  
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